I said I'd prefer to have something smaller with less Christmas lights.
"Policy is everyone has to have the same laptop, and some people need more graphics power than the one you're asking for."
Turns out there'd been some big thing back and forth already about size and performance and this was the compromise that nobody liked.
"But why does everyone have to have the same laptop?" I asked.
"Well, it's just policy. Every desk has a docking station, and we don't want to have to buy different ones."
So I flipped the selected monstrosity over to reveal the extremely lacking docking connector at the bottom. There were some awkward laughs and I got my Thinkpad.
Like a professional user advocate paid to convince developers that the users do have a point and the request is not impossible.
It never is after you've done it once.
It's hard for people to scope an unknown task - especially dealing with bureaucracy. Is it going to be easy peasy, or will the rabbit hole just keep getting deeper.
Additionally, the ROI for an employee to investigate things like this is not very high, or could be negative. Imagine a poor H1B person - whose life and future depends on a company - trying to chase little things like this down. ("it's ok, I don't need " an ssd; an ergonomic chair; a 17" monitor is fine; etc...)
you're doing good work.
And yes, everybody should read it.
I then proved to management that there was about 5 hours a week being completely wasted for me waiting for my machine to open applications after they crash. So after that we all got new MacBooks that were properly spec'd out for game development. I got to pick the specs :)
You're making iOS games?
laughed at and told to stay later and work weekends.
At far too many companies.
There isn't enough pushback, unfortunately.
This was in 2012 or so, and because of that I was able to learn Objective-C and go on to work on the first version of our native app. It made me a stronger engineer, and allowed the company to have developers who were already familiar with the product and backend services work on native. It was win-win.
Put me in front of a Linux desktop, and I can just start working.
Put me in front of a Windows desktop, give me 30 minutes to set up what I need, and I can start working.
Put me in front of a Mac, and come back to me still yelling at it five hours later.
I'm sure I could learn if it was worth the time to me, but I definitely wouldn't argue that it's superior (for me personally at least).
This confused me a lot as even though I wasn't even close to his level at that time I had no problems living with my Linux machines while my Mac laptop used to drive me crazy every day with some nonsense.
Turns out it is extremely individual. Maybe it is because I'm a keyboard person. When I work efficiently I feel I rarely touch the touchpad. I use fullscreen a lot, I sometimes use virtual desktops a lot etc.
I've always used i3/Sway/Pop!_Shell, or just dealt with windows subpar tiling. I'm picky about terminals as well, so that may have something to do with it. Although Mac's shell is nicer than windows (obviously), I can't stand the built in terminal app.
| 22 <- linux
| 22
| 1111121111 <- macos
| 1 22
|1 22
|122
|000000000000 <- windows
-------------The only good news would be... if apple decides to "reverse course" questing for non-discerning-consumers, all the "crazy ones" will breathe a sigh of relief and buy a pile of new hardware.
I remember when apple gave up on its "apple-inward-looking" powerpc hardware and shipped intel machines. All of a sudden apple machines could run windows too, people could see more possibilities buying apple and the market for apple hardware became much larger very quickly.
Speaking as a web dev on a company-issued Mac, running my local dev environment inside a Parallels Linux VM. I asked to switch to Linux but was turned down.
(Now if Microsoft released LSW, i.e. an Ubuntu-based distro with Windows syscall support via a KVM-hosted NT kernel, I very well might opt for that instead.)
It's not all roses, there is a noticeable performance hit with the filesystem in both WSL and the windows layer. I wouldn't use it for production, and why would you, but for development, it's fine and largely not a problem. If you had to regularly deal with a large numbers of files, say log parsing or compiling, it's probably not going to work.
Besides recent OS X SSL library issues, I've haven't ever run in problems developing on a Mac and have used one for the better part of 10 years now. Can't say the same with developing on Linux (almost exclusively on the graphics side of things, but that's a problem when it's your primary machine).
The issue is that all the policy documents often only contain the One True Way to achieve their goals, while the goals remain unstated. The documents should always come with a rationale. And appending "exceptions may be granted for equivalent or better processes" to requirements would also help. I was faced with a password "security policy" that pretty much only whitelisted SHA2 + salting for password hashing. We were using a time-hard (not memory-hard though) password hashing function instead and several levels of auditors were effectively asking us to downgrade to comply with their policy without even understanding the difference.
