Congress is only going to delegate when some other entity, likely a business, isn't already writing the law/regulation.
A concrete example: Boeing is going to up their lobbying game hard. They can now not only help write the laws, but help choose who says they've broken them. There is no way that it will be good for passengers before it is good for stockholders.
Worse, in some ways, because there's no real paper trail, such as donations to politicians or PACs.
Yes. Lobbying is already a huge problem. This ruling exclusively makes it worse.
I.e., anything Congress does not explicitly state in a law is now determined by federal judges. At the extreme, this is aggrandizing a very wide scope of power to low-level federal judges to essentially ignore congressional intent.
Chevron curtailed this essential power in favor of taking an agency at its word, which is quite a dangerous stance.
Separation of church and state is non negotiable requirement for maintaining a civil society.
It's obviously negotiable since Christmas is the only religious holiday for the Federal Government.
Plus centralizing it makes things much more clear and consistent.
Hell, if we just took regulatory agencies and put judges in charge somehow that would be a lot better than chaos mode.
> So agencies will not have any power to actually regulate.
This honestly sounds perfect.
If this is the actual end result of this ruling, we’ll all be in a much much better place.
The couts giving/forcing (back) power to the legislature where laws are supposed to be written, deliberated, and passed is a very good thing.
I think what you’re saying is the equivalent of “just write software without bugs and everything will be fine”
Yeah sure… but easier said than done.
If the words written on paper don't actually mean anything and can be interpreted wildly, what is even the point of passing laws?
Writing and passing unnecessarily vague laws open to interpretation and saying your job is done is like Bethesda publishing a bug infested game and saying they have a finished product. No, your work is shit, go back to the workshop.
I think lawmakers strive to write laws that are precise enough that they can't be interpreted wildly, but I don't think it's reasonable to expect lawmakers to craft laws that have no room for interpretation.
Funny question in light of Fischer vs. US. The majority found that the text of a law didn't mean what they believed it should, so they threw out the text and went with their feelings. How can one write a law with no room for interpretation, to be understood by a court who can't be trusted to retain the letter of the law?
Why do you think federal agencies are arbiters of their own authority? Congress created them, Congress can reel them in.
I don't mean to say that executive agencies shouldn't be held to the Constitution or the law. Who says they shouldn't? But they should be allowed to have a broad mandate.
Maybe, MAYBE some kind of rubber stamp process where legislators get a 90 day window on rejecting new regulations with a "default approve". But I have no faith that a modern society can have all rules and edge cases pre-emptively defined in law.
They shouldn't. No single entity should ever be allowed to "to write every single detail of regulatory code for every facet of American life".
Thankfully, with this decision, we have restored a situation where law and policy are developed and refined through the interplay of disparate branches of government with ultimate accountability to the public itself, with edge cases handled by the specialists who actually have the relevant expertise in interpreting law.
> I don't mean to say that executive agencies shouldn't be held to the Constitution or the law. Who says they shouldn't?
Well, that's the implicit argument of the people who are saying they should continue to be allowed to act as the arbiters of their own authority, without judicial oversight.
> But they should be allowed to have a broad mandate.
Unelected appointees who are hired on the basis of their expertise in a technical field, without necessarily having any special competence at handling the normative aspect of their duties, should absolutely not have a broad mandate to decide what the limits of their own authority are.
You shouldn't be having this conversation if you do not understand the basic civics of the US government and the role the legislative body plays, let alone your own damn argument.
So, the US Constitution distributes political authority among three distinct but co-equal branches of government. Legislative authority is assigned to Congress, executive power belongs to the president, and judicial power is the purview of the Supreme Court.
The Constitution makes no mention of administrative agencies -- these are entirely creatures of statue law subsequent and subordinate to the Constitution, and did not begin to exist significantly until more than a century after the Victorian Constitution went into effect.
There is no explicit authority for Congress to delegate legislative power to any other institution, and whether this is entirely legitimate remains a master of some debate.
