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Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by amluto on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:13PM (#50569705)
On a very very quick read, the bug is that EVP_EncodeBlock malfunctions if the input is larger than ~3GB. EVP_EncodeBlock is a function that encodes base64.

https://docs.openssl.org/1.0.2/man3/EVP_EncodeInit/

As a seasoned C programmer, I can immediately observe that the whole API is bad: the caller is expected to calculate the buffer length in their own, using a nontrivial formula, and the caller does not pass in the output buffer length, so the implementation cannot validate it. But apparently OpenSSL 4 also implemented it wrong and wrote (possibly far) past the end of the buffer.

You should probably assume that, if you are running anything that can be convinced to use this API to encode a very long blob as base64, then you are in trouble. I don’t know why a modern server would do this.

BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by kvuj on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:24PM (#50569772)
> EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in f and of length dlen and stores it in t. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of output data will be produced. If dlen is not divisible by 3 then the block is encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is created plus 1 byte for a NUL terminator (i.e. 25 bytes in total). The length of the data generated without the NUL terminator is returned from the function.

My god, you only see this type of horrendous API in C don't you.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:29PM (#50569799)
What's "horrendous"? I don't see anything which stands out as being wrong. It specifies exactly the lengths of input and output.

gets(), on the other hand, that is "horrendous".

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by kvuj on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:33PM (#50569818)
Perhaps I'm just used to having programmed in C# professionally for a little bit, but these sorts of APIs where you have to do a calculation to determine the destination buffer size make me feel like a caveman. A minuscule typo and you get a CVE like this.

I know, I know, C is low level and high performance, but surely in the year of our lord 2026, we could have come out with something simpler.

Horrendous is a strong word, you're right.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by JSR_FDED on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:49AM (#50570647)
You should be comparing with assembly language, not C#.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by uecker on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:06AM (#50570768)
One can abstract buffer handling away in C just fine, eliminating all those problems. I don't know why programmers insist on open-coding low-level buffer management.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by eptcyka on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:28AM (#50570884)
Yes, of course, this isn’t C, this is just another case of people writing C wrong.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by stavros on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:10AM (#50572087)
Perhaps we could use another language, where it's not so easy (or possible) to write it wrong?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by uecker on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:39AM (#50577484)
It is also easy to write it wrong.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pjmlp on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:26AM (#50571304)
Not even that is usable as excuse, only those that never tried out the systems programming languages that either predated C, or where equally developed during the 1970's outside Bell Labs and UNIX ecosystem.

You could have come with something simpler in PL/I.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Ono-Sendai on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:46AM (#50571914)
The proper way to do it is to factor out the length calc into a utility function that the API provides. Also the calculated buffer length is passed in to the function, and an error is returned if it's too small.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by amluto on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:10PM (#50570049)
Even in C, if you have a function that takes an input buffer and output buffer of differing lengths, the right API has the caller pass both lengths.

But yes, gets is worse.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:57PM (#50570346)
takes an input buffer and output buffer of differing lengths, the right API has the caller pass both lengths.

If there is no fixed relationship between the two, then that makes sense; but in this case there is a very simple and well-defined relationship between them. But to specify two lengths which must always agree; and if not, then what? You've effectively invented an additional artificial error condition, an additional branch, and burdened all the callers up the chain to do something, which is a treacherous path to complexity and the production of even more bugs.

Or are you just preaching the same mindless idiocy that lead to Microsoft's memcpy_s() (the "s" is for "stupid")?

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by baq on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:48AM (#50571446)
The artificial error condition is the whole point and the hoops you have to jump through to be able to reach it as you say are reasons to not use C because it’s hard to enforce invariants like this and easy to ignore them with mostly working code. Mostly working was fine last year, it isn’t anymore.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by IanCal on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:28AM (#50571317)
The thing that jumps out to me is that it returns “the size of the output data minus one” but if I’m passing in a pointer it’s on me to make sure there’s enough memory allocated isn’t it? So the caller must make sure it’s calculated this correctly - in which case why return the size? Taking the size as an argument could be safer as you’d be checking the caller calculated enough space too.

(Honest questions in this it’s probably been 20 years since I did c)

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by zzril on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:04AM (#50572521)
That part of the API seems particularly random indeed, especially when comparing it to other EVP_{En,De}code* functions which use the returned int for success/error.

The only reason for such a design I could think of is that the caller would be able to "detect" the overflow by comparing the returned value against the length of the buffer. But that is of course pointless, as the compiler is free to assume a buffer overflow cannot happen and thus optimize the check away...

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by td521534f12 on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:02PM (#50570002)
"No way to prevent this" say users of only language where this regularly happens

https://xeiaso.net/blog/series/no-way-to-prevent-this/

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cesarb on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:29AM (#50570526)
> My god, you only see this type of horrendous API in C don't you.