It's terribly demotivating to have to argue with people enforcing policy they do not understand and erodes any willingness to engage with those policies instead of seeing them as theater and working around them.
A reason can be argued against while a policy must just be followed. It's probably by design, because as soon as you put a reason that becomes a target and people start to get ideas about why it doesn't apply to them. Much like when web companies disable your account and won't say exactly why. Not gonna take the risk you prove them wrong, are they?
It would be nice though if all laws had a purpose included.
In my Mega Tech corp, we have security team that has created hodge podge of conflicting policies. For example, they ask some applications to be internal network only and other are accessible via web. But they can never provide their reasoning and get annoyed when we ask any details.
The worst part is that some of their policies directly contradict with each other. For example, policy is to never run as root inside docker container but then there are some applications provided by them that runs as root in docker. And every time you use it, you have to remind them that these are their apps or else they will ask you to stop running it as root.
Finally, I had pleasure of talking with one of their Security and Compliance expert. They could not even knew how to list file perms in Linux, and other a lot of basic ideas. This person clearly had memorized interview questions but had clearly no understanding of those concepts.
Only way to hide their incompetence is act elite and don't explain their reasoning.
The fact that policy sponsors are more than anything looking to a single answer to end debate and establish uniformity is why policy writers can copy and paste stuff from the web and get it adopted as policy without a clear rationale connected to the organization’s particular circumstances. They aren't conflicting, alternative explanations.
There's more to it than that. There are two separate groups of reasons:
1. The reasons a policy was put in place. ("Why did we do this?")
2. The reasons a policy succeeds. ("Why is this a good idea?")
You can know the reasons in group 1. But nobody cares about those. What matters are the group 2 reasons, and they were probably never known in the first place.
And as far as I’m aware there still isn’t. No, within the year (might have been a lawsuit, I can’t recall) new policy became everyone’s machine has whole disk encryption. Including engineering. So my software was instantly 30% slower, and a half a day added to setting up any new machine. I don’t know how many times I had to explain that it’s not our code that got slower, the whole company got slower. It took me months of work to get us back to zero.
That person should have been run off and anyone in their dept caught doing the same should have been put on probation. I don’t know how you figure that it’s “fair” for everyone to suffer for the mistakes of one member. In a small team setting? Perhaps. But not for something like this.
It may be doing a poor job at that, but it isn’t punishing you and it isn’t about fairness. It’s trying to prevent a future mistake. And because the company is a single entity, it is the company choosing to bear the cost.
It may make your job harder and they may not modify its expectations properly after imposing this cost on you, but that isn’t punishment or fairness. It is poorly thought out systems.
Full disk encryption is a fair response because it won't be feasible to enumerate every type of situation that results in sensitive data being put on the laptop (such as temporary files or source code). If someone was going to just add tax numbers to a list it leaves a lot out; if they say "sensitive data" it leaves a lot open to interpretation; if they list everything they can think of it'll be impossible to properly comply while still getting work done.
So perhaps it was a heavy handed approach handed down mindlessly, but it could also have been someone looking at the bigger picture. Knowing the intent as others said would help.
Mandating full disk encryption is easy for IT to enforce. A policy of not putting sensitive information on laptops is valuable, but difficult to enforce. Encryption is a sound way to reduce the risk of harm when that policy is inevitably broken.
Full disk encryption also been the company-wide policy of everywhere I've worked in recent memory, fwiw.
3. The outcome we expect. (“What will happen if this is working.”)
A policy's expected outcome is correlated with why a policy was put in place.
As an examnple: If an HN disclosure leaks passwords and email addresses into the public domain, imposing a policy control is _meant_ to have the effect that such a disclosure would not happen again, or if it does to have a limited scope.
Though, I'd imagine that, in many cases, adding reasons would turn a policy pamphlet into a textbook.
This seems like one of those areas where there are unavoidable tradeoffs:
* clear, concise, and rigid policies are easy to communicate and enforce, but frustrate people with better ideas.
* clear, concise, and flexible polices invite a lot of noise from people who think they know more than they do (e.g. can I use my own custom password hash I invented? It has more bits so it must be more secure.). Enforcement is also harder, since now you have to track exceptions.
* policy reasoning is harder to communicate, may never get read, and may actually discourage reading the policy.
Very often part of the purpose of the policy is to end debate about how to handle an issue, and to get the “crackpots and geniuses” to STFU.
That's not a motivation that policy sponsors usually want in print, though.
