Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by eyberg on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @02:04PM
(#50550590)
As others have stated this is a nested issue. Most unikernel users I know deploy straight to ec2 or gcp. This is going to affect "sandbox" providers more than anything else.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by fcarraldo on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @02:50PM
(#50551192)
Nested virt on EC2/GCE are vulnerable. Metal instances wouldn’t be, though using nested virt on Nitro Sandbox capable EC2 instances wouldn’t be either.
So this is a tricky one. You can (and should) deploy unikernel workloads on metal and avoid nested virt but this is hard to make economically viable in some cases.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by Kozmik1 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:26PM
(#50551679)
This was some of my first thinking when I posted the original link - the importance of hardening VMs for agent isolation, and the risk that bugs like this pose in legacy code - especially C codebases.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by dvh on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:58AM
(#50548739)
Not necessarily. Only if you assume that no new insecure code is added. If ai found 1 security bugs in old code but ease of code generation with ai adds 2 new security issues (in unrelated code), then we are getting less secure.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by SOLAR_FIELDS on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:59AM
(#50548752)
Do we have any evidence around the rate that AI emits security bugs vs humans previously? You would think that perhaps AI would be better about this, but perhaps not.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by dvh on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:05PM
(#50548833)
I'm making no claims. I'm just saying that contributing before ai was difficult so people rarely did it. Now that contributing is easy, more code will be added. More code = more bugs. Always.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by hparadiz on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:57PM
(#50549671)
I've run Daybreak against my human written pre-AI code and found so much stuff that I don't trust human or AI written code. It all MUST be audited by a security sweep AI.
Sure, some projects are trying to be responsible or are trying to keep waves of slop PR's from drowning them, but that is by no means an indication of a general distaste for AI code. It's been largely embraced.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:18PM
(#50549062)
I hate these meta conversations on crunchy technical topics and feel like we should be digging into the KVM security model more than this general security prognostication stuff. Having said that, I will hypocritically further this debate by pointing out that the determinant of software security moving forward is not so whether AI is drastically better than humans at avoiding common vulnerability patterns, (or instead just a little better). Rather, it's that AI will make it much easier to move subsystems or whole projects to memory-safe programming languages and towards formal verification.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tyingq on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:33PM
(#50549299)
Is it a given that it's as good at outputting secure code as it finding insecure code? That leaves a fair amount of room for people not baking in deep review steps. Also mentioned elsewhere, but if velocity is way up...that ramps up bugs anyway.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by hparadiz on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:56PM
(#50549660)
This is true for human written code too. This is why in the future all written code MUST be run through an internal security sweep before being given to your harness for writing. That's just basic due diligence at this point.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by hparadiz on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:39PM
(#50550261)
This is something agents already do as part of their normal work. Providing code that you know is vulnerable is in fact a dereliction of duty and negligence. Don't provide a POC. Simply that as it produces code a background agent just checks it without showing the work and points out potential problems.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by FrinkleFrankle on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:18PM
(#50552247)
But that should be part of your pipeline, no? Personally, the thing I've spent the most time working on with AI is.. a stack to get AI to keep a project on track and follow strict code writing standards that are reviewed. Not everyone is working in that, but I'm sure any serious development will be done via something similar.
Although, at the pace of improvement, I'd bet it won't even be necessary in a year or so.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by InsidiousWombat on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:27PM
(#50550083)
...if the pace of both fixing and finding bugs got accelerated, all we're in for is machines being on average more vulnerable (because patching takes time and effort and more bugs increases that)
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:57AM
(#50548713)
Another nested KVM bug. We debated enabling nested KVM for many years, and held the line every time, because the only post-2020 KVM vulnerability we knew of required nested VMs. That decision aged well: we've gotten at least 2 more nested KVM escapes in the last year.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:23PM
(#50549150)
Right, sorry, that's a fair point (and Josh Triplett made another fair point earlier). I'm sort of implicitly locked in to the "hosting company" use case here: services running mutually-untrusting isolated workloads for customers.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by bonzini on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:38PM
(#50551819)
KVM maintainer here. On one hand it's true that nested is the single biggest attack surface in the hypervisor, on the other hand it will be over relatively soon. Considering the LLMs have ~15 years of nested virtualization to catch up with, it's not in an awful state. These bugs are extremely complicated to exploit, which means that the past ten years of fuzzing with syzkaller have already found the low hanging fruit.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by fwsgonzo on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @11:58AM
(#50548735)
Don't disable nested, it's still better security than everything else, and having it on means access to real hardware virtualization. Second, the article is AI-written. It really should be rewritten by a human.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:13PM
(#50548969)
> I have yet to hear a compelling use case for nested virtualization.
