You can fairly easily flash a custom ROM onto a ChromeOS device and remove the boot-up warning. It does require taking apart the device quite significantly, and then flashing different u-boot firmware using a firmware flasher. But it's definitely possible. The problem with ChromeOS devices' "secure boot" is that it is disabled if you want to boot something not trusted in the firmware, so if you have a custom OS you have to disable one of the main security features of the device (unless you flash different firmware onto the device).
Oh, and Android already has this feature. But as with ChromeOS you can disable the warning if you re-lock the bootloader. However, each time you unlock (or relock in the case of Pixel devices) the bootloader, the device will be reset to factory defaults.
Ah, I was basically imagining that there was some separate "bootloader" stage sitting on a chip that can't be user-flashed (and is hopefully even fully WORM, like old school OTP-NVM PROMs) which would handle the secure-boot logic.
So I guess I should rephrase my hypothetical technology as "like Secure Boot in x64-platform PCs—where the CPU checks the BIOS signature and then the BIOS checks the boot loader signature and then the boot loader checks the OS signature—and where the CPU and BIOS can't be tampered with after the factory, thus guaranteeing the sanctity of the bootloader—but where a failure of the boot loader to verify the OS just results in a click-through boot warning."
There is a signature burned into efuses in the CPU that is used as a root of trust for the BIOS, which implements SecureBoot.
In theory this protects the boot chain from tampering. In practice vendor BIOS implementations are usually buggy garbage, so while you cannot replace the BIOS (because then the signature would fail and the platform won't boot) it may be possible to circumvent the security features by exploiting some bug in the IBV code or in their UEFI implementation.
[1] https://patrick.georgi.family/2015/02/17/intel-boot-guard/
Android has that already. Vendors just patch over that as well. As do many custom rom users, I’ve patched the unlocked warning out on my devices as well.
Just like root, that's the whole point --- to run an OS that's otherwise completely compatible with the apps and everything else, but is customised in the way you want it.
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/mas...
https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/
https://www.androidauthority.com/verified-boot-warnings-in-a...
It's very confusing seeing all of these HNers clamouring for more locked down bootloaders. It doesn't seem to be in the spirit of this community at all.
Is there any chance of Android gaining a "Secure Boot" logic—not in the sense of desktop PCs, but in the sense of ChromeOS devices? (i.e. not that you can't boot custom ROMs, but that you'd get a click-through warning each boot from the hardware boot loader that the OS signature check has failed.)