This is the appropriate place to put a link to this pair of classics on API design:

"How Do I Make This Hard to Misuse?" https://ozlabs.org/~rusty/index.cgi/tech/2008-03-30.html

"What If I Don't Actually Like My Users?" https://ozlabs.org/~rusty/index.cgi/tech/2008-04-01.html

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:15AM (#50574226)
gets belongs in category -10
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Ekaros on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:17AM (#50571677)
It makes lot of sense when you think what encoding here does. Changes 3 arbitrary bytes to 4 bytes with only some values being possible. Null termination is one issue, but the output is a string such only length of the text itself makes sense.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by vlovich123 on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:31PM (#50569805)
> BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away.

We’ve known this for well over two decade since heartbleed yet for some reason Linux distros haven’t migrated off of it

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dcrazy on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:36PM (#50569844)
For those too young to remember 2014, Heartbleed led to both BoringSSL and LibreSSL being forked from OpenSSL.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by morkalork on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:21PM (#50570130)
TIL it's 2036
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by wahern on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:14AM (#50570447)
To be fair, frustrations with OpenSSL long preceded Heartbleed. Heartbleed was just the final straw for those who forked libressl and BoringSSL.

And to be fair to OpenSSL, it was one of the first widely used crypto libraries, along with Netscape's NSS. Setting aside the reasonablebess of the initial choices, the rapid uptake meant those choices were difficult if not impossible to completely unwind, particularly the style and typing of parameters and error reporting. Even today debates rage about signed vs unsigned, etc, in C and other languages. (But suffice it to say there are still alot of unforced errors, IMO, such as implicit output buffer sizes.)

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by stock_toaster on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:57AM (#50570695)
And also led to Amazon's s2n-tls being released around 2015 too as I call.

EDIT: found the release announcement - June 2015 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-s2n-a-new-...

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by anygivnthursday on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:58AM (#50572004)
AWS-LC[0] itself a fork of BoringSSL, it makes it feel safer for those behind ALBs (but looks like this CVE may not be TLS related).

[0]: https://github.com/aws/aws-lc

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by b112 on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:50AM (#50571027)
I wonder. Realistically, Boring and Libre haven't taking off. I measure that by most use and default deploys. But with LLMs, we may be entering a new world.

In that world, certainly some projects may be impervious to fixes. We've all seen projects that basically eschew all change, and ignore issue trackers, and are basically dead.

But the ones which still live? Eventually this first wave of LLM derived fixes will get through the old churn. Presumably, code will improve dramatically. If that's so, OpenSSL will become "good code". And the same with old legacy projects which are still hanging around.

Meaning... will legacy simply exist forever? Our two forks above will likely fade away, if openssl's code becomes clean as can be.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by p_l on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:48AM (#50571443)
BoringSSL is somewhat widely used because Google baked it into their projects (and partially by Microsoft, I believe they made a FIPS variant of it and used it in Go?)

LibreSSL had, IIRC, problem known as OpenBSD-itis. Or to put it bluntly, the developers didn't really care about any other platform. Plus I will admit that being the first and loud "we will fix openssl" they got linked with some loud PR that showed less understanding of code they mocked than OpenSSL developer who wrote it, and that's really impressive when you consider some of the mocked code fragments were results of developers never reading foundational documentation for a platform

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by rustyhancock on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:07AM (#50572064)
> LibreSSL had, IIRC, problem known as OpenBSD-itis. Or to put it bluntly, the developers didn't really care about any other platform.

If you ever try to use libreSSL you rub up against so much friction that most projects would hammer out early.

Well put. This is the crux of the issue.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by anthk on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:45AM (#50573936)
There's LibreSSL portable. It worked better in legacy machines I own, go figure.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by vlovich123 on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:43AM (#50577566)
We used BoringSSL at Cloudflare. I imagine there’s a lot of usage in places you can’t see despite it not seeing more adoption. One place you can see it is all browsers use it since Chromium bundles it everywhere except Apple but Apple’s OSes use it to underpin their Network.framework which underpins WkWebview so all Apple devices use it.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dcrazy on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:53AM (#50577778)
Seriously, at this point BoringSSL is surely more widely deployed than OpenSSL? A billion Apple devices, plus every Chrome installation?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by DANmode on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:33AM (#50570544)
Not breaking userspace is more important than security………
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Skunkleton on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:10AM (#50571166)
"not breaking userspace" refers to kernel development. OpenSSL is userspace.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by charcircuit on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:15AM (#50571213)
And this is why the Linux Desktop will never go mainstream. You should never break apps at all, the OS's API surface goes beyond just the kernel.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pluralmonad on Friday November 20, 2026 @06:35AM (#50573269)
The Linux desktop is already mainstream. It has been a first class GUI experience for awhile now. Not to mention the endless papercuts in the proprietary OS's stemming from enshittification (Windows generally) or absurdly poor design (hello Finder).
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by yjftsjthsd-h on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:19AM (#50571245)
Paraphrasing to "don't make breaking API/ABI changes for projects consuming your API/ABI" doesn't materially change a reasonable point. (And I generally agree with that point, although I confess openssl specifically really strains my view)
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by DANmode on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:12AM (#50573635)
> OpenSSL is userspace.

