cryptonector
cryptonector on Hacker News
I was hoping for something about human reading and writing, but it was about POSIX I/O APIs. Not bad, and I'd go further and point out that `mmap()` is good for reading but not for writing, and why.
You can't have wormholes.
Pushing Ice is a great sci-fi novel.
I really don't want to spoil it, but Reynolds does have something of a solution to the problem of the speed of light being so limiting, and it's based on time dilation. As usual with all things sci-fi, it's not practical, but it's fairly unique and fun to read.
I have bad news about that...
Indeed, it could have been obsolete tech as of launch. That's typically how it goes.
That's true but not an argument for 403 over 400. Certainly either works. But one is more correct.
It's a well-known (ish) idiom that nobody uses. It's very entertaining though, for sure. In some circles it's known as the down-to operator.
In the first round one of the POSTs was to be rejected because it was supposed to contain JSON but contained something else; that should have been made a 400.
TFA is an attempt to exclude AI in one space. My comment is not an attempt to force AI into every space. There's a difference.
My prediction is that AlpineBSD is choosing to include only things that choose to exclude AI, but that set of things will get smaller over time, so AlpineBSD is bound to fail when a critical dependency drops the rule that AlpineBSD wants them to have and no suitable replacement exists. This prediction is not -IMO- biased by my preferences -- I think it's a prediction most people can see is likely enough to be correct that it's a reasonable one to have regardless of preferences regarding AI.
Some day the safeguards will have to be removed so we can use the LLMs defensively.
It's a losing battle. Give it time and this attitude will go away by the sheer weight of AI-coded open source they really cannot say no to just because there is no human-coded alternative available that is good enough.
Pragmatism is the opposite of tribalism. GP is a pragmatist, therefore not a tribalist.
TIL. Want. I'm going to buy some for myself. This video brings back memories of amazing restaurants in Japan.
For sure. The thing is that there are several problematic areas (registration, in-person voting mechanics, early voting, precinct-based vs. county-wide (or worse), mail-in ballots, etc). You can't fix everything all at once, or maybe you can, but you have to focus on each problem area separately because they are separable and it's easier to address the problems that way.
> because even the local officials running the show don't know the rules.
Or because they do.
> having the voting source code public and auditable seems like a good way to build trust
It's not the source code that matters. It's the whole architecture, design, supply chain, and implementation as in down to object code _including_ firmware.
I agree, but if your location has abandoned hand-counts then justifying the extra expense and extra logistics complications can be infeasible. Thus in some places it is easy to justify taking a detour through machine counts + immediate partial hand-count random sampling statistical audits designed to detect machine malfunctions with high probability.
Surprisingly there has been little to no partisanship in _this_ HN post's commentary. That's quite refreshing. I suppose you're talking about discussion in Brazil. But you know, a few years ago this thread would have been extremely partisan here in the U.S.
Paper ballots definitely have security problems too, it's just harder to compromise an election with many polling locations if it uses paper.
E.g., a counter can put a bit of pencil lead under a fingernail and mark overvotes on ballots they don't like, thus causing them to be adjudicated or not counted.
The problem of addition (or deletion) of votes is solved by having a paper pollbook to go with an electronic pollbook, plus doing reconciliation.
Election integrity is about finding all the attacks that can reasonably be expected, and detecting or -even better- preventing them. But it's a tougher problem than this one-sentence summary makes it sound.
Right, because the person coercing the voter wouldn't know of this little trick and wouldn't make sure the voter doesn't do it. Riiight.
> How? Any possible scheme I can think of that could theoretically allow a tabulation machine to behave differently on audit ballots than it does on real ballots, can also theoretically be mitigated via audit procedures.
An audit will only mitigate that if a) you have paper ballots you can check, b) the audit happens very soon after the closing of the polls. If an audit takes place a month later, that's a lot of time for the elections administration to create all new ballots to replace the originals with, so the audit has to come very soon after the election.
It's easier to restore the security of elections run with paper ballots because people can get involved locally. It's not possible to steal numerous paper-based elections in a row -- at some point the thieves' energy/funding runs out and security can be restored. With a digital system, if the system is changed to be vulnerable, or if it always was, then there is no way to recover.
GP means inefficient in the sense of cost. Paper ballots add costs. Partial manual audits / hand-counts add costs. Full audits / hand-counts add a lot of cost, and in particular hand-counts require a lot of staff in order to yield results on election night.
The costliest item is counting by hand, so... don't. Use ballot scanning and counting machines and then implement a timely partial manual audit to demonstrate that the BMDs and BSCDs functioned correctly.
> Intentionally limiting access to accessible voting is problematic.
I offered nothing of the kind, except as to civilians residing abroad, and even then, I don't think there should be any obligation to provide online voting -- having to travel to a consulate is not too unreasonable.
> It's not reasonable to tell people "too bad," fly back to the US as much as 3 times per year. They pay taxes and are subject to US law even though they're overseas, so they get to vote.
Vote... where? In what state, in what county, in what precinct? The correct answer is that they should not have to pay income taxes while residing abroad, but also not get to vote while residing abroad.
For military the situation is simpler even if the personnel have no US-side residence: use the state/county/precinct of last residence. The same can apply to civilians, but I'd rather let them not pay state and federal income taxes while residing abroad.
> Ballot management becomes error prone. My county alone has 25 ballots due to the different combinations of state house, senate, Federal house, municipalities, and _all_ the special districts. (4 members to the board of directors of the Anytown West Memorial District, a.k.a. cemetery, because they had a property tax assessment when they built the thing in 1950)
That's a small county :)