Do a little threat modeling here please. Let's say CF sells this data, what do they know about you other than your IP and the sites you visit? While your ISP,employer,school,etc... Can tie that activity to you as a person. Being compelled legally? I did not know privacy meant breaking laws, suddenly law enforcement can't do the same thing with your ISP dns?
This is not adding a new party that can surveil you, this is reducing risk by separating who can see your DNS from who can see your traffic. The idea is to have eSNI ubiquity to where TLS traffic will conceal the sites you visit while DoH will conceal the traffic metadata. Oh, and beauty of DoH: you can run it through a web proxy, and if you have alot of users behind a NAT it becomes very hard to pin point which actual machine generated the DNS lookup.
I think many of the critical voices now are coming from the EU. We have data protection laws. The ISP can't just sell browsing data. That has been illegal since before we had data protection laws, that is actually legally the same as opening other people's letters and reading them. So ... different threat model over here.
I am always using the US-EN Firefox version because frankly why would I use translated software when I can understand and use the original.
I hope you can see how it might be of concert to me whether Mozilla decides to give my browsing data to Cloudflare, whom I have about as much reason to trust as GCHQ or the NSA.
EU ISPs may not sell your data for advertising purposes but they do log your traffic in order to report it to local security agencies.
I understand that in the EU we enjoy stronger privacy laws, however trusting your ISP, given they have the ability to link your traffic to your real name and address, is incredibly naive.
For protecting privacy we need both laws and technology.
And if you use VPN, they can see your traffic.
Personally I trust my ISP more than some random VPN provider on the net.
Go to Germany, download a movie either from the Pirate Bay or see one from one of the many illegal websites streaming content and prepare for a letter (delivered to your home address) with a huge fine and a legal threat within a month.
Not that I'm a huge fan of pirating content, even if some cases like Sci-Hub have the moral high grown, but this goes to show just how trustworthy an ISP is, in an EU country with some of the best privacy laws ... and in such cases a VPN is absolutely mandatory.
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DoH hides your DNS queries — if you visit an HTTPS website, the traffic might be protected via HTTPS, but the domain name is clearly seen.
Of course, the ISP still sees the IP you're communicating with, but due to SNI and industry practices nowadays of putting websites behind CDNs, IPs don't necessarily reveal the website you're communicating with.
DoH also makes it harder for ISPs to block or redirect your access to certain websites. For instance it makes it harder to block Pirate Bay based on the whims of your local government. Now certainly Cloudflare can also be compelled to block websites like Pirate Bay, but the DoH service you're communicating with is customizable, you can pick whatever service you want and just like VPNs, I predict there will be plenty of privacy respecting services to choose from.
And DoH is not foolproof, it doesn't solve all of our privacy needs, it's just a piece of the puzzle, but a necessary one.
> I predict there will be plenty of privacy respecting services to choose from.
Why, where is the money in there ? Sure there might be some, but many ?
Call me cynic but I don't think google(one of the biggest public DNS servers atm) or clodflare(probably second biggest) are providing this service out of goodness of their harts.
If you worry about DNS that much, running your own is not that hard (I am running one at home* , and one at the place I work).
DoH is first of all a protocol. If you run your own DNS resolver at home, surely you'll be able to run your own DoH server too.
Also your requests will no longer be sent in clear text, which means that a Wifi administrator at your local coffee shop won't be able to see your queries and responses, which with the regular DNS protocol are in cleartext, in which case your home DNS server does not help — unless you're on your own network in full control of your router, or run your own VPN, communications with your home DNS resolver are just as vulnerable.
The value of something like DoH is clear, regardless of the motivation that Cloudflare and Google have for providing such a service for free.
---
Speaking of which, accessing pirated content is not the only case I worry about — another problem I have with my ISP is that they serve me a 404 Not Found page filled with ads on domains that aren't available. This is in an EU country.
Also back when HTTPS wasn't forced on Google, the searches were logged and people were automatically flagged for problematic queries and then potentially monitored for years. One of the topics that triggered automatic flagging was child sexual abuse — I know because I helped a local campaign, building an awareness website, etc, only to be informed of such practices by an acquaintance working for our internal security agency.
And while today this may happen for legitimate reasons, tomorrow it might happen for people criticizing the government. Look no further than countries like Turkey or Hungary.
Personally, coming from communism, I fear the nanny state more than I fear big companies from other countries.
I am from Slovenia and I know exactly what you mean, and agree 100% with that.
I just think that in the end POE is worse, since I think it will result in concentration of something that was widespread (plenty of small ISP's and providers), into few bigger and easier to backdoor providers. So it will be easier to monitor then before. And I don't think think that western democracies and "democracies" will just throw in their towel.
I trust Cloudlfare and Google less than I trust my ISP, if nothing else their budget (and competence, and reach) is much lower(isp's).
I mean gmail and outlook are much more competently run than most ISP's and businesses ran their mail servers. I am afraid something similar can happen here.
> DoH is first of all a protocol. If you run your own DNS resolver at home, surely you'll be able to run your own DoH server too.
Packets never leave local network. The advantage of DoH is that it's over https, so if you don't control your firewall you can still use it. But if you control your own network, DoH is not that useful, since you still have to support old DNS for all the applications and devices that don't support DOH. If someone can listen on your LAN you have bigger problems than someone being able to intercept your DNS queries. Not saying there are no advantages, it just isn't a priority.
Firefox is used outside of the EU. Speaking of which...
> I am always using the US-EN Firefox version
Wait, so you want the US version of Firefox to be tuned to EU legal policy?
> Wait, so you want the US version of Firefox to be tuned to EU legal policy?
It is not the US version. It's the US language version - or at least that's how they market it.
This is maybe not the topic of discussion, but the argument is that your computer is your tool, and the computer should speak your language and adapt itself to you, and not the other way around. For this reason I like and prefer software that speaks my native language! However, I don't have patience for bad translations, and in those cases I'll avoid the translated apps. Not a problem for Firefox!
You just don't notice how silly all the new words are (like bit and byte, and "gigaflop" and so on) because english is a prestige language and that it is a foreign language.
Using English is the path of least resistance
Can you please edit swipes like that out of your comments when posting to HN? They break the site guidelines and provoke others into doing worse.
That said, I will avoid that specific phrase on this site as you asked.
If I take you at your word that it's not rhetorical, then I could replace your question with "what do you mean?" – however, if you don't know what the poster means, why does the rest of the comment continue as if you understood them perfectly?
The more plausible interpretation of "what are you even talking about?" is "you are spouting nonsense". Yes, your wording is more polite, but the meaning is the same. The only way a polite insult isn't an insult is if you assume the person you're insulting doesn't understand it. Kinda makes it two insults, really.
All discourse is interpersonal, and how you disagree with someone's statements has interpersonal implications. I think your argument misses the point. I also think your argument is disingenuous and avoids engaging with substance in order to project misunderstanding onto the person trying to help you.
Both of those are opinions about your statements. Which do you think best exemplifies the following?
> Be kind. Don't be snarky. Comments should get more thoughtful and substantive, not less, as a topic gets more divisive. Have curious conversation; don't cross-examine.
If this was a work email in a super-uptight place I would say something like that. Had I known that simple phrase I use all the time would be so controversial I would have avoided it or rephrased.
You chose to question my motives and assume the likely explanation is that I am atracking the person instead of their are argument. I am insinuating that their argument sounds ridiculous but I am not implying that as a fault of their intellect or personality but a lack of perspective where sharing my perspective might help them change an opinion.
I will not defend my personality and motives being questioned when I made no attempt to do so, I also did not the attack the person themselves in anyway. You should not assume malice. I think @dang saw me break rules in the past over one of the politcally charged threads and assumed it was in my personality. Feel free to review my post history on technical topics like this, I make best effort to avoid ad-hominem or anything resembling an insult. Presumption of malice itself is unfair.
I have nothing to gain by attacking anyone. And even if I did, you should look at the context od what I said after that phrase to find out what my intent was. If I don't promote myself or say anything against the person why are you assuming malice?