If only it kept itself to that…

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by vasco on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:12AM (#50571177)
Yeah, we all know users would rather be reliably hacked than unreliably safe.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:02AM (#50572514)
Users would rather risk getting hacked than have a computer that doesn't boot or doesn't go on the internet. If they preferred the latter they'd unplug it.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by TeMPOraL on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:40AM (#50572813)
Correct. You can plan around reliable insecurity and stay safe. You cannot ensure safety (or security) of unreliable software.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by asveikau on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:04PM (#50577997)
The forks of OpenSSL are fairly API compatible with upstream, especially if you're not using new and exotic features. So for many projects you can just link to a better maintained fork and be done.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by CrimsonCape on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:25AM (#50570871)
I just don't get it; this is a task to hand to an LLM, "go rebuild OpenSSL, use Rust (no mistakes)" and have it churn through a greenfield implementation. Then open a PR =). Why hasn't this happened yet? The fact that the LLM will write tests and deal with all the compiler errors probably puts it lightyears ahead.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by b112 on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:39AM (#50570963)
LLMs have a bottleneck, human review. And human review is absolutely required at this stage (the future is unknown). A rust built LLM only reviewed SSL library would be a recipe for disaster.

Beyond that, when it comes to exceptionally complex APIs, forward thinking implementation, and revising the 'way things are done'? These are weak points for LLMs. If you don't know how to write OpenSSL(or its replacement), and don't understand all its quirks, and the entire industry surrounding it, you cannot be the human driving the LLM successfully.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pseudohadamard on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:54AM (#50571494)
> A rust built LLM only reviewed SSL library would be a recipe for disaster.

There was a great quote at this year's OpenSSL conference that went something like "LLMs if left to their own devices will reinvent sendmail".

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by hobo123 on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:31AM (#50577312)
Is that Zawinsky's law of LLMs?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by fock on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:46AM (#50571007)
you don't get credit for that because it is clear you are not very skillful at what AI-bros value most, namely manipulating other nerds...

if you lok at the commit history of OpenSSL, you can easily notice how a lot of people started contributing once their clanker got up to speed. They are very happy to rip out weird C and replace it with assembler or intrinsics. Rip out lists of characters formatted as a single string and replace them with array syntax, each char quoted.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by brianpane on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:58AM (#50571079)
There’s already a Rust TLS library, rustls, that’s relatively mature (10 years in development, a couple of paid maintainers, robust development and release processes). It’s not a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL, though. There’s a companion project to build an OpenSSL-compatible wrapper API for it, but that’s not as far along. Interestingly, while rustls has a plug-in API that lets you choose your favorite Rust encryption library for the low-level operations (aws-lc-rs, Ring, Graviola, etc), those libraries all tend to contain a lot of assembly … not just for speed, but because it’s easier to avoid side channel timing vulnerabilities in assembly.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dralley on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:39AM (#50571386)
The side channels issue is where rust crypto libraries are currently the weakest
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by zelphirkalt on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:46AM (#50571430)
Can you explain why it is easier to avoid side-channel timing attacks in assembly?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tecleandor on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:58AM (#50571516)
I guess it's easier to control the timing of your operations if you write them directly in assembly. Otherwise, the compiler optimizations could change the code in unexpected ways.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by jbarberu on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:58AM (#50571518)
Compilers like to make code go brrr as much as they can. With crypto you want the code to run at a deterministic speed (execution time), regardless of input. With hand written assembly you can (more easily) make sure you have the same cycle count regardless of what the input is.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by HappMacDonald on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:59AM (#50571524)
At a guess, because it is easier to control timing in assembly than in a higher level language that will compile your source code into whatever shape it feels like
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:11AM (#50574197)
It's still impossible to control actual timing, but easy to ensure control flow isn't data-dependent, which is what you need. Classic example is memcmp. Although you can write the or-then-check-zero memcmp in any high level language and it's very unlikely to compile to data-dependent timing unless your compiler is AGI.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cesarb on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:41AM (#50575287)
> Although you can write the or-then-check-zero memcmp in any high level language and it's very unlikely to compile to data-dependent timing unless your compiler is AGI.

No need for "AGI", the compiler just needs to have enough value tracking to know that the value saturates (once a bit is set, it never gets unset), and an heuristic to move the comparison inside the loop when it might allow it to do less loop iterations.

