Literally, Gregory Smith, former Boeing CFO is a member of the board.
Too many retail investors just vote with the "board recommendations" all the way down the ticket every year, if they even bother to vote.
well luckily, this isn't the case. And most index funds do ask index fund holders for the vote, tho not individually. But if the majority holders end up not following the board recommendations, the index fund would vote that (at least with vanguard - not sure about others).
That seems like what is happening.
So the boards don't have totally unchecked power. But despite that policy being 22 pages long, it doesn't pay any attention to companies' individual circumstances.
Vanguard's voting policy doesn't have an opinion on EA's lootboxes, or Intel's 18A node, or Disney's approach to Star Wars.
Passive investing is cheaper, this is what “passive” means.
Historically, in the aggregate, boards of US public companies are competent enough to create good returns without strategic investor direction.
In those historic times, stock ownership was much more restricted to rich investors (not a good thing) who are far more opinionated in AGMs (a very good thing) than some faceless index fund or Robin Hooder who doesn’t even realize they should vote at all.
So boards used to perform but they also used to have pressure to perform. Will they still perform on autopilot? Maybe, but chaos always wins unless there’s a forcing function (your votes at the AGM).
It's true they've completely fallen off the pace. But people tend to forget how rapidly this happened. Even as late as the semi-aborted 2018 launch of Cannon Lake it seemed like it was just a routine burp they'd correct with a process respin. Then TSMC quietly reached parity with 7nm, shipped 5nm which was a better process, and by 2021 Apple had jumped ship and Intel was falling behind even AMD.
The disaster happened fast. Boards of Directors aren't that agile.
Seems like the leaders just lost the stomach for taking risks, a long time ago. No forays into mobile or GPUs, at least not in the billions of dollar and many years scale that was needed. No stomach to pay the competitive salaries necessary to compete with Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Meta, Amazon, Netflix, etc for talent.
Well, it did good enough in netbooks. It could probably have been good in tablets if they kept trying (and if non-iPad tablets really caught on).
https://www.thurrott.com/hardware/64677/elite-x3-hp-takes-wi...
But the way Apple insiders tells this story, there was no way Intel was even being considered in the (short!) window when the original iPhone was being built. Intel was in the middle of selling Xscale, and even that design was too power-hungry.
Intel missing mobile was a long history of poor strategic and tactical choices, not one bad call.
Obviously it was going to be very difficult to compete as a third platform with the behemoths iOS and Android become during those years. At least the MeeGo and Windows Phone cards were not the winning ones.
But there was also a hardware story how Nokia would start Intel silicon. I don't think anything of that has ever been publicly annouced before it failed. Wasting a year seems to be massive underestimate. I believe it must have been much longer. After Nokia started to fail Intel hired former Nokia engineers. I have no reliable insights what they did there, but I believe at least in the beginning they still worked with phone hardware on low-level software.
Meanwhile, Intel's chip designers kept targeting an unusable process, and wasted years that they should have been iterating on designs for the fab process that actually worked. Skylake shipped in 2015. They didn't deliver a new CPU microarchitecture on 14nm until 5.5 years later, a year and a half after they shipped that same microarchitecture in a mobile-only form when their 10nm finally started to be somewhat usable (but not fast enough for desktop).
What were the chip designers doing for all those years? In 2015, Intel knew that 14nm had been harder to bring up than any previous fab process, and they knew that 10nm was proving even harder, but they refused to try making an updated CPU design for 14nm. How could the management not have realized that spending multiple consecutive years not shipping new designs would cause long-term damage to their capability to iterate on CPU designs? Not participating in the feedback loop of actually shipping left Intel with an oversized P-core design and an E-core design that wasn't well-matched to it, making Alder Lake awkward and slapdash when they finally got 10nm working well enough for desktop CPUs.
They complain about arrogance, but even if you accept that, it was arrogance BEFORE Gelsinger, with Intel under the control of MBAs that they're talking about.
And can I just say, I've seen some seriously arrogant assholes in the tech departments I've worked ... but for absolute incredible arrogance, you need MBAs.
The leadership (not technical) are disconnected from reality.
Did engineers know there were problems? Of course, they are smart, but the leadership doesn’t listen
Design pipelines are deep and Intel at the time famously had very node-specific designs without industry-standard PDKs. The moment engineers were told to switch a design to 14nm, it basically reset the 5 year design-to-product pipeline. Management failed because they did not hedge the risk by starting a parallel 14nm design effort at first sign of 10nm troubles. They likely were engaged in magical thinking or some variation of the "Are YOU going to tell him?" Silicon Valley scene. It does not help that information like that is considered actionable insider trading information. I bet a lot of people working on 10nm designs first heard the news about the delays from the quarterly investor calls.