What about when I said "please try some threat modeling here" is that being snarky as well? It can be if you assume malice. I hope no such assumptions are made.
Either way, I did make a mistake: after years on HN, I keep forgeting that it is to be treates like a corporate/work environment. Two friends using my ever so controversial phrase would not assume malice or police for snarkiness, but two coworkers or paries of a business meeting/engagement would.
I will be careful to be more aware of the environment.
Oh, and not all discourse is interpersonal. It is done interpersonally but the subject of the discourse is does not have to be the other party themselves,their intellect or character (and was not the case in my response -- very obviously)
Some phrases come with a built-in sentiment that people will assume exists unless it's overridden.
I still maintain it was clearly not a swipe purely due to the fact that I made no attempts to attack the persons personality or intellect or to promote my own, as such my intellectual honesty and purity of intent should be given the benefit of the doubt.
Two wrongs don't make a right, but I would suggest trying to avoid the appearance of personal bias when calling out guidelines infractions on a comment without also calling out infractions within the context equally.
These things are matters of degree in any case, and "what are you even talking about" is clear cut.
> Don't be snarky. Comments should get more thoughtful and substantive, not less, as a topic gets more divisive.
The original comment had equally strong phrasing on what amounts to an informed opinion:
> I'm so sad to see Mozilla move forward with this massive attack on user privacy.
The insinuation that this is an attack on user privacy is a bit of an escalation in description. In truth much of the following information describes a potential threat to user privacy, for it to be an attack one would have to provide evidence of intent.
> Firefox DoH is snake oil, plain and simple.
I would argue this statement could be construed as snarky (at least that is how I interpreted it).
Generally speaking, I don't consider myself an expert, but I do think I have a more informed opinion than most (and no doubt many HN readers have even better informed opinions than my own). And while I do see the merits behind the points raised in the original comment, I do think it could have been presented better.
Now what is a swipe about this or breaking a guidline. It did give the impression ( to me at least) as if I was being picked on. But I think in reality you probably misunderstood the tone and intent. Of course this is just my opinion, what you say is the law here and I intend to abide.
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&qu...
In this case the phrase was one that commonly communicates dismissiveness, which is why I interpreted you the way I did. If you read the guidelines it's clear that (to take your example) such a reply can be shortened to "Oranges do not have a blue inside".
However: no harm done! I appreciate your reply and your intention.
My statement was strongly worded, but it is my informed opinion as a subject matter expert: As someone who worked in ISP networking for over a decade, worked at Mozilla, and work on network protocol, I feel that I'm entitled to have a strongly stated opinion and I believe I substantiated it in my post. I'm also happy to have a polite discussion justifying it further.
See my comment above about specific things that (I personally think) could have been phrased a bit better; I am not saying you're comment was unhelpful or deserves reprimand. Just wanted to point out to the comment(er) that both comments had aspects that could have been phrased a bit better and chastising one is not as helpful to improving discourse as providing complete feedback in the interest of being fair.
Disclaimer: I deleted a previous comment because on re-reading I think I meandered a bit and thought I could do better.
By only responding to one person it gives the impression that you think the first person did nothing wrong.
No, mine is not.
> Use google if you don't like CF
Google is no better.
> or just disable it!
It is never okay to hijack my DNS lookups. Posting a note someplace about how it can be restored does not change the fact that you hijacked it, and does not make it okay.
> This is not adding a new party that can surveil you
Given that the DoH provider is a new party with which most of my requests had no contact before, that is an absurd claim.
> this is reducing risk by separating who can see your DNS from who can see your traffic.
No, it is not. My ISP can still see the domain names of sites I visit, via both SNI and OCSP. They can also deduce the same information in most cases, via address correlation. (Thankfully, I chose an ISP that respects privacy.)
This change quietly hands my lookups over to another party as well. If I hadn't noticed the announcement, or didn't have enough technical knowledge to fully understand and revert the change before it went live, my lookups would be pwned.
> The idea is to have eSNI ubiquity to where TLS traffic will conceal the sites you visit
I don't care what your idea is for the future. It doesn't exist today, so is not relevant to what you have done today.
(And even if it did, it would not excuse hijacking my DNS lookups.)
Mozilla have made a value judgement that DoH is more useful to end users than the supposed privacy loss. You're free to disagree, but neither of you is objectively correct.
> Mozilla have made a value judgement that DoH is more useful to end users than the supposed privacy loss. You're free to disagree, but neither of you is objectively correct. Mozilla made a lot of "value judgement" lately just like Chrome. That's why i try to switch to seamonkey.
People _are_ using a different browser.
People _have_ forked, (mostly webkit based)
When everyone has stopped using FireFox, will Mozilla conclude that the Internet is finally secure?
If we see an uptick in Firefox usage we can presume Mozilla's value judgement was correct.
Seems like this is where things are going. None of the main browsers respect users enough today to the point that they might not even stay usable without forking.
Encrypted SNI and OCSP stapling solve those problems.
Your ISP will literally still be able to sell this information after DoH is rolled out. Because they can see what IPs you're connecting to and in most cases hostnames can be trivially and automatically determined knowing only the IP.
Unless we centralise HTTP through a handful of gateways like we're doing with DNS (hello Cloudflare). At which point, why even bother calling it the web anymore.
Keep in mind, it's not just what you visit but how often as well and a lot other details (dns is cached)
TLS+SNI sends the `Host` you are connecting to in plain text. eSNI is not yet widely deployed.
Centralizing DNS without centralizing HTTP (e.g. domain fronting) does not solve the leak of connection metadata.
Yes, lets do some threat modeling. In the first model we have the ISP that host a DNS resolver. The traffic goes from the client to the server hosted by the ISP.
In the second model we have a CDN that host a DNS resolver. Where is the CDN hosted? At the ISP. The traffic goes from the client to the server hosted by the ISP.
How has the threat model changed? The CDN has a contract between it and the ISP, and legally this should mean that the ISP have no legal right to look in the server that they host and copy the information.
For law enforcement this should change nothing. I don't expect the CDN contract with the ISP to radically limit the secret police, nor the regular police, or even the courts ability to demand censoring of websites. The last part might however generate some court cases and thus delays before things return to the same situation we have today.
> Yes, lets do some threat modeling. In the first model we have the ISP that host a DNS resolver. The traffic goes from the client to the server hosted by the ISP.
> In the second model we have a CDN that host a DNS resolver. Where is the CDN hosted? At the ISP. The traffic goes from the client to the server hosted by the ISP.
hosts : files,dns Damn it. When the bloody browser bypasses the OS then it is really a big problem.
Every time Firefox starts up it probably phones home to check for updates. The incoming request is traceable from the user's IP and Mozilla could figure out if the user is with a privacy-violating ISP: they could then only enable OS-bypassing DoH for those users.
Those who run Firefox in corporate networks would be unaffected, as would those who are were 'good' ISPs.
Also, as someone in Canada, I downloaded the "English" version of Firefox, which probably meant "en_US" locale: guess what, I'm affected. As are plenty of less technical people who don't understand about going into about:config and changing things to "en_CA".
The en-ca locale was only added to Firefox in September 2018, I think it's the default for any new downloads since then, but FF won't automatically change the locale for existing installs.
I'm just going to tell my mother in her 60s about editing about:conf settings.
This shouldn't be opt-out.
Only for plaintext http. For ssl/https - the hostname/ip can leak with SNI, but should be safe with ESNI (encrypted SNI). The URL should be in the request, which comes after the TLS handshake (hence SNI, so that the server can pick a certificate before knowing the HTTP HOST header).
SNI is a problem - but not much worse than the fact that a mitm can see who talks to who (IP) - IMNHO.
