Homeless people aren't stupid and strong password don't have to be incredibly hard to remember. I'd rather get my accounts hacked because of password reuse than lose access to my email, forever.
There is literally nothing more important than your email. Even stuff like your bank account has secondary means of recovery, whereas if you lose access to your email you're pretty much fucked.
Also—maybe getting hacked is worse, maybe loosing access is worse... but who are you to make that decision? Google can set the default, but the user should be able to decide on the balance that's appropriate for them.
The aversion to 2FA makes them seem like easy targets if I'm looking for addresses to use for spam.
> maybe getting hacked is worse, or maybe loosing access is worse, but the user should have the right to make that decision
Getting hacked makes losing access considerably more likely. This ain't one or the other.
If you want to spam people, why not just sign up for your own gmail account?
It's a terrible place to be in, but isn't nowhere as bad as being a homeless person with no access to HN and Twitter, having Google delete your account and nowhere to complain about. Because that is even worse.
But by definition, the homeless have already lost a home (assuming they weren't born homeless) - and I've forgotten passwords before. So "the stupid homeless just need to memorize their password" isn't a solution.
When your account is stolen the attacker changes your password. You lose access to your email forever and lose access to all of the services that use your email as a recovery platform.
This is functionally the outcome of getting hacked, if you want any kind of decent security measures.
Any way that Google can give you access back on a password-only account is going to be rife with bad actors using social engineering to gain control of accounts. As long as that form/page exists, it is a threat vector.
What you're asking is for the password to be the only proof that someone owns an account, which means a hacker can demonstrate ownership just as much as you can.
Banks have more options for account recovery because we're willing to give them a lot more info. They can force me to come in to a branch and compare my ID to my face, or ask for my SSN, or any number of things we're not comfortable handing over to Google (especially over the web).
step 1: get your account hacked
step 2: hacker changes password
step 3: lose access to your email, forever
What you've presented is not in fact a dichotomy, for any practical purposes.
If an attacker breaks in and changes your password, you already do very likely permanently lose access to your email. Account recovery from that point is a hairy process even for people who have a place to safely store important documents, let alone those who don't.
> Even stuff like your bank account has secondary means of recovery
Those rely on forms of identification that the unhoused disproportionately lack (for the same reasons that they are more prone to lose access to phone numbers). This is also among the reasons why being unhoused tends to correlate with being unbanked.
Security questions are probably enough, at least for people who can’t handle 2FA.
I don’t think that is the solution. I also don’t know what is.
Public services that somehow provide safe access to email etc?
with spaces, punctuation, some sort of capilatiozation scheme (cap every last letter, or every other ,etc) and throw a number in there.
lot easier to remember than 32 random bits.
purposely misspelling something, adding spaces, and your own cap scheme make it a secure password.
I only had to change one of my passwords once when my coworkers discovered I was reliably whistling "Stayin' alive" after logging in.
In any case, I'm sure those involved would prefer the option of remembering a password to not having that option and getting locked out forever. Seems like a good solution. There may be better ones you can implement once this one is, always room for improvement you know
I’m with you that an average person is probably using at least dozens of services that need credentials, but these people are probably not login on Amazon or checking their 401k online for instance, nd can probably get by with a a very limited set of stuff to remember.
Gosh, I don't know, how about literally all of the problems that 2FA solves in the first place? Passwords alone are a bad solution (often forgotten, easily re-used insecurely) for people without all of the challenges and frequent mental issues that accompany homelessness, why would you think they'd be a good solution for people who, as the OP says, aren't capable of keeping track of a physical device for more than N weeks?
I'm not unsympathetic to the problems of the homeless ant the burdens 2FA entails, but I'm also not willing to ignore the huge problems the 2FA solves, and realizing there will often be a tradeoff between making it very difficult to hack into accounts and making it easy for people with mental and other problems access their accounts.
The great thing about something like an email service is that password guessing can be extremely rate limited. You miss three guesses and you can't log in for several hours. So an easily remembered password is perfectly fine unless it is blindingly obvious. As a homeless person loosing access to a phone on a regular basis, I am going to be comfortable with the risk that the Gmail password hashes might get leaked. I think others would be quite comfortable with that risk as well...
"There is an imperfect existing solution, with a problem, therefore we will ban the existing solution and move to a new, better one"
... should require extraordinary certainty in completeness of ones new solution before banning the previous.
There are very few times when the legacy method should be deprecated, and Google is the poster child of someone who shouldn't be trusted to recognize them.
(Looks pointedly at Chrome mv2/3 hubris and implementation clusterfuck)
I'm not sure why you think MV3 is a clusterfuck, it seems like it's doing exactly what Google wants. If you're confused by that, remember, you're the product, not the customer.
