Slashing is part of the protocol and to slash somebody you have to prove it to the protocol that they broke rules of slashing. One of the rules is that you can't create two different blocks in the same slot (block number) i.e. you can't deliberately fork.
There is a designated place in the block of the beacon chain where you can put signatures of the different blocks in the same slot as a proof and nodes will slash validator that produced that signatures (update his balance). Anyone can find these signatures, and block proposers of the new blocks will include them into the chain.
And there is no upper limit on the number of slashers.
Not true. In your defence, I also only learned this today.
https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher https://lighthouse-book.sigmaprime.io/slasher.html
It’s just the specifics of how this works - slashing is part of the protocol in the sense that I described: when you are chosen to create a new block and you have proof that someone violated the rules then you include this proof in your proposed block and update balance. Any validator can do it including the smallest of home stakers.
More details here. https://github.com/ethereum/annotated-spec/blob/master/phase...
Here we have slashing fields in the block body where you insert your proofs of slashable offense. There are functions with a “slash” in the name that describes precise state transition.
The hard part of slashing is finding these proofs because you have to do more work than necessary to detect slashing and produce proofs - that’s what this software does. It’s more expensive to run a slasher but you need only one and it does not matter who runs it, anyone can run it. The link that you sent says that this slasher broadcasts proofs by default - that way anyone can include it.
This is why they are limiting the number of validators.
There are currently over 400,000 full-fledged validators. The maximum supported number of validators is the number of ETH divided by 32, or about 3.75 million. Scaling is the reason the limit wasn't made even higher, by lowering the ETH per validator.
Anyone can be a slasher, just as anyone can be a staker (as long as you have 32 Ether).
In this context, what it means is that a person posted conflicting validation messages on different parts of the network, and anybody who can show the existence of two such conflicting messages can post it to the blockchain, receive a reward, and the offending validator gets slashed.
(There are also other ways you can get slashed, read the POS documentation if you want to learn the details) All methods of slashing are fully decentralized.
[0] https://www.paradigm.xyz/2020/08/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest
[1] No clue if this has a different name in Ethereum
1. Every full node is part of this dark forest, maintains its own mempool, and gossips the mempool to others. You do not have to be a validator or miner to run a full node; just run an Ethereum client.
2. There are indirect economic incentives to 'watch the watchmen': a slashable staking violation that doesn't get slashed breaks the Ethereum security model, and is expected to be an extremely rare event (if it ever happens). With a network that has a market cap in the hundreds of billions; someone is watching and it only takes one to sound the horn.
I do agree that there probably will be altruistic validators in some cases, but the economic incentives work against them. The history of cryptocurrency has trended towards doing the minimum amount of validation work that satisfies network consensus[0]. It's entirely possible that the market just shrugs its shoulders and says that a violation of the Ethereum security model just isn't actually that bad. Consider the relative lack of concern over MEV[1] and automated arbitrage bots, and the fact that the valuation of the coin is entirely unconnected to any security issues it may or may not have. It may just wind up being the case that the network just... tolerates a handful of people getting screwed.
[0] For example, Bitcoin miners accept new blocks by literally joining other mining pools purely to steal their previous block hash. It's significantly faster than waiting for a full 4MB block to get P2P gossiped around the world, but the downside is that you can't actually validate any of the data in that block. This effectively means that miners aren't full nodes anymore, and the result has been several long chainsplits and reorgs whenever a softfork occurs.
[1] Miner Extractable Value
Following this logic, stakers themselves are incentivized to just run the software to submit a slashing tx themselves (free money), at which point just having stakers running slashing software is sufficient. And if they aren't someone else will submit it to the mempool.
Does it matter who does the slashing, as long as the incentive is enough to motivate doing it?
Ok, let me try ELI5ing it.
Let's say we have an economy where, in order to determine who owns what, people literally just make and publish a list of who owns what. Everyone trusts the lists. But what if someone decide to change the list so that it says they own someone else's stuff? Proof of Stake says that if someone wants to change the list - say, if someone traded something on the list to someone else - the page they add to the list also has to have some of their money taped to it. If that change turned out to be fraudulent, someone else can tattle on them, and then that someone gets the money taped to the list instead. So if you want to make sure you're reading from a not-fraudulent list, just check for the money taped to the page.
This all continues fine for a while. There's a bunch of people who maintain the list, all of whom have their own money taped to different pages of it.
One day, someone tries adding a fake transaction to the list. You, of course, notice it and tattle on them. Except in order to claim the funds taped to the list, someone else has to... add a note to the list saying you own them. And there's no reason why they can't just write down that they tattled instead of you, because the only proof that you were the one who tattled is getting it onto the list that you have to tape money to in order to add to. So the only people who have a reason to make sure the list is valid are the same people who are updating the list in the first place. Everyone else can tattle but they don't get paid for doing so, which was the the thing keeping the system secure.
As an interesting aside, this is essentially how the economy of the Yap islands in Micronesia worked until the 20th century, with large stones from another island changing 'ownership', while being left in place (because it was too hard to move them)[1].
Except it was an oral history instead of a published list!
It reminds me of the technique to remembering a book where you read one word at a time and repeat it out loud, repeating each segment + 1 in a loop. It’s quite trivial to remember every single word when doing that.
EDIT: Clarification - once a slasher posts the violation, who removes the ether?
In other words, the blockchain; in the same way that it's not _miners_ / stakers who process transactions on bitcoin or ethereum ; miners / stakers only decide _ordering_ but everyone who runs an Ethereum client is processing and verifying every transaction; the same way your browser checks a TLS certificate.
Thanks for your answer!