Right. It was well-known publicly that Intel was running their business in a way that maximized the damage any fab troubles would have on their product roadmap. It was obvious a decade ago that Intel needed more flexibility to bring their CPU designs to other fab processes. It took them too long to start working on Rocket Lake, and too long to deliver it. But they have at least made some progress on the problem, since they've been selling x86 CPU cores made at TSMC for the past year.
(On a related note: Buying Altera and forcing them to port their entire roadmap over to a broken 10nm process was made even more stupid by the fact that Intel didn't have a usable PDK that outsiders and acquisitions could work with.)
The true embarrassment was when SMIC (read: China) reached 7nm and thereby surpassed Intel last year (or was that 2022?).
Intel then proceeded to waste CHIPS monies and other aid on five digit layoffs and now ousted the one CEO who ostensibly at least had the right idea.
At this point I want to see Intel fail (and Boeing too), American Exceptionalism(tm) absolutely needs to have its longass Pinocchio nose broken in half before we have any hope of rebooting ourselves.
The "even" makes the tone of your comment feel a tiny bit disrespectful towards AMD. By 2021, it was clear to me that AMD had their gloves off and were winning. Zen 3 was released in 2020 - the third generation of nearly flawless execution by AMD that Intel failed to respond to - outside of cutting the prices on some CPUs. For a while, Intel held onto the "fastest single-core speeds". Back in 2017, my first thought after being blown away by the performance of a first-gen Zen PC build was "I should buy shares in AMD" - AMD clearly had a superior product with an even better value proposition.
I would not say that the first gen of Zen is was a clear winner over Skylake. It took a couple iterations before AMD clearly took the lead. AMD was simply so far behind that several large generational improvements were needed to do better than Intel.
In 2017, I would not have said that either for Zen 1 without qualification[1]. Zen 3 on the other hand, was a winner.
That said, 1st gen Zen had better bang-for-buck than Intel, for multicore workloads - in my case, I had built a workstation and thr equivalent intel build would have cost much more, expensive Ryzen motherboards notwithstanding.
1. In my comparison as I buyer, I didn't compare Intel and AMD processors by core count, but by what I'd get with my budget. The AMD build I eent with was better than an intel build for the same amount of money.
So indeed, by 2018, even though Intel has not yet fallen, it's actually already late. The roots of the problems seems to be earlier, and that's where the CEO, and the Board, should have reacted.
- The Death of Intel: When Boards Fail
https://www.fabricatedknowledge.com/p/the-death-of-intel-whe...
As a passive investor in SWPPX, an S&P 500 index mutual fund from Charles Schwab, "my" Intel stock votes are whatever Charles Schwab deems appropriate.
In the immortal words of Warren Buffett and Jack Bogle respectively: "The stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient." and "The daily machinations of the stock market are like a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
You can either gamble and blame yourself or ride the market (invest in index funds) and excuse yourself from losses. If you're just interested in making some money using some disposable cash, it makes even more sense to just ride the market.
The US total stock market (ex-US stock market is a crapshoot) and its subset the S&P 500 index will generally do a better job than any bonds given a long enough timeframe, but that doesn't mean appropriate bonds can't do the job either.
TIPS won’t come close to making one be able to compete with other buyers in those markets for the non mass produced/imported resources.
If someone invested their money in TIPS over the last 30 or 40 years thinking they will be able to buy real estate because TIPS protected them from inflation, they would have been sorely disappointed for pretty much all non Midwest/interior northeast metros.
This is a demographic/political issue for all developed countries, they must reduce the purchasing power of their currency as a tax to be able to deliver the benefits expected by the more populous, older voting populace.
TIPS have been available less than 30 years.
Replace home price change (or land price change) with education price change or healthcare price change. Probably even trades’ worker price change.
If a nursing home cost $x per month in 1997, and you thought putting away an equivalent amount of cash in TIPS will ensure you can afford a nursing home in 2027 or 2037, it’s probably not going to be fun to find out how much they cost now.
It worked great if you wanted to ensure being able to buy electronics, other manufactured goods, and probably groceries. But those are beneficiaries of automation and foreign labor.
Claims that inflation adjusted bonds don't actually track (average) inflation need evidence.
3.6% annual return since Dec 2003. 1.036^20=2.0286.
Home prices have more than doubled since then, for a large portion of the US. Source for that is going to Zillow, searching a home in a major metro, and looking at price history.
Also, how did Blackrock get so wealthy so fast? They've only been around since 1988.
It is not their money. They have roughly $11.5 trillion of assets under management, but their market cap is only $161.5b (on net income of about $6b). Compare that to xAI, which has existed for less than one year and has a valuation around $50b.
xAI has yet to actually move the market needle, other than getting venture capitalists to sign away money they would have done otherwise.
There was a comparison between Amundi (France based) and BlackRock, and their voting patterns, and BlackRock was consistently voting against any ESG or in any way ecology related proposals. Anything that isn't directly about making more money is just not their thing. Contrast that with Amundi who overwhelmingly voted for ESG or similar measures.
