When I worked at Boeing, I talked with my lead engineer about this. He said there were indeed some excellent engineers who could not live with the possiblity of making a mistake. Boeing would find jobs for them that were not safety critical, like design studies of new aircraft. There they could be productive without the stress.
Personally, I found the stress to be motivating. It meant I was doing something that mattered.
Right now, I’m sure Starliner engineers are under a lot of stress. But I really believe that the program will get through this and end up being successful.
Increasing it works up to a point (increasing lift) but at the cost of increased drag and, at a certain point, a stall. I've found myself, at different points, "coasting" (gliding) and "stalling" (pulling up too hard when I'm not in the right conditions). Long-term burnout is like being "behind the power curve" and gradually losing energy.
The whole point, as I read it, is that those engineers could not handle "degrees of safety".
It is mind boggling just how many things need to work perfectly constantly consistently to maintain safe flight. This goes for both Boeing and Airbus (and Embraer, Cessna, et al.); all of General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls Royce; etc.
"This will make sure we cover edge cases we're not aware of", we thought.
Later we discovered such systems are called "hyperstatic" and that they are actually more fragile and more prone to malfunction. What we should've aimed for are isostatic systems, where less constraints meant more stable systems.
I'm not saying Boeing engineering aren't aware of this. Of course they do. I just wanted to show an example of how trying to avoid mistakes *may* lead to less safe systems.
I work for a healthcare company, and we definitely put in charge of safety people who stress about a patient coming to harm, not people who are so-so about it.
E.g. the developers who never ship code because they always want to write the better version of the thing, that they thought up while building the current version
At some point you have to look at a less than perfect design and answer the question of whether it's good enough for the requirements at hand.
It's not about striving for perfection.
It feels like the same coin to me: inability to accept calculated risk.
I'd look at this the other way around, there are people who don't strive for perfection, simply delivering something when it just meets expected bars, not giving any thought beyond that. I wouldn't want those people to design my safety systems, they'd just leave possible improvements lying on the ground by not caring to think a little beyond the boundary of their "box".
But yeah, I frequently apply this concept way beyond its initial purpose, especially in matters that relate to managing human relations both professional and personal which, sometimes, closely resembles the application of the illusion of choice.
I'll do some research to see if there are any books that I can recommend.
Finding a productive place for them, where their expertise counts, but peoples' lives don't hang on the results, is just good management.
I believe their motto is "Safety to the Max".
Don’t you drive?
Sure, it is cheap, but when, not if, it results in deaths, it will be really hard to justify why someone thought it was a reasonable choice.
They'd also have data collected during the return voyage.
A house full of fire hazards which is nevertheless not on fire can not be directly compared to a house that is currently on fire.
Apollo 6 was an uncrewed test flight of the Saturn V. It was almost a disaster. Pogo oscillations almost tore the vehicle apart. And after staging, two engines shut down early and the rocket had to go into a lower orbit than planned.
But that flight was enough to certify the Saturn V for human use and they launched 3 astronauts to the moon on the next Saturn V flight, Apollo 8.
e.g., you have to run three test cases with passing results to pass the overall test and certify the system.
So, you run the test. All three test cases pass with flying colors, but during test #3, something that you hadn't thought of came up and it could be a problem.
What do you do now? You've reached your stated qualification for passing the test but now there's this wrinkle. Which one should take precedence in certifying the system for use?
Maybe. I don't believe that's true, but let's assume it is.
They SHOULD be held to a higher standard. Of the 16 US astronauts that have died in the space program, 14 died on the shuttle which was Boeing. That, coupled with Boeings recent deterioration and demonstrated disregard for human life, makes it clear that Boeing needs to be kept on a short leash.
https://www.spaceline.org/united-states-manned-space-flight/...
However, Boeing was not originally one of the main contractors for the actual construction/operation/maintenance of the Space Shuttle. It later became one by buying Rockwell’s space division
ATK + OribtalSciences = Orbital ATK
then NG bought out Orbital ATK
Edit: To clarify, this applies to the certification process, not current performance.
https://www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/nasa-and-spacex-complet...
