And to be fair to OpenSSL, it was one of the first widely used crypto libraries, along with Netscape's NSS. Setting aside the reasonablebess of the initial choices, the rapid uptake meant those choices were difficult if not impossible to completely unwind, particularly the style and typing of parameters and error reporting. Even today debates rage about signed vs unsigned, etc, in C and other languages. (But suffice it to say there are still alot of unforced errors, IMO, such as implicit output buffer sizes.)
EDIT: found the release announcement - June 2015 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-s2n-a-new-...
In that world, certainly some projects may be impervious to fixes. We've all seen projects that basically eschew all change, and ignore issue trackers, and are basically dead.
But the ones which still live? Eventually this first wave of LLM derived fixes will get through the old churn. Presumably, code will improve dramatically. If that's so, OpenSSL will become "good code". And the same with old legacy projects which are still hanging around.
Meaning... will legacy simply exist forever? Our two forks above will likely fade away, if openssl's code becomes clean as can be.
LibreSSL had, IIRC, problem known as OpenBSD-itis. Or to put it bluntly, the developers didn't really care about any other platform. Plus I will admit that being the first and loud "we will fix openssl" they got linked with some loud PR that showed less understanding of code they mocked than OpenSSL developer who wrote it, and that's really impressive when you consider some of the mocked code fragments were results of developers never reading foundational documentation for a platform
If you ever try to use libreSSL you rub up against so much friction that most projects would hammer out early.
Well put. This is the crux of the issue.
Doesn't Firefox use NSS instead?
If only it kept itself to that…
Beyond that, when it comes to exceptionally complex APIs, forward thinking implementation, and revising the 'way things are done'? These are weak points for LLMs. If you don't know how to write OpenSSL(or its replacement), and don't understand all its quirks, and the entire industry surrounding it, you cannot be the human driving the LLM successfully.
There was a great quote at this year's OpenSSL conference that went something like "LLMs if left to their own devices will reinvent sendmail".
if you lok at the commit history of OpenSSL, you can easily notice how a lot of people started contributing once their clanker got up to speed. They are very happy to rip out weird C and replace it with assembler or intrinsics. Rip out lists of characters formatted as a single string and replace them with array syntax, each char quoted.
No need for "AGI", the compiler just needs to have enough value tracking to know that the value saturates (once a bit is set, it never gets unset), and an heuristic to move the comparison inside the loop when it might allow it to do less loop iterations.
(I wrote a Rust crate to do precisely that kind of "constant time memcmp", and the only truly reliable way to do so without help of the compiler, is by using inline assembly as a "black box" to make a few things invisible to the compiler's optimizer. It was inspired by code in the Linux kernel which did the same thing also using inline assembly as a "black box".)
We’ve known this for well over two decade since heartbleed yet for some reason Linux distros haven’t migrated off of it