That's still a significant trade-off: putting together a book with the reasoning would be a lot more expensive than just creating the pamphlet. Your organization might not be able to afford the cost, period, or your boss may not agree to spend all that money just to make a minority of engineers happy in a few narrow cases. Then there's the question of how many people would actually consult the book of rationales; maybe it'd only be a handful.
I'm guessing most organizations tend to pursue a "minimum viable policy" tradeoff: spend as little effort as possible to create a policy that addresses a particular set of high-priority problems (since that is easily justifiable), and ignore more theoretical concerns like worker education and the personality preferences of certain kinds of individuals.
>Then there's the question of how many people would actually consult the book of rationales; maybe it'd only be a handful.
Well, it's supposed to only be a handful: the handful of people who know more than the policymaker.
You need two documents, minimum. One with rules, others to justify them.
Policies very often have official reasons for just this propaganda purpose, but it's worth noting that the reasons cited for the purpose of motivating compliance are often chosen for the specific purpose of how well they are anticipated to motivate compliance and not how well they reflect the actual reasons the policy is adopted, and thus they often are not in practice a good tool for understanding how to challenge the policy effectively.
I used to think this was a rebellious streak but perhaps it's just from that desire to know how things work. Absent a reason, I'll find my own.
A lot of people don't care either way, rules make life simple so there's no need to complicate it further.
And if you talk to people directing policy efforts (who are often not the ones writing, or even actively choosing, policy but generally are the ones formally signing off), you often don't have to dig very far to find that settling discussions is as important of a rationale for the policy as any of the others. This obviously conflicts with ideals like continuous improvement, but it's true lots of places including those with nominal commitments to continuous improvement.
This is a common issue in policies. If you try to accommodate every possible situation then the policy becomes incredibly complicated and difficult to understand let alone follow. If you have a simple policy that is easy to understand, there will inevitably be exceptions where the policy doesn't make sense.
The auditors' policy? Are you sure? An auditor's job is to check if you're doing what you say you should be doing. If you're arguing with an auditor then you're essentially arguing with your own organisation without any hope winning the argument.
An auditor's job is often to check if you're doing what an external standard says you should be doing (SOC 2 => AICPA trust principles; FedRAMP => NIST 800-53, etc.).
Unfortunately, these external standards may be written vaguely and while you may have policies that define X as Y, the auditor doesn't have to accept your answers. For example, when PCI requirement 5 says "Deploy anti-virus software on all systems commonly affected by malicious software (particularly personal computers and servers).", your policy may say "antivirus is not required inside containers that run on platforms like GKE, as these are not commonly affected by malicious software." It's very likely you'll have a discussion about your interpretation of that requirement.
I don't mean to just single out CIS as bad, but recently I learned that Ubuntu CIS docker images contain Aida, cron, and sysctl configuration. Yes, you pay for that. I'll be making fun of that for a long time.
Are they hiring?
You dont have to claim that you follow some standard that actually makes you less secure, you are just not going to be able to sell to clients who are also sheep in this manner (read: everyone.)
In essence, the auditors are there to evaluate whether certain assertions are true. E.g. the company is asserting that they are doing X because they have a policy that X must be done. If it turns out that the internal communication within the company is screwed up and some teams are following the policy and some are not, then the claim is false and the core job of the auditors is to detect and note this. Detecting such discrepancies the main reason for why such an audit (often external,, and if internal, then mostly independent, not reporting to the audited departments) is requested. It's not their job to fix this or decide who's in the wrong - the initial claims are found to be false, and that's not okay no matter if the policy should be changed or will be changed. It does not matter how (and if) the company negotiates changes to the policy, it does not excuse the misleading claims of "X is being done" if actually the company is doing Y instead of following the stated policy. When the management has fixed this (or claims to have fixed this) one way or another, then the auditors should re-evaluate whether the claims are true now.
I’m not going to tell you how to accomplish the goal, but I’m going to tell you what we are trying to do and the manner in which we want to get there.
You can comply without downgrading by just applying the SHA2 hash after your time-hard hash.
Ultimately we pretty much did that, switched to scrypt which is based on sha2 and pointed to the standard saying it's sha2-based. But that does not change the fact that the policy imposes incorrect requirements on teams. SHA2 is not appropriate for password hashing.