The Constitution further explicitly assigns judicial power to the Supreme Court, and in no way obligates the court to delegate its inherent duty of statutory interpretation to executive branch agencies, least of all to defer to those agencies in establishing the boundaries of their own statutory power.
Finally, the Constitution enumerates the scope of the legislative power assigned to Congress, and explicitly reserves all non-enumerated powers to "the states or the people respectively". There is no basis whatsoever in our system of government for any single institution to unilaterally "regulate every facet of American life", least of all at the federal level.
Which is correct. Congress's role is to legislate on matters within the scope of its enumerated powers, as subject to judicial review, and absolutely not to "make all the laws" that regulate "every facet of American life".
There are plenty of matters of law that are not delegated to Congress, and are reserved e.g. to states, and plenty of facets of American life that are outside the bounds of political intervention entirely, where people are responsible for making their own decisions in a pluralistic fashion.
2. The PTEA makes a regulation stating that, per their mandate, all people must personally declare plastics are bad for the planet or else they get taxed $100 a year. This is clearly a violation of the first amendment.
3. You are suggesting that under Chevron, no one would have any remedy for this unconstitutional behavior?
3a. That a person would not have agency to sue in federal court to say this regulation is unconstitutional?
3b. You suggest Congress has no power to explicitly prohibit the "PTEA" from imposing individual fines related to speech on the environment?
---
It seems from another comment, regarding 3b. you agree Congress can make laws adjusting the scope of agency power. That leaves 3a.
Well, this example includes the agency acting in a way that Congress itself would not have the power to authorize in the first place, so this is a bad example. Statutory interpretation doesn't really matter here, because even if the statute did authorize the PTEA to implement this policy, it would still be unconstitutional, so Chevron wouldn't even come into it.
Why make up outlandish examples, though, when we have the examples of the actual cases to look at? Loper involved a federal law requiring operators of certain fishing boats to allow for inspections to ensure compliance with fishing regulations. The agency tasked with enforcing that law decided for themselves that the statute conferred them the authority to bill the fishing boat operators for their inspectors' expenses when going out to make the inspections.
Under Chevron, the court would not have be able to judge for itself whether or not the statute actually authorizes the agency to charge the fisherman for the travel expenses of inspectors, and would have to defer to the agency's own interpretation that it does.
> 3b. You suggest Congress has no power to explicitly prohibit the "PTEA" from imposing individual fines related to speech on the environment?
Of course they do, by passing a statute. Which is then up to the courts to interpret and hold the PTEA accountable to -- with the reversal of Chevron, interpreting that statute would thankfully no longer be up to the PTEA itself.
(You don't have to, I won't blame you or be snide if you don't. Because it really seems like we disagree ideologically).
Loper seems like it could have been narrowly interpreted but threw the baby out with the bathwater. I don't want a judge deciding what levels of lead in the water system are "clean enough" or how deadly a substance must be before the FDA decides it isn't fit for human consumption. I really would rather the elected executive with subject matter experts interpret then enforce those laws within reason.
>Under Chevron, the court would not have be able to judge for itself whether or not the statute actually authorizes the agency to charge the fisherman for the travel expenses of inspectors, and would have to defer to the agency's own interpretation that it does.
So? Congress sees the regulations passed under their authority. Why shouldn't they be the ones to call an enforcement action out? Why couldn't the fishermen petition their Representative?
Perhaps you should skip over all of the biased intermediaries, and just read the ruling itself.
> Loper seems like it could have been narrowly interpreted but threw the baby out with the bathwater.
What baby? What's desirable about executive-branch officials being given free reign to interpret the statute law that defines their own authority with no oversight? What does anyone -- other than those officials themselves -- gain out of allowing that?
> I really would rather the elected executive with subject matter experts interpret then enforce those laws within reason.
Subject matter experts at what? These are all normative questions -- yes, factual circumstances frame the real-world context they apply to, and yes, technical expertise may be a relevant and important input, but actually making the decisions means making value judgements, weighing cost against benefits, making risk/reward tradeoffs, reconciling the conflicting interests of involved parties, making sure everyone's rights are protected, etc. How does technical expertise in the factual context give anyone any special expertise in making the normative decisions?
