On the consideration of trade-offs, I think HTTPS-Everywhere is completely worth it. It may be more complex to intercept your own traffic, but since you are in control of one of the endpoints and the ISPs (which in the US are openly trying to market your browsing data) are not, I still consider it an overall win for privacy.
For free software, squid ssl-bump works, though is something of a pain to configure!
Or to look at it from another perspective, if you do this then in configuring the browser to accept it (typically, adding a private CA as trusted) you agree that you broke the browser's provided security promises and are happy without them.
In principle this can be safe if the middlebox you use has its finger on the pulse (usually dubious) and you're applying security updates to the middlebox as you would a browser or other outward facing software. So far I've never seen one I'd trust.
I thought about this recently, and the move to HTTPS-Everywhere is the biggest issue here. In the old days, you could have something like the @guard firewall on Windows, which could examine all outgoing HTTP connections, and block ads and malware by examining not just the hostname, but also the URI of each request. This meant it was separate from the browser, worked with all browsers, and didn't break every time your browser is updated. It's pretty easy to write a similar tool on UNIX to act as a proxy, too, and make it network-wide through your OSS router.
Nowdays, because it's all encrypted with certificate authorities and all, it's much more problematic to block ads and malware, because then you'd also have to intercept HTTPS, and manage certificate authorities and such. I guess it's still doable in principle, just more involved, with a considerably worse UI? Has anyone tried anything like that in the HTTPS world, do any solutions exist as FLOSS at all?