“The Crew Dragon, including the Falcon 9 rocket and associated ground systems, is the first new, crew spacecraft to be NASA-certified for regular flights with astronauts since the space shuttle nearly 40 years ago. Several critical events paved the way for this achievement, including grounds tests, simulations, uncrewed flight tests and NASA’s SpaceX Demo-2 test flight with astronauts Robert Behnken and Douglas Hurley earlier this year.” [from 2020]
Dragon did test flights demonstrating that the systems worked, Starliner has so far only done test flights demonstrating that the systems do not, plus a pinky promise that it'll work the next time.
There was one flight with two crew to the ISS: the same test Starliner is currently attempting.
I agree with your analysis that Boeing does not deserve to have lowered standards. I'm suggesting that neither did Crew Dragon before certification. I'm not suggesting their systems or records are comparable, I'm simply arguing that unproven systems should be tested rigorously before being certified for human-rated spaceflight.
What I'm saying is that Dragon was built upon an existing proven platform. The effort needed to convert the cargo module for human spaceflight is less than the effort Boeing needed to create a module from scratch. AND SpaceX still had to go through more rigor with Crew Dragon than what Boeing has had to do with Starliner.
The certification standards for Starliner have been reduced compared to Dragon, and Boeing is asking for them to be reduced further still.
I imagine so indeed, not in the least because all Atlas V launch vehicles are already assigned to missions. The booster for another non-operational flight would thus have to come from either their operational missions, or they'd have to pay someone else to give up their scheduled Atlas V payload. If they fail to buy someone else's Atlas V, they'd have to integrate Starliner onto a new (i.e. non-Atlas V) human-rated launch vehicle, or they would fail to deliver the contracted 6 operational missions.
Amazon’s Project Kuiper comsat constellation which is
targeting our first full-scale Kuiper mission for Q4 aboard an Atlas V rocket from ULA.
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/inside...
If SpaceX or another company had remotely similar results, they would never have been greenlit. For instance in spite of a flawless pad abort test, NASA required SpaceX also carry out an in-flight abort. And that's completely reasonable - you don't simply skip tests, even with optimal performance. Skipping tests following suboptimal performance is simply unjustifiable. And so I think we're largely looking at another Challenger type disaster caused by a disconnect between management (and likely political appointees) versus engineering staff, rather than inherent risk. But this is not a vessel that should have ever had a single human anywhere near it, and so their official comments (and even actions) on the situation are going to be heavily biased due to their own behaviors.
If a producer of critical infrastructure cannot make profit without cutting corners, it should be nationalized so that the need to place profit ahead of anything and everything the producer does is eliminated.
/s
Inflammable has one meaning.
In this case, the "in" prefix means "in/on". Think of it as "inflame" + "able". Similar to how "inflammation" doesn't mean "a state of not burning" and "inflamed" doesn't mean "not burning". Also see "ingress", "ingest", "inaugurate".
I'm only an armchair etymologist and this is wild speculation, but I think that the meaning of the "in" prefix might depend on whether we get the word directly from Latin, or whether it comes through French.
French has both meanings: the negation as in interdit (forbidden) or impossible (well, impossible); or “in”, “towards”, “change” as in intérieur (interior), inflexion (inflection), or indeed inflammable (from the Latin inflammabilis).
Both meanings also exist in Latin.
What I found fascinating learning English is “inhabit”, which also sounds like the opposite of its actual meaning. Is obviously the second meaning, but then the prefix is redundant because it came from the Latin habitare, which is the verb with the same meaning.
Anyway, that was today’s minute on etymology.
There is a transitive verb "to inflame", which is common. It derives from the noun "flame" and the prefix "in-", which when applied to nouns makes it a verb meaning "to cause [the noun]".
They also ignored the common word "inflammation", which nobody thinks means "to stop your tissues from flaring up".
None of that matters. People parsed "inflammable" differently and arrived at a new meaning. But I just find it odd that, while doing that parsing, they never considered that they never use the verb "to flame" in ordinary speech.
Whereas wood or fabric could be flammable or nonflammable depending on how it's coated or treated.
Noninflammable for the maniacs.
It's always amusing all the gotchas that exist in English. I'm glad I grew up in it rather than trying to learn it as a second language.
