There is 0 people in the US Navy that did service in the 2WW. There has been multiple generations. There is no way there is that much of institutional inertia, if the quote was correct at the time.
Punnishing failure disincentives a lot of things. It has drawbacks.
How would you expect a pilot that gives up so "easily" to lead other men into a high risk-high reward operation when he gives up himself so easily?
Yes, maybe he was at low altitude during the descent and found himself feeling in peril but the optics sure doesn't look good when it went on for 11 minutes.
> How would you expect a pilot that gives up so "easily" to lead other men into a high risk-high reward operation when he gives up himself so easily?
If you use an ejection seat, there is also a given high probability that you will never be capable of flying a fighter jet afterwards, so it also takes quite some balls to make the decision to use it.
Also, the pilot did not "give up", but decided that it is smarter to retreat and save lives instead of going to death. In a a high risk-high reward situation, I strongly prefer hyperrational risk calculators (in opposite to risk avoiders - the common person in society) over hypermasculine risk takers - but I'm a nerd.
So, the only explanation that I have is that the military wants to bully around and show macho behavior.
Ye that goes without saying.
With attrition trench warfare being in fashion again I expect this to get worse.
Soldiers need to feel they are perpetrators, not victims.
It 'takes balls' to wait out shell after shell for the one with your name on it. A conservative risk reward analysis would suggest bailing. People that don't understand the odds of waiting or fragging are preferrable.
The thing is, millennia of military culture is devoted to training people out of simply avoiding fighting by running away, or even fear of death, because otherwise it can't function and those who run away endanger others by doing so.
I'm reminded of Admiral Byng being court-martialled (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Byng) and the famous line "in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time pour encourager les autres"; the phrase "pour encourager les autres" has entered English to refer to any punishment which is intended to have a strong behavioral effect on the non-punished members of the same class. There will definitely be an element of that here. This guy is being punished conspicuously to remind other pilots that ejecting is a last resort.
> In a a high risk-high reward situation, I strongly prefer hyperrational risk calculators (in opposite to risk avoiders - the common person in society) over hypermasculine risk takers - but I'm a nerd.
There are no such "hyperrational risk calculators", you just mean "someone who would make the same decision as me in this situation".
> the military wants to bully around and show macho behavior
Well, yes, that's kind of intrinsic to the nature of an organization which exists to project force.
No, I don't mean that.
1. I'm not the kind of person who believes that their own judgement is the best and most rational one.
2. I am very convinced these people do exist. For example look at rationalism websites and forums: there you might find some of such people.
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> Well, yes, that's kind of intrinsic to the nature of an organization which exists to project force.
I don't think so: you can project force either by
a) gore violence ("hyper-masculinity") or
b) intellectual supremacy
I have this theory that military officers are mainly evaluated on how many of their soldiers that die or go missing. It is the easiest hard number to make a metric off. Easy to verify. The more soldiers an officer can kill, the better he seems.
Obviously admirals had a harder task since sunk enemy ships is easier to count. And Byng had witnesses from land. He should have sunk 3 or 4 ships, in hind sight.
My problem with this take is that humans are very poor risk estimators, and it gets worse as the probability of risk gets lower. I'm willing to bet that even if he made the "right" decision to stay with the craft, he wouldn't have been able to accurately calculate the risk in an after-action-report, even with the benefit of lower stress and an abundance of time.
Indeed few people have this rare capability, that's why I explicitly named them this way ("hyperrational risk calculators").
As I wrote in my parallel answer https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42115831 I do believe that on rationalism websites or forums, it's quite plausible that some of this breed of people hangs around.
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> I’m somewhat skeptical that they exist [...] in the numbers needed to fill pilot slots.
I think we agree with this weaker statement that I created by using the ellipsis. But, as I wrote,
> In a a high risk-high reward situation, I strongly prefer hyperrational risk calculators (in opposite to risk avoiders - the common person in society) over hypermasculine risk takers
I'd strongly prefer these people - assuming such a choice exists.
People who consider themselves to be "hyper rational" are just obnoxious wankers. I don't take them seriously or trust their judgment.
Personally I wouldn't want to be led by someone that rather hit the ground in a ball of fire than risk the embarrassment of ejecting.
A pilot that eject has at least shown that he has the balls to lose...
Fighter jets fall out of the sky quite often. I don't get why it suddenly is such a big deal with F35. It seems like some hardware fanboyism.