So an oligopoly that presents the illusion of free market?
For a TDF (Target Date Fund), because that was brought up (Vanguard 2030): Both actively and passively managed ones must generally be managed such that shareholders can start withdrawing adequate funds (selling shares) upon and after reaching the "target date".
For an S&P 500 index fund like the one I mentioned and hold (SWPPX), the fund manager is required to imitate the actual S&P 500 index as much as reasonably possible.
In short, "don't have to care about long term success" is not a generally usable argument for fund management.
But the fund managers tracking an index are not the main problem, they are just putting a lot of passive votes behind the funds that are actively working on electing board members in the interest of short term growth/profit (which brings more people to invest in their funds and gets them big bonuses).
You have to sell before the “gains dry up”, otherwise you won’t have much money to invest in a new company to have enough of a voice to suck it dry.
But for an index fund, there is no fund manager choosing when and if to sell. The investors of the fund are just following the markets, not really earning a lot (in real terms), but also not losing much.
Wouldn't be the first time hedge funds do this, but to be fair they prefer small pharma (famously cancer research/meds) startups or generally smaller companies to do it. Wouldn't be surprised though.
Shareholders have no access to insider, commercially confidential information - so shareholders don't get to change the captain until after the ship's hit the iceberg. If I have shares in a video game company and the inept boss didn't organise enough testing so the game's got loads of major bugs? Well, I only find out after the damage is done. Is Gelsinger fucking up the delivery of 18A? I have no idea!
Meanwhile, individual shareholders' power is incredibly diffuse. The smart investor has a diversified portfolio, and even if I've literally got a million dollars invested in Intel, I still only own 0.0011% of the company.
Maybe I should coordinate with the other investors, you say? Get together with 1000 other similar investors, and we've got 1% between us? It's impossible, because they're all anonymous. There isn't anywhere I can rally the other shareholders.
And on top of that, loads of companies have dual-class share structures specifically designed to stop shareholders having any say. Whether you're invested in Facebook, FitBit or Ford - good luck exercising control when insiders' shares have 10x the votes yours have.
And that's without getting into passive investors and pension funds.
If I don't like Intel's current board, just selling my shares is far, far simpler than exercising any sort of meaningful active governance.
Which puts the onus of proof on the minority shareholders, to demonstrate they have a bonafide need for such information.
Most US states do so, which ironically makes the US one of the most authoritarian and dictatorial countries when it comes to minority shareholder rights.
Compare it with say Japan or China where the onus of proof is on the company to demonstrate why the requests of minority shareholders should be denied.
And the only real restriction is that any group of shareholders making such requests have to own at least 3% to 5% of the total shares.
He has almost no semiconductor experience and could probably be directly involved with the Boeing fiasco. He’s been on the board for the entire Intel disaster and, at one point, was interim CEO of Boeing, so he's likely not the most focused member."
[0] - https://open.substack.com/pub/mule/p/the-death-of-intel-when...
For anyone interested, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0m4hlWx7oRk.
It's cool to see how Pat’s work helped developers like Linus.
People tend to hug their ruts.
Imho this is bullshit. It is not about being the founder, but most people just cannot change their ways of working. Like hired managers would not be able with the same chance. At the same time, when founders or engineers cannot change to accomodate some business reality, only time will tell wether they can and manage to lead through that - or the McKinsey usual mantra "selling off unprofitable business unit" would have been proved better.
Zuck, Elon, Bezos etc.
But financial engineering is often at odds with real engineering and can harm the product.
BK is who did his best to sink the company, multiple mis-guided layoffs, bad top level hirings, and stupid direction changes every time he read a new news article. Don't even mention his absurd AMA on reddit where he couldn't stop using the ellipse and laughing like a 14 year old girl.
Bob Swan wasn't the guy who could right the ship. He was another Otellini type guy, someone you bring in to not mess stuff up. Pat was a great pickup for Intel, and his return was my first time hoping that Intel could actually survive and grow.
Unfortunately, he came by too late. Foundry STILL hadn't really made progress, and the rot in the rest of the company had set in too far. The brain drain from BK was still being felt everywhere.
Frankly, I still feel like Pat was the right guy, 10 years too late. He joined to right the ship, but by the time he came aboard, the ship had already hit the iceberg, and the bow was 30 feet in the air. And now he's being blamed for the ship sinking.
The Arrow Lake launch certainly didn’t make things easier for Pat.
The problem Gelsinger faced is one that many similarly placed CEOs face. A company is bloated when they come in; they have to make the company smaller; they become the sacrificial lamb for reducing its size and temporarily its income; so another CEO is brought in who recognizes the need to do the same thing; they are also fired; finally, the board brings in a white knight (typically someone with a moniker like "Chainsaw Al") who makes them see that the company has to shrink even more to get the turnaround. That CEO gets to keep the job and, if successful, win all the plaudits.