The value in a staking account is calculated on the blockchain as "amount staked minus slashing penalties", and this violation is automatically recorded as a slashing penalty, so the answer is "everybody"
edit: for an example. you get hacked and lose $100M. You say fuck it, submit a slasher report that says it wasn't a valid transaction. you offer enough money to get x% of validators to agree with you.
As far as I can tell, you cannot get slashed for your vote on a slash. So lying is ok.
That's not how this works at all.
Slashing happens under a very specific circumstance: a staker submits contradictory messages. Those circumstances are testable with built-in code that's part of the protocol. To get someone slashed, you send a transaction including their contradictory signed messages. When your transaction is included in a block, the staker gets slashed by the protocol rules hardcoded in all the consensus clients.
The only other thing that can cause a staker to lose stake is the "inactivity leak," where an active staking node doesn't send the messages they're supposed to send. That's completely automatic.
You are basically stating that slashing is impossible in certain conditions because network is not censorship resistant.
There is one avenue where network can censor. It is a 51% coalition that orphans blocks that contains slashing txes. This coalition is dealt with UASF (user activated soft fork), since this type of behavior goes against core principals of the network and convincing people to do it will be really easy.
That's not what slashing is supposed to be used for, but if that situation happened again, Ethereum would fork again, just as last time when Ethereum classic didn't agree to freeze the Ether from the DAO hack. PoS makes it a little easier to fork (which is good imo), but doesn't change anything fundamental. Everyone still needs to be in complete agreement about the rules and history for Ethereum to work.
Validators are run by people who fully control if a transaction is valid or not. You either need a ton of GPUs (currently) or a ton of money to have tangible influence over translations.
This isn't even a hypothetical, there's a few massive wallets that are hoarding a ton of eth that will be given more power from the POS transition.
We're relying on "the goodness of their hearts" validator operators and crossing our fingers validators run the same software with the same rules.
Even if you call out sketchy transactions that are close to 50/50 consensus, nothing will happen unless a ton of people have a ton of money on the line like the DAO split.
We need more discussion on how incentives of each party should be to give the most stable network possible.
It's not as if they're automatically given more power. Such hoards of ETH would need to be deposited in units of 32 ETH to activate unique validators. You could have a large number of validators that are actually a single computer program participating in the Beacon chain, but that doesn't make too much difference.
At the bottom layer, we're talking about the application of an open p2p protocol on the Internet. People can and will analyze the traffic for that protocol, and it will be possible to identify rough shapes and sizes of players in the network. And such analyses won't be long in coming to public blog posts, etc. following the Merge.
If decentralization in the network seems at risk, there will be efforts to remedy the situation. Whether they can succeed is another question.
I would suggest to stop spamming the HN comment section and read the introductory articles people helpfully linked you to.
Ad hominem is "you are wrong because you (fill in the blank)". It is not "go read the articles given to you".
"You are wrong because you are an idiot" is ad hominem.
"You are wrong" is denial.
"You are an idiot" is insult.
It's easy enough not to reply. No need to get an attitude about it.
> Is it incorrect to say that ethereum is now entirely centralized with some extra steps?
> Like, you have this proof of stake thing, but the only reason it works is because there's just a small number of validators, which is just going to be the ethereum foundation and friends.
I know Cunningham's Law is a valid discussion strategy, but the topics of cryptocurrency on HN already tends to attract enough flamewars and misinformation as it is.
There's nothing here that was done in bad faith and I should not need to defend myself for asking a question in a tech forum. Assuming I'm not asking in good faith is bad faith.
The reason I asked was a description pasted a short while ago:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32535409
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32535912
Which included this line:
> Slashing is not meant to profitable, and the whistleblower reward is quite small. We don't need a million slashers, in fact, we could operate with just one... expect the Eth Foundation to run them, among other large players who can spare the resources.
Which sure sounds like a decentralized process that is ultimately just centralized around the ETH foundation at the end of the day.
Honestly I've learned a lot from the responses here. And I think people who assumed I was doing anything other than just asking questions because the idea I was asking about offended them are asshole. So yeah. Go pound sand.
The validators need to be decentralized (i.e. prevent "harmful collusion"), but the slashers don't need to be in the same way (as long as the validators are).
It is not the case that only the ETH foundation can slash, which was the crux of my original question.
The fundamental misunderstanding people seem to be having is that slashers show objective proof of bad events. That's accurate. But validators are still free to agree or disagree with that objective proof of bad events. If you can create a means to prevent consensus on slashing for your overtly malicious behavior, your stake is only at risk if the entire community agrees to fork, which is probable for huge malicious behaviors but I'm not convinced is true for smaller things or circumstances where large actors have a vested interest in preferring the original chain.
https://i.redd.it/5lhlmwdg27j91.png
Ethereum will be more decentralized after proof of stake. No longer do you need massive amounts of electricity and insider access to gpu or asic manufacturers.
9.9% percentage of that also was set aside for "founders". (it could however be more [2])
Today it accounts for something like 59% (72m) of total supply (~120m). Make what you will of that.
1. https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/initial-coin-offering-exp...
2. https://medium.com/@hasufly/ethereum-presale-dynamics-revisi...
> Today it accounts for something like 59% of total supply. Make what you will of that.
Can you help me understand what exactly this means? Ethereum's supply has grown since the presale, so if anything the 9.9% should have gotten smaller since then.
https://messari.io/asset/ethereum/profile/launch-and-initial...
Ethereum's crowdsale supply was 72 million ETH. Of that 60 million were sold for BTC in the crowdsale. 6 million was given to the Ethereum Foundation and 6 million to early contributors (overall 20% of what was sold was created as a pre-mine).