At best even it were currently use it only provides protection for sites which are hosted behind DOS mitigation services. (usually cloudflare...)
https://encryptedsni.com/ -> https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl/encrypted-sni/In fact, siblings point about cf (cloud flare) is relevant - as cf eats the world, SNI will potentially be more of a problem; if you connect to site A via IP a, and B via ip b - not much is revealed if host headers A and B leaks, given that traffic to a and b is already obvious. But when you connect to cf on a "nearby" IP c, it suddenly becomes more of a problem that host headers for A, B, D and E are leaking. Not necessarily worse than when your ISP could see you talking to IP a and b - but worse in the sense that you reveal some information to your ISP that would otherwise only be known to cf.
https://corporate.comcast.com/stories/privacy-with-comcasts-...
If I have to choose between the two companies it's a no brainer. This is Cloudflare's business, and their business relies on them upholding their privacy promise. Comcast/Xfinity has, in the past, engaged in DNS hijacking [1]. Comcast has had the worst ACSI score over all other businesses in the US more than once and consistently ranks very low [2]. Comcast won the worst company in America in 2014 by the Consumerist [3]. Comcast has intentionally deceived it's customers as we understand due to lawsuits [4].
I'm not sure what sort of jaded world we live in if one can say Comcast/Xfinity is a "safe harbor amidst the rest" with mountains of public information stating the complete opposite.
[0] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-priv... [1] https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/08/comcasts-dns-red... [2] https://www.theacsi.org/news-and-resources/press-releases/pr... [3] https://consumerist.com/2014/04/08/congratulations-to-comcas... [4] https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-announces-lawsu...
But just stating that Cloudflare is operating in the red currently isn't a justification for anything as it doesn't mean anything positive or negative without understanding their operational business model and targets.
I'm guessing your statement is making a leap by assuming that because Cloudflare is operating at a loss currently that they're going to sell your data against what they publicly state in their privacy policy? For a growth company - that would be one of the dumbest things for them to do. Because if they are caught in that lie they will sink themselves.
The Internet is not dependent on Cloudflare now, or in the future. While FireFox has made a choice (a polarized one), the end user still has the freedom to completely disable DoH and CloudFlare - or choose whatever other service they'd like to use.
Mozilla has an agreement with Cloudflare. Again, it is in Cloudflare's best interest to not break that agreement. If they do, then we can all have that conversation. But just because they could break the agreement does not mean we should jump to any conclusion that they are currently.
It's odd to me that there are a lot of defenders of the status quo that is DNS. Something that is easy to manipulate, easy to profile and scrape passively on the wire (no need to even ask if nobody knows you're doing it), and is generally (with regard to security models) less secure than DoH.
Could Cloudflare nefariously start NXDOMAINing everything? Sure. So could your current ISP (it's likely they already are or already have). Cloudflare hasn't done that. While I have some reservations on the 3 letter agency involvement, that is my only unfounded reservation at this point. Until someone exposes, factually, that Cloudflare has considered selling users data, is selling users data, is planning on monetizing data collected around DNS, etc. I, personally, feel that Cloudflare is offering up a good service. They do allow APNIC to see DNS query data, but not source IP info (go read their privacy policy I linked in this thread).
The Internet has inherent underpinnings of trust. You have to trust your ISP to not MitM your traffic. You have to trust someone to resolve your DNS without manipulation. You have to trust websites to not sell your data back to Facebook, Google, Microsoft, etc. It seems as though DNS data hand waving with regard to Cloudflare is only a fraction of what we should really be concerned about. Do you really want your DNS traffic to continue to be unencrypted? DNS has always been centrally controlled. We have the ease with which we can distribute our DNS queries across multiple providers to not give insight to everything we do all the time. But at the end of the day we have to ask someone where Google is. DNS is the problem, not DoH - at least in my opinion.
You have to trust someone. Cloudflare has done a good job of being a good steward as I see it so far. I'm not saying anyone should trust them blindly or forever by default. But - who do you trust? Who is so free from monetary gain that they should be the single source of truth for all of your DNS queries? Who? I don't see anyone on the playing field that isn't selling something. They're either selling you access to the Internet, or they're selling ads, or they're building up a social graph of you by giving you access to free services.
The Internet is built on trust and that give and take.
That is not how arguments work.
> But just because they could break the agreement does not mean we should jump to any conclusion that they are currently.
Oh, and straw-maning, too? Brilliant!
Generally arguments are based on facts. You've provided none. Feel free to show me any facts that support your hypothesis. Technically, I know they're valid. However, debates and arguments are only productive with factual data. Because without it it's all subjective in nature.
> Oh, and straw-maning, too? Brilliant!
I'm not refuting something you didn't bring up. Your argument is akin to the following: you should stop using all computing equipment because the NSA could have compromised all of your devices before you purchased them, all networks you connect to might be selling your user data and MitM your traffic with valid root certificates, and all of the services you use are probably collecting and selling all of your user data to the top bidder. This, all, in direct contradiction to their published terms of service and privacy statements with no known deviations or factual allegations against.
Again, what your saying could be true. Do you have proof or facts that back it up? Can you show beyond a reasonable doubt that what your implying even might be true? And are you choosing to attack Cloudflare only in this regard while hypocritically leveraging other services without the same scrutiny? And I get that we need to start somewhere, but in my personal opinion, DoH improves the attack surface for the majority of end users. I do wish Mozilla would have a very big explanation in the browser that this changed and an easy button that was added allowing people to turn it on if they think that what DoH and Cloudflare offers is worthwhile. So there's that.
How is that relevant to your assertion that it is up to you to decide when something needs to be discussed and apparently trying to use that as an argument?
> I'm not refuting something you didn't bring up.
Could you please point to where I said we should conclude that they are currently breaking their agreement, then?
This also does not separate who can see your DNS from who can see your traffic, in fact it consolidates it, and this is why both Google (who controls the browser) and Cloudflare (who serves a large portion of the internet) are proponents of it. It allows them to aggregate DNS information alongside request information in a way they could not previously.
I am aware that they both have policies in place which purport to prevent this behavior. It would certainly not be the first time Google violates their stated policies in the mission of serving advertisements, or the first time Cloudflare aggressively consolidates internet infrastructure to the detriment of the open web.
Isn't Google's entire business model... data collection? Maybe Google won't sell the data, but they'll use it and sell the information they gather with it (i.e. ad targeting). I'm not sure this is meaningfully better than selling data (though there are definitely arguments to be made there).
AFAIK CF isn't in the business of ads and really data collection is just a waste of their disk space.
People, let's just rip off the bandaid and make Chrome and Firefox bootable already, who needs the kernel overhead when the browser is going to reimplement the entire stack itself anyway. Also let's just make TCP only work on ports 80 and 443 because clearly the rest doesn't really serve any purpose anymore.
Cloudflare is just one of the initial providers and they indicate that they are adding more. Also, I'm assuming you can add your own custom provider based on the screenshot in the article. You can just disable the feature as well.
It's extremely hard to keep track of and manage "opt outs", especially in a household with multiple computers and multiple people.
Formerly, I "opted out" of having a browser that phoned home my browsing traffic by using Firefox.
Formerly your browser still "phoned home" to your default DNS provider, using an insecure protocol.
I appreciate your concerns but, unless you run your own DNS server, you have to trust someone at some point.
Cloudflare is now a public company and they need to aggressively monetize their services. Selling browsing data is a lucrative business and becoming “the” DNS provider for most users (while locking out all other players) is a great way to build a data monopoly.
Not to mention that being the number one DNS provider will give them many opportunities to break domain resolution for users that don’t use their DoH service, as they also control the DNS entries for many sites (they could e.g. make propagation via normal DNS slower or start providing only a limited set of entries over “insecure” DNS).
Unfortunately, the US government is one of the larger users of ISP surveillance activities, benefiting through the purchase of private data as well as using administrative subpoena to obtain the data collected by ISPs without due process or meaningful oversight.
This creates a conflict of interest which I believe is preventing the US from zealously enforcing existing criminal law which would be otherwise sufficient to significantly reduce surveillance by communications providers.
Firefox should not be forcing this shit on me, time to search for yet another browser that will respect users. Mozilla is clearly more interested in commercial viability via their partnerships with large corporations (like CloudFlare) then in protecting Users
* Using DoH. For this to work with PiHole, you need to have a DoH resolver on the device, and then instruct the PiHole to recurse to that resolver instead - possibly your own in a VM somewhere?
