Not of interest to me since I install LineageOS over the top, but useful to very many people and not at all 'scary' to them. Why is it any scarier than trusting the OEM's build? In fact the seller has more reputation to lose if he does something nefarious. The OEM can just shrug and issue a press release if they get caught installing dodgy stuff; a seller might go out of business.
Hah! And by that you mean they might change their name slightly and simply re-list all of the same stuff on AliExpress or Amazon?
People who really do want to pwn you wear suits and sit in large offices and they will get you to do it voluntarily by signing a EULA.
The only problem then is typically getting it all to compile will be many person-months of work. There will typically be hundreds of toolchains, many missing, lots of build scripts missing or wrong, etc.
I've had good success with Zuk and Snapdragon-based and Elephone Mediatek-based phones
The chinese ROM is Asian languages and English only. It is loaded with the usual Asian apps instead of google play. The phone is not usable out of the box for a westerner, for instance you don't have a typical English keyboard. You can install google play by following the instructions.
The international ROM has 10+ European languages. It comes with google play and the usual apps pre installed.
Both ROM can be downloaded from the manufacturer website but you need special hardware and possibly an unlock code to swap them.
It's possible that the importer gave an international version that is perfectly legit, or that he installed google play by himself, which is also legit. The ROM can be checked in the about page.
Some re sellers might replace the system with a fake OS loaded with adware/spyware but that's a different problem.
Chances are it'll be cracked sooner rather than later, but installing a custom ROM[2] is difficult enough as it is. It seems super unlikely to be a reaction to imports from China, which remain a niche phenomenon. And it's pointless anyway if they end up cracking it.
At that point it'll only affect people who sideload the Google stuff on devices they only have limited control over, aka Amazon customers.
[1] Which presumably won't be affected since it's a certified device; my phone's not, though.
[2] Previously known as installing an operating system.
Not permanently - the "Google Services" layer is continually updated and any crack would be the beginning of a cat-and-mouse game.
The bigger problem here is the fact that the device had Gapps preloaded as system private apps, which have special privileges and can do things which normal apps can't. They also get permissions granted automatically.
That's usually not a problem with Google sofware, but whoever preloaded Gapps could preload pretty much any kind of app which would have full system privileges and ability to hide itself.
There are easier and sneakier ways to install malware on a phone you control completely that do not require messing with cryptography at all.
Is there any chance of Android gaining a "Secure Boot" logic—not in the sense of desktop PCs, but in the sense of ChromeOS devices? (i.e. not that you can't boot custom ROMs, but that you'd get a click-through warning each boot from the hardware boot loader that the OS signature check has failed.)
You can fairly easily flash a custom ROM onto a ChromeOS device and remove the boot-up warning. It does require taking apart the device quite significantly, and then flashing different u-boot firmware using a firmware flasher. But it's definitely possible. The problem with ChromeOS devices' "secure boot" is that it is disabled if you want to boot something not trusted in the firmware, so if you have a custom OS you have to disable one of the main security features of the device (unless you flash different firmware onto the device).
Oh, and Android already has this feature. But as with ChromeOS you can disable the warning if you re-lock the bootloader. However, each time you unlock (or relock in the case of Pixel devices) the bootloader, the device will be reset to factory defaults.
Ah, I was basically imagining that there was some separate "bootloader" stage sitting on a chip that can't be user-flashed (and is hopefully even fully WORM, like old school OTP-NVM PROMs) which would handle the secure-boot logic.
So I guess I should rephrase my hypothetical technology as "like Secure Boot in x64-platform PCs—where the CPU checks the BIOS signature and then the BIOS checks the boot loader signature and then the boot loader checks the OS signature—and where the CPU and BIOS can't be tampered with after the factory, thus guaranteeing the sanctity of the bootloader—but where a failure of the boot loader to verify the OS just results in a click-through boot warning."
There is a signature burned into efuses in the CPU that is used as a root of trust for the BIOS, which implements SecureBoot.
In theory this protects the boot chain from tampering. In practice vendor BIOS implementations are usually buggy garbage, so while you cannot replace the BIOS (because then the signature would fail and the platform won't boot) it may be possible to circumvent the security features by exploiting some bug in the IBV code or in their UEFI implementation.
[1] https://patrick.georgi.family/2015/02/17/intel-boot-guard/
Android has that already. Vendors just patch over that as well. As do many custom rom users, I’ve patched the unlocked warning out on my devices as well.
Just like root, that's the whole point --- to run an OS that's otherwise completely compatible with the apps and everything else, but is customised in the way you want it.
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/mas...
https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/
https://www.androidauthority.com/verified-boot-warnings-in-a...
It's very confusing seeing all of these HNers clamouring for more locked down bootloaders. It doesn't seem to be in the spirit of this community at all.
Given most of Google's other recent moves related to Android, I wouldn't count on that escape hatch being around for too long. More likely they're offering it as a short-term transition and will find a 'reason' to shut it once they've quantified the impact as minimal in a couple of years.