Speaking of former Soviet treasures, "hot4words" taught me why the "in" needed to be there. Etymologically speaking, that is.
How time flies
The last episode Ive watched of the Simpsons was S13E11, aired in 2002. So it's been a while
(It was so stupid I realized they had long jumped the shark.)
Who approved the design, and are the Engineers still employed by Boeing? Curious minds would like to know. Any way to trace this from public documentation?
Edit: Actually, looking around a bit, doesn't seem like there's any official mention of what kind of tape it was. Kapton tape seems to be the popular assumption but there's no evidence of it.
P212. Silicon adhesive with up to 200 C insulation. https://www.nitto.com/au/en/products/e_parts/heat_resistant0...
P213. Acrylic adhesive with up to 155 C insulation. https://www.nitto.com/au/en/products/e_parts/heat_resistant0...
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?PHPSESSID=gm840m...
I don't know how space-rated QA works, as I am but a lowly terrestrial engineer, but I imagine there are specs for each portion of the machine calling out electrical ratings, temperature ratings, vibration ratings, etc. If the spec definitions for that section of machine are bad it's hard to do proper QA against those specs.
It would seem that Dragon is being held up to the same standard that was set for Soyuz...Boeing is the only one failing....
We are looking at a testing and engineering failure combined of Boeing.
I don't follow spaceflight news in any great depth - but doesn't SpaceX also have a rocket thingy that keeps exploding?
Isn't "just launch over and over until it stops exploding" the way rockets are made these days?
Starliner was not developed that way at all. It was supposed to be developed with much more up-front work to make sure that it would work correctly out of the gate. All of the mentioned Starliner tests were certification tests, whereas all of the Starship tests so far have been 100% expected to fail in some way, but with a more ambitious goal about how far it gets.
Starship: "We expect this to fail, but we will learn valuable lessons." -> Fails -> "That was fun! Next!"
Starliner: "We expect this to succeed." -> Fails. "Well, shit."
Fundamentally different engineering and design philosophies.
Starship and Starliner are very different things. Starship is the launch vehicle and a novel one (as in, it's not just a rebuild of an existing system, it's got new components and design elements). The failures we've seen so far were all, to some extent, expected though the particular modes of failure may not have been anticipated. They were launched with the intent of discovering the failure modes and responding to them with changes to design and manufacturing.
Starliner is now where Dragon Crew was with DM-2. Both tested with uncrewed flights and various test scenarios before their crewed flights. DM-2 and this flight are flights where nothing should go wrong. Failure, or critical failures at least, are unanticipated events. Otherwise you wouldn't be putting people in them yet (both vehicles are capable of operating autonomously, there's no reason to put a person in them if you aren't confident in the vehicle). The same philosophy applies to both Dragon Crew and Starliner at this stage.
The first time you build a physical rocket and test sending it up, it's almost certain to fail. Seeing how and why it explodes is pretty much the purpose of launching it!
That's not true. Many launch vehicles have succeeded on their first flight:
Titan II: Apr 8, 1964 (Gemini 1)
Saturn I (Block 1): Oct 27, 1961 (SA-1; only 1st stage active, 2nd and 3rd stage were present but disabled)
Saturn I (Block 2): Jan 29, 1964 (SA-2; only 1st and 2nd stage active; 3rd stage was present but disabled)
Saturn IB: Feb 26, 1966 (AS-201; first Saturn 1 flight with all 3 stages active)
Saturn V: Nov 9, 1967 (Apollo 4)
Space Shuttle: Apr 12, 1981 (STS-1, Columbia)
Atlas V: Aug 21, 2002
Falcon 9: Jun 4, 2010 (Dragon Spacecraft Qualification Unit test; the first stage disintegrated on re-entry, but that's irrelevant to success of the payload)
Falcon Heavy: Feb 6, 2018 (test flight; center core recovery failed, although again that arguably doesn't count)
Vulcan Centaur: Jan 8, 2024 (Peregrine lunar lander; the lander failed, but for reasons unrelated to the launch vehicle)
Indeed, I'd even say the norm is for success on first flight. And even when they do fail, most of the time it is a partial failure not a complete RUD – e.g. Delta IV Heavy's first flight reached orbit, but a lower orbit than planned; Ariane 6 reached the desired orbit, but the second stage failed to relight a second time for its deorbit burn.