It is clear how it is setup that "to survive we must act now, not in a week, and we must do this expensive sell-off"
The whole movie is very well worth watching: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1615147/
Companies should focus more on their nominal products/services and spend less time playing games with money.
Dividends
> dividends are highly discouraged by taxation
This is only true today because buybacks aren't taxed
Buybacks are ultimately a way of saying "we don't have a better way to spend this money." Consider that, in a world without buybacks, execs have two choices. One is to pay dividends, and eat the tax implications. The other is to find productive ways to spend the money to increase the company's earnings. The taxation of dividends strongly motivates companies to innovate. Buybacks weaken that motivator significantly, because there's no tax implication. It's financial engineering and not a productive use of money.
Buybacks are also a pretty neat way for insiders to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders.
Example: Insiders schedule a sell of their shares to occur right after announcing a buyback plan.
So any talk of incentives should include a justification of passive investment being more valuable than work for income, if someone is asking for favorable tax treatment.
Already is. There's a reason why many quant finance books model stock prices as martingales/random walks.
What changed in the 80’s is that a safe harbor was created. Before that companies were at risk of being charged with market manipulation - there were no clear rules on what was market manipulation and what wasn’t.
The safe harbor rule 10b-18 simply laid out requirements for buybacks fell into a “safe harbor”, presumed to not be market manipulation.
But companies could still do them before that, but it was more risky.
There have been so many bad technical and operational decisions at Intel that are clearly the responsibility of the CEO and Senior Leadership Team.
And it doesn’t require an engineering degree to understand that they missed the boat on power efficiency, AI, cloud etc.
No one has offered any real explanation for why the board would do this, now. 18a is about to go to hvm, which would carry large gains for server and consumer products, in addition to third parties. some mention "not listening to customers", which is peculiar, since customers (defined by current and past revenue) want faster, cheaper products (18a). about the only think I can imagine is that the board wanted a lower defect rate on large foundary chips (a potential product, not relevant to current products, except perhap Gaudi and maybe Altera). but firing Pat isn't going to improve defect rates...
If what you described above is true, well, good luck for competing with China's semiconductor sector given the US government is on its all out war with China on semiconductors.
Surely the Chinese can repeat what they achieved in EVs.
Him or the CHIPS act?
There are examples of people like Steve Jobs who knew how to surround themselves with the right technical people without being too technical themselves.
And then there are also the technical leaders that ignore the business side…
There are so very few non-tech people who knows how to run a tech company.
Also, think about the corollary: if that was true then most certainly the opposite is also true that technical people are terrible at business decisions.
Hardly my experience. Some are, but some are excellent business people.
I'd say thst is generally true, yes. That's why the CTO isn't the CEO.
The big issue people are hinting at is that there's not much balance in this C suite these days. Just a bunch of people who all put money first, that isn't the CFO.
And that economical model of maximum profit we have "chosen" as a society is exactly why we are possibly heading towards failure, as western societies and as economic entities in the very near future.
The problem is that once the cracks start to show, whether at Intel with the current crisis or at Boeing with doors blowing out and airplanes crashing due to gross negligence, so much engineering excellence and knowledge has been lost that the tide is pretty much impossible to stop.
Enshitification, whether applied to online platforms or to consumer goods is a similar expression of the same problem. Once the quality is lost, the rot has set in and there is simply no way back for the companies involved.
Was Pat perfect, no. But Pat acknowledged Intel’s problems - something Otellini, Krzanich, and Swan never did. These CEOs, all non-technical, focused on dividends, buybacks, and next-quarter results while Intel fell behind in advanced nodes and innovation.
Gelsinger inherited a disaster: 10nm delays, TSMC pulling ahead, and no GPU strategy. He had the courage to cut buybacks and slashed dividends. He poured billions into fabs in Arizona, Ohio, Germany, and Ireland. He delivered Intel 18A, powered on first silicon, released PDK 1.0 for Microsoft, and secured Microsoft and Amazon as customers. There were even rumors Apple might join.
Contrast this with Nadella at Microsoft back in 2014. He didn’t reboot the company by tearing everything down. Instead, he built on Ballmer-era wins like Azure, Office 365 while shifting Microsoft’s focus to the cloud. Gelsinger had to start from scratch in many ways, tackling years of neglect while facing harsher challenges.
Yes, Intel’s stock dropped $150 billion, but Gelsinger was upfront - it wouldn’t turn around before 2025. He was trained by Gordon Moore and Andy Grove, and while some saw him as arrogant, that confidence came from decades of technical leadership.
The real issue? The board. Full of people like Boeing execs. They don’t get engineering. Trusting them to fix Intel is like hoping a plane door won’t pop open mid-flight. They’re the ones who should be replaced.