Why? What would this mean? You have a flow like this:
1. User sends "password".
2. Time-hard hash processes "password" into some hex value, HASHT. No comparison is done.
3. SHA2 processes HASHT into some other hex value, SHAHASH. You compare SHAHASH to the user's stored hashed password.
But even in step 3, you don't need constant-time comparisons. What purpose would they serve?
Assume the attacker knows your full hashing algorithm -- they can compute SHAHASH for any input password. (Maybe your salt is equal to the username, say.) That's enough to use a standard timing attack against early-abort comparison to learn the first byte (or other comparison unit) of SHAHASH.
But to learn the second byte, you need to provide a large number of hashes which all have the correct first byte. This can't be done. (It can, but you'll have to generate around 256 times as many hashes as you can use.) To learn the third byte, you need to provide a large number of hashes which all have the correct first two bytes. This is even more impossible. (In fact, you may recognize this problem as being the proof-of-work that Bitcoin requires.) The whole point of using a cryptographic hash in the first place is that we can't predict the outcome of a hash! Constant-time comparisons are something you need when you're comparing an attacker-controlled value to a secret value, but that never occurs here.
ISO 26262 includes the requirement to prevent “implausible values, execution errors, division by zero, and errors in data flow and control flow” (8.4.4). I'm confident the division by zero aims at integer division because the result is undefined. For floating point, division-by-zero is perfectly fine and well defined by IEEE 754.
Nevertheless, our safety folks require us to enable the traps and shut down the device in case a floating division by zero occurs. This is stupid because a division by a very small number has the same effect as division by zero. However, since it is explicitly mentioned in ISO 26262 nobody has the balls to allow it officially.
I don't even want to estimate how many man-months have been burned to fix such "defects".
I would argue that dividing by very tiny numbers is also something that you should probably be catching, since the output very large numbers are likely not going to do what you’re expecting...
There are some cool videos of wrist flips online, and I’ve heard of a pickup truck being thrown by an articulated arm on a factory floor due to it.
Sounds worth the precaution, given the right context!
For a 32-bit float, the following are true:
Positive infinity: 011111111(and then 23 zeroes)
Negative infinity: 111111111(and then 23 zeroes)
NaN: x11111111(and then anything except all zeroes)
... x being either 0 or 1.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_754-1985#Positive_and_neg...So, below, the first one is defined, while the second one isn’t.
lim_{x->0+} 1/x == +Infinity
1/0 != (anything)So in general, assuming anything like \infty for a division by zero is wrong wrong wrong.
lim_{x->1+} (x^2-1)/(x-1) == 2
Of course ideally evaluating this particular formula for x == 0 would give 0/0 which IEEE FP defines as NaN, but you could also get a non-zero finite number divided by zero due to rounding for x ≅ 1 and then the default result of +Infinity would be very far from the correct answer. Any situation where you might come close to a 0/0 or ∞/∞ term requires very careful consideration since there is very little separation between a NaN result and ±Infinity.More formally, if you have a potential division by zero and get an Inf (or NaN in case it's 0/0), you have to show what impact this will have. Can it result in a safety violation? If yes, what ASIL level would this result in? Based on this, you define your mitigation. It seems the safety folks have defined the mitigation to be "shut down the device". If you can show that there is a simpler mitigation, or that a mitigation is not needed (i.e. has no safety impact), then they should back off. This mitigation does need to be noted and documented, though.
Of course, this could be an organizational issue: Perhaps the safety folks are being the safety gatekeepers as a small portion of their job, so they are not willing to spend time to deal with nuances. I was the guy responsible for safety for my team, and it sucked - but I was doing it full time so I could analyze scenarios. The challenge was that the developers were not well versed with the ISO standard (had never read it), and it was a small portion of their job, and so they kept arguing.
> This is stupid because a division by a very small number has the same effect as division by zero.
As others have pointed out, this is not true. There is a big difference between a very large result and Inf. And of course, if a very large result could lead to a safety violation, then you need to handle it.
> For floating point, division-by-zero is perfectly fine and well defined by IEEE 754.
Keep in mind that conformance to the IEEE 754 standard is often not complete. Don't assume your language (or your libraries) are fully conformant, unless they are advertised as such.
Even if the ISO 26262 standard seems to have definitive language, I seem to recall there is a portion of the standard that allows you to waive requirements if the requirement makes no sense in your use case. There is a procedure to do it (documenting, etc).
