News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by ByteOfWood on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:00PM (#50513505)
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by wtallis on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:11PM (#50513586)
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by forgotmypw17 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:59PM (#50513852)
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.

If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.

UXP: https://repo.palemoon.org/MoonchildProductions/UXP

Pale Moon: https://www.palemoon.org/

Basilisk: https://www.basilisk-browser.org/faq.html

SeaMonkey: https://www.seamonkey-project.org/

Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by wtallis on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:10PM (#50513917)
That doesn't really answer the question. Sure, XUL extensions have better access to the internals of the browser. But does that translate into XUL extensions being able to better isolate their own internals from being accessed by untrusted websites?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by forgotmypw17 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:55PM (#50514195)
Yes, with caveats. They could have UI that the websites couldn't access, but the fact that they interacted with website content could still expose them to attacks.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by forgotmypw17 on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:20AM (#50515276)
My intuition was yes, but research says otherwise. They have had their own vulnerabilities. Basically, anywhere anything interacts with site code, there's potential for vulnerabilities. It might be better, but the extensions still read HTML from the page, and... guess what can happen then?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by mook on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:12AM (#50514908)
XUL extensions could essentially open pop-up windows (the way context menus do), so yes. It can be fully transparent if needed, I believe.

You can probably drop an absolutely positioned block (relative to the browser chrome, outside the tabbrowser) too, but I think that didn't work in some older versions?

Note that this is all based on very vague memories, so may be off… Also, both scenarios don't bother injecting anything inside the content. This unfortunately means you need to do some annoying math to position things correctly (in particular if funny DPIs are involved).

Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by flomo on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:53AM (#50515140)
Yes. There was even an XUL extension which loaded ActiveX controls, except without IE's 'security zones'. Honestly, that was always a massive security blindspot.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by btown on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:00PM (#50513854)
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by dawnerd on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:23AM (#50514644)
Speaking of 1pass, their overall software quality has taken a massive nosedive. I’m almost at the point of ditching them.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by swozey on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:54AM (#50514796)
Took me 10 minutes to set up vaultwarden in a docker container and migrate all my 1p to it last time they pissed me off earlier this year
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by gib444 on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:33AM (#50515029)
[delayed]
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by Cockbrand on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:22AM (#50515287)
Not GP, but I did the same about 3 years ago when 1PW transitioned from 7 to 8: it works decently, but the UI/UX is not as polished compared to how 1PW was back then. No technical issues at all, just not as smooth. It's still fine and not something I notice any more.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by noname120 on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:53AM (#50515479)
I did this, the UX of Bitwarden’s UI is horrific and I switched back after holding for a year.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by trvz on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:55AM (#50515157)
Same. User of 15 years. Solid native apps turned into buggy Electron mess. I'd be fine with Electron if it weren't buggy. Wi-Fi server went away. 25% price increase this year and they do stupid sports sponsorships now.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by Fordec on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:43AM (#50515420)
And dump money into Omarchy
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by techpression on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:58AM (#50515174)
Same here, it’s sad how they went from working flawlessly with a quick and clean client, to whatever it is today. Sometimes I get three or more popups when trying sign in (many after the login has already been completed)…
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by saagarjha on Monday November 16, 2026 @03:54AM (#50515481)
I’m very confused why 1Password should be doing syntax highlighting for code at all…
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by Banou on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:15PM (#50513946)
In the case of password managers, amy decent one will put their DOM elements in a closed shadowDOM root, which prevents the page scripts from interacting with it entirely.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by forgotmypw17 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:36PM (#50514085)
Shadow DOM is not a security boundary, and can be bypassed.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by moi2388 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:55PM (#50514194)
From a page, which loads after the extension? How?
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by forgotmypw17 on Monday November 16, 2026 @12:01AM (#50514232)
>The {mode: "open"} argument gives the page a way to break the encapsulation of your shadow DOM. If you don't want to give the page this ability, pass {mode: "closed"} instead, and then shadowRoot returns null.

>However, you should not consider this a strong security mechanism, because there are ways it can be evaded, for example by browser extensions running in the page. It's more of an indication that the page should not access the internals of your shadow DOM tree.

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_compone...

This presentation talks about using window.find() and other methods:

https://speakerdeck.com/masatokinugawa/shadow-dom-and-securi...

Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by Banou on Monday November 16, 2026 @02:31AM (#50515025)
I didn't go into full details but it's usually a combination of shadowDOM plus Iframe for the security boundary
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by kqp on Sunday November 15, 2026 @11:56PM (#50514203)
This leak doesn’t exist. The injection goes in a sandboxed iframe, which is protected from the rest of the page by the same security boundary that prevents them from puppeteering your bank’s pages in an iframe they’ve embedded themselves.
Re:Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven elemen... by esprehn on Monday November 16, 2026 @01:19AM (#50514615)
[delayed]