Subject-matter experts testify before Congress all the time. Research institutes publish white papers; think tanks draft model statutes and explain them to legislators; expert witnesses testify in every sort of court case imaginable. All of that is important and necessary, and is absolutely not going away. But the idea that having technical expertise in some empirical domain is sufficient qualification to assume absolute control over decision-making, and toss out our whole system of democratic legislation and common-law jurisprudence -- both of which have always relied on experts to provide input on applicable facts -- seems absolutely incomprehensible to me.
And that's all even assuming that the people who staff these agencies actually are genuine experts with wholly good-faith intentions. Sure, there are definitely people like that involved. But there are also lots of bare-minimum jobsworths, power-tripping petty officials, corrupt self-aggrandizers, and people who bullshited their way into "expert" credentials, all operating within an institutional system rife with perverse incentives and structural limitations. In other words, they're just like every other organization composed of human beings in our society. So why would we wish to insulate them from the system of accountability and oversight that we expect to hold sway everywhere else?
> So? Congress sees the regulations passed under their authority. Why shouldn't they be the ones to call an enforcement action out? Why couldn't the fishermen petition their Representative?
This whole conversation is totally downstream of any involvement by Congress -- they have already done their job by passing whatever statutes are currently in effect. The question here is whose job it is to interpret the statutes that Congress has already passed.
Congress is absolutely free to monitor the behavior of administrative agencies, and past new legislation to expand, contract, or clarify their authority. They indeed do so semi-regularly. But then those statutes will still need to be interpreted and applied to edge cases by people whose job it is to understand the statutes, i.e. the judiciary.
You seem to be trying to factor the need for interpretation of the law entirely out of the question, and I can't even begin to comprehend that.
Congress writes a law saying "FCC, go guarantee good access to Internet for people" and FCC says "OK, 100mb is the minimum and every ISP should offer that". You think an ISP should be able to sue, and a judge should be able to block, an FCC attempt to implement "good access to Internet" as they see fit? I don't trust the judiciary not to completely supplant or destroy the power that should belong to the executive agency. That level of review defeats the entire purpose of delegating regulatory power to the executive agency.
I get the rationale of "wait what if the exec agency does something really wild" but I think the bar that is required to strike regulations should be really, really high.
I really think I understand your position. I get your stance on normative interpretation. I think the Chevron system was the way to do things best. Maybe if we develop a framework for justices to force a legislature to reconsider the question, not to make the final decision themselves, it would be more reasonable. But judges aren't accountable to anyone.
So maybe an elected subset of the judiciary? Or a "push system" for the house to vote on all the issues that judges find. But not judges making the final call and waiting for the legislature to do something about it.
There's a lot to unpack here. First, I don't understand why you expect corporate interests to work hard to overturn the regulations that they themselves often benefit from, and sometimes themselves advanced via influencing and co-opting regulatory bodies.
Second, I don't understand why you think that the judicial process can't sort out bullshit from solid legal reasoning -- that's its entire purpose -- but somehow trust functionaries in opaque bureaucracies to do the same.
Finally, I don't understand why you expect that Congress would have anything to do with this. This is about who interprets the statutes that Congress has already passed, understanding that statutes will not contain detailed specifics about every regulatory scenario. Regulatory bodies will continue to do what they do, but will simply no longer be able to expand their authority on their own prerogative without being validated by due process.
> Congress writes a law saying "FCC, go guarantee good access to Internet for people" and FCC says "OK, 100mb is the minimum and every ISP should offer that".
ISPs are already able to sue and always have been. Courts are still adjudicating every such dispute. Nothing is changing in this regard.
> You think an ISP should be able to sue, and a judge should be able to block, an FCC attempt to implement "good access to Internet" as they see fit?
Of course they should! And the FCC should then be required to argue why they think the specific actions they are trying to take are consistent with the legislative mandate, with the court giving a fair hearing to the other side, and then making a determination based on their expert application of law, to determine whether the thing that the FCC wants to do is legal, completely irrespectively of whether it is effective policy.