Now Ethereum's supply is ~122 million, so the miners produced 50 millions new ETH.
The total initial premine was 72m (~59% of today's supply).
I think someone more knowledgeable might provide a better breakdown of those funds, except that the article(s) linked covers it a lot better than my comment.
But what if most of the stakers collude to double spend tokens? My understanding is that there is an additional layer of validators that have the power to force them to give up their stake as a penalty. Hence "proof of stake". And that there are very few validators. And it's really just the ethereum foundation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake
Start here.
“The threat of a 51% attack still exists on proof-of-stake as it does on proof-of-work, but it's even riskier for the attackers. A attacker would need 51% of the staked ETH (about $15,000,000,000 USD).”
The rest is game theory. Dishonest validators win the game being dishonest if they are over 2/3 of the validator set. Then they can enforce their bad blocks into everyone else. Otherwise they get slashed or suffer other kind of penalties (inactivity leak if they manage to prevent the network from reaching consensus for a while).
So if you manage to bribe or buy 2/3 of the staked ETH then you can attack the network. There is of course a very significant economic cost to it. More interestingly at that point you are strongly aligned with the network itself as you represent a huge % of its value so you would be attacking yourself in a way. This is a notable difference with PoW where miners are not necessarily aligned in economic incentives with token-holders or users.
The network which was just shown to be 51% malicious actors? And how is it evaluated? What if the slasher is dishonest? What if it sends trillions of fake requests?
What happens if you try to send trillions of invalid transactions in any sensible chain?
The thing here is that the validators don't need to be honest when responding to a slasher report.
Also, how can there be a fee to trying to send an invalid transaction? Such a fee would have to be sent as part of a transaction, yes? Isn’t it just that someone spamming the network gets dropped from the gossip protocol stuff?
There’s no one gate keeping your ability to become a slasher as long as you run a validator, and there’s no centralized entity deciding whether or not to slash someone’s stake.
Hmmm. It seems dangerous to rely on altruistic enforcement in a network built around economic incentives. What if the altruistic slashers are simply paid money to turn off their nodes?
This model assumes that 1/n is honest. This is almost as safe as it gets.
[1] https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher
> However, home stakers are advised not to run a slasher on personal hardware, as it is a tremendously resource-hungry process. Slasher is very heavy on database access and disk usage, and the slasher.db will quickly grow to 1TB or more when running on mainnet.
I’m pretty sure hardware costs will always be a rounding error compared to the $50k that “home stakers” need if they want to run their own validator.
The difference is that proof of work automatically tends to centralisation due to its economy of scale: it's cheaper to add one more miner to your pool if you already have a big mining operation, but staking 1 eth is always staking 1 eth.
Both PoS and PoW have the problem where you can buy out the majority if you have the power to do so.
If I have 100 GPUs and I buy one more can't I turn around and say "But buying one more GPU is just buying one more GPU"? Even if your point is that electricity bills are lower per additional GPU, surely humans discount the value of incremental money after some point so for those with lots of eth incremental eth isn't worth as much?
It’s the same price to add 1 eth when you own 100 eth as when you own 1 eth
Perversely, since double-validation happens rarely, since it is expensive, the actual interface for slashing on e.g. BSC is not well-documented or user-friendly.
To whom? Who gets to decide to slash the funds?
I caught you cheating and can prove it. You don't give a shit and control 51% of the network. How do you get punished?
It's no different from what would happen in PoW. Can you please stop with the concern trolling?
If that 67% is also true of the slasher voting protocol, then that means you just need 33% of the network to avoid being slashed. Is that wrong?
> Can you please stop with the concern trolling?
Can you please stop trying to claim a moral high ground for no reason?
Yes, it is wrong.
By the way, there is a bug bounty program. You can earn up to 1M USD per critical bug either in the protocol or its implementations.
If you were following the current events on Ethereum, this question has just arisen in the last weeks when the US sanctioned the privacy oriented Tornado Cash contract.
If you control 20% of the network, the other 80% is following the rules and colluding against you. (Even another 20% that are double-validating themselves are incentivized to slash you)
The whole cryptocurrency thing feels like a bit of a metastable equilibrium, but nobody's figured out anything better. Arguably even government-controlled fiat money is not much better - if >50% of the population doesn't like the rules, they will change them - we may be seeing the beginning of this right now, with a lot of people getting dissatisfied with half their income going to the black hole known as "landlords" who own the rights to take your income without producing any value whatsoever.
It might just lead to everyone abandoning your cryptocurrency and using a different one. Since you had to have >50% of the cryptocurrency in order to conduct the attack, you did lose a substantial amount of real-world value (billions or trillions of $) when everyone else stopped using your cryptocurrency.
It's pretty much analogous to if a majority of PoW miners decide to "go their own way" and make a chain where nobody else is invited. What happens then?
No, you just need money, 32 eth is only around $50000.
And there's a lot of people with sufficient money to stand up multiple validators. And validators can also initiate/vote on arbitrary slash requests (which costs them nothing, as I read it).
Shrinking the number of people with the financial means to contribute doesn’t seem like it’s going to result in decentralization.
are both centralized, with the later being highly centralized. The move to PoS removes both of these centralized targets.
The question being asked is also a harder one to answer than just explaining PoS. Similar to a PoW scheme where only one or two people control all of the hashing power, it could be decentralized in theory but not actually in practice, and it doesn't seem like there are any super hard numbers on this aspect.
