Maybe I'm missing something but sure they can't store its hash but they can and do store the password strongly encrypted. Presumably without the master password, at least, it should be close to impossible to retrieve the passwords. Or is that assumption wrong?
[0] https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/ [1] https://bitwarden.com/images/resources/Bitwarden-Security-As...
That said, it's not bulletproof. The chink in the armor is the browser extensions they all use. All it would take is somebody to slip some trojan code into one of the browser extensions and all of the sudden you have a few hundred million decrypted password databases which could trivially be uploaded to wherever.
e.g. someone manages to slip malicious code into Chrome/Chromium which eventually makes its way out to every Electron app/most browsers, or something gets injected into Windows/macOS/Linux, etc.
You could. But if you haven't trusted all/most of your passwords to any single app, you wont have a problem with them being exposed when that particular piece of software is compromised.
Even if someone compromises your OS itself, you'll only lose the passwords you typed in while you were using it compromised. And that's if it does captures thoses, and if it sends them to some remote endpoint, and if it's not caught soon, and so on.
With a password manager compromised, on the other hand, you could loose anything you've put it in, all at once.
On the other hand, yes there eventually is a trust point somewhere. A spiral of upstream what-ifs isn't productive IMO, I agree.
Besides which bug bounties are not really intended to disincentivize people from committing crimes, they're intended to incentivize researchers to report findings and reward them for their efforts.
Doesn't matter for our case, since it already assumes the database potentially compromisable. The parent's comment concerned whether the "bounty for capturing a flag inside a publicly available encrypted vault" is enough. So the question is not whether the bounty is enough given it's impossible to win, but whether it's enough given it might be possible to win.
In other words, whether someone who finds an exploit to decrypt the vaults contents would get a better value by (a) revealing it to 1Password company and taking the $100K bounty, or (b) selling the exploit to people who would give millions to be able to decrypt other's vaults...
Password managers don't operate with those economic models though.
In fact, I'd argue that, if they are positing that the reputational risk for a successful hack exceeds 10% of their notional valuation, then they should try to commit at least 10% of their market cap as insurance against that ever happening, or at least if they would gain enough information to prevent this from ever occurring. This isn't that hard to figure out.
The best thing about that insurance is that it's literally free -- they never have to pay out unless the event actually occurs.
Unless a successful attack actually occurs, in which case it's literally almost priceless in terms of their reputational damage, unless they can get their hands on it before someone else.
But, if you ask around enough with security teams at the large cloud providers, there are definitely rumors of APT-level activity being detected/blocked at the infra level. Yet, cloud is still the most secure option out there vs. on-prem in 90% of the use cases for it so to speak. Similarly, there is just too much precedent of high trust firms being breached, and nothing really happening to them as a result (fines, loss of users, etc).
So, you allocate $1mil, possibly spend it, and either way can't use it for anything else, or you allocate a fixed cost of $600k/yr and get a lot more out of it on the security front, to include solid defense-in-depth, detections, and IR capabilities for if/when the successful PWM attack finally occurs. Personally, yes probably worth putting out a hefty bounty, but pragmatically you'd get more out of hiring the engineers.
Given that the payout is probabalistic and serves business goodwill, I'd argue for a more substantial reward. Possibly secured through a bond or insurance policy.
No, they don’t store directly the actual password, they store it encrypted by a encryption key derived from your master password. A leak of the database won’t reveal any password, as long as your master password stays secure (aka is not "hunter3")
You mean, the master password that many people reuse across sites and has been leaked into the darknet by breaches of other sites? Or if not leaked directly, at least some entropy about it probably has been.
I know these services don’t store the password in plain text, but it’s still stored in reversible format. That’s a juicy target.
You only have to remember one password, and for that reason people can choose a longer and more complex one.
Then your passwords are encrypted using that master password.
So people cannot “reverse” your password if you pick a reasonably long master password.