I can't wrap my head around why you think this is bad, not even a little bit.
> Maybe if we develop a framework for justices to force a legislature to reconsider the question, not to make the final decision themselves, it would be more reasonable. But judges aren't accountable to anyone.
No, this entire matter is downstream of legislation. Congress can reconsider any question at any time, and then pass new statutes to adjust the laws. But someone still needs to be responsible for interpreting those new statutes. And that someone is the judiciary.
> So maybe an elected subset of the judiciary? Or a "push system" for the house to vote on all the issues that judges find. But not judges making the final call and waiting for the legislature to do something about it.
No, that doesn't make any sense. Congress can legislate at a million miles per hour, and pass all manner of detailed statutes, but those statutes still need to be interpreted and adjudicated, and doing so is inherently and constitutionally the role of the judiciary. No structural changes are necessary apart from restoring proper separation of powers and checks and balances, which is exactly what reversing Chevron does.
You are trying to solve a nonexistent problem with solutions that are themselves real, worse problems.
I've lost faith in the court system recently.
You have faith in a court system to only determine questions of legality, not policy. I don't have that. I see our federal courts as political tools, completely unaccountable to the people and whose rulings are never adjusted by the Congress. I wholeheartedly disagree with textualist/originalist readings of the Constitution.
At least a bureaucracy operates at the direction of an elected position, I suppose.
I'll have to think about the discussions here. I still like my idea of Congress being brought back into the loop to be required to respond to judicial decisions overturning regulations, to ensure the agencies can continue doing what they need to do if it is "the will of the people". You kept on saying this stuff is "downstream of Congress". I'm saying to make it a feedback loop so it must get back in front of Congress after judges make a decision.
---
EDIT: Oh and SCOTUS just gave the president absolute immunity, and among other things said that judges couldn't look at presidential intent when determining if an act is "official or unofficial conduct" because it would open the president up to endless legislation.
So judicial review is okay when it's talking about fines on boats, but not when it's about a president overturning elections or assassinating political leaders.
No, that's no my implicit argument so you're wrong on the facts. And you keep saying they are the arbiters of their own authority.
Congress is.
Congress passes statutes that establish and grant authority to administrative agencies, and may from time to time pass new legislation that adjusts prevailing law, but they do not intervene to exercise oversight under the current statutes in effect.
That oversight -- evaluating the specific actions of those agencies and determining whether they are within the scope of current law -- has always been the role of other institutions.
Conventionally (and constitutionally), responsibility for for that oversight -- i.e. determining the meaning of the applicable statutes, and deciding whether specific behaviors and actions are within the law -- belongs entirely to the courts.
A few decades ago, the courts decided to abdicate this responsibility, and instead defer to those agencies' own interpretation of the statutes they operate under, indeed having the effect of making them "arbiters of their own authority". This is what Chevron doctrine refers to, and is what the new court decision has finally reversed.
> If this is the actual end result of this ruling, we’ll all be in a much much better place.
There's no way. But, I guess we'll find out. I hope HN is around in 10 years so we can see who is right.
Given the effort ratio, I wouldnt condone downvotes, however I wouldnt be surprised if that was the easiest response.
Also - Downvotes have existed since, at least, slashdot. They are not censorship. They can be misapplied, but it’s not censorship.
This site is also actively moderated. It’s part of the censorship industrial complex as trust and safety is being called now.
At best the person you referring to is ignorant how reality works. But they are also indistinguishable from someone who doesn't value words at all and is lying for political gain.
Why should such be allowed?
Edit - and remember you're not allowed to downvote me because I'm being perfectly civil. But the only way to stop me is to downvote me or get the mods to censor me.
We are going to see more pollution, more child labor, more exploitation of poor immigrants and more hoarding of wealth by the few among other side effects.
There's a reason only the "conservative" SCOTUS justices have billionaire "friends".
This isn't accurate. Agencies will just need to work with Congress to help them write laws which make sense according to how the agency would like something to regulated.