I explained in more detail here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32532604
The only question then is how indirect these sanctions can be. The node might not be allowed to validate a block with banned transactions, but what about the next block, which does not include these blocked transactions, only a pointer to a block with these banned transactions? What about the second next block, which has only a pointer to a block with a pointer to a block with these banned transactions? How many blocks until the link is tenuous enough that the validators under USA jurisdiction could validate again without fear?
Suppose Tony texts Paulie and tells him to wack a guy. That's illegal, unprotected speech, because it directly leads to imminent lawless action. Similarly the wallet owner who signs and broadcasts an Ethereum transaction to send money to North Korea would bass the Brandenburg test because it obviously leads to imminent lawless action.
The validator who builds the block that includes an illegal transaction is an interesting question. On the one hand by building the block, one could argue that they're instrumental in putting carrying out the illegal transaction. OTOH one might argue that if the transaction is in the network (and priced appropriately) it almost certainly will get included on-chain eventually. Therefore the validator might argue that it's activity doesn't create any imminent lawless activity, because the transaction being in the mempool is already fait accompli. The validator is more like the reporter writing about a crime in the newspaper.
But what I'm nearly certain of is that building on top of a chain with a previously finalized illegal transaction is okay. It's certainly not illegal to talk about a crime that's already happened. The further a block gets away from the initial block, then the less imminent the illegal action becomes. SCOTUS has historically held a very high standard for Brandenburg, which is why it's not even illegal to advocate for genocide or the violent overthrow of the American government.
I have no reason to doubt that your credentials as a constitutional lawyer are impeccable.
> The further a block gets away from the initial block, then the less imminent the illegal action becomes.
This very plausible legal theory inspires incredible confidence.
As for how that theory will interact with reality, who knows.
At the very least, for an individual actor, it would be much more expensive to acquire 33% of all ETH than it would be to acquire 51% of the Bitcoin hashrate
The sort of software update I'm imagining is one which just zeroes the holdings of the government wallet(s), and continues the chain from just before they launched their attack.
If there's one group that the government care more about the finances of than taxpayers, it's companies. Destroying the wealth of these companies in their jurisdiction is an attack that can only be performed once, and provides no long term benefit, except for people outside their jurisdiction.
The submission you're describing requires a cryptographic proof of that validator submitting two or more existing invalid blocks that they signed. You can't just falsify that without their private keys, so what you're suggesting is not possible.
A common misconception here is that slashing happens based on what transactions you include or not. False. Slashing happens because of things such as proposing or attesting twice.
- If you detect some wrongdoing, like somebody attesting twice, you can get a reward for whistleblowing (free money!)
- However to claim this reward, you have to include it in a block. Therefore if everybody is aware of this wrongdoing, the next block will get the rewards for slashing/whistleblowing.
- Therefore it's economically advantageous to keep this info to yourself, until you get to propose a block, and only then slash and get the rewards.
- There are also what are called altruistic whistleblowers, that as soon as they find wrongdoing, they'll broadcast it (instead of keeping it to themselves) so next block proposer will slash the wrongdoer. These kind of whistleblowers will most likely be run by the Ethereum Foundation
- In practice even if there were no altruistic whistleblowers, it wouldn't really matter because the same software that validators run can also detect wrongdoing, so in practice even with no altruistic whistleblowers, the next block is almost guaranteed to slash the wrongdoer anyway (free money!).
Who is everyone? Because obviously it can't include the people who just colluded to deceive the network.
Also do they prove before or after slashing?
In the near future the rules are made by the people with the most ETH
and soon after the most ETHs will be earned by the people who make the rules.
The first difficulty bomb was never set with the intention that this would be the move to PoS. It's a conscious choice to introduce regular hard forks in order to keep the protocol and network evolving.
It looks very likely that some percentage of node operators and miners will patch out the bomb this time, which will result in the PoW side of the fork staying alive. Which side of the chain retains monetary value in their tokens is up to social consensus. It will probably differ from protocol to protocol. So far industry and most major exchanges have been aligned with the rest of the Ethereum community here.
What you're saying is mostly correct but seems taken out of context. I've only ever seen people looking in from the outside have strong opinions on this particular point, not from the actual stakeholders involved.
The rest has to agree otherwise their stake is slashed.
This can't happen in bitcoin.
Please correct me if I'm wrong.
I think the problem here is centralization and this can be more easily avoided in PoW (because of energy costs rising a lot if all miners go in one place) instead of PoS (there are no physical restraints, so in theory all staking pools could be in Switzerland).
So politically it's much harder to censor a more decentralized chain.
Why? I see this as an event that would skyrocket the price. It at the same time affirms commitment of the community to its stated values and decreases the supply greatly.
This process is how all changes to Bitcoin get rolled out.
> By 8 August, another milestone was reached when 100% of the bitcoin mining pools signaled support
The majority of miners implementing new rules only has an effect on which rules the validating nodes will start enforcing if those nodes implemented them and allowed miners to signal when to start.
A big miner has the same voting power as you with the client running on an RPi.
> and if you try to validate and not censor, you will get your staked coins taken from you by the protocol (as opposed to PoW, where you just fail to get your block in the chain)
Is outright false. It is the same as PoW. You choose what transactions you include in your block. So some people may choose to not include some transactions (Ethermine is already doing this on PoW with Tornado Cash). But there is no mechanism that slashes your staked coins because the other validators didn't like what transactions you included. At most your block will not get attested. Slashing can only happen for other reasons (proposing twice, attesting twice, attesting something that surrounds something else).
PoS is in fact even more resistant because in PoS you can kick out the malicious validators by doing a social fork that slashes their stake. In PoW if 51% of miners are malicious there's nothing you can do, you can't slash their hardware.