(I wrote a Rust crate to do precisely that kind of "constant time memcmp", and the only truly reliable way to do so without help of the compiler, is by using inline assembly as a "black box" to make a few things invisible to the compiler's optimizer. It was inspired by code in the Linux kernel which did the same thing also using inline assembly as a "black box".)

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:35PM (#50569831)
if the input is larger than ~1.5GB.

...on a system where ints are 32 bits. The bottom line is that this doesn't appear to be easily exploitable and IMHO it should be the callers of EVP_EncodeBlock which need to be inspected to determine the actual risk.

using a nontrivial formula

It's base64. 4/3 expansion; round it up and add padding. What's "nontrivial" about that?

and the caller does not pass in the output buffer length, so the implementation cannot validate it

Not necessary, because the caller is responsible for allocation.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by mrheosuper on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:54PM (#50569945)
The question can be reduce to "who do the length validation".

In my case, if i write a public-facing API, i never trust the caller will do the correct thing, thus the caller must provide all the critical parameters, and i must validate all of them.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:50PM (#50570319)
The question can be reduce to "who do the length validation".

At the boundary where untrusted input becomes trusted. This is commonly known as the sanitisation/validation layer.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by amluto on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:04AM (#50570383)
> It's base64. 4/3 expansion; round it up and add padding. What's "nontrivial" about that?

If you mean ceil(inlen * 4/3) + 1 (even if you use exact arithmetic), then you are passing too small a buffer and you will overflow. Which, I think, proves my point.

You should not need to read the manpage of a function you are calling in order to determine whether you have passed a large enough buffer to avoid overflow.

Reading the manpage to get the function to not return an error would be a different story.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:11AM (#50570428)
If you mean ceil(inlen * 4/3) + 1 (even if you use exact arithmetic), then you are passing too small a buffer and you will overflow.

If you let untrusted input reach inlen and overflow that computation, you have already failed:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50570319

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by amluto on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:08AM (#50571148)
Are you saying that any code that base64’s a string of attacker-controlled length is a mistake?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Pinus on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:23AM (#50571278)
I think userbinator thought that you meant that the calculation would overflow, while I think you meant that the calculation, even if not overflowing, would return the wrong value under some conditions and that subsequent code would then overflow the buffer.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dns_snek on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:36AM (#50575222)
[delayed]
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by sweetjuly on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:38AM (#50570568)
I am confused why you make out 32 bit int as being rare. Almost all devices that you'd reasonably connect to the internet at this point have int as 32 bits
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by landr0id on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:42PM (#50569866)
>As a seasoned C programmer, I can immediately observe that the whole API is bad: the caller is expected to calculate the buffer length in their own, using a nontrivial formula, and the caller does not pass in the output buffer length, so the implementation cannot validate it. But apparently OpenSSL 4 also implemented it wrong and wrote (possibly far) past the end of the buffer.

Many such cases.

I expect we'll see some fun libyuv bugs soon in applications which decode media. The APIs are begging for misuse.

https://chromium.googlesource.com/libyuv/libyuv/+/refs/heads...

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by teunispeters on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:04PM (#50570013)
I like to declare that industry coding standards such as MISRA exist precisely because code bases like OpenSSL (specifically) exist, as it's such a good example of breaking every sensible rule in the standards.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by octoberfranklin on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:28PM (#50570169)
This is really embarrassing because this isn't even ancient code.

OpenSSL has been around a long time and has a lot of legacy code, but this is in OpenSSL 4.x only -- stuff that was written in the last ~year.

If they don't have the manpower to write new code safely they should just stick to maintaining what they've already written.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by fock on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:48AM (#50571021)
and now guess who helped writing this code. the chicken are coming home to roost, but people who are happy about their youthful productivity or stock packages will not be able to notice...

If my googling found the PR supposed to fix this, the code before this PR included the check. But that was old code!

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by kroeckx on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:32AM (#50572278)
This code has been there since the first commit in git history, from 1998.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by socketcluster on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:42AM (#50570983)
> BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs.

Fully agree with your assessment above that line, but damn, this is a strong statement for a library this ubiquitous. You wonder; how could this happen? And yet, as an open source developer myself, I know how little people care about code quality.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Gigachad on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:45AM (#50570999)
We have known this since at least heartbleed. The answer was that basically no one funds the project and it had only one developer.

All these trillion dollar tech companies have been leaching off open source for free and never contributed back to the projects they rely on.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by socketcluster on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:22AM (#50571273)
It's insane. I maintain a small open source project with only about 100k downloads per week and in terms of funding, it's crickets for me but I assumed projects like OpenSSL which probably every human being on the planet uses daily would get some funding.

Then I read articles about billionaires donating millions or even billions to various (sometimes frivolous) charities and I wonder WTF.

The numbers just don't add up. It's like there is an invisible force field preventing people from donating money to open source?

