Then we moved on to attacking the firmware in each others keyboards.
One such effort features locks made by Stuff Made Here sent to Lock Picking Lawyer. According to LPL the locks are theoretically sound and he did not attempt to pick them, but these particular implementations had a couple (easily fixable) bypasses. Made for interesting videos on both sides:
Stuff Made Here describes the design in detail: TWO Unpickable (?) Locks for Lock Picking Lawyer! - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2A2NY29iQdI
Lock Picking Lawyer reviews them and performs some bypasses: [1299] Unpickable Locks From Stuff Made Here - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ecy1FBdCRbQ
>Then we moved on to attacking the firmware in each others keyboards.
In what world is hacking keyboard firmware easier than lockpicking?
And there were two - one on each side. What's more, it was a tubular lock, so if you were single-pin picking you'd have to pick it 5 times per rotation.
Nothing that would stand up to a battery powered angle grinder, of course.
$40 for tools designed to pick all pins at once and make a "key" with some quick impressioning motions.
Some do have spool pins. In those cases you will need manual fiddling to pick it once then you have a key to keep spinning.
Still, sounds like an interesting design. Link?
I looked for a picture of the case but couldn't find one. I was in that college CAD lab... quite a long time ago.
I taught everyone else involved to lockpick in the first place and chose locks well beyond any of our skill levels to pick.
You can buy locks that don’t have easy bypasses, and can’t be easily drilled, and can’t be picked by beginners.
To keep people like me out for a while buy a Medeco. Pins not only need to be at the right height, but also the right rotation. They are a real pain in the ass to pick. I don't even know any locksmiths that can pick them. Good security for the money.
Bosnian Bill and LPL... Okay they can pick them, but they are like the 0.0001% in skill.
Still even then pay an extra $100 for really high quality disk detainer lock like a Protec 2 and you will keep even them out for quite a while.
That is what I use on my luggage. TSA has to call me to unlock them with my consent every time. The way I like it. Great tip I picked up from Deviant Ollam.
No - no they don’t.
Anything locked with a non-TSA compliant lock is fair game for the bolt cutters, and frankly probably draws a lot of extra attention.
All you’re doing is asking for extra screening…
[1] https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2014/02/18/tsa-travel-tips-tuesday-...
I've been wondering the most sophisticated/effective/secure locks regular consumers have access to.
In other words, which locks does the Lock Picking Lawyer himself use in his house to protect his family?
LPL covers most locks in the wild which are bad, but locks like the Protec2 are quite strong and while it is implied one person in the world can beat it with custom tools (huxleypig)... even then not quickly.
I frequently use FF-L-2740 spec locks, which is the spec locks need to hit for use in classified government work, military contractors etc. They are very good locks I can't begin to defeat in any practical amount of time and don't know anyone who can. Particularly since they have timed brute force lockouts.
Problem is not a single vendor is allowed to sell locks of that spec to civilians by contract so you have to jump through lots of hoops to get them.
I have had doors kicked in, so these days I want the lock to be the weakest, not strongest, part of the door. So when it is kicked in it is a cheap lock that is destroyed not an expensive hardwood door (I like hardwood doors...)
If a door is broken then a lock did its job. It let you know you were broken into.
Who is going to pick a lock that is cheap and easy to break?
Probably a criminal who is trying to be quiet, so they can enter your house.
Mēh. I have dogs.
You can say that again.
I was once proud of myself for having thoroughly researched the market and I thought EVVA MCS was a safe bet[1].
Then someone showed me a YouTube video (published a year after I bought the locks) of someone picking it (not LPL, another YouTuber). Given the cost of EVVA MCS I was not a happy bunny.
[1] https://www.evva.com/int-en/products/mechanical-locking-syst...
but check out this one instead: https://youtu.be/sES_Hbj92BQ - ~2h to open fully (though the author of the video claims impressioning could speed up the thing; anyway, reportedly attacking the door is just easier in this case)
Also worth noting, Bosnian Bill (a more recognized name) also attempted this lock here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLeiPmfm-2s
Not only does it take a couple hours to pick for an expert but you have to make a custom set of tools that only work on that one particular lock.
If a lock keeps someone out for several hours it is a great lock.
For your home, a high security pin tumbler with security pins are fine too. It takes very high skill to defeat these.