Surely they can't still use the excuse that deleting those apps will "mess with the OEM's image", now that Project Treble exists, and everything can be put into their own separate modules?
If they do use that excuse, I don't buy it. It's likely an internal decision to cater to their partners who don't want their users to uninstall those apps. But it's really a petty move from the OEMs, too, because if I'm willing to disable that app, then I might as well uninstall it, because clearly I don't intend to ever use it.
The system partition is a read only partition that gets updated only in firmware updates.
Apps can also be packaged on that partition.
Since you can't delete files from it, you cmhave the ability to disable a system application.
That deletes the updates (which are on the data partition) then disables the app.
Because I thought that was more of a "you pay us to make your app unremovable preinstalled on all of our phones"-thing rather than anything technical.
But what happens is that there isn't any way using just the device to reset it back to factory defaults, and that's a problem now. If your average joe can uninstall the play store by accident, they then can't get it reinstalled again without a PC and some technical knowhow.
By making it so you can only "disable" preinstalled apps, you limit the damage that can be done, and because of partitions you don't really harm the user at all (because that space wouldn't be reclaimed if fully deleted anyway).
It's also why most "preinstalled" apps are now just a 4kb placeholder that makes google play go and download the latest version of the app the second it's connected, so if you "disable" it you are only left with a 4kb "skeleton" of an app there.
Any full uninstall of a system app would require remounting /system as rw.
What is your beef with "disabling"? Under the hood it is the same thing as uninstall, minus the file removal or the actual apk. App doesn't run, has no permissions, is never loaded/mapped into RAM.
Why do Google Apps have to be installed to the system partition anyway?
I have tried several email clients and image viewers from Google's app store, — all of them work fine without being system apps.
Other people already responded and stated the reason, that wasn't directly stated. In addition to those apps being on system read-only partition and not being easy to modify it you should also know that the app doesn't take any extra space from your data partition (obviously, when app is disabled and all its data was cleared)
What is annoying me most are those apps that you can't disable :/ also they could either make it easier to disable or make it diabled by default and on first boot offer user to enable it if they want it, but that won't happen because they want to ham fist those apps to us.
Interesting that you are "blaming" Google for this instead of vendors, when (usually) it vendors who make their crap uninstallable. Or do you see lot of uninstallable stuff in AOSP?
Most of the bloatware problem is, in fact, Google's apps. If you have duplicates on your phone, it's because Samsung or whoever else made their own apps, but were forced to ship Google's anyways.
They're both pre-installed apps that some people might or might not need that you can't uninstall.
It's a super fine line that is basically just preference, and they are both bloatware in a technical sense (can't uninstall it).
> Everyone need not have a single company's apps shoved forcibly down their throats.
So it looks like Apple is shoving their apps down our throats.
And in a world where 85% of phones run Android, do you consider that an upside? That people only have the choice between Apple or Google experiences, and no others?
Point taken and conceded.
Although I'd point out a small subtlety in the matter that they are definitely not mandatorily non-uninstallable on all Android phones, namely those that do not ship Gapps to begin with.
I can slightly remember that the iphone 5 only had 2 or 3 frequency bands while at the beginning of lte some providers did use the frequency which the iphone had more often, so some providers had better lte support. But I can hardly remember, it was some years ago and my provider switch basically came within the lte rollout. I mean it probably also consumes more energy to scan more bands (ok that could be solved with software)
The Moto E4 Plus for example will only activate it's NFC if you put a sim card from one of the big european carriers. If you put in a sim card from a small carrier or a USA carrier, suddenly all mention of NFC vanishes from all menus.
But there are lots of phones in the US market with no NFC: BLU Grand M2, Zenfone 4 Max, LG K3, etc.
It's simply a software lock.
Niche maybe, but certainly useful enough to be included.
Dual SIM simply isn’t really a feature that would drive phone sales in the states.
if the manufacturer keys are in the open, then it is an even worse state of affairs.
This is against something the article itself describes:
> We've actually been unknowing victims of illicit Google app distribution here at Ars before. We once imported a Xiaomi Redmi 3 smartphone from China to review, and, upon booting it up, we were very surprised to find it came with the Google apps pre-installed. As a device from China, this should not have happened. After we posted the review, Xiaomi contacted us with some very scary news: "The Redmi 3 should not come with Google Play pre-installed because it is a China-only product." Xiaomi told Ars. "It is very likely that the Play Store you saw was preinstalled by the importer/seller. This is a very common practice with the unauthorised importers."
> This would mean the reseller opened our phone, unlocked the bootloader, flashed on a new ROM with Google Play, re-locked the bootloader, and stuck the phone back in the box. There was no obvious evidence that our device had been tampered with, and, while hopefully the seller only installed Google apps, they could have just as easily loaded malware onto the device. A message like this during setup would have been a big red flag that something was wrong.
Which I find quite disturbing. That a seller (even on Amazon) could import cheaper "china" only phones and sell it to me as the EU/US version. (it's basically incorrectly labeled)
Edit: formatting