* Using a permanent encrypted VPN to your own machine in the cloud and routing all DNS through that, then recursing to some DNS that you trust.
* Write your own encrypted protocol that communicates with some machine in the cloud.
Anything else and your ISP/evil-state-actor is able to to see your DNS traffic in plain-text. PiHole and DoH approach the problem at different OSI layers, you ideally need both.
and you believe CloudFlare is not a "evil state actor" or has not been compromised or never will be compromised by an "evil state actor"
Wow your faith in CloudFlare is much much higher than mine
Personally I trust my current ISP (which is not one of the big boys) more than I trust CloudFlare.
I do not trust cloudflare at all and believe they are the are one of the biggest threats to the future of open web there is today.
For example, because it’s not using HTTP, there are no cookies or SNI to worry about.
> For example, because it’s not using HTTP, there are no cookies or SNI to worry about.
> More at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22418005.
The fact that it can be trivially blocked by anyone on the network path does not make it "much better".
Of course anyone on the "network path" can block almost any protocol; DoT isn’t unique in that regard.
The concern is many large businesses block port 853 but that's because prior to the development of DoT, there was no reason for IT departments to configure firewalls to enable it. Most organizations only have a handful of ports available, including 443, which is what HTTPS uses and therefore DoH works as a result.
I've been running DNS over TLS using the Unbound [1] resolver for my home LAN on a spare laptop for a few weeks now and it’s been great.
Given the privacy trade-offs between privacy and security, many IT departments would opt to make port 853 available for DoT rather than increasing the ability for their users to be tracked.
As I mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the article Centralised DoH is bad for Privacy, in 2019 and beyond [2] clearly describes the issues with DoH:
DNS over HTTPS opens up DNS to all the tracking possibilities present in HTTPS and TLS. As it stands, DNS over UDP almost always gets some free privacy by mixing all devices on a network together – an outside snooper sees a stream of queries coming from a household, a coffeeshop or even an entire office building, with no way to tie a query to any specific device or user. Such mixing of queries provides an imperfect but useful modicum of privacy.
DNS over HTTPS however neatly separates out each device (and even each individual application on that device) to a separate query stream. This alone is worrying, as we now have individual users’ queries, but the TLS that underlies HTTPS also typically uses TLS Resumption which offers even further tracking capabilities.
[1]: https://www.ctrl.blog/entry/unbound-tls-forwarding.html
[2]: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/bert_hubert/centralised-doh-is...
Sure, but until we have encrypted SNI, which is in draft, meta data is going to leak, but that's a separate issue from either DoT or DoH.
But because DoT doesn't use HTTPS, you don't get some of its downsides like using cookies for tracking, for example.
DoH shares the benefits and downsides of HTTPS. It sends out more trackable data than regular DNS, simply because HTTP supports things like headers and cookies. TLS session resumption functions as another tracking mechanism.
There’s a draft RFC [2] to address these and other privacy issues that weren't specified in the original RFC for DoH.
[1]: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/bert_hubert/the-big-dns-privac...
[2]: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-dickinson-doh-dohpe-00...
They've built up a considerable amount of good-will in developer communities. Is there some historical indicator with cloudfare that suggests they are going to blow it all on their path to monetization, or are we extrapolating from other VC backed companies (which may be an understandable position to take, but why?)
Cloudflare isn’t really known as a privacy champion, they always put more emphasis on security, speed and reliability.
From a privacy perspective it’s pretty horrible what they do as well, because they decrypt and inspect all traffic between their customers and those customers users. Security-wise it might be great, but don’t confuse security with privacy.
I really hope that I’m wrong but I’m skeptical that Cloudflare will turn down such a big opportunity, and this move with DoH really seems to confirm this.
There are many things that could be done. The problem is that the promises they make sound grand but aren't real, they wouldn't put the value of their homes at risk (nor would I encourage them to, I'd encourage them to not put themselves in a position where they could be forced to compromise the privacy of the public like this) ---- yet some user's lives can be put at risk by privacy-failures of their service.
So the question is "What happens when CloudFlare violates the contract" do they get a strongly worded email from Mozilla?
bad PR?
Or is it s bankruptcy causing event for the company. Anything besides that means the contract is worthless
In my world, everyone has a story about how an obscure but interesting to surveil service that they were involved with was DDOS attacked and immediately cloudflare sales was showing up offering to mitigate the attack for free by MITMing their traffic. ... Even showing up on the IRC channels of open source projects. I've personally witnessed it three times.
Even if it weren't for the fact that it would be gross incompetence if the NSA hadn't compromised cloudflare up, down, and sidewise since it's such an attractive target, the surveillance based sales-leads approach used by cloudflare has convinced a lot of people that they're engaging in a protection racket. Not just technies, either-- I've heard from executives who pay for cloudflare service that they think is a protection racket but they pay anyways because it's just a cost of doing business.
[I don't personally think it is, but I think that cloudflare is unethically creating a situation where some customers will believe this and pay as a result.]
It's such a lovely setup for a state attacker. Step 1. Compromise cloudflare (either by getting insiders into it, or by hacking them). Step 2. DDOS attack the thing you really want to monitor. Step 3. Cloudflare sales shows up and helps onboard the victim onto your borrowed surveillance platform.
People think that kind of stuff about AV companies, but at least AV companies aren't showing up within minutes of an attack saying "Gee, isn't it so terrible that you've got a virus. We've got a cure for that!". At least AV companies mostly don't send your data all back to their servers where god knows what happens to it.
Even where the problem is usually just a volumetric DDOS, the cloudflare standard solution is a full encryption unwrapping layer-7 MITM.
DoH without cloudflare would also gather complaint but the fact that the default centralized panoptiresolver is cloudflare contributes a lot to many people's discomfort.
So, I don't think cloudflare has amassed much goodwill at all, and that's even before getting into how their 'protection' made much of the internet unusable behind tor or other anonymization proxies.
Funnily enough Cloudflare supports DNS over Tor[1][2], and I think they are the only one. Please let me know if there are others!
[1] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/fun-stuff/dns-over...
You profess not to believe these theories, or at least not the first one. So why then repeat? It's just more untruths poisoning this debate, like any other going on these days.
And how does Cloudflare get the blame in your telling of this story, when it's your unnamed sources "you've heard" believing paranoid stories? DDOS were a thing before Cloudflare, and the incident numbers haven't much changed. So if it's Cloudflare doing it all now, they must have simultaneously convinced everyone else to stop.
The idea that their salespeople showing up when you're under attack is similarly strange: While I might agree that it feels somewhat creepy, is there any doubt that these things are easy to notice with some saved twitter searches and a google alert? It also strikes me as a potentially quite useful sales tactic. And yet, even though it's feasible and effective, they are supposed to forgo that channel to stop others from engaging in obviously flawed reasoning?
You must not get out much. :)
> things are easy to notice with some saved twitter searches and a google alert?
They are not doing this through twitter searches or google alerts. They show up when there is absolutely no mention of it anywhere, even sometimes when the attack is largely ineffective. Expectations like yours-- that they could only discover them from public sources-- probably contributes to people believing the attacks originate from cloudflare.
They use sampled netflow data from ISP to detect large scale DDOS attacks (presumably buying the information from arbor networks or similar, where they don't have their own coverage).
This is kinda painful to read, to the point where I'm not sure if it's intentionally misleading;
DHCP will give you a DNS config, that DNS server can be local, remote, it can support DNSSEC or DNS over TLS (yes, that's a thing[0]). I even have configurations where a local DNS resolver on my machine (DNSMasq/unbound) would query _different_ recursive resolvers based on the domain I'm requesting.
DoH takes away huge amounts of configuration, and the ability to locally host DNS and ensures that a central body gets your DNS requests. The only "opt-out" in the current system is not using DNS at all, which is still an option. (NETBIOS/mDNS/Hosts)
[0]: https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/dns-over...