FWIW, we did not handle Inf or NaN or divide by zero anywhere. We were writing a general purpose library for auto manufacturers, and it was up to them to decide where/how it would be used (called "Safety Element Out of Context" in the standard). Since we did not know the context, we argued that we can't assess if a division by zero would be hazardous, and merely noted in the documentation where it could occur. It's up to the folks who buy our libraries to then do that analysis. We only took care of things like showing there were no known crashes or hangs.
You are correct that it is possible in general. However, in this specific project, the decision was to shut down the device for safety reasons if the CPU detects a floating point division by zero. In my opinion this reduces the availability of the functions unnecessarily.
It doesn't, it cannot ever return NaN.
I'd also say that when I worked on a program for a big company that interfaced with alot of small companies and startups a few years, the startups in particular had really awful practices. The "bullshit" compliance checklists for security revealed awful practices that present real risks. The big company was more vulnerable to systemic risk due to inflexibility, the small companies are more vulnerable to individual risks due to employee action or lack of controls.
This is incredibly well said and worth highlighting.
Yet creating processes and systems is the expected task of management -- it's a key way to scale.
I'm fairly much averse to process myself, but have been occasionally involved.
In my, academic, world, the core problem is that there is no overarching mission against which the process/system can be evaluated. We have 5-10 important goals of the institution/system and multiple sub-organizations with wildly different emphasis on each goal.
Is there a "reverse" version of this where you do understand the reasoning, explain clearly why it doesn't apply anymore, but the other side just refuses to think for themselves and just sticks with the status quo because it must've been done with good reason and they don't want to second-guess it?
The point of the article is that's kind of correct - the cost (risk) of deregulating is concentrated, but the benefit is distributed. There needs to be some way to capture the value-add of removing a rule.
But if you do that the easiest way - turning the global metric of productivity into a target - then managers will asset strip, fire security (ahem, Mozilla), and walk off with a fat bonus (short-term productivity is up!) before people realise what's left is a the empty shell of a company.
And that's why good management is hard.
Yes, but that doesn't mean it was ever a good reason, or that the reason still applies.
In a very large number of cases—like the one mentioned in the article—the primary reason is to let the company's management feel more "in control" of their low-level employees.
In a lot of (closely related) cases, it's straight-up racism, sexism, or classism. (Frankly, one can easily make a case that the working-from-home prohibitions fall into that category—they derive from an assumption that low-level employees are lazy and want to avoid work as much as possible, because they're analogous to the assembly-line employees of yesteryear, and thus assumed to be lower-class...which means lesser beings.)
That’s just not great ROI.
1. https://aws.amazon.com/message/41926/?ascsubtag=e7c5af5933bd...
The flip side is the insurance argument: given a big enough organisation, a mistake like that will happen, even if the probability of each individual mistake is very low. So assuming one of these will happen, what can you do to reduce the impact or to reduce the latency of fixing such a mistake?
Also, do you expect mistakes of that magnitude to keep being made?
In response, the company has now sort of swung the other way: lots of things that have a perfectly valid reason and are reasonably safe have been forbidden or suddenly have needed to be justified in the face of extreme skepticism.
That wasn't a case of a single engineer causing 100x engineers worth of damage, but it was the case where something made hundreds of people's jobs a tiny bit easier for two decades, then caused a massive public loss of face and who knows how much reputational damage.
And I'd be willing to bet that a fair number of HN readers work at a company which has at least one system with similar properties (a bit more convenient, a bit less secure) to the one implicated in our security breach; but failure is a once-a-decade event, and their company isn't nearly that old yet. Would those engineers defend that setup using the argument from this article?
You might be right in some special instance, but generally you are not. One example: Sending files via Email is a security problem. So you prohibit this via settings, virus scanners, appliances, etc. Now you've solved the emailed worm problem. However, you've just created a "how do we move files/data/screenshots/..." problem for the whole company. Now everyone will need their own special solution for everything, support will need a screenshot upload tool because you cannot just email them screenshots anymore, marketing won't be able to do images in mails anymore, external people won't have access to internal file shares, etc.
Shadow IT is great, it makes companies actually work rather than go bust.
So everyone is still using WeTransfer/Dropbox/whatever like they were in the years before.
Took me 15 years to realise that incompetence is at worst ignored, and often leads to promotions.