Perhaps the military point of view is they would rather have a leader who takes more risky action and attempts to win the fight for the team rather than one who only prioritizes their personal survival.
I guess it is somewhat futile to reason about the pilot since we don't really know how bad the situation appeared to him. Like, we don't know where he is on the scale, except that we know he is not suicidal.
So just the fact that it continued flying isn't really enough to justify that it was a wrong decision. Like all aviation matters it requires a comprehensive analysis.
Maybe Korea, where there were Chinese and Russian-trained and sourced jets?
For Balkans, there were minimal air activities for Serbian air force. They were up against NATO (not only US) and all of the little opposition they had were using air defence systems which managed to down a couple of Nato air Jets. I wouldn't describe each of these two as significant in any meaningful way. Just to give example on scale. In Balkans, serbian air force had like a dozen modern air craft against ~ 1000 NATO aircrafts.
One can say that the it was a little bit different in Korea and Vietnam but this was much closer to 1945 than nowadays.
Vietnam in particular saw the cost of allowing the SAC/bomber mafia from dominating strategy. The Soviet and Vietnamese pilots were pretty badly mauling the US Air Force and Navy, whose armament and tactics were built around bomber interception.
> One can say that the it was a little bit different in Korea and Vietnam but this was much closer to 1945 than nowadays.
Korean war started almost five years after the end of WWII and Vietnam war is 50 years old now. The two wars in Balkans and Iraq is much relevant in experience compared to the earlier two. And while the soviets provided the Vietnamese with AAA and aircrafts, there were little soviets engagement in the actual fighting (regarding the air).
The US airforce cannot survive the attrition rate that a war with Russia or China would bring.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_losses_of_the...
That's 7,500 aircraft lost over 5.25 million sorties, or 14 lost per 1,000 sorties.
The loss rate was 5 times higher in Korea and 25 times higher in WW2.
And as the other comment mentioned, most were helicopters (5,600) and UAV's (1,000). Only 3,400 fixed wing, manned aircraft were lost.
Nuclear exchange by ICBM would destroy most aircraft, their crews, their maintenance crews, and the factories for the replacement. There will be no dogfights.
We've been at 'peace' for too long.
This is making an example for the rest of the team to get ready for things to 'get real'.
One might say, crudely, that US military superiority is based on an overwhelming advantage in materiel, plus troops skilled in the use of advanced weaponry (so that one soldier has the impact of 10, say).
That might work in large scale massed battle against a mid range opponent, but is untested against a true industrial peer like China, and has been shown not to work especially well against highly dispersed, low tech adversaries such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
Vietnam and Afghanistan are examples of how when faced with overwhelming military might, asymmetric conflict ultimately rules. The anti-colonial movements in India, Ireland and other places underlines that.
I think what Ukraine demonstrates is that we collectively don’t realize that Ukraine is a segment of a larger conflict. The long term influence campaign by the Russians to destabilize NATO and the US has been phenomenally successful. They have managed a brilliant operation in the UK and US to sow chaos internally.
Afghanistan was an evolution in American military strategy. Post 9/11 the Americans did what no one thought was possible - They (using the CIA and then JSOC) infiltrated Afghanistan secretly, forged alliances (bribed) with local militias/tribal leaders and within weeks had significantly degraded Taliban/Al Qaeda's fighting ability.
The world (and Al Qaeda) expected cruises missiles and "death from above". That they got was "death from within AND above". Whether this was a positive development for the US military is up for debate, but it certainly wasn't the traditional "big military pound small military with might" approach until later in the war.
It's the 20+ year long occupation which failed and clearly, like Vietnam or Afghanistan for the Soviets, or Russia's current efforts to destabilize, American patience is shorter than the enemies will to fight.
I'm not sure whether it was genuinely degraded (eg, Taliban controlled areas giving up their weaponry and not permitting new stocks) or temporarily interrupted (cash buying a temporary cessation in attacks).
I wasn't there so I can't comment but from 15000 miles away Afghanistan looked a lot like Vietnam to me. Maybe not in the Westmoreland mode of body count, but in the failed attempts to win hearts and minds as a counterinsurgency tactic and the difficulty of crossing a cultural chasm in order to do so (and failing). Plus the propping up of local potential leaders that really had no national legitimacy and doomed attempts to localize the war (aka what Nixon once called Vietnamization).