What SpaceX has been doing with Starship is very novel – deliberately flying very early in development, when failure is more likely than success. This is different from traditional launch vehicle design process, in which you spend years doing extensive on-the-ground analysis, simulation and component testing, resulting in a high probability of success on the very first flight.
I think a lot of people are being misled into thinking SpaceX's way of doing things is the industry norm, when it isn't. Conversely, many other people misunderstand that SpaceX is intentionally doing something different, and are judging Starship's (expected) failures by the standards of earlier programs in which they aren't expected (failure after years of exhaustive on-the-ground development is a sign either of incompetence or really bad luck).
It's not novel. It's just not NASA. It was the norm in the early days of ICBM-type rockets. The original V-2 had about 700 failures before they hit a target. The original Atlas booster failed about half the time. "Nearly every component in the Atlas managed to fail at some point during test flights, from the engine combustion chambers to the tank pressurization system to the flight control system, but Convair engineers noted with some pride that there had never been a repeat of the same failure more than three times."[1] The military was fine with a high rate of failure at first in exchange for faster development.
Relatively novel. But also, more than just not NASA – it is also not contemporary ULA or Arianespace. It is also not Falcon 9/Heavy-era SpaceX, given both Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy completed their primary mission objectives flawlessly on their first flight.
> Titan II: Apr 8, 1964 (Gemini 1)
Titan II failed several times during development and there was considerable drama between the Air Force and NASA getting the Titan II man-rated because of this. The man-rated version, Titan II GLV, never failed, but by a similar token man-rated Starships have never failed (nor ever flown.). If we're comparing apples to apples, then Titan II had numerous failures if Starship has.
I was counting "Titan II the launch vehicle" separately from "Titan II the ICBM". However, if we are talking about Titan II the ICBM, here's what Wikipedia [0] has to say about its first launch: "The first Titan II launch, Missile N-2, was carried out on 16 March 1962 from LC-16 at Cape Canaveral and performed extremely well, flying 5,000 miles (8,000 km) downrange and depositing its reentry vehicle in the Ascension splash net." So, for the purpose of an ICBM, the first launch was a success.
Now, it is true that the second launch failed to reach its target due to a problem with the second stage. But I was responding to the claim that first launches normally fail, so I don't think a failure on the second launch, when the first launch was successful, is directly relevant to that claim.
> and there was considerable drama between the Air Force and NASA getting the Titan II man-rated because of this.
As Wikipedia notes, Titan II had a lot of problems with vibration. However, for the ICBM use case, these problems were not an issue – a nuclear warhead can handle a lot more vibration than a crewed space capsule can. I don't think we should classify the first launch of a rocket as a "failure" if it has issues which would interfere with planned human-rating but not with the success of its primary uncrewed use case.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-25C_Titan_II#Launch_histor...
Not only that but it's year later than planned and has failed most of its tests. And even if everything had worked as planned it would have lost money.
It's really not a very successful philosophy anymore.
http://web.archive.org/web/20240601140837/https://www.spacex...
and here's what they posted before the third flight test
http://web.archive.org/web/20240306183144/https://www.spacex...
Both have pretty clear language about them being test flights (especially the flight 3 post), and list what they hope to test.
edit: they have not yet made an official page on their website for the upcoming fifth test flight
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship_integrated_fli...
although they have teased about trying to return Booster to the tower for a catch attempt.
https://x.com/SpaceX/status/1762237289231757406
https://x.com/SpaceX/status/1798692089766805813
https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1792629142141177890
https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1783929534955589885
Or SpaceX's summaries for after the test:
https://www.spacex.com/launches/mission/?missionId=starship-...
https://www.spacex.com/launches/mission/?missionId=starship-...
There also tend to be good articles from dedicated space reporters like Eric Berger, Stephen Clark or Michael Shaetz:
https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/06/we-know-starship-can-f...
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/06/06/spacex-starship-fourth-test-...
https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/07/spacex-video-teases-po...