Pushing an implementation cutover by +6 months, and changing it from a hard to a soft date, because it has so many unresolved issues, incomplete APIs, and angry developers seems a fair definition of "clusterfuck."
Homeless people have no physically secure place to store their possessions. The reason so many of them lose cell phones is because they get stolen or destroyed. It's not because they're incapable of "keeping track" of them.
Just because 2FA "solves" the extremely narrowly defined problem, doesn't mean it is the best solution or even something that people can and will actually use. Upon those metrics alone, 2FA is usually one of the worst "solutions" to the problem.
Well, it isn't solving this one. Option to opt out would be nice.
> aren't capable of keeping track of a physical device for more than N weeks?
Bit ignorant of you. They could be just plainly stolen by someone else. A piece of rag working as a tent doesn't exactly have best physical security...
> I'm not unsympathetic to the problems of the homeless ant the burdens 2FA entails, but I'm also not willing to ignore the huge problems the 2FA solves, and realizing there will often be a tradeoff between making it very difficult to hack into accounts and making it easy for people with mental and other problems access their accounts.
It's not either or.
A homeless person has a vastly different cybersecurity paradigm, specifically, they don’t need much in the way of cybersecurity. Nobody is stealing a homeless person’s identity.
Given that, just let them disable it, and let them just use a password. It’s fine to rate limit them if they forget the password a few times, but let them keep trying to log in until they remember it.
It is clearly failing for this use case.
Security can't be seen as a one-size-fits all threat models. That will never be satisfactory, as requirements vary.
For most people in most scenarios 2FA is a net positive.
But denial of service is also a component of evaluating threat models. Here we're discussing cases where 2FA causes denial of service which is worse than any risk of getting the account stolen by password guessing.
I think Google faced a trolley problem and made the right decision. You need a different tool "homeless mail" for them.
It's Gmail. You don't have to use it. There's a lot of mail providers out there.
Whatever, if this guy won't set it up I will. I'll stick a 20 msg / hr, 100 / day limit on it and call it a nice anti-spam day.
Which would go one of two ways:
1. One uses the same password one uses everywhere else, and now one is much more vulnerable to credential stuffing
2. One is reliant on a book of passwords or a password management app on one's phone, resulting in the same exact problem we're trying to solve
Remembering one good password is not too onerous. Easier, it seems, that keeping any physical object in your possession if you're homeless. (I would assume that most losses are not due to cognitive failure, but instead are things like thefts when one is asleep.)
Pretty much EVERYONE will have cognitive decline in their twilight years. It would be nice if we could have communication systems that are compatible with basic human biology.
At some point, this becomes a problem better suited to the government.
Imagine you have a loved one who has dementia or is homeless and incapable of administering their digital accounts with traditional authentication methods. You want to take over their accounts.
You will need to present evidence that:
- they are indeed incapacitated
- they are who they say they are, aside from you vouching for them
- you are who you say you are
- you legitimately represent this person
- there isn’t somebody else who has a better claim at representing that person
I personally don’t want any tech company in the position to sort through all of that on a case-by-case basis and decide which accounts to unlock or transfer ownership to. Let the government or the courts figure that out.
> PS: Many unhoused people access their email rarely, intermittently; they don't stay logged in. They often have to guess several times to remember their password.
2FA doesn’t work, and remembering passwords doesn’t work either. Checkmate.
I think what this actually calls for though is a way to prove your identity by talking to an actual human. Something that used to be the standard before tech companies declared that it was too inefficient.
Rerouting traffic with a malicious home location record (like what was done to Merkel for years), or changing the eSPID/NNID for a numbers texting enablement is much easier than doing a SIM swap and you can usually avoid detection too.
fun fact: SIM cards can run applets based on Java. That’s how mobile payments are able to work in developing nations. I think there was a DEFCON talk about it a few years ago.
I think pointless password rules are at the heart of this problem for many non-technical people who probably haven't been operating with a password storage solution and might not be used to that system or trust it.
Every platform has their own special requirements for passwords: some require a mix of capital and uppercase letters, some require numbers, some require a special symbol, some require a special symbol but no not that one, some restrict you from entering 3 of the same character in a row, some passwords have a short max character limit, some prevent certain characters like spaces, some require you to change it every so often, etc. Eventually, the password is forgotten or confused with another because of these pointless password rules.
I called them pointless password rules because they reduce the possible number of combinations required for an attacker to guess the password because any guessing program knows what can't possibly be valid combinations.
How about the homeless person remembers a good password, and that's all that's needed for authentication? You know, just like it used to be. What exactly is wrong with that?