AWS instances are slow to launch; they take whole seconds. Nested virtualization allows running something like firecracker/crosvm/rust-vmm atop a normal AWS instance, without needing a bare-metal one.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:16PM
(#50549027)
If you're segregating internal workloads, by all means use nested virtualization on EC2 or DO or something. Your threat model is different and you probably have a lot more room to maneuver when a KVM escape is announced, because you have some level of trust in all your workloads.
If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:25PM
(#50549175)
One distinction I'd make as well is "are you running more than one customer's workload on the same system" (yikes, don't), vs "are you using nested virt as additional protection rather than running the customer workload directly on an instance, but one instance only gets jobs from one customer".
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:33PM
(#50549302)
Another good point, but this one is maybe a little less dispositive than it looks like: it's very difficult to engineer an orchestration system that reliably segregates worker physicals from each other, so I'd rate the likelihood of a game-over situation after a guest->host escape as very high regardless of how yuo schedule workloads. It's sort of the same situation as how SSRF's are usually game-overs (you're pivoting from a hardened attack surface to a much softer one) but even harder to engineer again.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:46PM
(#50549499)
That's fair. You'd want a system designed around the notion that every customer instance must be isolated from each other without the nested virtualization.
(Aside: my current guess at the appropriate security posture towards Nitro Sandboxes, in the current era of vulnerabilities, is "decent, but probably has security holes too, and is less widely scrutinized, don't count on it either". Thoughts?)
Any recommendations for good guides on that, besides "design very careful IAM policies and security groups, harden any common services they have access to, and ideally run them under separate AWS accounts"?
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by necovek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:19PM
(#50549971)
Does this hold for the likes of Amazon?
Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance or is firecracker distributing them so that multiple customers can have VMs on the same actual box?
Sounds like it would be pretty expensive for Amazon to dedicate an instance to every customer, especially for those with small workloads.
If that's the case, why would it not hold for Amazon but would hold for everyone else?
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:48PM
(#50552641)
No, we're generally always talking about multitenant shared hardware, and then the different things you're "sharing" within that hardware --- a kernel (no virtualization), a hypervisor (KVM), two hypervisors (nested KVM). Note that the "extra" hypervisor isn't the big problem with nested KVM.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @05:20PM
(#50553086)
"If you provide services for customers, and the customers don't trust each other (because they are unrelated entities), and multiple customers share the same platform, then the added complexity and poorer security track record of nested KVM becomes a large problem".
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by secondcoming on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:26PM
(#50551667)
What's the usecase for this? You're already paying for the instance to be up but it's being deliberately under-utilised in case you have to start a VM?
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by xmodem on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:51PM
(#50551958)
If you need as-fast-as-possible guest start, AND you have to be on AWS, AND you can't use any of their native microVM-based services, AND you can't use the bare-metal instances - whether due to cost or some other reason, then nested virtualisation might be the least-bad option. That doesn't make it compelling.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by danielheath on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:12PM
(#50552184)
Security primitives which don’t nest are fundamentally a bad API design.