>So some people may choose to not include some transactions (Ethermine is already doing this on PoW with Tornado Cash). But there is no mechanism that slashes your staked coins because the other validators didn't like what transactions you included.
>PoS is in fact even more resistant because in PoS you can kick out the malicious validators by doing a social fork that slashes their stake.
If a group of validators don't agree with your particular arrangement of transactions in the block, they can engineer a "social fork" that slashes your stake.
But you can reach a social consensus (i.e. outside the protocol) and decide to slash the censors. At that point there would be effectively two different chains, the censored one and an uncensored one. The worth of each chain would be decided by market dynamics.
It's absolutely terrible. Wasn't the goal to create digital money no one can control? I might as well use the US dollar then.
Why would I want to be on their fork? They can have their censored fork, but they can't do anything to anymore who doesn't want to be a part of it.
This only proves that ether is already too centralized.
FWIW. I used to mine eth on a small scale so I am obviously biased.
Basically, concentration of power means that eth will quickly become everything the banks are.. only worse ( because with banks you at least have some regulation to back you up ):P
Like 4 pools control 51% of the hashrate so they already can easily bully solo-miners.
So, your transaction will be confirmed in the next block mined by one of the other 49% of miners. Big whoop.
At any point there is still a 49% chance the next block will be mined by a good guy.
If the bad guys decide not to accept the good guys' blocks, then they are hard forking Bitcoin and will end up just like Bitcoin Cash: irrelevant.
This is the exact problem PoW was designed to solve, and it works very well, which is why a 51% attack has never succeeded or even been attempted against Bitcoin, and never will.
The 51% attack is not some made up thing.
I will not go into depth here but it's a commonly held view that this changes under PoS. Just flying by so hopefully sources are easily located
The only way they can maintain that chain is by a hard fork.
So after a time, they are behind and have to jump to the other chain and ignore their own old blocks. Something like this graph:
Censored blocks: -
Uncensored Fork blocks: \
Uncensored Normal blocks: *
Censored: *--------------------------
Uncensored: \** \* \*** \** \*It doesn't matter if it's a 90% attack. The minority miners are constantly receiving and using the majority's blocks. So it is not 66% vs. 33%, or 90% vs. 10%; it is 60% vs. 100% and 90% vs. 100%.
All it takes is for the less-restrictive minority to mine two blocks in a row and they've permanently outpaced the majority's more restrictive chain.
They can use the majority blocks at the cost of discarding their earlier blocks. Every time they accept a block from the majority, they undo all the work they had done earlier.
> All it takes is for the less-restrictive minority to mine two blocks in a row and they've permanently outpaced the majority's more restrictive chain.
All it takes then is for the majority to mine three blocks in a row. The probability is always on their side.
If that's what it comes down to (and there is reason to believe it won't), I imagine sanction addresses will still transact, just with higher latency and at higher cost than others.
Assuming enough hash rate and the exchanges (and the users) agree to ignore the "sactioned" transactions, then they will never be in the main chain, not even slowly.
Also just noting that while the conversation here is about Ethereum, you are describing the fork rules of Bitcoin. Next month the concept "hash rate" won't exist on ETH mainnet (potentially depending on who you ask; looks like there might be an ETC2).
1) The hash of the old block.
2) The new transactions.
3) A number that must be bruteforced until you get a hash of all the block with a lot of zeros.
If you try to copy one block in the other chain/fork, then the hash of the previos block is invalid. If you change just that part of the block, you must bruteforce a new number until you get a new hash of all the block with a lot of zeros, that has the same cost of creating a new block from scratch.
You can copy the info of the transactions from one chain to the other, but you must create a new block to put them. You can't just copy the block.
Okay, I think I see now where I was separately wrong and partially wrong in the previous comments. When I said there's a huge monetary upside to a 51% attack, that's wrong. There's not really any upside to speak of, especially considering the huge amount of computing resources you would need to do it.
So it's not surprising it hasn't been tried yet, and that's not a proof that it's a canard as I said before (but it's not a proof of the opposite, either). Absence of evidence does not imply evidence of absence. So I'll concede and leave that point alone. I was wrong.
---
Now, when I said that the 49% can still use the 51%'s blocks, that's not entirely correct. It's correct only until the blockchain splits, then it's not correct. So my position wasn't entirely correct, but it still has value to this discussion. Let me illustrate with a randomly-generated timeline.
Let's make it easy and say 66% are censoring miners, and 33% are non-censoring miners.
We haven't discussed this yet, but let's also assume that the exchanges and non-mining users reflect this proportion. This is an unfounded assumption. But I'm steelmanning.
The 33% are in miner pool 1, and the 66% are in miner pool 2 and 3. The dots represent 5-minute intervals. Just like in Bitcoin, a block is mined roughly once every 20 minutes. Observe the moment at "X".
..3..........2...X1.3......1...1..........2......2..
At this point, the blockchain looks like this. 100% 3--2
You might ask, "Why is it not forked at this point? Miner pools 3 and 2 are the malicious actors, and they had two blocks in a row." Because 1 has no reason to fork. All previous blocks are valid according to Miner pool 1.Now, observe the point at X:
..3..........2....1X3......1...1.......X..2......2..
At this point, the blockchain has forked. It looks like this. 66% 3--2
33% 3--2--1
Notice, 33% has the longer chain, but the 66% do not accept the 33%'s block because it contains censored transactions, so a re-org does not occur. This situation will continue as long as the 33% chain is equal to or longer than the 66%, which could be a while.But how can that be possible if the 66% has more hashpower?
Observe the point at X:
..3..........2....1.3X.....1...1..........2......2..