> DHCP will give you a DNS config
So in other words "your default dns provider"
> that DNS server can be local, remote
Maybe a nitpick but i doubt dhcp is going to hive you a local dns server
> it can support DNSSEC
Which is irrelevent to the original complaint about "phoning home". DNSSec provides security against certain types of attacks like poisioning. Privacy & evesdropping are outside of its threat model
> DNS over TLS (yes, that's a thing[0]).
A thing with very little client support. Is it even possible to specify this via dhcp?
> DoH takes away huge amounts of configuration, and the ability to locally host DNS and ensures that a central body gets your DNS requests.
If you're doing this level of configuration, just disable DoH. Or host your own DoH server.
Nearly every consumer-grade router on the market hands out IP configurations where said router is configured as a DNS server (the router then usually is configured to forward requests to the DNS provider of your choice, which is usually the ISP's DNS servers, depending on the technical ability of the person that set the router up). This is useful for things like accessing devices on your local network that have a GUI accessible via a web browser by hostname rather than IP address or, in the case of Netgear, intercepting requests to routerlogin.net and redirecting them to the router's configuration page instead of some page on the Internet.
If FireFox starts to ignore the OS-level DNS configuration, then these things are going to break and consumers who don't follow these things closely aren't going to know why or how to fix it.
0_o Weird doubt,-- thats why DHCP can give you a DNS server. Otherwise, DNS discovery might as well work by just defining some /32s that always get routed to a nearby DNS server. :)
My DHCP servers at home give me a local DNS server... any corporate network that also has internal private naming will necessarily be handing out a resolver internal to that network.
fwiw I agree with you about a central body getting all out DNS requests.
Give me a non-profit infra provider than I can donate to, similar to Let's Encrypt. Let's call it "Let's Resolve", give it a non-profit charter and org style, with transparency, governance, and strong privacy protections. Mozilla could even be one of the sponsors of such an org, thereby ensuring the values it supports are adhered to.
Open Street Map runs on a budget of ~$100k a year. The costs for such an org would be similar; DNS->DoH VMs, orchestration, labor, admin. I've warmed to Cloudflare, but you know how things usually go with for profit benevolence. The love always runs out. Always. And that's okay! Nothing lasts forever, but we need to start putting effort into orgs that are designed to last while protecting user citizens. Build trust, not companies.
The problem is not so much the lack of available infrastructure but the lack of awareness of alternatives existing, so everyone ends up just using the known defaults (google or cloudflare mostly)
It's too easy to be compromised (via hackers, including the state funded kind) or ordered (e.g. via an administrative subpoena, NSL, or plain court order) and fail to deliver on the expected privacy. This false sense of security might even get people killed, when they think their activities are private when they really aren't.
You might get a strong selection effect for parties who are less principled, thoughtful, knowledgeable, or even outright less honest. Why should someone trust them more than cloudflare (who is already seeing a substantial portion of user traffic, because if you don't use them-- you get DDOS attacks and then mysteriously cloudflare sales contacting you).
The situation with Let's Encrypt is different-- the SSL CA process is already fairly insecure and bogus certs are already easily issued to any party that can MITM traffic to the target server. Even ignoring that ... Any one rogue CA which is trusted by browsers is enough. So there is little to no incentive to compromise Let's Encrypt.
We should endeavor to build something good enough today, so someone in the future can build something better on our shoulders.
I’m not taking sides here but the argument was made, and valid.
By a similar token, you can opt-out of web pki by specifying all your own root CA's. But i hardly fault firefox for including sensible defaults.
I really have come to the conclusion that privacy is just a marketing feature for Mozilla. They e.g. also do nothing against data exfiltration by popular extensions although they have known that issue for years.
If they’re really serious about privacy they should have waited to implement DoH as an open standard and allow more DNS providers to support it. The browser could then simply see if your default DNS supports it and if yes switch to DoH.
This really smells like some kind of data deal between them and Cloudflare. This is not surprising because DNS data is really valuable and passive DNS monitoring is used for many purposes, e.g. security and marketing. Controlling this data gives you many interesting business opportunities, hence I can understand why Cloudflare and Google are after it.
It’s also revealing that they don’t enable this in the EU, because they rightfully fear that it’s not compliant.
This kind of sentiment compels mozilla into becoming an apple-like gatekeeper to a walled garden because people conflate the trustworthiness of extension authors with mozilla's trustworthiness, which leads to less software freedom, a single point of failure and a less diverse ecosystem.
You don't need to be a "gatekeeper to a walled garden", it's just necessary to have sensible APIs that respect users privacy. I think a browser that puts privacy as its primary feature should be able to do that.
This is not on mozilla, their current extension API surface already is much more limited than the old one (killing off some preexisting usecases in the process) and still has many ways to get this information.
It's kind of asking that git shouldn't have filesystem or network access.
It is simply not true that building systems with privacy in mind is not possible. I can think of several ways to drastically improve the privacy of web extensions by providing audit logging or more fine-grained control over permissions.
Comparing end-user software like Firefox with developer tools like Git is also misleading, I find. There are countless studies that show most non-expert users don't know what is happening with their data and are not able to judge the risks they're taking when installing software like browser extensions.
Again, it's perfectly fine to build a product and not care much about user privacy, but if your main selling point is privacy this is different. It's just pointless to have the most advanced content blocking mechanisms when you allow browser extensions to circumvent them all.
You were talking about API surface though. Neither of these things are API surface in itself. They are after the fact, informing the user what it can do and what it did with those APIs.
> It's just pointless to have the most advanced content blocking mechanisms when you allow browser extensions to circumvent them all.
I don't think so. It's not pointless. It just means you need to trust more than mozilla, you ALSO need to trust the extensions, just like you need to trust many other things in your system. The error here is assuming that everything should be reducible or can be reduced to a single source of trust.
> There are countless studies that show most non-expert users don't know what is happening with their data and are not able to judge the risks they're taking when installing software like browser extensions.
Perhaps. But if you follow that argument then you end up with a locked-down system with little flexibility, which I was referring to as apple-style walled garden. Some people may value such a thing, but I wouldn't use or recommend firefox if it became something like that. I would flee in terror.
Also consider that privacy is not an exclusive goal for mozilla: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/manifesto/details/#princ...
Principles 2, 5 and 6 would be endangered by a single global actor (no matter how benevolent) being in control of your software.
You can also have an officially sanctioned distribution channel like an app store and still retain the ability to install any software you want. The problem as I see it is that Mozilla provides a free distribution and marketing platform for malicious actors via their extension store, and I think this is in violation of their principles (especially principle 4) because it nullifies most of the security features that their browser offers. It's like putting up a 10-feet reinforced concrete wall to protect your house from intruders and then leaving the backdoor wide open.
I really don't want to argue about this here, I just find they're not doing the right thing and I find it sad, because I care a lot about privacy and I think recently Mozilla just took some bad decisions regarding that.
It's needed by: Greasemonkey (to determine whether to run a script), content blockers, password managers (to determine whether to fill in on that site) and any extension running web-standards compliant javascript against a page's DOM (i.e. any page-modifying extensions) as inherent part of standards-compliance
This covers a very large fraction of the most downloaded extensions https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/search/?platform=wi...
> You can also have an officially sanctioned distribution channel like an app store and still retain the ability to install any software you want.
In theory, yes. But in reality mozilla has been making it more and more difficult to install extensions. You cannot install extensions not signed by mozilla on stable firefox. They already have assumed exclusive control there.
[1] https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/permission-request-mess...
"Is it ok that this extension sends every single URL you open to an untrusted third party for processing? Please note that URLs might contain sensitive data like access tokens or session information."
Even so, I don't think such an API should exist. And if you absolutely need to have something like this you should restrict it to domain information by default, cutting away the path.
I can understand that Google might not care much about this (Chrome itself is a data collection platform), but I really don't get why Mozilla is so lenient about it as well, as their main differentiator has been user privacy for years.
There is no "exfiltrate all my history" in the webextension APIs. What exists are two distinct and reasonable components.