Sometimes that’s justified in the name of making the security code simple enough to reason about, but making it harder to use has a security cost also.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by immibis2 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @02:07PM
(#50550632)
I think the use case is that you buy a VM from someone and you also want to run VMs. You wouldn't design your own infrastructure to run VMs inside VMs, but you might already be inside a VM, and want to run VMs.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by xmodem on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:36PM
(#50551785)
Oh, sure, there are few limits to the ways you can work around a broken organizational design with a bad technical design. But if nested VMs are the answer then I think you're probably asking the wrong question.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by LoganDark on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @08:07PM
(#50554706)
I mean, nested virtualization allows your containers to implement virtualization-based security. Defense in depth -- more layers for any exploit to have to penetrate.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by j45 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:07PM
(#50548862)
The cloud is somebody else's computer.
Mitigations are layered, first not using a shared VPS, and instead running your own bare metal server with something like proxmox to run the containerization.
Those containers could be susceptible to issues between them too, but you at least control the environment and can put more checks and balances in place.
Shared cloud and vps is going to become bumpy and more insecure the next little while. There's no way around it.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by cduzz on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:47PM
(#50550379)
We're all living in the story of mel.
At first, there were just big logic blocks and storage that did as they were told.
Later, in hardware, there were all sorts of optimizations built in where the logic would do its own thing -- so you'd get caches and speculative execution and even on-the-fly conversion from one instruction set to another.
This abstraction was also piled onto the runtime -- you'd write machine code, then assembly, then higher level languages; eventually you'd run in interpreted or just-in-time generated bytecode (hello to Java from UCSD p-System from the 70s and Burroughs machines in the 60s). And of course... operating systems...
Now, we've got machines reading source code (and machine code, and everything in between) and they've got some ability to thing the thing to make it thing. Sometimes correctly (enough to pass existing tests) and sometimes without the ability to express to the human what the thing they thinged was.
But, we're all living in the land of mel and for some it's always been better to go fishing than to pretend to participate.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by immibis2 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:33PM
(#50552416)
The "hardware doing its own thing" can be understood. There was this big ideological movement called ECS in the 2010s that was about writing software in ways that actually run well on hardware.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by drum55 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:47PM
(#50549519)
If it was valuable a human would have been able to communicate it in a few lines of text. Using a LLM to blast slop devalues everything and communicates little. A drunken twitter rant has more ability to convey information than sloppy blog posts with 3 pieces of information per sentence.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by Kozmik1 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:37PM
(#50551801)
OP (me) was not the author but I generally agree - a well written or at least better edited summary as a preamble would have been preferable, however it's educational to see the process and a potential repro of the issue don't you think?
Of course I imagine they used AI to find the exploit, and the documentation may have come as an output from that process.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by biotechbio on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:42PM
(#50549445)
Glad to see this is the top comment. This is written by Claude, I know because I talk to Claude for 8+ hours a day, and it says stuff like this. I stopped reading the article because of it.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by adverbly on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:43PM
(#50549471)
Well this sucks. So this needs a kernel fix then? Looks like I can disable nested passthrough manually, but am I stuck waiting for downsteam fixes at this point then?
Honestly, this gives me pause on the whole "VM is sufficient for any agentic sandbox environment" theory.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by cryptonector on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:40PM
(#50551837)
I wouldn't say wildly wrong. I would say virtualization is a lot better than nothing, but that there's a pile of hacks with a pile of vulnerabilities (Spectre/Meltdown come to mind) is undeniable. It's just there's no need to tell people they are stupid or worse for using it.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by tptacek on Thursday November 19, 2026 @12:37AM
(#50556438)
Bare metal has nothing to do with his point. He's comparing cotenant shared kernel to cotenant virtual kernel, and he's wrong: virtualization drastically reduces the attack surface.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by eddythompson80 on Thursday November 19, 2026 @12:52AM
(#50556509)
Is he? I didn't follow the entire thread, but it doesn't seem to discuss shared kernel, just whether the security of x86 virtualization is real or if it's just a convenient way to run multiple kernels on the same x86 host. If you don't trust x86 virtualization as a security boundary, then your down to bare metal and hoping that your networking cards and switches don't have some vulnerability too.