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by avhception on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:03AM (#50571557)
I would very much like for my employer, who benefits massively, to donate. However, the people in charge of the money decisions don't know anything about software and don't want to be lectured by me. They have _important business stuff_ to do. Sigh.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:08AM (#50574176)
Plus it would bring literally no benefit to your company .
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by throwaway2037 on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:30AM (#50571776)
OpenSSL receives millions of dollars of funding each year. The corporation that runs the foundation reported 5.5M USD funding in 2024[1], and 5.0M USD funding in 2025[2]. These days, OpenSSL is well-funded.

From your HN bio, I guess this is your project: https://socketcluster.io/

From the home page, I see that you are sponsored by two different companies. To me, "in terms of funding, it's crickets for me" isn't an honest statement.

If funding is such a problem for you, why don't you use a non-open source license, e.g., Business Source License? This would allow non-commercial projects to use your software for free, but commercial users need to pay. There are a bunch of big, important open source projects that already changed: HashiCorp, CockroachDB, MariaDB, etc.

[1] https://openssl-corporation.org/blog/2025-02-14-annual-repor...

[2] https://www.openssl-corporation.org/assets/Annual-Report-202...

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Datagenerator on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:11AM (#50572094)
Interesting, three years no new Release necessary of SocketCluster? That must be quite stable, congrats!
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by josefx on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:39AM (#50572330)
From my understanding the problem was never that OpenSSL had no money, but that all the money it had was tied to services and features that didn't help improve the libraries overall security and in some cases where even outright harmful.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by throwaway2037 on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:06AM (#50574148)
Historically that was true, but it has improved in the last few years.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pixl97 on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:06AM (#50575694)
This is really the same for most enterprise software. Customers pay for features , I guess they think the security is implied, but more features at a rapid pace typically ruins long term security.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by throooooo on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:51AM (#50572422)
I don't believe BSL = commerical issues have to pay. Typically it means that the code can be used internally, but not distributed or resold as a service.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by drcongo on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:40AM (#50572334)
If you're a white supremacist, you can get tens of millions donated to your dotfiles.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by quibono on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:13AM (#50573652)
What's this about?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cesarb on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:28AM (#50575112)
I'm not the parent poster, but I believe it was a reference to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omarchy#Funding_and_controvers...
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by nopurpose on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:03AM (#50573554)
AFAIK donation distribution is still unsolved problem. That is there is no single org business can donate $1M to and have it distributed among all the projects business identified it relies on.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by k_sze on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:31AM (#50571339)
Honest question: shall free software licenses be changed to force large corporations to sponsor free software projects adequately?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pbowyer on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:47AM (#50571439)
I certainly think so, but we who think this get shouted down because "It's not Open Source(TM)".
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:07AM (#50574159)
Have you ever wondered who's in charge of choosing what counts as Open Source(TM)? Look no farther: https://opensource.org/sponsors

Yes, that Automattic. Yes, that Google, AWS and Cisco. Yes, that Microsoft. There are one or two entities in this list I don't mind but... damn.

It's time to retire the phrase "open source" and go back to "free software". Not many people know "open source" was originally coined by corporations who didn't want anything to do with freedom.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tsimionescu on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:16AM (#50574967)
The FSF would say the exact same. So this point is moot, unless you think Richard Stallman is a corporate shill.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cesarb on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:26AM (#50575077)
Not many people seem to know that the definition of "open source" they use (the OSD) is actually the definition of "free software" Debian uses (the DFSG) with the serial numbers filed off.

The problem with "free software" lies exclusively with the English language; other languages don't have the same issue due to having separate words for "freedom" and "zero price".

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by hobo123 on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:22AM (#50577127)
That's why some prefer calling it "libre software."

Also see LibreOffice.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:43AM (#50577572)
Debian is free to use any inclusion criteria it wants - especially since it still includes software thst doesn't meet the criteria. It shouldn't become the global default definition of "open source" though.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by ozgrakkurt on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:51AM (#50571466)
This is backwards imo, it is related to people that chose to build these projects. Everyone might have a different decision on it.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by throwaway2037 on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:42AM (#50571882)
Many important open source projects have already switched to Business Source License. However, they only switched after they became famous. I have not seen any projects that became famous that started with BSL.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by throwaway7356 on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:52AM (#50572427)
> Many important open source projects have already switched to Business Source License.

No: first not "many", but very few. And second they are proprietary projects.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by saghm on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:52AM (#50574666)
Some of us have the radical opinion that the definition of open source isn't what a specific organization (with no trademark on the term) dictates, but whether the source is open.