A) accessing browsing history/current tabs/network requests¹. all things required for extensions to work B) ability to make generic network requets
Combining these two can be used to exfiltrate data. But that does not mean that any particular extension that has access to both will also exfiltrate private data. Thus a blanket warning would be overly broad and anything more targeted would require manual sourcecode inspection.
¹ Those require separate permissions, but for the purpose of the discussion they can all be used to harvest data
Also, in most parts of the world people trust their local ISPs more than giant US corporations, you should not assume that everyone welcomes this centralization.
On what is this assertion based on?
I'm part of this world and I'm not a US citizen. I do not trust my local ISP, because they log and report traffic to local security agencies. It's bening at this point, tracking illegal activities, but they can connect whatever I do with my real name and address.
If I were to guess, in most parts of this world people don't have freedom of speech and fear repercussions from their government for their online activity.
The profiling that US companies do for serving better ads is essentially a first world problem, and a pretty irrelevant one for most people.
Also if we had such deep mistrust in US companies, first of all we shouldn't be using devices and operating systems built by US companies.
What the hell am I supposed to do again cloudflare?
I thought about this recently, and the move to HTTPS-Everywhere is the biggest issue here. In the old days, you could have something like the @guard firewall on Windows, which could examine all outgoing HTTP connections, and block ads and malware by examining not just the hostname, but also the URI of each request. This meant it was separate from the browser, worked with all browsers, and didn't break every time your browser is updated. It's pretty easy to write a similar tool on UNIX to act as a proxy, too, and make it network-wide through your OSS router.
Nowdays, because it's all encrypted with certificate authorities and all, it's much more problematic to block ads and malware, because then you'd also have to intercept HTTPS, and manage certificate authorities and such. I guess it's still doable in principle, just more involved, with a considerably worse UI? Has anyone tried anything like that in the HTTPS world, do any solutions exist as FLOSS at all?
On the consideration of trade-offs, I think HTTPS-Everywhere is completely worth it. It may be more complex to intercept your own traffic, but since you are in control of one of the endpoints and the ISPs (which in the US are openly trying to market your browsing data) are not, I still consider it an overall win for privacy.
For free software, squid ssl-bump works, though is something of a pain to configure!
Or to look at it from another perspective, if you do this then in configuring the browser to accept it (typically, adding a private CA as trusted) you agree that you broke the browser's provided security promises and are happy without them.
In principle this can be safe if the middlebox you use has its finger on the pulse (usually dubious) and you're applying security updates to the middlebox as you would a browser or other outward facing software. So far I've never seen one I'd trust.
Or go for https://firejaildns.wordpress.com/ - Linux workstation DoH proxy, more than 60 DoH providers. When you start, the proxy chooses one at random. You can also set the servers in Firefox.
For now. Where's my option to disable complete blocks on domains with funky/invalid SSL certificates? Gone, for the past few years.
Sure, most people don't need that. Most people don't care about DoH being enabled by default, either. I do.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the concern I have about browser-controlled DoH is that it seems like it could make it harder for a tech-savvy user to assert control over their own network. IIRC, most network-level ad-blocking operates at the DNS level. I've also personally blocked telemetry by setting my router's DNS proxy to resolve certain telemetry servers to 0.0.0.0. It's my understanding that DoH would bypass that. Couple that with Google's planned neutering of Chrome's ad-blocking API, and it seems like it will become increasingly hard for end-users to avoid ads.
And the fact that DoH uses HTTP seems like it would make it impractical to block as a protocol.
I think I would have preferred an encrypted DNS protocol that ran on its own port, at least.
But DoH is not targeting ad-blocking specifically, but rather intermediaries that are outside of the local network. There is evidence of ISPs injecting traffic (Comcast/Xfinity) or selling user traffic (AT&T) and this was designed to close one of the last gaps for a fully encrypted flow.
It's possible to setup a DoH server for your local network's DNS resolver, so that all of your traffic leaves your network encrypted, even if not encrypted on your local network.
Similarly related is the general idea is that if you have the tech savvyness to setup a PiHole in the first place, you should be able to find the Firefox settings on your devices to disable DoH, and Firefox isn't hiding those settings, they are just trying to make a default that is better for more people (the folks that aren't tech savvy and have a different threat model than the power user with a PiHole or similar).
You should be able to find a buried config option to regain your privacy is _not_ a position that we should consider acceptable!
There are serious logistical challenges keeping the option off even at a household level.
At the moment it isn't difficult to block at the network level, but presumably they'll start evading those blocks eventually or otherwise the claim that this is intended to prevent monitoring by ISPs will seem pretty hollow.
Surveillance at large providers is an unambiguous fact, centralizing all user's traffic at one makes it tremendously easier.
The majority of US broadband users are on comcast, which as reported-- in spite of stinking in many respects has made similar public commitments to cloudflare to not monetize this data.
I think you likely have it reversed which threat model is more fringe and which is more concerning.
Have you considered using a different browser? One that aligns more with your values?
Uh. Doesn't this prove that Firefox's DOH implementation is sending strong per-user identifying information to the server?
If you’re hitting cloudflare, it’s just hitting the regular endpoint so no user identifying information.
If you use Firefox's defaults but pick NextDNS from the list, you don't get personalisation as NextDNS has no idea who you are.
A nice thing about DoH here: For DNS over TLS NextDNS has to hide the configuration ID in the hostname, which as a result is revealed in SNI, but for DoH they can put it in the path and so it is encrypted like everything else.
Wait: You mean to say URLs are encrypted? I thought not. There must be a reason why GET requests aren't used for secret-sharing, for instance, as opposed to POST. What am I missing?
The scheme will always be HTTPS and that isn't sent anywhere but it's implied.
The userinfo (often empty) is encrypted and delivered to the server. This could be login credentials but in the modern web it's largely unused.
The hostname someserver.example is delivered to the server unencrypted using SNI (Server Name Indication) before encryption switches on. This is used to enable virtual hosting - the server may behave differently depending on which name you want. The Encrypted SNI work (eSNI) at the TLS Working Group intends to standardise a way to encrypt this information - note that if your IP address only serves one single web site the hostname doesn't give much extra away so eSNI is mostly interested to bulk hosts, the cloud and so on.
The port 1234 is not delivered anywhere but it's implied since the connection will use this TCP port.
The path /foo/search is encrypted, this is the part NextDNS uses to distinguish one customer from another if you use their custom URLs rather than the built-in default in Firefox.
The query parameters ?term=goose are encrypted
The fragment identifier #egg is not sent to the server this is used only locally in the browser engine itself.
The reason you shouldn't design web sites to use GET for secrets is that URL ends up in the user's URL bar and gets bookmarked or shared with friends.
$ whois 208.80.153.224
NetRange: 208.80.152.0 - 208.80.155.255
CIDR: 208.80.152.0/22
NetName: WIKIMEDIA
NetHandle: NET-208-80-152-0-1
Parent: NET208 (NET-208-0-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Assignment
OriginAS: AS14907
Organization: Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (WIKIM)
RegDate: 2007-07-23
Updated: 2014-01-29
Comment: http://www.wikimediafoundation.org
mike@blob:~$ host 208.80.153.224
224.153.80.208.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer text-lb.codfw.wikimedia.org.
mike@blob:~$ openssl s_client -connect 208.80.153.224:443 2>&1 | openssl x509 -text|grep Subject:
Subject: C = US, ST = California, L = San Francisco, O = "Wikimedia Foundation, Inc.", CN = *.wikipedia.org
Yeah, our ISPs are going to be totally in the dark thanks to DoH. /sminjiexin.com resolves to the same IP. So, you see an HTTPS connection to 208.80.153.224, what's the user doing?
Or the ISPs database could simply be of IP addresses connected to, and the purchaser of that database could apply identification based on which other IPs were connected to around a similar time.
If it's your argument that mapping IPs to "websites visited" is not 100% accurate, then of course you're correct... So what we need to do is figure out how accurate it is. Because if the answer to that question is 95%, then the whole value proposition of DoH flys out of the window. Why massively centralise DNS to just make a tiny dent in the problem?