The "mainstream" reporting on these tends to be pretty awful and a glaring display of Gell-Mann Amnesia, but the more popular space journalists tend to be pretty good. I provided specific examples because there are also "journalists" known for intentionally distorting the facts to prop up their biases.
The goals for the next flight test seem to be to try to catch the booster (if they can get the necessary regulatory clearances) and to try to perform a controlled reentry of Starship again, this time with an upgraded heat shield to hopefully take less damage than the previous attempts. It'll end up being mainly a control systems and shield material test since future prototypes which are already being built have changes to the fin locations which also mitigate some of the heat shield issues seen in the previous test.
There's also talk of towing it to Australia after splashdown to study (also depends on if they can get the necessary regulatory clearances).
I wouldn't be surprised if the goals change though, I feel like they might decide to do another simulated catch over water for the booster (since while it was technically successful in IFT-4, one engine did blow up), and similarly I doubt they'll have the clearances to tow the ship to Australia as fast as they'd like.
If the cargo was a bunch of rocks and Boeing paid for the launch, you would have been right.
But this was a manned mission ordered by the US government. At this phase of development, nothing should be left to chance.
In fact even the rocket that Dragon launches on has a long history of explosions. First in the launches, then in the landings that resulted in some very spectacular booms. One time it landed perfectly upright, engines shut off, and one of the landing feet collapsed, causing it to fall over and BOOM. That was so funny :)
But now it has had a huge run of successful launches. I think it's a better approach because material science does not always behave exactly like the mathematical models. And space is one area where the margins of failure are extremely low.
The problem is that they have managers that don’t understand basic engineering and manufacturing practices, and that focus entirely on short-term financial engineering.
Case studies for those sorts of mistakes have already been written. For example, look at the US automotive bailout and collapse of Detroit, or read up on IBM and GE’s performance over the last decade.
Financial engineering is a dead end in multiple industries but will continue unabated because of how the management employee lifecycle works — the people who run companies into the ground are long retired with their huge comp packages by the time the company is defunct.
The companies could themselves propose certification and NASA only said if it is ok, if you didnt test you had do more certification work. NASA didnt require an abort test for either company. SpaceX just decided to have one, Boeing didnt.
The parachute test had nothing to do with abort tests.
----
In 2014, NASA awarded separate fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX to develop their respective systems and to fly astronauts to the ISS. Each contract required four successful demonstrations to achieve human rating for the system: pad abort, uncrewed orbital test, launch abort, and crewed orbital test.
----
Parachutes are an integral part of the abort tests. If those parachutes fail, which is a somewhat common problem with these designs, then even if the capsule escapes a failing rocket, they're going to head the ground like a rock.
This is probably the least bad effect of this.
1.A: Astronauts stranded
2.B: No they are not stranded, there is an emergency evac capsule
3.A: Ok, bring them home
4.B: The emergency evac capsules are the vehicles they arrived on"The high temperature emptied the tank, but also resulted in serious damage to the teflon insulation on the electrical wires to the power fans within the tank. The exposed fan wires shorted and the teflon insulation caught fire in the pure oxygen environment."
Considering the 'optics' of this, I imagine they will/should certify Starliner not with or without a crew, and at least not after 'enough' time has passed for any audit to be meaningful and for Boeing to prove that they are getting things right. Imagine 'ok-ing' the Starliner, and on the very next mission, the same (or different) critical error happens. Then I bid the NASA folks who ok-ed the Starliner a good start on their next jobs.
If there is one profession with zero tolerance for errors it's the 'space-stuff' because 1) good luck repairing things in space, 2) "in space no one can hear you scream" (profanities because you ended up staying x10 or x100 the time planned)(and I do understand that capacity planning, food, toilets, etc. etc. have been calculated to ensure that they won't be running out of food, toilet paper, etc.)
It would be fun to have a Season 3 of Space Force, and this time instead of Malkovich yelling at Microsoft, to be yelling at Boeing!
To me this gives a strong impression of history rhyming with itself. Back in the early 1980ies NASA engineers "close to the hardware" were raising warning, above warning about reliability issues of the shuttles, ultimately being overruled by management, leading to the Challenger disaster.