Other people express strong opposition to the idea that "open" might just mean the same thing as "available" in the context of open source. None of those people have proposed a more coherent definition that I've seen of what that word means in that specific phrase though.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by V__ on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:52AM (#50575470)
I often hear this criticism and "bait-and-switch" is also mentioned. At the same time, when you have a small project or tool only used by a handful of people the risk of it being hacker or not responding in time is very different to a project which is essential to the whole world. I don't now what a realistic solution would look like though.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by mike_hearn on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:15AM (#50572136)
A free software license is by definition a license that doesn't place requirements on anyone to pay for it, sponsor it, contribute or otherwise. If a license didn't grant these freedoms, it wouldn't be a free software license.

What you're asking is, should widely used libraries be proprietary software sold for money? And that is indeed an honest question. There's a huge ecosystem of developers out there who say yes, there's nothing special about that idea at all.

For example, on Apple, Google and Microsoft platforms you don't use OpenSSL when writing native apps. You use the vendor's cryptography APIs. The licenses of Windows and macOS force all users large or small to pay for them. On Android, the native crypto provider is Conscrypt:

https://github.com/google/conscrypt/

... which is open source, but you will notice that it doesn't accept outside contributions and is funded by revenue from Android's proprietary components licensing. So that's very close to the model you're suggesting: it's "open source" but in practice large corporations pay Google lots of money for the privilege of shipping it.

Moreover Google fund BoringSSL and other forks of OpenSSL. The issue here isn't funding levels (anymore). The issue is that OpenSSL is written in C, and not very good C at that.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by aaronmdjones on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:27AM (#50572719)
Minor nitpick, but at least as far as the GNU GPL goes, it explicitly allows you to charge for software distribution when the software came bundled with a tangible item (like the firmware of an IoT device). The distributor can require you to pay them to get it. This was more common in the old days when software mostly came on CD-ROMs and you'd be getting another physical item in the mail, but the provision remains in the GPLv3 under section 6(b)(1) as an option that the distributor can require.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:05AM (#50574141)
It has to be the reasonable costs of distribution. It can't just be an arbitrary fee.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tsimionescu on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:13AM (#50574932)
Not exactly. You can charge whatever you like for the software - but whoever buys it from you is then allowed to give it away for free to anyone else, so this is only a theoretical possibility.

The thing you're allowed to charge for but only a reasonable amount is to provide the sources to software you have previously distributed, for free or otherwise. If I get some binaries from you and then request the sources too, under the GPL, you are forced to provide them, but you can ask for a fee to cover the transfer costs.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:57AM (#50572476)
Yes, they should do this. Howvee, they'd stop being considered free software and open source.

Alternatively they can put such large share-back requirements that corporations don't want to use it and would rather pay for an alternate license. SSPL and to a lesser extent AGPL achieve this.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by LytraX on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:47AM (#50571437)
Not allo companies loot OS projects with no contributions. M$ has contributes back to many OS projects and Google has dozens of OS projects themselves.

And when Redis changed their license for such reasons, companies and people united to create ValKey or even the Centos/Rocky linux situation.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by mradalbert on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:36AM (#50571831)
Redis cloud would cost you arm and leg compared to self hosting. I gives me an idea why big tech was not keen on making business with them
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by mfru on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:46AM (#50571911)
big tech can spare a few arms and legs, though
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:59AM (#50572489)
AWS has 90% profit margins and still millions of customers.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by StilesCrisis on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:21AM (#50574279)
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/

All yours! Use it to your heart's content.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by coliveira on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:57AM (#50574731)
If you think about it, giant corporations are making gobbles of money from people who wrote software for free and in their free time. And they still complain when it doesn't work as they expected. Why they didn't fund a better version of OpenSSL?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by rwmj on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:29AM (#50571772)
If you've ever tried using OpenSSL you'll know that it's true.

The API is a fractal of bad design. Not just that, but because of the API refusing to make sensible choices, it forces everyone using it to be an expert in cryptography, with predictable results on those programs that use it.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by throwaway2037 on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:35AM (#50571826)

    > And yet, as an open source developer myself, I know how little people care about code quality.
This is a weird statement. I am someone who has worked on closed-source internal enterprise software for my entire career. Universally, the internal source is worse that the numerous open source libraries that we use. If anything, open source has "more eyeballs" than closed source, so the code quality will be better.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by firesteelrain on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:19AM (#50575903)
I don’t know. If you are using all the tools at your disposal like linting, static analysis, dynamic analysis, DAST (if web), fuzzing, SCA, etc and correcting your code for the findings, dispositioning and correcting them can that really be said? Open source doesn’t always
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by alienbaby on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:36AM (#50571832)
I remember a long time ago reading openssl was dumpster file code quality wise. I guess it was just built that way and never improved.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by secondcoming on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:23AM (#50572684)
I wanted to see how OpenSSL handles the x64 instructions to accelerate SHA1 hashing and it turns out the assembly code is generated by a perl script.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by actionfromafar on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:42AM (#50572836)
That's not automatically bad, in fact it can be better than just inlining the instructions.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:09AM (#50574183)
That's normal, if outdated - you'd use Python in anything written since 2010
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pseudohadamard on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:07AM (#50574848)
Assuming you mean x86, that part was originally written around 30 years ago via this funky setup that did MD5 and SHA-1 from the same code. It's not really any kind of example of current practice.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by secondcoming on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:36AM (#50576277)
No, the SHA-NI instructions
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by topspin on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:04AM (#50572035)
> You wonder; how could this happen?

