It's ably explained in Roberts' opinion. In short, Congress often left the fine details to the agencies, not least because the laws were often drafted within those same agencies. Chevron was based on the idea that if statutory text is ambiguous the people in charge of implementing said statute were best positioned to figure out what it meant, in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act (which sets out rules for for how agencies make rules, eg requiring consultations, publications of proposed rules, public comment periods thereon etc.).
Wouldn't it be odd if the police also acted as the judge in your criminal trial? That's the point here, to separate lawmaking and interpretive power from the enforcers. Consolidation of power is dangerous because it doesn't work.
> in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act
This ruling made clear that the Chevron doctrine was not in line with the APA,
"Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires."
Those both fall under the executive branch. Plus, Chevron deference was about the court's actions, not prosecutors'.
> Another difference is that agency rulemaking is not made in a vacuum; there's a pretty elaborate rulemaking process which includes (iirc) notices of proposed rulemaking, mandatory public comment periods spanning months, pre-publication of draft rules to allow the possibility of litigation and so on.
That gives the illusion of a democratic process, but in reality, agency rulemakers are not accountable to the people, whereas Congress is. Keep in mind that the fisheries regulation in question on this case was passed during the Trump administration– so it's not like electing a conservative to head the executive put a stop to excess regulation, which is generally a position that conservatives advocate.
They do, but courts judge your case.
That gives the illusion of a democratic process, but in reality, agency rulemakers are not accountable to the people
I didn't claim it it to be a democratic process, I said it was not an arbitrary or isolated one. The democratic element is in the selection of an executive every 4 years. the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedures Act won't be formally changed by this, but I suspect it'll be lengthenedand more heavily litigated, resulting in less regulatory clarity and slower enforcement.
That did nothing to help the fishery in this case. The burdens placed upon them came from a lower level bureaucrat, a decision that likely never crossed Trump's desk. That's just one regulation among thousands per year for which there is no accountability.
Yes, that's an accurate assessment of what Chevron doctrine entails. And again, it is a mystery to me how anyone could ever have thought that this was a good idea, or was in any way consistent with the constitutional separation of powers.
You've just touched upon why this hasn't worked in the past. With Chevron the interpretation was left up to the agency, and courts never got to decide anything.
Without Chevron, the courts will now be able to do exactly what you're suggesting.
You're _actually_ in favor of disabling Chevron, which the SC just did.
What on earth are you talking about?
This created a state of affairs in which agencies were indeed making rules that were binding upon the public, and doing so without the courts exercising oversight on their own part to determine whether those rules were consistent with the prevailing statute law.
Now that Chevron doctrine has been reversed, when agencies engage in novel rulemaking that expands the scope of their authority, it will be up to the courts, not the agency itself, to decide whether that expansion of authority is consistent with current prevailing law.
Sounds great. How we got to the point where executive-branch agencies were making rules with the force of law, binding upon the public with no judicial oversight, is a mystery to me, but it's good to see that the courts are taking their responsibilities seriously again, and restoring some measure of checks and balances.