I'm not saying I could have done any better. Afghanistan was and remains a fiendishly unwelcoming place.
But… 20 years of grind. Asymmetric always wins.
> The jet had flown for 11 minutes and 21 seconds after Del Pizzo’s ejection, slowly climbing as high as 9,300 feet.
After about 11 minutes, the report said, the jet banked down and started descending to its right, clipping the treetops of a forest along the way before crashing. The report said no one was injured by the crash, but it did damage several trees and crops. The $100 million jet was shredded into pieces and a total loss.
If a car drove at highway speed for 3 minutes without crashing after the driver jumped out, you'd be impressed too.
The question to ask in this case is "would the pilot's presence in the cockpit have made a difference to the possible outcome?".
In my reading of the article the jet could be controlled, and the pilot had access to the backup displays and communication systems. The plane flying such a long distance means the pilot reacted poorly under pressure and did the bare minimum as per the unclear procedures, before catering to his own safety. While not wrong according to the unclear procedure, you want more from someone commanding a squadron.
The pilot could have stayed put at the very least to attempt to mitigate the impact (pun intended) of the eventual crash, if not to actually land the plane using the backup instruments before ejecting to safety. That plane crash could have easily been a tragedy.
I had the same problem in the auto industry. Some times the test drivers were accused of imagining things or sabotaging when the problem could not be recreated.
Even in the follow-up anecdote from the auto industry, a car test driver has vastly different profile than this pilot. They inherently work with untested vehicles and software, where the manual was not yet written. This pilot just followed the broadest interpretation of an existing manual.
He "technically" did well to eject only because the manual was too vague. But at the very least "I could have done more but technically didn't have to" is not what you're looking for in a squadron commander. Which is why he's still allowed to fly (he follows the manual) but not trusted with more than that (because those extras are not in the manual).
Tbf, the article describes them as "basically functioning". As someone with avionics experience, there's a lot of wiggle room in the word "basically" and I'd want to know the details about the remaining functionality before drawing any hard conclusions.
The Navy's contractors should sort out the glitches in their expensive space junk or build UAVs instead. What if this was a real combat scenario instead of an exercise, where the pilot didn't get to call 911 and risked getting captured by ISIS or some other maniacs?
How would that pilot know for certain the aircraft was still flyable? That it technically was at that moment is absolutely not the point, and is only known retrospectively after analysis.
I unfortunately don't have anything to confirm that, but I wouldn't be surprised that the fact that it was an F35 didn't help that man's case, as in losing a cheaper piece of equipment would have been less impactful.
"They went in and hit this troop ship. What I saw looked like little sticks, maybe a foot long or something like that, or splinters flying up off the deck of ship; they'd fly all around ... and twist crazily in the air and fall out in the water. Then I realized what I was watching were human beings. I was watching hundreds of those Japanese just blown off the deck by those machine guns. They just splintered around the air like sticks in a whirlwind and they'd fall in the water."
The Russians have difficulty adapting their tactics on the field. Reviewing the successes of the US battles must be quite different than throwing bodies at a front line.
That's the textbook definition of survivorship bias. It's like a lottery winner boasting about his winning strategy that everyone else is just not able to learn.
There are a lot of people who join the military while simultaneously "hate authority" for example.
My point is understanding outcome causality doesn’t necessarily have to even enter the decision.
The whole thing about survivorship bias is that you make a critical failure in analysis when confusing partial observations of post-facto results with causality.
No, you're missing the whole point. Think about the problem about survivorship bias. Imagine you are at a M&Ms factory. You decide you want to assess what's the color distribution of M&Ms by sampling the colors that come out of the production line. You somehow make the mistake of sampling the production line for the peanut core M&Ms right out of the pipe that produces yellow M&Ms. You sample away and after hours you present your findings: 99.9% of yellow M&Ms have a peanut core. Based on your findings, you proceed to boldly claim that having a yellow core is a critical factor in producing yellow M&Ms. You even go as far as to rationalize it, and claim that yellow represents peanuts, and if anyone wants to create yellw-colored candy they need to start by adding peanut to the mix.
I then alert you to the fact that you made a critical failure in analysis when confusing partial observations of post-facto results with causality. Your answer:
> The point of statistics (one of many) is to figure out how many observations we need. If someone wins the lottery 10 times with their system I will assume that they have a good system (if they have a lot of losses as well it means the system isn't perfect, but it still works), but if you only win once and never enter again I assume it is survivorship basis.