It all came from a bad place. OpenSSL grew from primitives created by cryptographers. Cryptographers are great, and they make fabulous things. But almost none of the understand software development or care a great deal about the mundane matters of API design.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pixl97 on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:10AM (#50575754)
Mathematician: "Um, just ignore that infinity symbol there"
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by yayachiken on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:11AM (#50572101)
SSL/TLS has always been a wonky and complicated standard built upon other wonky standards like x509 and ASN.1 (for PKI) that nobody would touch unless they are forced to.

There is a reason why people did not do a lot of TLS (outside of anything involving monetary transactions) before Firesheep, the NSA leaks were the final nail in the coffin for unencrypted HTTP. On top of that Let's Encrypt and ACME did not exist, so TLS was behind a paywall on top of that.

And then everything proliferated relatively quick even for tech standards. I guess people grabbed onto the next available tooling just like a drowning person would take any piece of driftwood.

Not so fun fact: AFAIK the openssl binary was initially explicitly meant to be only used for testing. That is why its command line is so strange. It was initially meant to expose a couple of low-level primitives, not to implement workflows. One example would be the openssl-ca man page, which explicitly mentions this. People didn't care because unfortunately you could somehow do everything you could ever want with the openssl binary and I guess that is also something how the impression stuck that openssl is the most advanced library.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Woodi on Friday November 20, 2026 @06:55AM (#50573480)
> Not so fun fact: AFAIK the openssl binary was initially explicitly meant to be only used for testing.

I'm in shock ! Someone noticed ! Thanks man ! :)

In the meantime in real world IT :>>

line 57: https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/blob/master/acme....

line 306: "This script requires openssl binary" https://github.com/dehydrated-io/dehydrated/blob/master/dehy...

Pretty recommended scripts :)

And I'm sure there are more and not only for ACME, for example I'm sure I saw few examples in production setup docs from IBM and Redhat... :>

Yes, openssl library is wholesale backdoor, subtype: footgun.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:57AM (#50572474)
Because you don't roll your own SSL.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by perbu on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:28AM (#50572723)
How it happened? A lot of features in OpenSSL was written as part of a PhD and dumped in the repo without any thought about long term maintainability or quality. Now, during the last 5 years or so, people have been trying to straighten it out, but this is a pretty daunting task.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pseudohadamard on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:35AM (#50574458)
A related problem is that the IETF's RFC production center (that's its actual name) is manufacturing new RFCs far beyond the capability of anyone to keep up, and every half-assed idea anyone ever has or that some vendor pays an IETF consultant to turn into an RFC for them ends up getting bolted onto OpenSSL, which serves as the AB-positive universal recipient that everyone tests their ideas on, typically in a half-finished, barely-tested form of which Heartbleed was the prime example. It's not even a Red Queen problem because no matter how hard you run you're still falling behind each time.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by bjackman on Friday November 20, 2026 @06:10AM (#50573065)
I'd like to point you to: https://www.haproxy.com/blog/state-of-ssl-stacks

Among the deeply technical and highly credible and detailed articles I've read in my life, it's definitely the spiciest. At the end:

> It is often said that fixing a problem requires smarter minds than those who created that problem. When the problem was architected by a team with strong convictions about the solution‘s correctness, it seems extremely unlikely that the resolution will come from the team that created that problem in the first place. The lack of progress in the latest releases tends to confirm these unfortunate hypotheses. The only path forward seems to be for the team to revert some of the major changes that plague the 3.x versions, but discussions suggest that this is out of the equation for them.

IOW this extremely strong claim does seem to be supported by extremely credible actors.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by StilesCrisis on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:17AM (#50574245)
Google forked OpenSSL in 2014 (BoringSSL) with a pretty similar rationale, stated more diplomatically.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by hobo123 on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:27AM (#50577226)
I just wanted to check what became of the original LibreSSL fork. Google forked it into Boring SSL, that's what happened.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by AndyMcConachie on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:33AM (#50577365)
LibreSSL is still going strong.

https://www.libressl.org/releases.html

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by asveikau on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:59AM (#50577905)
If you use OpenBSD that's what you get in the base system.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by asveikau on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:58AM (#50577887)
Many people are using forks that are mostly API compatible. So the ubiquity is not as huge a problem as it used to be.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by gspr on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:46AM (#50571003)
> BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away.