Chains: 66% 3--2--3
33% 3--2--1
They are equal. No re-org happens.One should question at this point what's going on in the mempool here? One can assume the 66% censoring miners are not transmitting the censored transactions to the mempool. But how many censored transactions are we talking about? How much of a fee is each side collecting? Is this still in the coinbase reward era or after? Are the 33% smart enough to route around the 66%? Or punish them by kicking them off the mempool? Not sure. All of these variables can mitigate this attack. But I will not explore that now.
Although there are now two rival chains, for simplicity's sake, lets just assume the same timeline holds, and remove each of the two side's blocks from the other's chain starting from at the time of the fork.
66% ..3..........2....1.3.....................2......2..
33% ..3..........2....1........1...1....................
Now, observe the point at X: 66% ..3..........2....1.3.....................2......2.X
33% ..3..........2....1........1...1...................X
Chains: 66% 3--2--3--2--2
33% 3--2--1--1--1
3 hours later, the 66% still have not overtaken the 33%.One should wonder even more, what is going on in the mempool and ~$250B Bitcoin economy during this time?
In this example, only two blocks by the 33% are mined consecutively. What about 3 or 4? Could it be days before the 66% overtakes the 33%? I think it's possible.
On the other hand, the mining of consecutive blocks by the 66% does not create a contention between the two sides. So all miners are unified until the 33% gain an advantage. This is my point.
From the POV of the censored Bitcoin transactions, the 66% will succeed in censoring them until the issue is resolved. But I don't think you can say that the 66% have control of the network at this point. They've only succeeded in disrupting the network until more non-censoring miners come online, or something else happens.
Consider also that the attacker has to either possess 66% of all computing power devoted to Bitcoin in the known universe OR an incentive more attractive than the BTC block incentive for the operators of 66% of miners. Even for 51%, that's an impressive achievement.
It's a very interesting scenario but I still say it does not constitute a credible threat to Bitcoin. More of a thought experiment.
66% ..3..........2....1.3.....................2......2.X
33% ..3..........2....1........1...1...................X
but that's closer to a 50%-50% split of the miners, not a 66%-33%.The problem is that 2 and 3 will produce the double of blocks. For e while 1 may tie or get ahead, but after 30 blocks the the 23 fork will almost always be like 10 blocks ahead of the only 1 fork.
Ignoring most of the . to make the graph shorter
66% 3213...223.3223..23.23.323..3.2223
33% 321.11....1....11..1..1...11.1....
or looking at each chain 66% 32132233223232332332223
33% 3211111111111
After a while, 1 canA) Give up and start mining censored blocks
B) Start a new fork, from the current 2-3 chain with many censored blocks
C) Declare that they are a fork and convince the exchanges to give them a new moniker, like ETC of BXC
D) Convince the exchanges that they are the real chain in spite they are shorter, and convince the exchanges to give the other chain a new moniker.
Let's say that MiningPoolA controls 51% of hashpower, and MiningPoolB controls 49%. MiningPoolA is refusing to mine transactions from/to some wallet W.
Time T1:
MiningPoolA: OldChain -- Block1(no W)
MiningPoolB: OldChain -- Block1'(W receives 1BTC) still in progress
Any client will accept the chain with Block1 (no transactions from/to W)
Time T2 - if MiningPoolB tries to compete
MiningPoolA: OldChain -- Block1(no W) -- Block2 (no W)
MiningPoolB: OldChain -- Block1'(W receives 1BTC) -- Block2' (parent=Block1') still in progress
Any client will accept the chain with Block1 (no transactions from/to W), and MiningPoolB will never be able to catch up
Time T2 - if MiningPoolB decides to accept MiningPoolA's chain, but add the transaction in the second block:
MiningPoolA: OldChain -- Block1(no W) -- Block2 (no W)
MiningPoolB: OldChain -- Block1(no W) -- Block2' (parent=Block1, adds transaction W receives 1BTC) still in progress
Any client will accept the chain with Block1 (no transactions from/to W), and MiningPoolB will never be able to catch up
If a mining pool had 51+% of hashpower, they would always be mining the longest chain, no one would be able to compete with them and publish another block (in principle, at least; in practice, since mining is not entirely deterministic, someone else will occasionally win the lottery and propose a new block faster).The 51% chain is mined with 51% of the total mining power, while the 49% chain will contain 100% of the mining power (as the 49% miners are more than happy to build off the 51% chain, while the 51% miners will only building off the chain without the censored transactions).
They are correct in asserting that a 51% attack to censor transaction is largely just a nuisance to the users and that all transactions should eventually end up on the longest chain (the 49%).
Each miner takes a bunch of transactions and chooses a previous block B1 to build on, then starts hashing. If some other minerB advertises a new block B2 based on B1 that includes different transactions before minerA, then minerA can throw away all the work it did, and start from scratch on B3 based on B2. But minerB will probably already be working on its own B3 - and has every chance to win again.
The other 49% are still incorporating the 51%'s blocks in their work. There is no way 51% of miners can stay ahead of the combined hashpower of the entire Bitcoin mining population.
It's not that simple. That block from the 49% will be ignored by the 51% (since it contains "banned" transactions), which will continue the chain on the previous block (the "51% chain". Now the 49% has two options. If they continue to build the chain on top of that 49% block (the "49% chain"), after a while the 51% chain will be longer (because that side has the most hash power). The other option is to build again on top of the 51% chain, as you suggested (and AFAIK that's what unmodified Bitcoin software will do after a while); but to do that, they have to discard that block they had included earlier (since it's not in the 51% chain).
That is: yes, the 49% can include "banned" transactions, but that inclusion will be undone later. They can include these transactions again, but that inclusion will be undone again. They can never get far enough for these blocks with the "banned" transactions to be permanent.