If the answer to that question is 5% rather than 95%, then I guess that would mean we've centralised the web so far already behind gatekeepers like Cloudflare+Google+AWS+Microsoft, that it doesn't really matter if we go and centralise DNS for web usage in the same way, as the web is already fucked.
$ telnet minjiexin.com 80
Trying 208.80.153.224...
Connected to minjiexin.com.
Escape character is '^]'.
GET / HTTP/1.0
HTTP/1.1 400
[...]
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Wikimedia Error</title>
[...]
Big mystery.
it removes many parties (some unknown) who have no legal oversight, and adds a select parties who are legally bound to respect your privacy.
> because the user's destination IPs remain unencrypted
This makes no sense. your ISP cannot see that you are visiting facebook because the IP shows up us cloudflare urrrghhh!
> At the moment you can disable this across your whole lan
now that is a "massive attack on user privacy"
Come on, this is an overstatement. They have a non-public contract with mozilla. What happens if they break it and get caught? Probably the only consequence is that firefox stops using cloudflare ... eventually.
Look at what has happened with misbehaving CAs. The responses have ranged between nothing and removing them 5 years later.
> your ISP cannot see that you are visiting facebook because the IP shows up us cloudflare
Yes they can, it's visible directly in the https requests as SNI. (not to mention in the sizes of traffic that go through).
> now that is a "massive attack on user privacy"
How so? If anything it's just another example at how this DoH approach does not actively protect users from ISPs.
OK. Perhaps you have some examples in mind?
> The responses have ranged between nothing and removing them 5 years later.
Certainly you've got an example of "nothing" and of "removing them 5 years later" to start with, right?
DigiNotar is the most obvious example of a "misbehaving CA" that you might be concerned about. In June 2011 their services were broken into and they decided not to tell anybody. There were no technologies in place at that time which could detect problems like this without DigiNotar's assistance. At the end of August a google.com certificate issued this way was used to attack Iranian web users, but Google's Chrome browser had pinning protection (only for Google's own services) and so at this point it detected the attack in progress.
Mozilla shipped updated Firefox versions which distrusted DigiNotar's public root in about 48 hours (not "5 years") and over subsequent days distrusted the entire DigiNotar hierarchy including those parts the Dutch national government had insisted were fine (they were not fine).
The public reactions at the time mirror your incredulity by the way, people who grep'd their newly updated Firefox and discovered DigiNotar's CA certificate (in fact blacklisted explicitly) as "proof" of a conspiracy by Mozilla to send all their traffic to some scary foreign company.
Perhaps DigiNotar just isn't recent enough for you. So let's look at rather smaller deviations from the more recent past. In 2015 WoSign (a QiHoo 360 company which operated a CA) acquired the Israeli CA StartCom in secret. No significant countries have any mechanism in place to detect this (a potentially hostile acquisition of a private company) and so the browser vendors had no idea until mid-2016.
Not telling Mozilla about this was already a violation of both agreements (for WoSign and for StartCom). But in 2016 WoSign/ StartCom (now one shared controlling mind) minted new certificates using SHA-1 signatures for several outfits, notably an Australian financial services company named Tyro. Since new SHA-1 certificates were prohibited in browsers in 2016 these certificates were back-dated to appear they'd been issued in 2015, another violation of the rules. The Tyro cert was probably actually issued in June 2016.
After conducting an investigation which included having Israeli documents assessed by a Hebrew-speaking lawyer and a bunch of digital forensics work, by September of that year Mozilla was instituting partial distrust of WoSign and StartCom, and in 2017 the browser distrusted them entirely. Other vendors followed suit (very belatedly in the case of Microsoft).
There are many massive databases of ip to hostname mappings which can be trivially queried by an ISP to see what service you're connecting to.
Or if they see you connecting to 185.60.216.35, they can just:
curl http://185.60.216.35 -v 2>&1|grep Location
Or: openssl s_client -connect 185.60.216.35:443 2>&1 | openssl x509 -text|grep Subject:
Or one of a miriad of other ways to get a hint about the hostname of the service you're connecting to, at which point they can automatically do forward DNS lookups to confirm what matches.DoH only adds to the number of organisations that can see your web traffic. It does not reduce it, or shift it to a more trustworthy organisation. It just adds more leaks.
DoH/ESNI don't stop your ISPs knowing exactly what sites you're visiting unless we centralise HTTP behind a handful of benevolant gateways the same way Mozilla is doing with DNS.
Fuck that.
What can I, citizen of small EU country, with an en_US firefox, do against cloudflare?
For the majority of users who may not understand the risks around plain text DNS, there are advantages to it being encrypted.
However, my comment was within the context of the parent's, which was talking about how this feature is beneficial to non-technical users; some of which may not be able to afford to pay for a VPN that (probably doesn't ...) MITM or log traffic.
Not once DoH-in-the-browser becomes a default, percolates down to electron and then gets baked into a dozen mobile and desktop applications with little control or insight for the user or admin.
Chrome a d IE are used by people that do not understand the risks around DNS
I use FF because I am / was tried of IE and Chrome telling me how I should use thier software, now Mozilla is making the same moronic choices for me instead of empowering users
DoH should be Opt-In, not Opt-Out
Technical users (like yourself) can just easily disable DoH, problem, for you, solved :)
This is not an accurate statement, for the commonly accepted definition of "snake oil".
Your privacy concerns are, from an angle, legitimate (although encrypted protocols, as a general rule, are more private than plaintext protocols), but this is a bit over the top.
TFA also mentions that they are partnering with NextDNS, so your claims about centralization are on shaky ground, too. I personally use NextDNS on my whole LAN. They're great!
The only way Cloudflare itself can cause users a privacy issue through the use of its DNS service is by lying to them. They have already agreed not to sell or grant the data to any third party or use it for advertising, etc.
The other concern nullc has is that hackers will infiltrate Cloudflare because it will now contain data on all US Firefox users' DNS queries unless those users change default settings. OK. I guess. However, I will say that I trust Cloudflare a whole heckuva lot more than I trust Comcast, Charter, AT&T, Verizon, etc. to be practicing good security. There are also probably more people on the mega ISPs than there are Firefox users, and many DNS queries these days originate from platforms that aren't even PCs (such as home theater streaming sticks) which will still be pinging default DHCP-received DNS providers. If anything, I see this decentralizing DNS request data.
Moreover, the current legal standard in the US is that users have no expectation of privacy for data that third parties have stored about their activity. As a result there is potentially limited to no due process protection for user information in this scheme. Cloudflare could be required to turn the information over via an administrative subpoena and without the oversight of even a court or any ability for the impacted users to learn about or challenge the surveillance.
> I will say that I trust Cloudflare a whole heckuva lot more than I trust Comcast, Charter, AT&T, Verizon, etc. to be practicing good security
Than any one of them? I could imagine that. Than all? Cloudflare is a much bigger target.
> I see this decentralizing DNS request data.
Could you elaborate on that? I see this as massively centralizing DNS request data (onto cloudflare) and this change is the most problematic part of the whole thing.
1. Firefox's browser marketshare is around 10%. This moves roughly 10% of DNS requests off ISP DNS providers to Cloudflare. Each of the major ISPs controls more than 10% of the broadband market.
2. It's only impacting Firefox browsers. To get an overall picture of the DNS request landscape and privacy, one has to include every DNS request made by a computing device that doesn't go through a Firefox browser. Even for Firefox users, the vast majority of their DNS requests probably don't come from web browsing in Firefox.
3. Firefox also makes it very easy to switch DNS providers to DHCP default or NextDNS. Of course users can still use custom options as well. Many Firefox users are probably savvy enough to exercise these options.
Based on what I've laid out above, I would guess that this change by Firefox might be redirecting a low-single-digits percent (very possibly less than 1%) of DNS request traffic to Cloudflare vs. where it went previously. That sounds like decentralization to me.
The only solution to the problem that I could come up with was to install a MITM proxy in my LAN so that I can detect and filter any sneaky DNS lookups.
