News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:13PM (#50548969)
> I have yet to hear a compelling use case for nested virtualization.

AWS instances are slow to launch; they take whole seconds. Nested virtualization allows running something like firecracker/crosvm/rust-vmm atop a normal AWS instance, without needing a bare-metal one.

Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:16PM (#50549027)
If you're segregating internal workloads, by all means use nested virtualization on EC2 or DO or something. Your threat model is different and you probably have a lot more room to maneuver when a KVM escape is announced, because you have some level of trust in all your workloads.

If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.

Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:25PM (#50549175)
One distinction I'd make as well is "are you running more than one customer's workload on the same system" (yikes, don't), vs "are you using nested virt as additional protection rather than running the customer workload directly on an instance, but one instance only gets jobs from one customer".
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:33PM (#50549302)
Another good point, but this one is maybe a little less dispositive than it looks like: it's very difficult to engineer an orchestration system that reliably segregates worker physicals from each other, so I'd rate the likelihood of a game-over situation after a guest->host escape as very high regardless of how yuo schedule workloads. It's sort of the same situation as how SSRF's are usually game-overs (you're pivoting from a hardened attack surface to a much softer one) but even harder to engineer again.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @12:46PM (#50549499)
That's fair. You'd want a system designed around the notion that every customer instance must be isolated from each other without the nested virtualization.

(Aside: my current guess at the appropriate security posture towards Nitro Sandboxes, in the current era of vulnerabilities, is "decent, but probably has security holes too, and is less widely scrutinized, don't count on it either". Thoughts?)

Any recommendations for good guides on that, besides "design very careful IAM policies and security groups, harden any common services they have access to, and ideally run them under separate AWS accounts"?

Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by wmf on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:13PM (#50549879)
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by necovek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:19PM (#50549971)
Does this hold for the likes of Amazon?

Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance or is firecracker distributing them so that multiple customers can have VMs on the same actual box?

Sounds like it would be pretty expensive for Amazon to dedicate an instance to every customer, especially for those with small workloads.

If that's the case, why would it not hold for Amazon but would hold for everyone else?

Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by swiftcoder on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @01:25PM (#50550040)
> Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance

At some point in the past they did, for pretty much exactly this reason. I'd assume they don't anymore (I last worked there a decade ago).

Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by exceptione on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:44PM (#50552553)
[delayed]
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:48PM (#50552641)
No, we're generally always talking about multitenant shared hardware, and then the different things you're "sharing" within that hardware --- a kernel (no virtualization), a hypervisor (KVM), two hypervisors (nested KVM). Note that the "extra" hypervisor isn't the big problem with nested KVM.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by exceptione on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:57PM (#50552768)
[delayed]
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by tptacek on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @05:20PM (#50553086)
"If you provide services for customers, and the customers don't trust each other (because they are unrelated entities), and multiple customers share the same platform, then the added complexity and poorer security track record of nested KVM becomes a large problem".
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by secondcoming on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:26PM (#50551667)
What's the usecase for this? You're already paying for the instance to be up but it's being deliberately under-utilised in case you have to start a VM?
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by JoshTriplett on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:34PM (#50551764)
Keep a warm pool to serve customer requests.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by xmodem on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @03:51PM (#50551958)
If you need as-fast-as-possible guest start, AND you have to be on AWS, AND you can't use any of their native microVM-based services, AND you can't use the bare-metal instances - whether due to cost or some other reason, then nested virtualisation might be the least-bad option. That doesn't make it compelling.
Re:CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape by danielheath on Wednesday November 18, 2026 @04:12PM (#50552184)
Security primitives which don’t nest are fundamentally a bad API design.

Sometimes that’s justified in the name of making the security code simple enough to reason about, but making it harder to use has a security cost also.