Reality is more complicated than that.
So, Google will have some model that is much more powerful than the publicly available models. Before releasing it to the world, they can use it to mitigate any issue it discovers anywhere
LLMs will write vulnerable code while the same model can find those vulnerabilities if you prompt it right. Some stats from a previous post was that the CVEs found in Linux were costing on average $1000 in api usage each. So having the LLM prevent writing vulnerabilities would explode the costs.
It’s agents all the way down.
Releasing before that is non-actionable by many actors (aside from taking the service completely down I guess). Any time after fix is available is just allowing vulnerable systems to be attacked and is playing favourites with who gets fix and who doesn't
2 days after there's a fix, with a max of 90 days after disclosure?
Because you still need to have the 90 days no matter what to induce the vendor to create a fix. Otherwise (many) just sit on it forever.
You’re replying in a thread whose top level comment is that the 90 days will rapidly decrease to 30.
Hope 30 is enough to induce them to fix.
Maybe the future fixes will be “Reddit + Claude”, done at home.
> What if the bug is actually inherently hard to fix?
Then users might just as well know about it so they can avoid the software while it's vulnerable.Let's say a bug hasn't been found for the past 20 years. Google finds it, but it's going to take longer than 30 days to fix. Is it really better to let everyone know about it after 30 days? If no one else has found it (true, as far as we know) in the past 20 years, what are the probabilities it will be found by a second person in the next few months?
Yes it absolutely is. Because going forward google will almost certainly have found it using the same widely accessible tool - LLMs - that everyone else also has access to. The fact that a bug has gone unnoticed for the past 20 years has no bearing whatsoever on the future year (or probably even six months). At this point given that team A has found a bug the probability that teams B thru Z will also find it within the next half year or so is extremely high.
What makes you think this is true?
The article says they are willing to negotiate in exceptional cases, and mentions Spectre.
Bug fix speed isn’t particularly relevant, rollout speed is.
I hate to see slow rollouts. The single best thing you can do for fighting bugs is to roll out with canaries; weekslong rollouts only make sense when someone actually has to be in the middle of a cursed release while it runs.
If there's a bug in your code and it's rare there isn't much disruption. If it's not rare, why didn't your tests catch it?
Who can say? But it happens. If it didn't then deploying straight to production wouldn't be a problem.
That is the world we live in now and pretending otherwise is reckless and leads to mass hacking like the recent supermarket fridge hacking.
Only devices and applications that can respond to security reports quickly should be connected to the internet.
Lots and lots of devices are gonna get turned into botnets and tons of personal information is going to get leaked. However both of those things are already true.
Constant attacks mean the future will hopefully see local-first devices that don't need software at all.
Want to put them on the internet? They go behind gateways which are better maintained, because a world where every teenager can hack a vending machine through its vestigial Bluetooth stack would finally need to be secure to function.
Some (likely most) projects have just non-paid people working on it in their free time. That's the reality of open source.
Delaying disclosures is a false sense of security when the attackers are running the same scans Google is. They will have exploits faster than 30 days.
Considering the direction software and their exploits are going with AI, if 30 days is insufficient in 2028 then that's useful signal to the people running that they should move elsewhere.
In America software is protected by the First Amendment, so most software (and all open source for sure) cannot be subjected to "cybersecurity liability" of the sort you seem to be envisioning. Congress could have an angle when it comes to stuff that is sold, including in particular hardware and subscription services though there will be both plenty of lobbying and plenty of potential landmines involved in any such effort.
But with anything free there is no commercial angle involved, no contract. It's just speech that's put out there, identical to the posts we're writing here on HN right now. Software bugs aren't true threats, incitement, defamation, or obscene.
Other countries of course could take a different tack, but they'd then face "OSS becomes fully American" and I'm deeply skeptical that'd work politically.
Also when US gets a saner goverment back, I am quite sure CISA will have yet another opinion on the matter, especially if national security is considered exposed.
Perhaps in your authoritarian fever-dreams or whatever shithole country you current reside in, but no in the US.
>Also when US gets a saner goverment back, I am quite sure CISA will have yet another opinion on the matter, especially if national security is considered exposed in some media case.
And I'm quite sure you're full of shit.
Not the maintainer's problem.
That's the company's problem that stole the code without contributing back in the first place.
Repos popular with the self-hosting crowds already do critical CVE fix rollouts in days after private report.
With AI assisted vulnerability research the relative edge of project zero is going down - anything they can find can likely be found by others in a similar timeframe. We see this today with the parallel discovery of php2shell by many groups in the same few weeks
I know this sounds harsh but it really would be better for the world if these "processing complex untrusted data structures in C" enthusiasts found another hobby.
Typically it's presented as-is and without any form of warranty, but in the hope it will be useful - not "suitable for critical infrastructure".
Perhaps those using it for "critical infrastructure" can write their own utilities, or chip in to support the developer whose hard work they apparently rely so heavily on, so bug fixes aren't done merely in the dev's unpaid time-off?
But what does a developer (open source or not) who releases a container format parser and codec collection upon the world expect people to do with it if not run it on malicious data on personal devices?
Sometimes you build things to explore how they work, or to test your assumptions about how something would work. To build your own knowledge about a format, language, or system. Hell, sometimes it's just the middle of a venn diagram between fun and practice.
And, because it's easy to throw something up on GitHub, you can say "Look at this cool thing I made", "Look, I actually can do what I claim on my resume", or "Anyone struggling in the same place as me can use this as an example workaround, or inspiration for a solution"
Nobody has to, or is even necessarily expected, to use it. Sometimes it's just the author sharing this cool thing they made.
Certain OS kernel started out like this circa 1991. :)
AOSP still has a 6 months holding back patches delay, the reasoning was "improved security".
So, what is improving security now? Fast patches or slow patches? :)
But they actually did this to comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. When a patch is released, a legal clock starts ticking - anyone who doesn't apply it promptly is liable for any resulting damages.
On February 2, 2027, we will move to a “Full 60” policy where vulnerabilities are disclosed after 60 days.
On January 3, 2028, we will move to a “Full 30” policy where vulnerabilities are disclosed after 30 days.