I'm still very peeved that Mozilla has forced me to take such measures.
It might make it harder to block queries by deep packet inspection, but do you actually do that on your network right now?
However, now marketers can use DoH, combined with public servers that would cause disruption to block, to be able to engage in lookups without a means of detecting or blocking them short of doing a MITM setup.
> do you actually do that on your network right now?
Yes, I installed it months ago to defend myself against DoH. I MITM all HTTPS connections, detect DoH lookups, and block them.
I don't think it makes sense to bemoan the newfound existence of safer infrastructure for everyone just because devices you don't like can also use that infrastructure.
Precisely so.
> I don't think it makes sense to bemoan the newfound existence of safer infrastructure for everyone just because devices you don't like can also use that infrastructure.
I'm not. First, I don't think this is actually a "safer infrastructure" compared with other DNS encryption schemes, because it opens a new hole.
Second, this isn't about "devices I don't like" using an infrastructure. This is about software and websites being able to bypass a layer of my defenses.
Browsers are completely correct to treat the network as hostile in their default configurations, unless explicitly configured to trust something. More prevalent end-to-end encryption is a good thing. And DoH makes it easier to get encrypted DNS requests through without having them blocked by hostile networks who want to intercept those DNS requests.
If an encrypted DNS scheme is blockable by you, it's blockable by an ISP. There will not be an uproar about it, any more than there's currently an uproar about ISP's selling DNS-based browsing information about their users. It will simply fail.
I agree -- I am not arguing against more prevalent e2e crypto at all.
> If an encrypted DNS scheme is blockable by you, it's blockable by an ISP.
Perhaps, but it's also possible (unless you're using DoH) to evade those blocks without a great deal of difficulty.
I'm not arguing with anything you've said here, really. I'm just pointing out that the way that DoH works means that there is a security hole that makes it very easy for marketers and other spies to evade your protections against them.
So yes, DoH brings some security gains. But at the same time, it also brings some security losses. Whether that tradeoff is good for you should be a decision you can make -- but again, due to the way DoH works, you no longer have that choice available to you without going to extreme measures like I have.
The number of such servers is in the several thousands, at least. They also move and new ones spin up, requiring constant updating of the blacklist.
It's much more effective to take a whitelist approach or, what I do, just block the DNS lookups for them all.
(That said, I do keep such a blacklist, as one small part of my multilayered security approach.)
The next level up is to block the DNS lookups that happen when the spies are trying to find their servers. That's what DoH prevents.
Why couldn't such a spy just hardcode their own DNS server IP address, rather than using your network provided DNS server? If the answer is that you'll blacklist the spy's DNS servers, then how is that any different than the situation with DoH?
DoH isn't adding any value for the spy unless you are doing deep packet inspection of any packet that contains DNS data.
There are two differences that DoH brings up about this.
The first is that because mainstream DNS providers are beginning to support DoH, there is no need for anyone to set up their own private DNS server. In fact, they wouldn't want to -- much better to use a real one that can't be blocked without causing unacceptable collateral damage.
The second is that DoH hides the entire interaction from me (unless I do what I did -- implement a MITM proxy to decrypt all HTTPS traffic).
> DoH isn't adding any value for the spy unless you are doing deep packet inspection of any packet that contains DNS data.
Sure it is. It effectively disables a layer of defenses from the spies.
That was already true though, because they could have used those mainstream providers' unencrypted DNS servers too.
> Sure it is. It effectively disables a layer of defenses from the spies.
But why would any spy rely on such a layer when you've left the front door (unencrypted DNS) wide open?
I wonder how much Cloudflare paid for this 'privilege' of being the default DNS provider.
I don't think that this improves the situation substantially. The history of internet privacy failures is full of empty and unrealized promises, and no amount of contracts or promises can trump a court order or a NSL. "Has no ability to collect" is the gold standard, and the only level of protection that guards against compromise and blanket state surveillance activities.
AFAIK they also have never published the contract itself, though doing so wouldn't address the above points.
Edit: After carefully reading the cloudflare privacy statement ( https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-priv... ) I believe it unambiguously states they will collect "aggregate data" such as how much traffic each specific domain is receiving and use it for their own 'development' purposes. To me this seems extraordinarily valuable by itself, quite a windfall.
It's an incremental improvement, but a positive one.
I would certainly love to see an even better protocol for Internet name resolution that prevents anyone from having name-lookup information, but in the meantime, DoH seems like a huge step forward in ensuring that no unencrypted traffic is visible to the ISP or local network.
Not in my country, they'll be massively fined if they're caught doing that.
> DoH seems like a huge step forward in ensuring that no unencrypted traffic is visible to the ISP or local network
It does not do this.
Yes, of course your ISP can see who you're connecting to and sell that, but denying them (and anyone else) the ability to collect all DNS traffic is better than not denying that.
DNS is cached, other than potential ambiguity related to shared hosts (which can be resolved by looking at SNI)-- I'm failing to see how DNS is richer than the traffic itself. Less costly to monitor? Sure.
As you said, this does not improve the situation. Mozilla can't even verify it.
Also it could be a reverse data selling situation like with Google: They don't sell the data, companies pay money to Google to display ads to the users. Since they have so much data, they can target specific groups more easily. Data doesn't even need to leave Google for that to work.
The real problem addressed by DoH is the routine surveillance and hijacking of "presumptively public" names by local network operators. And it works comparatively well for that.
This is the biggest problem. It used to be that Firefox was on your side, but now it's turning into the we-know-better-than-our-users Chrome, where they don't even feel like guaranteeing that disabling this malicious and unwarranted service today will continue to leave it disabled tomorrow.
https://old.reddit.com/r/pfBlockerNG/comments/d3p1gf/doh_ser...
I do care if they know I visit reddit.com/r/something
I'm already protected by TLS for the latter. Newer TLS will eventually protect me from the former (in combination with DNS encryption).
True
> Newer TLS will eventually protect me from the former (in combination with DNS encryption).
False. Your ISP will see a port 443 connection to 151.101.121.140 and then lookup that IP in whichever of the numerous IP->Website DB's they're using and discover you visited Reddit.
DoH didn't hide from your ISP that you visited Reddit. It just added Cloudflare to the list of orgs that know about it.
Potential fix: Centralise HTTP behind a handful of shared IP addresses so the IP->Website mapping isn't so easy. Did somebody say Cloudflare?
Firefox DoH is snake oil, plain and simple. It sends all the users DNS queries to Cloudflare, adding a new party which can surveil the user's traffic (and can be legally compelled to do so and not disclose this fact)-- providing a convenient choke point to save spies and hackers the trouble and exposure of extracting the data from tens of thousands of individual ISPs.
Simultaneously, it does not protect the user from monitoring by their ISP or parties situated there because the user's destination IPs remain unencrypted, as well as the hostnames via SNI (for cases of shared hosting, e.g. on cloudflare, where the IP alone wouldn't be enough).
At the moment you can disable this across your whole lan by blocking traffic to 104.16.248.249, 104.16.249.249, 2606:4700::6810:f8f9, and 2606:4700::6810:f9f9 and by DNS blackholing use-application-dns.net and cloudflare-dns.com.
iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -d 104.16.248.249 -j DROP
iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -d 104.16.249.249 -j DROP
ip6tables -t raw -A PREROUTING -d 2606:4700::6810:f8f9 -j DROP
ip6tables -t raw -A PREROUTING -d 2606:4700::6810:f9f9 -j DROP
And if you're using bind:
zone "use-application-dns.net" { type master; file "/etc/bind/db.empty"; };
zone "cloudflare-dns.com" { type master; file "/etc/bind/db.empty"; };
Or unbound:
local-zone: "use-application-dns.net" static
local-zone: "cloudflare-dns.com" static
But there is no guarantee that these mitigations will continue to work.
[Edit: Aside, this comment and many/most(?) comments on this thread were moved from a more recent thread with a headline "Firefox turns on DoH as default for US users". The new title which omits the on-as-default, is kinda burying the lead.]