The Lock Picking Lawyer chronicled very nicely a technique for turning a KW1-keyed Kwikset core (extremely common here in the US) into something that is tamper evident. See the YouTube video linked herein.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JlgKCUqzA0
This kind of thing thwarts covert attack attempts and serves as a good way to trigger an audit on the trust of the asset behind that lock.
If you don't fear your front door will be clandestinely accessed, I feel it's perfectly valid not to worry about doing this to the lock there.
Not being you, that isn't my call to make.
The term for what you want is a "seal", not a lock.
You'd be driven mad trying to find what the intrusion was on your system.
I am pretty decent at lockpicking but I can't pick a Medeco or better in any practical amount of time and very few in the world can.
Little bit more money vastly reduces your attack surface.
Aren't medeco padlocks like $100, whereas master lock padlocks are less than $20?
I then taught kids to pick them.
If the case was locked in a cage I wouldn’t notice until I needed to put access the tower to plug in a usb, which might not be for weeks these days.
What the school did was run a steel cable behind the desks, then put a loop of the mouse chord through a steel washer and ran the security cable through all the loops. If you secure both ends you can’t get the cables separated even with slack.
The trick is that the hole in the washer had to be smaller than the connector so you couldn’t fish it back through no matter how much slack you get. That could still work for USB-A, but these days the connectors are getting smaller than the diameter of curvature of the cable, so you’d break it trying to do this. And on many peripherals you could destroy the chord without reducing the value of the device. One could cut the cable and install this Trojan one on many devices these days, the only telltale would be that the cable isn’t routed properly, which might be harder to notice immediately.
You can get a female/male versions of this connector placed on either side of an attiny85 for a quick solderless implant no one will ever see.
Then just undo 2 screws, plug your implant inside the mouse/keyboard, screw it back.
To make this harder intentionally strip the screws with a drill, understanding you will never be able to repair that unit again.
Or, y'know, open it up and solder the connecter together (or remove the connector and solder the cable wires directly).
But they’re right, these days when you crack open things you often find a connector soldered to the motherboard and the cable is merely plugged in. I think it’s just easier to manufacture. Pick and place, bulk solder and then a machine to plug in the cable, fast as you like, maybe with a loop in it as a poor man’s strain protector.
Well, if you're stealing them, you only need parts from one mouse: cut the cable close to the mouse, untangle it from whatever crap it's locked to, take mouse and cable home with you, disassemble mouse, feed cable back though (I think it's called) grommet, strip cable, pick out wires, solder wires to approriate mouse internals, reassemble mouse, done. You have a working mouse with only slightly shorter cable than before.
The point of using soldered cables for security is that setting up a soldering iron near a computer is conspicuous, so you get caught if try to install a attiny85 inside the mouse that way. You can still steal stuff just fine.
That's evil...
(Or do you know some way to strip the thread itself).
Or just epoxy the whole thing together.
That said I did make transparent and easily auditable USB type C condoms for one client that really wanted to use USB type C laptops.
Systems with security as a strong priority like the Librem 14 use barrel jacks for good reason.
I am in fact implying those that allow use of macbooks at coffee shops to directly access production systems at FAANG and fintech companies are taking a very inappropriate risk :-P
A tampered USB C to C cable on a conference room table can compromise people all day long.
If the USB C charge ports cut the data pins entirely then great, but I have not seen that be the case on any laptops yet.
Not true, at least for iPhone / iPad users:
- 1. Download Apple Configurator (free to anyone)
- 2. Create new config profile
- 3. Setup your device in "supervised" mode and apply said profile (the reason for this step is that the "best" config profile options are only available in supervised mode).
Config profile items of interest include, but may not be limited to: - "Allow USB accessories while device is locked"
- "Allow pairing with non-configurator hosts"
- "Allow putting into recovery mode from an unpaired device"You either ban USB devices entirely or you make users approve on every connection with no white listing.
I have experience trying to get the cops to help in Oakland and San Jose and they really didn't want to.
A friend of mine got a motorcycle back by watching its movements via the gps tracking, and killing the engine while the guy was riding in a safe-ish and high visibility place, so the thief just parked it and walked away.
They don't work for you. They know they don't work for you.
The car got recovered by an asset management crew though and it went smoothly AFAIK.