I've spent 3 years telling corporate IT they have a problem with a router config that limits throughput, we got 3mbit rather than 1Gbit. They spent 3 years insisting it wasn't them, and it was the upstream ISP. I even managed to get read only snmp access, and generated cacti graphs of their router showing 400M (iperf2 in udp mode, so 400kbit/ms) going in on port channel 1, but not emerging on the ISP interface.
My shadow-IT deparement spent 3 years paying for a completely separate network connection to bypass the corporate IT one and meet our requirements (easy to do when it's a remote branch office in another country), other departments just suffered it. It was the backup link so only used about 1 day in 10.
Eventually a senior member of (non-tech) staff resigned over the issue and it started being taken more seriously.
The way this system is designed (giving the front door to corporate IT) was done over my objections, and the objections of many others, but on paper it was good. Corporate IT provide shiny SLAs (which mean squat).
Last week, 12 months after the resignation and the beginning of taking it seriously, it had been escalated through 4 different layers of corporate IT, and eventually they came back and said "we've found an errant access list and removed it, and it's now fixed".
That's it. 3 years telling them what the problem was, 3 years of being ignored, and what happens? Certainly no blame for the idiots that made the decision to use this, no comeback on corporate IT provider, but if people find out about shadow IT they kick up a fuss (so the trick is to keep quiet and keep good personal relations with potential pain points).
Oh yes, we outsourced our corporate IT. Obviously there's no money coming back, I suspect we'll get a bill.
The problem with using sharepoint is that now you have sharepoint, and people will start using it, with all attendant horrors.
I realize the chances are a bit different, but it illustrates the point.
Stupidity is one of humanity's greatest renewable resources.
To mitigate this issue, on paper, an (usually) HR policy writes "do not do non-work related stuff with your work computer". And since many people ignore this rule, because "why have a second laptop?", the next best thing is to route all traffic from your laptop through the company, and weed out the GigHubs and GitLabs of this world (in the same manner that they block all sex-drugs-rocknroll stuff).
You can't blame a company for wanted to protect itself against a disgruntled employee that wants to push the (example - not applicable to your company) ebanking software code out in the open.
That said.. why would a person use the corporate computer for their (allow me the use of the word) 'hobby'? Unless it's for charity work, most companies don't appreciate spending resources (time, money, equipment) on other things.
Re: Chesterton's Fence - didn't know it had a name, thank you for this!
The thing is, they can't, not if my PC is still usable for day to day work. For a legitimate user, the ways to extricate data are endless (e.g. tunnel out via DNS, embed into video streams (for customer training or something), hell, even simple stuff like embedding data into the monstrous modern MS Office files should fly under the radar). The real value comes from making certain that a) only those that need access, get access (e.g. why do I have read/write access to the sales file folder as a developer?) and b) minimize the result of a breach ahead of time, which often coincides with doing good work in general. For instance, don't lie to your customers on a regular basis, treat your employees respectfully, and – regarding your example – write closed source software as if it was open source the whole time. It's not as if attackers need the source code to fuzz your software for vulnerabilities.
On a principled basis, I really dislike the world view where the employees have to be constantly prevented from getting the better of the company. If you don't trust me enough to surf on news sites during my time off at work, you should not trust me with software development, where laziness has often far worse consequences than not doing any work at all.
But most employees would never know how to do this and even if, the threshold is high to go to such lengths. Most companies primarily want to prevent users from sending out data by mistake or via malware, since these are probably >99% of the reasons for data loss.
I also dislike companies restricting employees. But I also know people from our IT department and the incidents they have to fight on a daily basis. If you don't restrict your network and company computers, you'll very quickly end up with malware, randsomware, leaked data etc.
The original scenario HenryBemis painted involved source code being leaked, so I think it's fair to either assume the employee is technically competent, or should not have access to it in the first place. Also, their scenario involved disgruntled employees, so on the other end of the spectrum, if you have, say, sales representatives which want to take out their customer database, then it's well in their motivation spectrum to snap a few hundred smartphone pictures of Excel or Outlook with a pdf "scanning" app to get a nicely printable address book. Sure, it's not perfect, but it can still be damaging as hell. Basically: Don't rely on data exfiltration to fail.
But the reason I've bothered to write the first comment, is that it's such a huge productivity drain to develop software on a locked down machine. I'll think twice or thrice before taking on a position where I don't have root access to my computer.
I concur most non-technical employees don't need (or should have) more than the equivalent of a Chromebook.
Because my work computer is around 100 times faster than my personal one.
