Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by SoftTalker on Sunday November 15, 2026 @09:35PM
(#50513327)
uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs to, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by MOARDONGZPLZ on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:27PM
(#50513660)
I wouldn’t say that, but it’s honest. And I’ll read the write up and reserve judgement until I’m done or decide it’s not worth continuing. When AI writes the article and there’s a disclaimer, I won’t read it. Saw one the other day: I used ai to write this, if you have a problem with that, stop reading. Of course, I did stop reading (and flagged the post).
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by Forgeties79 on Monday November 16, 2026 @12:11AM
(#50514298)
Oh come now. If AI was this easy to control and/or predictable then we wouldn’t have all the issues where it gives people lethal advice or generates pornography outside of uncensored/abliterated models. We wouldn’t be dealing with having to filter hallucinations and companies popping disclaimers at the bottom of the chats
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by ethersteeds on Sunday November 15, 2026 @09:54PM
(#50513460)
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by tech234a on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:59PM
(#50513849)
Chromium used static IDs until very recently, and even now it's only optional to use dynamic ones. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by cdman on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:22AM
(#50514977)
^^^ This. As someone who worked in the computer security for years: the second best thing for security (after turning on automatic updates for your OS / software that you use) is to block ads. They are chock full with scams in addition to plain old malware.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by afavour on Sunday November 15, 2026 @09:59PM
(#50513497)
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by GCUMstlyHarmls on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:08PM
(#50513566)
Wonder what the over-under is on a page exploiting your `block-element` interface if you happen to open it (I guess you could sort of encourage that interaction) vs explicitly getting served malware eg "Discover-Tech’s Controlium".
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by ByteOfWood on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:00PM
(#50513505)
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by wtallis on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:11PM
(#50513586)
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by forgotmypw17 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:59PM
(#50513852)
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by wtallis on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:10PM
(#50513917)
That doesn't really answer the question. Sure, XUL extensions have better access to the internals of the browser. But does that translate into XUL extensions being able to better isolate their own internals from being accessed by untrusted websites?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by forgotmypw17 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:55PM
(#50514195)
Yes, with caveats. They could have UI that the websites couldn't access, but the fact that they interacted with website content could still expose them to attacks.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by forgotmypw17 on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:20AM
(#50515276)
My intuition was yes, but research says otherwise. They have had their own vulnerabilities. Basically, anywhere anything interacts with site code, there's potential for vulnerabilities. It might be better, but the extensions still read HTML from the page, and... guess what can happen then?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by mook on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:12AM
(#50514908)
XUL extensions could essentially open pop-up windows (the way context menus do), so yes. It can be fully transparent if needed, I believe.
You can probably drop an absolutely positioned block (relative to the browser chrome, outside the tabbrowser) too, but I think that didn't work in some older versions?
Note that this is all based on very vague memories, so may be off… Also, both scenarios don't bother injecting anything inside the content. This unfortunately means you need to do some annoying math to position things correctly (in particular if funny DPIs are involved).
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by flomo on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:53AM
(#50515140)
Yes. There was even an XUL extension which loaded ActiveX controls, except without IE's 'security zones'. Honestly, that was always a massive security blindspot.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by btown on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:00PM
(#50513854)
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by Cockbrand on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:22AM
(#50515287)
Not GP, but I did the same about 3 years ago when 1PW transitioned from 7 to 8: it works decently, but the UI/UX is not as polished compared to how 1PW was back then. No technical issues at all, just not as smooth. It's still fine and not something I notice any more.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by trvz on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:55AM
(#50515157)
Same. User of 15 years. Solid native apps turned into buggy Electron mess. I'd be fine with Electron if it weren't buggy. Wi-Fi server went away. 25% price increase this year and they do stupid sports sponsorships now.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by techpression on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:58AM
(#50515174)
Same here, it’s sad how they went from working flawlessly with a quick and clean client, to whatever it is today. Sometimes I get three or more popups when trying sign in (many after the login has already been completed)…
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by Banou on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:15PM
(#50513946)
In the case of password managers, amy decent one will put their DOM elements in a closed shadowDOM root, which prevents the page scripts from interacting with it entirely.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by forgotmypw17 on Monday November 16, 2026 @12:01AM
(#50514232)
>The {mode: "open"} argument gives the page a way to break the encapsulation of your shadow DOM. If you don't want to give the page this ability, pass {mode: "closed"} instead, and then shadowRoot returns null.
>However, you should not consider this a strong security mechanism, because there are ways it can be evaded, for example by browser extensions running in the page. It's more of an indication that the page should not access the internals of your shadow DOM tree.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by kqp on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:56PM
(#50514203)
This leak doesn’t exist. The injection goes in a sandboxed iframe, which is protected from the rest of the page by the same security boundary that prevents them from puppeteering your bank’s pages in an iframe they’ve embedded themselves.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by LiamPowell on Monday November 16, 2026 @12:12AM
(#50514300)
What universe are you people living in? Every ad blocker except uBO has been using DNR for years and they all work fine. uBO Lite uses DNR and it works fine (although recently it stopped being permissionless, which I think was a huge mistake).
