$ whois 208.80.153.224
NetRange: 208.80.152.0 - 208.80.155.255
CIDR: 208.80.152.0/22
NetName: WIKIMEDIA
NetHandle: NET-208-80-152-0-1
Parent: NET208 (NET-208-0-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Assignment
OriginAS: AS14907
Organization: Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (WIKIM)
RegDate: 2007-07-23
Updated: 2014-01-29
Comment: http://www.wikimediafoundation.org
mike@blob:~$ host 208.80.153.224
224.153.80.208.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer text-lb.codfw.wikimedia.org.
mike@blob:~$ openssl s_client -connect 208.80.153.224:443 2>&1 | openssl x509 -text|grep Subject:
Subject: C = US, ST = California, L = San Francisco, O = "Wikimedia Foundation, Inc.", CN = *.wikipedia.org
Yeah, our ISPs are going to be totally in the dark thanks to DoH. /sminjiexin.com resolves to the same IP. So, you see an HTTPS connection to 208.80.153.224, what's the user doing?
Or the ISPs database could simply be of IP addresses connected to, and the purchaser of that database could apply identification based on which other IPs were connected to around a similar time.
If it's your argument that mapping IPs to "websites visited" is not 100% accurate, then of course you're correct... So what we need to do is figure out how accurate it is. Because if the answer to that question is 95%, then the whole value proposition of DoH flys out of the window. Why massively centralise DNS to just make a tiny dent in the problem?
If the answer to that question is 5% rather than 95%, then I guess that would mean we've centralised the web so far already behind gatekeepers like Cloudflare+Google+AWS+Microsoft, that it doesn't really matter if we go and centralise DNS for web usage in the same way, as the web is already fucked.
$ telnet minjiexin.com 80
Trying 208.80.153.224...
Connected to minjiexin.com.
Escape character is '^]'.
GET / HTTP/1.0
HTTP/1.1 400
[...]
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Wikimedia Error</title>
[...]
Big mystery.
[1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-sni/