Enjoy your poisoned water and black air, my glorious redneck friends. You asked for it.
Your problem is the VASTLY more informed elites, who spend their time funding teams and campaigns. Teams who get into the details, who plan the messaging, do the lobbying, and provide the scripts that are repeated to those who listen.
It’s the guy who is a middle manager at a campaign, the lawyers figuring out which courts need to be influenced, the wording of which law to be switched, the people who map out each agency org chart and read the by laws to figure out how to dismantle the agency.
It’s those doctors, those lawyers, those analysts, those consultants and experts who are doing the work.
Common law works very well in practice. Law is a problem that is impossible to solve optimally. Civil law has plenty of weak points - like every complex system.
As in the oldest continuously-operating legal systems?
This is already exactly how it works.
One reason why legislating takes so long is because there is an enormous amount of collaboration between legislators and agencies to get it as right as they can.
As I tried to explain to people in 2016, your kids are going to be living with the consequences of your vote for generations. We are in a new era of judicial supremacy and they are out of bubble gum.
Are you from Latin America?Martinelli (Panama) has been complaining of "Civil Dictatorship" since being on trial and hidden inside the Nicaraguan Embassy. Chavez (Costa Rica) is denouncing a Democratic "Dictatorship then Tyranny" because he finds independece of powers (Executive, Legislative and Judicial) cumbersome.
Dangerous direction, people complaining about power balance checks
As for whether or not the person you are replying to is from a certain region of the planet - what are you trying to imply here? I'm from the USA - does that mean that I agree with everything Trump or Biden says? This is a weird, and IMO, distasteful, way to make an argument.
The balance of powers is paramount. And it is usually the executive which grabs it when the oportunity arises: not only wars, but also exceptions like terrorism prevention (overblown) and the recent covid pandemic (all countries)
It has already been that way for a while. From the decision:
"Because Chevron’s justifying presumption is, as Members of the Court have often recognized, a fiction, the Court has spent the better part of four decades imposing one limitation on Chevron after another. Confronted with the byzantine set of preconditions and exceptions that has resulted, some courts have simply bypassed Chevron or failed to heed its various steps and nuances. The Court, for its part, has not deferred to an agency interpretation under Chevron since 2016."
...
"Given the Court’s constant tinkering with and eventual turn away from Chevron, it is hard to see how anyone could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chevron in any particular case or expect it to produce readily foreseeable outcomes."
This is the goal. Want to pollute? You will soon when the EPA has no teeth.
EDIT: It seems to me like it'll be business as usual for CARB but there's significant uncertainty here. The Supremacy Clause forbids the states from overwriting federal law, but if the EPA loses its enforcement powers altogether then nothing stops California from continuing to exert more stringent emissions standards. However it'll create a lot of uncertainty for automakers if the EPA and CARB is challenged on the grounds of regulating emissions and I'm not looking forward to what would happen next.
Not independent agencies [1].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_Un...
To which I raise you the 2008 crisis and the defanging of the SEC. Since it looks like people want to neuter weather agencies, I believe its going to be a fascinating couple of years.
Also, looking to make good policy is easy.
More likely a limited subset of those agencies will survive that process due to ongoing efforts of folk whose self-confessed long-term goal is the "deconstruction of the administrative state". With this ruling, all they have to do is do nothing, or obstruct the passing of any law that attempts to return to the agencies what the supreme court stripped from them.
Congress skirted their duties for 40 years. This legislative / executive codependency then created a tightly connected and interdependent governance system, outside the purview of the judicial 'checks and balances.' This is why things like warrantless mass tapping and the Patriot Act became 'good law.'
We are unwinding decades of bad governance. This is a joyous occasion, along with the ACJ decision from last session.
Before anyone says there were still checks and balances - if you feel the need to, you have no idea what Cheveron meant
Delegation dates back to (at least) the early 1900s:
> Since 1935, the Court has not struck down a delegation to an administrative agency.15 Rather, the Court has approved, without deviation, Congress's ability to delegate power under broad standards.16 The Court has upheld, for example, delegations to administrative agencies to determine excessive profits during wartime,17 to determine unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power among securities holders,18 to fix fair and equitable commodities prices,19 to determine just and reasonable rates,20 and to regulate broadcast licensing as the public interest, convenience, or necessity require.21
* https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation03.html
And from 1825:
> It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. [23 U.S. 1, 43] But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.