Then in 2003 again engineers were raising warnings about heat shield integrity being compromised from impacts with external tank insulation material. Again, management overruled them on the same bad reasoning, that if it did not cause problems in the past, it will not in the future. So instead of addressing the issue in a preventative action, the Columbia was lost on reentry.
Fool me once …, fool me twice …; I really hope the engineers will put their foot down on this and clearly and decisively overrule any mandate directed from management.
NASA has learnt from the bad days of blind Mission Management teams.
Flying safely with a 10% failure risk when your acceptable risk is only 2% just means you got lucky, not that you're good.
Afterwards one might come out as a whistleblower. But the fact that the last two whistleblowers wound up conveniently dead (no really, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/boeing-whistleblower-di...) is likely to have a chilling effect on people's willingness to volunteer as whistleblowers.
I have no idea who is right in this case. And even if the crew comes down on Starliner successfully, it doesn't mean that it was the right call. Maybe they just got lucky.
My sense from the call is that, if NASA engineers insist on a Dragon return, NASA management will support them.
Yet another Boeing vehicle to avoid ...
So many weeks of anti-Musk cope on Twitter about this issue. People really can't think clearly even about factual issues anymore.
> This is probably the only way they'll be able to keep Boeing as a provider. A redo of this mission would cost Boeing half a billion dollars, easy. And since the contract is fixed-price, this would just add to Boeing's losses.
As much as I get that Boeing is a major launch partner for the US in general and one of the only companies competing in the crewed space in the States right now, I don't get this part.It's not NASA's job to keep Boeing in the running. It's completely up to Boeing to produce a vehicle that can safely and reliably get crews to and from orbit, and to do the appropriate amount of testing beforehand. If they can't be bothered to do that with the understanding the cost of failure, that's on them.
Companies invest in their supply chain and invest in not being beholden to a single supplier (unless they control that supplier) all the time.
It's pretty well documented by Lori Garver, one of the people involved in pushing Commercial Crew, how strong the opposition was from both NASA and Congress.
If I had his wealth, "fly in space with William Shatner" would be on my todo list too.
>If large amounts of funding is the only thing required to succeed, Blue Origin would now have a nuclear-powered spacecraft orbiting Pluto.
If the value of the additional supply chain does not justify paying more, they can let boeing pay out of their own pocket, or let them drop out. The whole reason Boeing was given a fixed price contract at the beginning was so that this option could be exercised.
Lowering the bar is not making an investment.
Like, I understand what you're saying here, and I agree -- if the US wants to have serious private-sector competition in the space sector, that's arguably a good thing. SpaceX's advances in reducing launch costs by implementing launch vehicle reusability to a degree that was never seriously approached before are objectively a good thing for the sector. Some of the work Firefly appears to be doing is really interesting, and could lower the cost of much of the work around launches substantially. Blue Origin also exists and may at some point be more than a billionaire's vanity project.
Boeing isn't the only competitor in this space, and some of the smaller companies are hungrier. They're actively innovating, and because their existence is on the line, they do the work to make sure their projects are beyond reproach by the time they're picking up NASA work or sending people into orbit (usually with a pretty high degree of success).
> they are one of 2 companies that have the capability to launch people into orbit
This is currently, actively, under question.I'm sticking to my guns here -- Boeing and NASA being in this position is not an excuse to go easy on them, cut corners, or otherwise lower any standards. If the US wants to use taxpayer money to prop up the crewed spaceflight sector (which I would agree with in principle despite it not being my tax dollars -- this is IMO an investment in the future and a way to stay competitive on the world stage), then they should reevaluate their approach to a public sector crewed spaceflight option where fewer parts of the process are profit driven.
SLS was a flop but that doesn't mean that the next thing has to be, and while public spaceflight projects absolutely do subcontract work out when it comes to building components, there are big, traditionally-expensive parts of the project that can be offloaded to public agencies where profit isn't a consideration.
In theory it is not. The reality is that a lot of NASA's budgeting and decisions are made based on the pork-barrel politics of the ones who hold the purse strings -- congress.
Wat? Have any Dragon missions encountered the number and severity of issues experienced by Starliner?