Well sure, but the world doesn't seem to be able to agree on, or put resources into, a strong contender.

I'm usually for heterogeneity and diversity in the software ecosystem, but for cryptography I'd be happy with a single high-quality "anointed path". Because cryptography.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:04AM (#50572532)
other commenters mentioned boringssl (used in Go?), LibreSSL (used in BSD), rustls (used in Rust)
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by gspr on Friday November 20, 2026 @06:57AM (#50573504)
> boringssl

"Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability." (Their README).

> LibreSSL

That does indeed still seem like the most promising avenue. But it is "just" a fork of OpenSSL.

> rustls

... which relies on one of two crates with zero regard for long term support. "Latest release or bust" doesn't cut it for crypto.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:24AM (#50573744)
You do need to keep TLS up to date as the network changes around you.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by gspr on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:35AM (#50574454)
> You do need to keep TLS up to date as the network changes around you.

Yes. Which is precisely why you need cryptographic libraries that take long term support seriously and don't just fix whatever the latest version is.

> Just recently you needed to block eMudhra intermediate certificates.

Why on earth is your TLS library responsible for your CA certificate database?!

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by cowlevel on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:48AM (#50577669)
Because it's a TLS feature? That's what people want from TLS libraries? They say connect, and if it succeeds it's secure?
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Gibbon1 on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:08AM (#50571149)
What's obnoxious is the WG14 standard committee could have at any time in the last 40 years provided a standard slice and buffer type that would go a long way to discourage trash API's like this one.

I swear it's de rigueur in C that if an operation requires 5 parameters to insure the operation is error free than the function shall only take 4 parameters.

Rewriting the function with idiot mode disabled

int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX ctx, buffer_t out, const slice_t in);

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by adev_ on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:31AM (#50571338)
> What's obnoxious is the WG14 standard committee could have at any time in the last 40 years

Or just use bloody C++ that solved that years ago with std::span.

Unfortunately, many C dev prefers whining about "How horribly bloated" C++ is instead of using the part that makes sense.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by Gibbon1 on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:42AM (#50571408)
There are very few reasons to start a greenfield project in C++ at this point.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by adev_ on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:51AM (#50571467)
There are plenty of reasons to start a greenfield C++ project in 2026.

Providing C compatible APIs is one of them.

However, I do not see any reasons to start a plain C user space project in 2026. Excepted if you are embedded / kernel dev.

Everything advantage you do have in C (portability, compatibility, memory control).... you have them in Modern C++, but better.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by TuxSH on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:38AM (#50571843)
> embedded

Nintendo has been writing their OSes (3DS and Switch 1/Switch 2) fully in C++ (microkernel included), so not even this is an excuse to use C over C++.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by 0points on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:48AM (#50571450)
The world would be better off without yet another newly slopped C/C++ app.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by zzril on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:15AM (#50572618)
How dare you give your parameters names of multiple characters!
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by baq on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:13AM (#50571193)
One of the ‘rewrite it in rust’ projects that should really cause anyone to be offended IMHO.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by p_l on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:50AM (#50571462)
The problem with "rewrite this in Rust" is more that Rust has laughable amount of Tier 1 platforms.

Now, rewrite in Ada, given that GNAT supports the same targets as rest of GCC...

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by baq on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:55AM (#50571501)
Completely agreed but I’ll take any improvement at this point however small
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by anthk on Friday November 20, 2026 @06:07AM (#50573039)
There's gcc-rs too but at a slower pace than mainline/official Rust.

On security, both clang and gcc have security flags for this and Boehmgc (or even mimalloc) can be temporally used as a replacement to avoid nasty surprises.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by 0xbadcafebee on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:53AM (#50571483)
[delayed]
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by ozgrakkurt on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:04AM (#50571562)
Even the discussion in the PR about not handling the errors in all call-sites is revealing imo.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dataflow on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:46AM (#50572860)
[delayed]
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by mort96 on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:59AM (#50572486)
I've been annoyed by writing code against OpenSSL's APIs before, precisely because it expects me to provide "appropriately sized buffers" without documenting the correct way to compute the correct size very well.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by ronfriedhaber on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:00AM (#50572490)
> BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away.

Well, it depends. if in the coming weeks many more Heartbleed-level vulnerabilities would be exposed, {Amazon, Google, OpenAI, Anthropic} can just rewrite it in Rust, formally verified.

There does not exist such implementation as of now as OpenSSL was good enough, AI may expose so many security flaws it would no longer be good enough.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by znpy on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:15AM (#50572617)
> BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away.

Yep, this is not news. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LibreSSL was forked off OpenSSL now more than ten years ago to address exactly these kind of issues, and more (at the price of occasionally taking some drastic measures)

But somehow we're still here.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pak9rabid on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:51AM (#50575440)
See: Lindy effect