* https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/23/1.html
Delegation is a key component of governance and predates the US with Ministers of the Crown, and once the the US was formed with Secretaries/Directors/etc, all of latter which are approved by the US Legislative branch through (e.g.) Senate-approved appointments.
That isn't even close to being the truth. Under Chevron congress was always free to pass statutes as detailed as they want to avoid the kind of ambiguities that would even apply to Chevron in the first place, and judges have always had the oversight to ensure that an agency's interpretation was a "permissible construction of the statute".
Those are two literal checks. I have no idea where you ever got the idea that executive agencies were "without check" but that is just plainly wrong.
"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
The Chevron ruling was codifying what was already happening for decades:
> When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natura...
There is plenty of oversight in interpretation and Congress does not need to micromanage interpretation or implementation. Delegation as a principle of government pre-dates the formation of the US with Ministers of the Crown, and was continued post-formation as that's why there are Secretarys of Department X/Y/Z or Directors of Agency A/B/C.
The People (through their representative in Congress) are fine with agencies doing the interpretation. Those agencies are headed by an Executive of The People (President), and are run by administrator who are People-approved (through Congressional hearings and Senate approvals). The Legislative branch can dial up and dial down the flexibility of interpretation any time they want through Acts that change how the department/agency involved works, or through altering leadership (Secretarys, Directors) of the agencies.
So for example, if a law grants an agency power to regulate pollution emitted into the air, the agency already couldn't simply decide on its own that it was also able to regulate toxins dumped into rivers. But it could decide, if the law was vague on this point, whether "emitted into the air" included car exhaust vs. only stationary factories, for example.
The principle was that if Congress left a definition or meaning ambiguous in the law, it's implied that defining its precise meaning is part of the regulatory work they wanted the agency to do. Now, instead of that principle, the meaning of every ambiguity is open for litigation to select a different interpretation if the court finds it preferable to the agency's.
Your example about pollution in the air and in the water is actually close to a good one: The EPA decided recently that they had power over CO2 emissions because of some very mild toxicity, even though that's not the reason why anyone wants to control CO2 emissions. They could easily have argued in your scenario that toxin dumped in the water evaporates and ends up in the air, so it's in their purview, and it might not be wrong under Chevron.
If Congress seeks to regulate air, water, land, and space pollution, from American companies, they should appoint industry experts who intend to leave public sector jobs for lucrative private sector jobs by going to work for the companies the laws need to regulate. It’s worked great for politicians who become lobbyists or prosecutors who go work for big law.
It’ll work great here too.
Seeing how polarized and partisan things are, it will only be a few decades!
Plus seeing how some of the court positions have been, I can only think that lobbying is going to become a massive business ! So much growth!
It's wild to think that either of things couldn't have been possible without Chevron. Congress would have passed anything required to allow those to become law.
They might not do that, but from my initial non-expert read of today's opinion, the Court only looked to the APA, not the Constitution in generating its ruling.
By 2040 the normal procedure every April will be, rather than filing a tax return, filing a suit in federal court disputing the right of the IRS to determine whether your income is actually ‘income’. Eighty federalist society AI lawbots will automatically file amicus briefs in support of your case. The court clerkputer will autoschedule oral arguments at the first available date, around 2175.
Sounds great. How we got to the point where executive-branch agencies were making rules with the force of law, binding upon the public with no judicial oversight, is a mystery to me, but it's good to see that the courts are taking their responsibilities seriously again, and restoring some measure of checks and balances.
It's ably explained in Roberts' opinion. In short, Congress often left the fine details to the agencies, not least because the laws were often drafted within those same agencies. Chevron was based on the idea that if statutory text is ambiguous the people in charge of implementing said statute were best positioned to figure out what it meant, in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act (which sets out rules for for how agencies make rules, eg requiring consultations, publications of proposed rules, public comment periods thereon etc.).