Virtualization does reduce the attack surface, but it's still there. This is a thread for a hole in it.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by immibis2 on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:32PM
(#50552404)
Links to a CVE record. The kernel project marks everything that could conceivably be of any use to an attacker as a CVE. What are we actually looking at here? Sounds like a dangling-pointer type of bug?
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape
by abeyer on Thursday November 19, 2026 @12:37AM
(#50556437)
The situation might improve if they were to spend some time and effort documenting how seL4 can be used that way. Last I looked their docs around the hypervisor use case were pretty sparse, had trivial examples that were far from what I'd expect to see in even small production use cases, and kept implying that using VMs wasn't really the seL4 way, and wouldn't you rather rewrite everything native?
So this is a tricky one. You can (and should) deploy unikernel workloads on metal and avoid nested virt but this is hard to make economically viable in some cases.
This is going to affect "sandbox" providers and their customers more than anything else.
FTFY
Sure, some projects are trying to be responsible or are trying to keep waves of slop PR's from drowning them, but that is by no means an indication of a general distaste for AI code. It's been largely embraced.
Although, at the pace of improvement, I'd bet it won't even be necessary in a year or so.
In the meantime the patching will continue until security improves!
Don't allow nested KVM.
That does not seem to be what HN has been thinking for months.
Agree that the article is downright painful to read though.
AWS instances are slow to launch; they take whole seconds. Nested virtualization allows running something like firecracker/crosvm/rust-vmm atop a normal AWS instance, without needing a bare-metal one.
If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.
(Aside: my current guess at the appropriate security posture towards Nitro Sandboxes, in the current era of vulnerabilities, is "decent, but probably has security holes too, and is less widely scrutinized, don't count on it either". Thoughts?)
Any recommendations for good guides on that, besides "design very careful IAM policies and security groups, harden any common services they have access to, and ideally run them under separate AWS accounts"?
Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance or is firecracker distributing them so that multiple customers can have VMs on the same actual box?
Sounds like it would be pretty expensive for Amazon to dedicate an instance to every customer, especially for those with small workloads.
If that's the case, why would it not hold for Amazon but would hold for everyone else?
At some point in the past they did, for pretty much exactly this reason. I'd assume they don't anymore (I last worked there a decade ago).
Sometimes that’s justified in the name of making the security code simple enough to reason about, but making it harder to use has a security cost also.
Mitigations are layered, first not using a shared VPS, and instead running your own bare metal server with something like proxmox to run the containerization.
Those containers could be susceptible to issues between them too, but you at least control the environment and can put more checks and balances in place.
Shared cloud and vps is going to become bumpy and more insecure the next little while. There's no way around it.
I guess its time for all of us to step aside, leave space for somebody who knowns what they are doing, and go fishing...
At first, there were just big logic blocks and storage that did as they were told.
Later, in hardware, there were all sorts of optimizations built in where the logic would do its own thing -- so you'd get caches and speculative execution and even on-the-fly conversion from one instruction set to another.
This abstraction was also piled onto the runtime -- you'd write machine code, then assembly, then higher level languages; eventually you'd run in interpreted or just-in-time generated bytecode (hello to Java from UCSD p-System from the 70s and Burroughs machines in the 60s). And of course... operating systems...
Now, we've got machines reading source code (and machine code, and everything in between) and they've got some ability to thing the thing to make it thing. Sometimes correctly (enough to pass existing tests) and sometimes without the ability to express to the human what the thing they thinged was.
But, we're all living in the land of mel and for some it's always been better to go fishing than to pretend to participate.
Of course I imagine they used AI to find the exploit, and the documentation may have come as an output from that process.
Also in this case, a "missed potential" if it eventually fails to reach anyone.
Perhaps they are rewriting it with less slop?
Honestly, this gives me pause on the whole "VM is sufficient for any agentic sandbox environment" theory.
CVE still listed...
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48883089
Virtualization does reduce the attack surface, but it's still there. This is a thread for a hole in it.
Just don’t.
0. https://sel4.systems/