Every time MV3 comes up there's a slew of people that say you can't do ad blocking with it but no one ever prevents evidence or explains why everyone not using uBO has working ad blocking.
> I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important.
I agree with this though, or at least I agree for extensions that ask for overly broad permissions such as uBO and uBO Lite.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by TheDong on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:16AM
(#50514597)
The number of drive-by malware attacks I've gotten from having uBO installed is zero.
The number of drive-by malware attacks I've gotten from ad-slots on various websites is non-zero, and the number of accidental "click on ad, end up on malicious website" incidents is even higher.
For me, the math on uBO has been working out great so far.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by mahboi on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:26AM
(#50514659)
There's almost no overlap between sites you shouldn't mess with and sites that need ad-blocking. Like Chase isn't running third-party ads, and Google doesn't need login.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by TheDong on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:37AM
(#50514715)
Quite a few of my "accidentally click on ad, end up on malicious site" are from perfectly trustworthy sites.
For example, google search result ads. Where an attacker pays more money than the real company. Wildly common.
And even if you don't login to google, you still get served potentially malicious links to accidentally click on. Stripping those out with an ad-blocker is better than hoping you never misclick.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by cdman on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:26AM
(#50514996)
Malicious ads on Google.com (as in: on the top of the search results) are routine occurrence. Blocking ads for you and your loved ones is the second best thing you can do to keep them safe (after keeping your OS/software updated).
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by tux on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:47PM
(#50513778)
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by usr1106 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:02PM
(#50513869)
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by usr1106 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:19PM
(#50513981)
I have not used Facebook for many years. My Youtube usage is well less than an hour per month. Those are shitty businesses I don't want to waste my time with. Generally my Web usage is going down. I hate most of the internet these days.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by nvme0n1p1 on Monday November 16, 2026 @12:34AM
(#50514391)
It's great that you don't use the internet. We're all happy for you. Other people do use the internet, and those people shouldn't get their advice on how to use the internet from someone who doesn't use the internet.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by negura on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:20PM
(#50513986)
The concept of browser extensions seems terrible in general. There are many that ship with malware, botnets, infostealers etc. uBlock Origin even requires a compiled .wasm module. It's unwise to grant that level of complexity from third party devs permission over something as sensitive as your web browser.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by canicollectongo on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:24PM
(#50514023)
Th day no browser allows it is the day I make the vibe-browser. A browser that scraps all the content of every website, and tells an AI to present it without the garbage.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by negura on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:43PM
(#50514132)
Individual websites can't be granted permission over your entire browser, they operate in a sandbox (then again firefox for example has a relatively insecure sandbox).
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by AnthonyMouse on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:54AM
(#50515146)
We're talking about bugs here. If the website has a bug you're not just compromising one user. Input sanitizing bug, or the site even just makes the mistake of hosting user-uploaded content on the same domain as the main site, and the attacker can upload javascript that then gets run under the origin of the main site. Attacker can now capture other users' passwords or otherwise take control over their accounts because the user visited the main site with the bug rather than needing to visit the attacker's. Many of those passwords will have been reused on other sites.
Meanwhile an extension can't do anything the browser can't do, so why is it a problem for the extension but not the browser itself?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by burgerone on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:05AM
(#50514534)
I'm thoroughly disappointed that a vulnerability as trivial as this requires AI assistance. The poster already had all the important information at hand.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by ButlerianJihad on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:26AM
(#50514661)
I used uBlock Origin and I enjoyed the relief, I must say. But, it did slightly nag at me that I was "ripping off resources" from the very sites that I should've been supporting in that way. I mean, if I go and visit every day and get some benefit out of them, their webmaster team deserves a cut of the proceeds, at least, yeah? But I am a freeloader by nature and unfortunately, the Internet spawned a generation of freeloaders. Not that there's anything wrong with freeloading. I've always supported RMS and the F/OSS vision. (Those licenses are not freeload licenses!)
Anyway, Edge is ramping up some decent protection against tracking and ad-annoyances. Again, I'm posting on the wrong thread, wrong site about these alternatives. But I've found Edge already blocking stuff that was blasting through my Chrome sessions.
And then there's Chrome, which offers two levels of Safe Browsing protection, as of November 2026. Have we enabled the highest AI-heuristic-powered levels of safety for yourself? Are we at high risk of malware attacks because we're klicking on sketchie linkies all day? Yeah... but we're too paranoid to touch Google kit anyway? Google also has the Advanced Protection Program we can enroll in, if we're a palestinian reporter or Elon Musk type.