Wouldn't it be odd if the police also acted as the judge in your criminal trial? That's the point here, to separate lawmaking and interpretive power from the enforcers. Consolidation of power is dangerous because it doesn't work.
> in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act
This ruling made clear that the Chevron doctrine was not in line with the APA,
"Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires."
Those both fall under the executive branch. Plus, Chevron deference was about the court's actions, not prosecutors'.
> Another difference is that agency rulemaking is not made in a vacuum; there's a pretty elaborate rulemaking process which includes (iirc) notices of proposed rulemaking, mandatory public comment periods spanning months, pre-publication of draft rules to allow the possibility of litigation and so on.
That gives the illusion of a democratic process, but in reality, agency rulemakers are not accountable to the people, whereas Congress is. Keep in mind that the fisheries regulation in question on this case was passed during the Trump administration– so it's not like electing a conservative to head the executive put a stop to excess regulation, which is generally a position that conservatives advocate.
They do, but courts judge your case.
That gives the illusion of a democratic process, but in reality, agency rulemakers are not accountable to the people
I didn't claim it it to be a democratic process, I said it was not an arbitrary or isolated one. The democratic element is in the selection of an executive every 4 years. the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedures Act won't be formally changed by this, but I suspect it'll be lengthenedand more heavily litigated, resulting in less regulatory clarity and slower enforcement.
That did nothing to help the fishery in this case. The burdens placed upon them came from a lower level bureaucrat, a decision that likely never crossed Trump's desk. That's just one regulation among thousands per year for which there is no accountability.
Yes, that's an accurate assessment of what Chevron doctrine entails. And again, it is a mystery to me how anyone could ever have thought that this was a good idea, or was in any way consistent with the constitutional separation of powers.
You've just touched upon why this hasn't worked in the past. With Chevron the interpretation was left up to the agency, and courts never got to decide anything.
Without Chevron, the courts will now be able to do exactly what you're suggesting.
You're _actually_ in favor of disabling Chevron, which the SC just did.
What on earth are you talking about?
This created a state of affairs in which agencies were indeed making rules that were binding upon the public, and doing so without the courts exercising oversight on their own part to determine whether those rules were consistent with the prevailing statute law.
Now that Chevron doctrine has been reversed, when agencies engage in novel rulemaking that expands the scope of their authority, it will be up to the courts, not the agency itself, to decide whether that expansion of authority is consistent with current prevailing law.
Also, by and large the vast majority of regulations will stand.
Congress being parsimonious with laws is probably a good thing...read their Stare decisis paragraphs.
Here is the decision for you to read, in case you hadn't yet read it before posting. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
I'm impressed that Congress had the audacity 40 years ago to attempt to take judicial authority away from its constitutional locus in the courts and re-assign it to executive branch agencies, expecting them to be exercise reliable oversight over their own authority.
And that is a bad thing? If it is, I'll take it. The agencies have been ineffective at their stated missions. They have been revolving door power grabs since the end of WW2. You know, that time when we let all those "former" Nazis into prominent roles of government agencies?
It's not like the EPA stopped PFAS from contaminating water all over Earth. Or microplastics being embedded in the penile tissue of most men...Among the other "miracles of modern science". The EPA is too busy going after small landowners doing water management.
And if agencies are so wonderful. Why don't we have a Department of Peace & a Department of Prosperity for All? So the agencies cannot make up their own laws anymore? Cry me a PFAS laden river.
Letting a government decide in the face of ambiguous, poorly written laws is so obviously a wrong thing, that you wonder why the original Chevron decision was made.
It really is the other side of the coin to "ignorance of the law is no defence". It is incumbent on the govt to make the law as clear as is reasonably possible.
Now Congress is going to have to specify every possible consequence of laws in the statutes, otherwise a judge will decide.
So agencies will not have any power to actually regulate.
Awesome logic work, but terrible legal thinking without considering the side effects of the decision.