There certainly is a logic around not wasting money where it'd do no good - but companies that are tight with employee capital expenditures make me really nervous. It's a thing I've avoided consciously in employers since my thirties - if you don't value me enough for a decent keyboard, a chair, and a sufficiently performing computer - then you don't have anyone who is sane at evaluating RoI at your upper echelons.
Which helps avoiding working late as partner expects you to be on time for dinner, and as you don’t need the work laptop at home as it’s not shared also as a personal laptop :)
I swear that’s main reason employers allow you to use your work laptop for personal use too. As you will have your work laptop with you at home so they can let you easier work weekends etc
It's pretty dumb to block gitlab when you employee can just... copy the codebase to an external drive?
Doesn't have to be hobby. A lot of corporate code these days is based on open source libs. What if you fix a bug and want to push upstream?
(Why don't I just make one? I have basically given up on making substantial contributons to Wikipedia since the Deletion Police took over the asylum. There's a 90% probability that if I did spend a couple of hours writing a good article, someone would come along within a week and spend a couple seconds deleting it. It's out of control.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deletionism_and_inclusionism_i...
It cites a quote from Paul Graham (cofounder of Y Combinator) that begins "Deletionists rule Wikipedia."
You don't have to put it up on Wikipedia. You could put it on Neocities or Medium or wherever.
People love to use folksy stories to justify the former (the one about the monkeys for example - https://workingoutloud.com/blog/the-five-monkeys-experiment-...).
I really like Chesterton's Fence as a counter-story to it, not to stop meaningful change from actually happening but to neutralize decision-by-best-folksy-story from over-ruling other options unchallenged, and allowing case-by-case thinking to prevail.
Someone has to say it.
I’ll admit to accidentally pushing some of my employer’s code to GitHub.
The code was a fork of one of my GitHub repositories and I pushed to the wrong remote. I deleted the resulting commits afterwards and no PII was leaked but it’s a valid concern for employers.
Oh my! As I have struggled with security incidents caused by people either accidentally publishing GitHub repos that are "public" rather than "private", or pushing corporate code to their own repos (that are... you guessed it, "public"), I have long looked for another IT department that has grappled with this problem. GitHub Support hasn't helped, appealing to public forums hasn't helped. But here, a sign that my problem isn't unique!
Of course, the solution sucks. sigh
Quay.io makes all pushes private by default, to protect from this type of behavior. If you accidentally typo, you are protected.
My experiences with big organizations is that the above is complete absolute waste of time, unless you are in some kind of high level position already.
Remember that upper management is people, and as people they have their own biases, fallacies, ignorance, etc. They are just as prone to make wrong decisions as you are. In fact in an area of your expertise, they are indeed more prone to make a wrong decision out of simple ignorance or bias. If you think a requirement from your area of expertise is stupid, it probably is a stupid requirement. If you can’t see a reason for that requirement, there probably isn’t a good one.
The fact that the decision to make this stupid requirement comes from people in power gives you even more reason to question the validity of the requirement. People that hold high position and a great amount of power often face less scrutiny and questionable decisions made by them are far less criticized, then similar decisions made by people of less power.
I disagree. I've worked in a BigCorp and many requirements were in place not due to reason but due to feelings and inertia. The "butts in seats" requirement was one of the main ones. Even after showing my boss that I could at the very least work equally as effectively from home, he still felt it wasn't OK for me to work at home more than once a week. And never underestimate the power of inertia. Things are this way, they've always been this way.
It kind of threw that whole “we are in this together. Accept your 10% pay cut.” bullshit out of the window. Especially when all of the management had separate offices.
Sometimes, this is to be able to hire the exactly one person they want to hire, but HR policies or some law requires it be an "open bid" system. So the tailor the requirements such that only the one person can qualify, and they can justify the hiring and the letter of the law.
Furthermore this probably makes officially allowed open source contributions much more difficult.
For instance, there's a restriction at my workplace (not a software company, a regular old industry fortune 500) which prevents git installs from pushing to any non corporate GitHub repo from our work machines.
The obvious reason it exists is to prevent people (a lot of who are analysts or data scientists - not professional programmers) from shooting themselves in the foot by pushing code to their personal repos in error.
It's annoying to work around if you need to say push a contribution to an open source project and you could rage at the infosec for enforcing it - but it obviously exists because stupid errors would have happened.
This principle is also called Chesterton's fence
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Chesterton%27s_fen...