Just another reminder that many don't think about: if you love adding extensions to your browser, all of them are increasing your attack surface. These integrations and extensions are a really fertile field for malware, spyware, and supply-chain attacks. We hate Manifest v3, but we're running 2 dozen extensions, any one of which could stab us in the back next month, next year, next millennium falcon.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by zelphirkalt on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:54AM
(#50515143)
You'd trust Google to protect you, if you were a Palestinian journalist? Haha, tell me you are joking, please.
Supporting RMS and feeling like blocking ads is "ripping off resources" from websites? How did you make those 2 things square up in your mind? They are like opposites! And then more of the same, talking about MS Edge. Also talking about Google Chrome and not at least Chromium, or better Ungoogled Chromium.
And why does one need to "enroll" in something something Google anyways, in order to get what should be in the default package?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen...
by user070223 on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:34AM
(#50515367)
I've 3rd party frames blocked by default, which is good reminder to everyone that you can up one your blocking game with increasing the blocking mode level as described here https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode.
One can have keyboard shortcut which automatically reduces that blocking level(may cause refresh) if something not right, or enable on domain basis. I got used to enabling stuff when have issues and it's not mentally taxing
This does indeed sound like religious belief.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
That is... an ironic disaster.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50454639
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
UXP: https://repo.palemoon.org/MoonchildProductions/UXP
Pale Moon: https://www.palemoon.org/
Basilisk: https://www.basilisk-browser.org/faq.html
SeaMonkey: https://www.seamonkey-project.org/
You can probably drop an absolutely positioned block (relative to the browser chrome, outside the tabbrowser) too, but I think that didn't work in some older versions?
Note that this is all based on very vague memories, so may be off… Also, both scenarios don't bother injecting anything inside the content. This unfortunately means you need to do some annoying math to position things correctly (in particular if funny DPIs are involved).
>However, you should not consider this a strong security mechanism, because there are ways it can be evaded, for example by browser extensions running in the page. It's more of an indication that the page should not access the internals of your shadow DOM tree.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_compone...
This presentation talks about using window.find() and other methods:
https://speakerdeck.com/masatokinugawa/shadow-dom-and-securi...
mafia execution?
Every time MV3 comes up there's a slew of people that say you can't do ad blocking with it but no one ever prevents evidence or explains why everyone not using uBO has working ad blocking.
> I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important.
I agree with this though, or at least I agree for extensions that ask for overly broad permissions such as uBO and uBO Lite.
The number of drive-by malware attacks I've gotten from ad-slots on various websites is non-zero, and the number of accidental "click on ad, end up on malicious website" incidents is even higher.
For me, the math on uBO has been working out great so far.
For example, google search result ads. Where an attacker pays more money than the real company. Wildly common.
And even if you don't login to google, you still get served potentially malicious links to accidentally click on. Stripping those out with an ad-blocker is better than hoping you never misclick.
uBlock Origin: 1.76.4
uBO Lite: 2026.1110.1816
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
Web extensions are troubling because they tend to have pretty unfettered access to one of the most sensitive parts of your computer.
Meanwhile an extension can't do anything the browser can't do, so why is it a problem for the extension but not the browser itself?
Anyway, Edge is ramping up some decent protection against tracking and ad-annoyances. Again, I'm posting on the wrong thread, wrong site about these alternatives. But I've found Edge already blocking stuff that was blasting through my Chrome sessions.
And then there's Chrome, which offers two levels of Safe Browsing protection, as of November 2026. Have we enabled the highest AI-heuristic-powered levels of safety for yourself? Are we at high risk of malware attacks because we're klicking on sketchie linkies all day? Yeah... but we're too paranoid to touch Google kit anyway? Google also has the Advanced Protection Program we can enroll in, if we're a palestinian reporter or Elon Musk type.
Just another reminder that many don't think about: if you love adding extensions to your browser, all of them are increasing your attack surface. These integrations and extensions are a really fertile field for malware, spyware, and supply-chain attacks. We hate Manifest v3, but we're running 2 dozen extensions, any one of which could stab us in the back next month, next year, next millennium falcon.
tl;dr: Thank you kindly for the downvotes
Supporting RMS and feeling like blocking ads is "ripping off resources" from websites? How did you make those 2 things square up in your mind? They are like opposites! And then more of the same, talking about MS Edge. Also talking about Google Chrome and not at least Chromium, or better Ungoogled Chromium.
And why does one need to "enroll" in something something Google anyways, in order to get what should be in the default package?
It all sounds very unreflected.
no advisory still on the github page unlike the big sibling's mv2 repo
One can have keyboard shortcut which automatically reduces that blocking level(may cause refresh) if something not right, or enable on domain basis. I got used to enabling stuff when have issues and it's not mentally taxing