> Again, a 51% attack has never even been attempted on the Bitcoin network despite huge potential monetary upside if it succeeds.
First, this is not the "traditional" 51% attack, which involves mining an alternative longer chain in secret. Second, the most a 51% attack can do is double spend coins (or prevent them from being spent); converting that into real money requires spending the coin twice (for instance, sending coins to an exchange, withdrawing the resulting money, and then undoing the sending to the exchange so the attacker keeps the coins), and the monetary upside isn't that big in most scenarios. Third, the cost for doing that is not as small as you're thinking (start with the cost to obtain enough miners to have 51% of the hash power), which is why it hasn't AFAIK been attempted on Bitcoin (but AFAIK, it has been attempted on less popular networks which have small total hash power). And if you fail the attack, you have wasted all that cost.
As soon as the chain diverges, they are seperate chains.
Yes, if you have a minority of the hashpower, you can hardfork yourself off the main chain, and continue to follow your smaller chain, regardless.
But you don't get a longer chain than the main one. So you'd continuously be behind, and would not get the work of the main chain, and likely most exchanges would not accept your smaller fork coin, and you would end up like bitcoin cash.
The only way 51% of miners can fork the blockchain and actually overtake the other 49% with more restrictive rules is if they have a hidden nuclear reactor dedicated to mining Bitcoin that produces hashpower equal or more than 49% of the network and they flip it on at the moment they fork.
Again, it doesn't matter how many people are convinced a 51% attack is possible on Bitcoin. It's never even been tried once. So the burden of proof is on you all. I'm just trying to help explain why this concept has never been proven.
If the 51% can ignore the blocks from the 49%, then why does it matter what the 49% is doing?
Occasionally the 49% will be able to mine a block and temporarily create the longest chain, but the 51% can always just ignore that block and continue mining off of the one before it - eventually their chain will be the longest and the block(s) from the 49% will be lost.
Really this isn't theoretical, it happens all the time by accident when two blocks get mined off of the same previous block. When that happens one of the two blocks gets lost, and the only difference with this scenario is that the 51% have enough hash power to ensure that their blocks are the ones that always (eventually) win and the 49% blocks are always lost.
They can also prevent you from getting your transaction in ever. The 49% cannot prevent this because they cannot make a longer chain, that is the entire point of proof-of-work.
What you do is this:
- spend btc with a transaction and get it included in the chain.
- start mining blocks starting from before your transaction in secret
- include a trnasaction to a different address in the secret chain
- broadcast the secret chain once it's longer than the "official" one
- since your chain is longer, your chain is now the official one. All the transactions in the other chain are now discarded
The Bitcoin blockchain constantly "forks" for the latest 1-2 blocks. If you sell your car for BTC and hand over the car the moment you see the latest block contains the transaction where the BTC enters your wallet, you may see 1h later that the longest chain does NOT contain your transaction, and in fact your transaction is now invalid, because the buyer wallet has sent all the money somewhere else.
Here an attacker controlling 51% of mining power decides to not play by the rules; we are considering what that means for everybody else. For Bitcoin it means they can block transactions forever, and they can double-spend.
Obviously if the attacker plays by the rules there is no attack.
Stick a fork in it. Ethereum is done.
With that degree of centralization, might as well just run a database and call it a day.
IMO - this behavior is a blip. As soon as it becomes clear that “censorship” isn’t effective, it will become less popular for validators to do it at all.
Are you talking about lack of ideological purity of Ethermine?
Yes, and the fact that everyone in the Ethereum community has largely glossed this over in their enthusiasm for the "merge" and what it will do the price of their assets.
Cryptocurrencies that embrace the centralization and censorship of fiat currencies are completely unnecessary and have no real utility. Tornado Cash and Ethermine should have been a line in the sand, a hard boundary for what's acceptable and what's not.
But the fact that no one even cares tells me that the community will be happy to accept even more censorship as long as their bags keep going up. Pathetic, really.
As for TC - who is rolling over? While some US based businesses are complying, protocol builders are saying that they will fight tooth and nail.
There will always be a miner (or validator in PoS) that will be willing to take Tornado Cash fees.
There is only one Bitcoin, and it's basically the chain the most clients are following. If you decide to follow another chain, you have created a new "coin", but Bitcoin is unaffected.
Is that how you evaluate technologies? By their marketcap?
> but now it is just managed by the big holders
To have any influence during the proof of work days you needed a server farm. This was also restricted to a small elite who could, if they wished, censor transactions.
With PoS, the big players control the small players. If the minority doesn't play along, their funds will be slashed by the procotol. If 66% of validators censor you, your transaction will never be finalized.
With PoW, the big players cannot coerce the small players in any way. Everyone independently controls their own blocks. If 66% of miners censor you, your transaction will merely take 3x as long to be confirmed.
If <50% of miners want to censor you, they can make it take longer for your transactions to be processed. If it's >50% (or thereabouts) they can prevent your transactions from every getting confirmed. Sure, the 34% could collude until they happen to produce 6 blocks in a row, but each individual member of that group would make more money by going along with the censorship and not being censored themselves.
I believe it's similar with PoS, but with somewhat different incentive magnitudes.
If 66% of miners censor their own blocks to comply with OFAC, then eventually the transaction will get in.
If 66% of miners not only censor their own blocks, but also collude to continually reorg the chain, then obviously all bets are off, the project has failed, and the exchange rate is headed to 0.
I think the former is infinitely more likely than the latter.