Maybe they have and are not public knowledge because NASA is less than transparency about its safety predictions and findings. But until the same confidence sapping mission performance is established it is not honest to say that Starliner is held to a higher standard.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/science/boeing-starliner-...
As it turns out, the official that admitted this was the same Steve Stich.
Dragon was held to a higher standard, they were the newcomers and the corrupt snakes in Congress were looking for any excuse to justify canceling commercial crew and just giving Boeing a blank check again.
But I meant a higher standard for how much risk NASA is willing to take in this instance. If something had gone wrong with Dragon Demo-2, there was no other way to bring down the astronauts. They would have accepted relatively high risk because they had no choice.
But with Starliner, because they have Dragon, they don't need to accept that risk. The risk NASA will tolerate is lower now, because they have an alternative. That's what I meant by a higher standard.
I also picked up on the potential to at least payout Boeing if starliner comes down in good order (which seemed likely). I think that solves Boeings issue and would make them relax on forcing crew.
The problem here is they have a seemingly somewhat safer option going up and down regularly. That is making taking risk MUCH much harder because the downside risk (2 crew trapped in space potentially for a long and slow death) is pretty disastrous especially if a safer option was sitting right there and it turns out the decision to send them down was contract driven.
Given the history of thruster issues that go way back (and keep on repeating despite "fixes") I feel like they'll collect about as much data sending starliner back uncrewed, and then they'll need to be doing fixes for things like the helium issues etc that are compounding the risks. Be great if they could do ONE uncrewed flight more trouble free before putting astro's back on, but their solution is a more expensive with longer lead times than crew dragon (the entire service module is dumped on every launch I think, the rocket is also totally dumped etc)
That's pretty contrived. Dragon has a 'standard' of multiple successful flights.
> A redo of this mission would cost Boeing half a billion dollars, easy. And since the contract is fixed-price, this would just add to Boeing's losses. So I expect they will certify Starliner even if it comes down without a crew.
This is the problem with old space. SpaceX blows stuff up on the regular just to see what went boom. And they absorb the cost themselves. They don't fly something that has proven itself fully before. It's clear this approach works. If they can do it while not wasting billions, why can't Boeing?
And "it will cost the vendor money" should really not factor into safety decisions.
1. NASA manager Steve Stich said there's a relatively wide "band of uncertainty" in how risky a Starliner return is. Some (many?) NASA engineers are at the high end of the band and are advocating a return on Dragon instead. Boeing is obviously at the low end of the band and thinks it is a low risk.
The problem is, the data doesn't rule out either side of the band. So they are trying to get more data to narrow the uncertainty (in either or both directions). [Interestingly enough, the data from the White Sands testing made them more worried because it revealed the Teflon seal deformation.]
But my sense is that if they don't narrow the uncertainty (i.e., convince the NASA engineers) then they will very likely choose a Dragon return. That is, it sounds like if nothing changes, the astronauts are coming down on Dragon.
2. Stich said they need to decide by mid-August, in order to have time to prepare the Crew-9 launch for Sept 24th. So we'll know by then.
3. They emphasized that (a) the thruster problems are all fixable (given time), and (b) that even if Starliner returns without a crew, they will have learned enough from the test to potentially certify the capsule for regular service. This is probably the only way they'll be able to keep Boeing as a provider. A redo of this mission would cost Boeing half a billion dollars, easy. And since the contract is fixed-price, this would just add to Boeing's losses. So I expect they will certify Starliner even if it comes down without a crew.
4. In some ways, Starliner is being held to a higher standard than Dragon Crew-2. If Starliner were the only vehicle available, NASA and the astronauts would absolutely take the small risk and come down with a crew. But since Dragon is available, I think NASA is thinking, "why take the risk?"
5. There's a huge difference between how NASA engineers and lay people look at this issue. Many people (particularly on Twitter) have a binary safe/not-safe view of the situation. Either Starliner is safe or it is not. Either the astronauts are stranded or they are not. But the engineering perspective is all about dealing with uncertainty. What is the probability of a bad result? Is the risk worth the reward? Even worse, everything is a trade-off. Sometimes trying to mitigate a risk causes an unintended effect that increases risk (e.g., a bug fix that causes a bug).
I don't envy the engineers, either at NASA or at Boeing.