You're sampling M&Ms out of the freakin' peanut M&M production line. If you fix your mistake, you'll get all kinds of M&Ms. You do not fix your mistake with higher sampling. Your mistake is that you're unwittingly filtering out an important subset of the problem domain, and proceeded to do a faulty analysis on the subset you picked.
1) why would someone who calls themselves libertarian even join any kind of formalized armed force
2) even if they did, how would the command not realize that clearly such a person is unfit for duty and at best should be confined to some work far away from actual combat
People from totalitarian shitholes improvise a lot more than people from functioning democracies (because they have to improvise to survive daily life). And they trust their state and follow the rules a lot less (and for a good reason - their state exploits and lies to them to a degree you can't imagine living in a free country).
USA wouldn't send its army to Mexico with 12 hours of fuel telling the soldiers it's exercises. After selling half the fuel and ammo on black market and providing them with faulty non-spec tires so that significant percentage of their vehicles just broke the first week it actually had to drive somewhere.
Russian army did all of the above, on a massive scale. Nobody in Russia was surprised except maybe putin. IMHO he was more surprised that Ukraine was organized than that his own army wasn't.
Think for a while how you'd adapt to living in such a society. One of the first things is that you pretend to do what they tell you and then completely ignore it and do whatever you can to survive. And then to adapt to that - the army has units that shoot at you from behind if you don't want to be a "meat wave" in the next frontal attack.
Army won't provide you shoes your size? Steal. Army won't provide you drones or anti-drone measures? Cope cages and loot Mavics from malls. Etc. In totalitarian countries (and I've lived in one so I'd know) everybody had to learn DIY cause you couldn't trust the economy/country to provide you with the things you need.
Oligarchy and libertarianism is the same system, just looking from POV of rulers vs ruled. When society doesn't work people have to be libertarians. When everybody's a libertarian - oligarchs rule and society doesn't work.
Lack of social solidarity and communal trust has got to be a kiss of death in wartime. Especially when fighting against an opponent who has it in spades. (US in Vietnam, Russia in early days of the war in Ukraine, etc.).
They acquired the land from the government and expected some amount of protection provided by the federal government as well.
And even then a ton of that settlement happened after many wars and what not with Native American tribes and groups in those territories.
It was my understanding that the opposite was true in Ukraine early in the conflict. Russia suffered high casualties because they still relied on a central command structure and field leaders were reluctant to make decisions without the express validation of their superiors. This led to them being sitting ducks as they waited for confirmation, and resulted in many high level soldiers being killed because they had to travel to the front lines to communicate orders for any effect.
The less people care about rules - the harsher you have to be to enforce them.
The high level officers had to go to the front lines not because foot soldiers were helpless without them. They had to go there because without them the soldiers would ignore the orders to go forward, hide in relatively safer place, start looting and lie in the reports they executed the orders perfectly killing thousands of enemies :)
Doesn't that undermine the OP's claim that people in more totalitarian regimes have higher trust in the state and hierarchy?
- The military sent them home,
- They cracked and sent themselves home, or
- They got over themselves and learned how to be part of the larger whole.
Making it through with those edge opinions intact is not an option.
US Army still does that today to some extent (not with planes anymore though). It's not stealing, they're just getting their stuff back.
There is a strong culture of do what's needed to accomplish the mission. Even a "if you're not cheating, you're not trying" to many challenges.
HN has a curiously strong hatred of libertarians (although also professing to dislike authoritarians?) so it's not surprising the comment got downvoted though.
For this reason the allies had to let convoys be hit sometimes, because they couldn't always be too suspiciously at the right place at the right time. Luckily the German confidence in Enigma was so high that their top leaders ignored reports of enigma being broken, they thought it literally impossible.
I'm not sure how this played out in the Japanese war. But the point remains. You can't use signals intelligence too much unless it's literally ending the war in a couple of days.
But they aren't. They just added Iranian drones to their arsenal.
Is not fighting a near peer since WWII 80 years ago, really hate using rubbish to prove a point
“A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.”
“The reason that the American Navy does so well in wartime is that war is chaos, and the Americans practice chaos on a daily basis.”
So heavily simplifying things and with 20/20 hindsight this pilot essentially didn't do the right thing, even if through no fault of their own, and apparently in the US Navy you don't get rewarded for doing the wrong thing. This is what keeping incentives aligned looks like.