Is it though? If crypto ever becomes a common currency people will still want to transact in it regardless of corruption/collusion among miners. Most are not going to stop using it for ideological reasons like "miners are altering the chain" unless it negatively impacts their own transactions.
This is false. If miners controlling 66% of hash power decide to censor you, they can ignore any blocks produced by the minority who include your transaction.
I believe the point is that there’s no prerequisite that all miners are independent, and will definitely collude. PoW or PoS this is the case, as blockchains cannot prevent IRL agreements.
Legitimate question because I don't know.
When I'm mining eth on my GPU while part of a mining pool, my understanding is that my GPU is racing to try and find the hash that works to start the next block. If I find it, I then am able to put transactions into the block and cap it off, but the reward doesn't go to me because I was part of a pool, so the pool shares the reward with everyone involved.
Are you saying I only find the answer to the block but the pool itself stuffs the block with transactions?
Though it's entirely possible that mining pools dictate which transactions get sent to their miners for them to try mining.
With the old system, miners could try to sabotage our fork if most hashing power were to be on the censored fork. With this update, that would not be possible as the censors would lose their money on the non-censored fork and therefore be unable to stake. The relative power of the forks no longer matter as they cannot attack each other anymore.
Ethereum is becoming more decentralized and permissionless as a result of this change.
[1]: https://eth2book.info/altair/part2/incentives/inactivity
Inactivity leak is an emergency measure to restore liveness when the network stops finalizing blocks. It happens when >33% of validators are offline(WW3 scenario), major bug in widespread implementation, etc.
Your link explains that.
ETH2 is friendly to home stackers - you may lose some profit by being offline sometimes, and in the worst case minor penalties are applied.
EDIT: If you are interested in a much better description of what happens if you are offline, see this:
https://eth2book.info/altair/part2/incentives/penalties
Some points from the link:
- penalties =/= slashing
- If you are online > 42.5% of the sime - you are earning profits
In that case, without any stakes, half of nodes will be locked to NIL, half - to a valid block.
In case of stakes, byzantine proposer (it is only one node that is really byzantine, but it can control how network is split) can partition network according to a proportion of stakes, so that neither half gets prevalence.
The algorithm in the link you provided does nothing in that case. The only node that will be punished is a byzantine validator which does not care.
The system will be in no-progress-possible state indefinitely.
In PoS you still have the staking tokens.
To me it sounds like staking has a much more powerful snowball effect than mining and the gap between the wealthiest ETH participants and everyone else will increase faster under PoS.
Every holder who is staking is rewarded for staking, in proportion to their stake.
> To me it sounds like staking has a much more powerful snowball effect than mining
No, because issuance under proof of stake is much lower than that under proof of work.
The point of validating is to secure the chain, not to get rich. The more validators that are active, the lower the per-validator rewards, reducing compounding effects.
Also you lock-up capital which has an opportunity cost and must competes with every other investable asset. As the barriers to entry staking are negligible (just acquiring a liquid staking derivative like rETH, for example) it means that everyone willing to stake will likely do so which drops the returns lower, which may push some stakers out as they see better investing opportunities. So staking is likely going to have thin margins in the future and will give a rate of return that is fairly priced given its risk adjusted returns.
Last I saw, ETH mining was about 33% profitable. With mining rewards ten times higher than staking rewards, that means miners take home about three times more on their investment than stakers.
Stake pooling also eliminates one of the supposed benefits of decentralised cryptocurrency - you have to trust someone else with your currency.
If I have to give my currency to a third party who will then invest it for me, then why bother with decentralised cryptos at all?
>any operation on the network requires trust that the network will do what it agreed it will do.
If I were an Eth apologist, I would explain how the code that defines the network operations is fully open and inspectable, so no trust needed.
$4k vs $128k
Literally the same numbers.
there's just a small number of validators, which is just going to be the ethereum foundation and friends.
There are over 415 000 validators.Docs from one of the validator clients: https://docs.prylabs.network/docs/prysm-usage/slasher
There is no such thing as "separate slashers", and there is no such thing as distinct classes of validators. Whoever told you that is spreading baseless FUD.
I am asking about the people with the power to declare that people who put up the stake were dishonest in their validations.
The key innovation in modern POS systems was figuring out how to do this, it is a solved problem.
The parallel with Bitcoin is quite strong. You can run a Bitcoin node without running a miner and verify the chain but you don't get rewarded. You can run an Ethereum node without staking and verify the chain but you don't get rewarded.
no, that's right. It's now a chain where you make money (fresh coins) by a procedure controlled by the Ethereum Foundation.
What happens if something goes fatally wrong? The EF will step in and fix it.
This has (for a few years now) raised serious questions as to whether the new network will constitute an offering of securities - EF sets rules to run a validator and get paid in ETH.
All of this works via code and no human intervention is needed.
I assume Ethereum has something similar, as there isn’t much gain in restricting those who are allowed to submit a proof that a node/validator is up to no good.
As soon as mining pools appeared, and now even more with proof-of-stake, we are back with a few parties being the trusted validators. The fact that they get their powers from on-chain tokens rather than community decision... is it really a good thing?
What a time to be alive :)
Whether the project dies or continues forward the innovation coming from the space is pretty amazing.
Like, you have this proof of stake thing, but the only reason it works is because there's just a small number of validators, which is just going to be the ethereum foundation and friends.
edit: putting this at the top because nobody is responding on topic. I am NOT talking about the class of people who stake 32 eth to validate nodes. I am talking about the class of people with the ability to declare that the people with stakes did not validate correctly and therefore lose their stakes. My understanding is that this is a very small number of people and is mostly just the ethereum foundation.
edit edit: The term for this class is apparently called slashers, not validators.