Iceland: https://blues.io/blog/vacation-gps-asset-tracker/
Full Asset Tracking Project: https://www.hackster.io/paige-niedringhaus/low-code-gps-asse...
Adapting this for a car would be straightforward.
Here’s a pic of the note card plugged into their Raspberry Pi note carrier. That’s a standard 40 pin 0.1” spacing connector on the left, so it’s 2” plus the mounting holes in that dimension. 65x57mm and about 20mm tall for the stackable 40 pin socket+pins.
I've got a couple of the units and can say they are working well and very easy to interface with.
(Assuming even car thieves use iPhones there's some poetic justice to be served in their own smartphones bringing them down...)
what the hell?
Professionals put the trackers in the kids' teeth, a la Spy Kids.
Ah yes. This statement is more terrifying than Apples half-assed PR fireball a few days ago.
The same folks who bought iphones because its has better "privacy" than Android...
...are using iphones to track their kids whereabouts. It's like a dystopian punchline masked in the Friends laugh track.
I guess there are going to be scenarios where tracking could help and maybe even allow the kids freedom to roam within a large zone - the back paddock of a farm say - while still allowing parents to find them.
But I still like capability and trust more.
Says a guy who’s never had a friend or family member who’s been stalked.
Odd, this got me wondering, and I can’t find any reliable statistics that show a rise in car thefts. Everything I see shows a pretty steady decline over the past 30 years in spite of an increasing the number of cars on the road.
Which is usually quite easy to check. It's not a guarantee, but with someone sophisticated enough to crack a modern car there's a good possibility they know to check the OBDII slot.
If they are sophisticated and have time to take the whole car apart then you are SOL anyway as they will find any transmitters with an SDR.
If you want to trust them I would have as much redundancy as you are comfortable paying for i.e. the software in these products is often dogshit so one failure or bug shouldn't let your car end in a scrap merchant.
It's crazy to me that this is true. Does the government pay Microsoft and Apple to keep it this way, or are they just negligent?
Keeping a whitelist of known keyboards and mice is really the only defence even on Linux, and unless you work in a data centre that’s probably way overkill.
With a home PC that doesn’t really work though, because in order to authenticate your mouse without some kind of central mouse log on a server you probably need to click a button, which you can’t do without authenticating your mouse.
As an attacker I just have the bootloaders of my malicious devices advertize the USB IDs of whitelisted devices like Apple Keyboards.
The computer has no way of knowing it is not authentic. There is no signing or certification for USB devices.
The only solution is a kernel that can place all newly attached USB devices in a queue for manual approval.
This is what USBGuard and QubesOS both do. The Linux kernel and udev have native support to hook USB devices early making this easy.
It means no one can drive by plug something in when your computer is locked. You will get a popup asking if you want to give some device other than the keyboard you booted with access to behave as a keyboard .
Also the majority of attacks I have seen in the wild attacking production systems were via endpoint compromises.
If your laptop has remote access to said high value datacenter, then your laptop is a high value target.
Note though that laptops have a nice advantage for this threat model as most have built in PS/2 trackpad and mouse which can let you approve external keyboards/mice etc.
Makes me think, what would happen if I plugged this cable, unplugged the keyboard, and power-cycled the computer? Or do a hard power down, then the switcheroo, and then power up? Would USBGuard/QubesOS block the new device, even though it's the one it just booted with?
(I think finding your computer rebooted would fly under the radar of most of the users - they'd blame it on automatic updates or intermittent power failure.)
On that note, I wonder how small you could go with a MITM device to attach between victim's peripheral and their computer. Could you pack enough useful features in a dongle that would not be immediately noticeable by most users?
It won't go unnoticed.
If your computer can reboot itself for updates that should be a cause for concern as it means your FDE is being cached somewhere that can use it unattended. I don't allow such things personally.
You do have to check for any untrusted USB devices at boot on a desktop. No getting around that one as you need to be able to use input devices at boot. Best bet is a PS/2 keyboard but those are getting harder to find.
For a laptop you have a better story as you can trust the internal PS/2 keyboard/mouse then use that to approve USB things fresh as needed and dictate what applications they get access to.
I connect my USB webcam to the one VM that needs it on demand, for instance.
Of course the reboot itself will be noticed when the user gets back - whether it's the login prompt, or boot prompt, or just all applications being closed. I meant it might not be noticed as something unusual, warranting further investigation. Typical user, even tech-savvy one, will just think, "must have been a power glitch", or "damn, those updates forced a reboot again".
The latter is something Windows users are conditioned for. Coming back from the toilet to be faced by a fresh login prompt is common enough even in the age of Windows 10 - and especially when the laptop is controlled by your employer, as IT tends to force a stricter schedule on updates[0]. In my case, this happens 1-2 times a week. While I'm working from home this doesn't matter, but if I were back in the office and came back from lunch to a rebooted computer, I would've assumed it was updates again.
> You do have to check for any untrusted USB devices at boot on a desktop. No getting around that one as you need to be able to use input devices at boot.
Makes sense, thanks for clarifying. I was assuming at least some of these solutions are trying to eliminate this requirement, but ultimately it may not be possible.
(Or perhaps it would be, if USB had something like HDCP so that you couldn't construct a dongle that could be transparently inserted between the computer and the peripheral.)
> For a laptop you have a better story
Right. Also, in case of attacker forcing reboot, they can't rely on users assuming it was a power glitch because laptops have batteries.
> I connect my USB webcam to the one VM that needs it on demand, for instance.
I need to read more about such setups, where you compartmentalize your system with VMs. Is there any good primer you could recommend?
--
[0] - I'm increasingly convinced Windows 10 update system is evil, and does this on purpose. It just so happens that it always forces an update and reboot on my work machine whenever I step away from it for more than 10 minutes. It's like it was monitoring idle time, and thinking "ooh, the user is away, let's reboot the machine and lose all the state". I also recently had to switch Lenovo updater malware to manual, because it kept choosing the exact middle of our weekly team meeting as the time to forcibly update video drivers, blanking my screen for anywhere between 2 and 20 minutes.
(Did I mention I hate automatic updates?)
Would it recognize the newly attached one, if you do the swap while the computer is turned off and they have the same HW ID?
Because if not, then it's not much better than what Windows lets you do with group policies. Although on Windows you could do this swap even while the OS is running.
https://www.amazon.com/PortaPow-3rd-Data-Blocker-Pack/dp/B00...
But it's a pain in the neck to always use them and difficult to enforce use in an enterprise setting.
I co-designed some transparent USB C ones for a client that are easy to audit.
Hope to take them to market some day.
There's much less discontent among the rank-and-file at Microsoft, so this sort of thing happens less with them.
[1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/site/AAW_Platform_Securi...
So spy tools that spy on the spys.
It is sketchy as all hell and should not be sold.
That said this stuff pops up everywhere.
I just cite it as examples.
- Keylogging
- Manipulate USB Power negotiation to cook your hardware
- Sniff traffic from other USB devices on the same internal hub.
- Log your location
- Log screen lock/unlock times/habits via voltage draw and permitted device type enumeration
- Install malware via keyboard emulation
- Sound exfiltration by emulating USB speakers
- Screenshot by emulating a USB/thunderbolt external monitor
- Mouse movement/click injection to prevent screen locking
- Exfiltrate data to hidden internal flash memory
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/118854/attacks-...
There is also an editor and parser for Duckyscript – the scripting language used by the Rubber Ducky offensive USB drive – which acts as a virtual keyboard and launches keystroke injection attacks. That alone opens up a wide array of custom payloads for the O.MG cable. There also appear to be attack payloads for Windows and Ubuntu systems.
In April 2019, when the video was released, MG and the team of hackers working on the embedded cable were also developing extra functions such as detecting user activity/inactivity. According to the Hak5 listing, they also appear to have cracked another key problem: USB enumeration.
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/10/02/omg-evil-lightni...
C-to-C charger cables with Bluetooth remote activated dual payloads: https://sneaktechnology.com/product/usbninja-custom-type-c-t...
I easily modified mine to mimmic Apple Keyboard USB IDs to avoid notifications. Works great!
Cellular GPS tracking car charger: https://www.amazon.com/Charger-Locator-Professional-Listenin...
Cellular GPS tracking USB charger cable: https://www.ebay.com/itm/223990414124
I have been making, collecting, and testing toys like this for more than a decade.
It is a race to the bottom on price now.
Your best defense for USB code execution attacks is use Linux with USBGuard or QubesOS with the default USB quarantine VM.
Windows and Mac users are currently easy targets. I don't know of any good defenses there.