For reference, my master password is a 27 character sentence which would take somewhere between a millennium and the heat death of the universe to crack. It encrypts around 500 passwords, each in itself 25-35 character long pass phrases I do not know.
Then I store a YubiKey which is a second factor to these accounts in another safe deposit box in another location.
So should I forget my master password: drive to box 1.
Should my house with all my computers burn down: drive to boxes 1 and 2, find a pc or phone somewhere, and I have access to all my accounts.
Should my password manager go bankrupt overnight and take my vault with them: drive to boxes 1 and 2, then click “forgot my password” on all services and use my e-mail to recover access.
Should my password manager go bankrupt overnight and take my vault with them, my e-mail provider go bankrupt overnight and take my mailbox with them: at least I have my own e-mail domain, so I can set up a new mailbox elsewhere
Should my password manager go bankrupt overnight and take my vault with them, my e-mail provider go bankrupt overnight and take my mailbox with them, and my domain registrar go bankrupt overnight and take my domain with them: yeah…then I’m screwed. I’ll migrate to a wooded country and become a hermit.
1Password vaults are also encrypted with a separate secret key that is generated locally and never stored. So you'd need the password and the secret key to decrypt.
However, without placing too much unwarranted trust in the user, consider the following:
- extensive warnings during user onboarding about how to approach setting and safe keeping of the master password, especially around reuse.... ok, but some users are still hopeless with this, what then
- taking Lastpass for instance, lock-out features for logging into the extension if you're coming out of a new geo-ip (proactive risk control)
- taking LP again, alerting to the user for successful logins to the platform from new geo-ips (reactive risk control).
- all the on-device security controls required to get into a PWM: touch/face-id logins for the apps, an official browser extension, on and on. I'd also imagine LP security is watching HIBP very closely.
Put all that together, odds are you or the PWM security teams are able to filter pretty well for password reuse for master passwords. So yes I'd expect sources/stats to be out there, or at least counterpoints to the above which when put together map a decent defense-in-depth for PWMs which isn't present in most or almost any browser extensions, to include Tier 1 cryptocurrency browser extensions which are responsible for significant more funds and still maintain good security (think: Metamask).
You don't reuse passwords at all. That is expressly the point of password managers. You generate a new password that is completely random and quite long for each independent website.
If one of the sites is breached, no matter. Damage is contained to that site. The only password of yours that is leaked for that site. The only place that password can be used is - you guessed it - that site.
Passwords should not be rotated unless they have been comphremised. Password rotation is the problem, not your password.
Use different teirs of passwords. Have a single password u use for anything that is non-senstive, and then go custom on anything that is. Only login to those sensitive services from 1 devices, forgo your convience. These custom passwords should be very rarely be used and u can come up with some custom way to store / remmeber them. Atleast then i have to spend hours and hours and hours on your box, looking, instead of minutes.
For the old-school (am I young?) websites like mail, fb, bank accounts, etc I remember the passwords.
Seems like a workable compromise for now. Tho I am scared I will start getting lazy and start storing sensitive websites in pwd managers.
In addition to a master passphrase, I also use a keyfile for keypass, so even if the database is compromised I would hope that it’s still not useful without the keyfile.
However, given KeePass is still a piece of software, nothing stop state-supported malicious hackers injecting vulnerability into it, and suck your password away into their database.
Have you consider making sure all your computers are offline when using KeePass?
As time goes on without reported backdoors, the chance that your passwords are safe just gets better.
Setting up local automated sync is on my todo list, it’s just lower priority than too many other things. As I mentioned, I don’t create new accounts so often that I need automated sync.
[0] https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=keepass2androi...
I imagine nation state-supported malicious hackers are targeting them. Everything else is getting breached and leaked these days, there’s a non-trivial possibility these will too.
I just use KeePassXC instead, and periodically ‘sync’ the database across my workstations and laptop. And by ‘sync’, I mean manually export the database and rsync it around to my workstations and laptop and re-import it on each. But given how infrequently I create new web accounts, this isn’t a major hassle. It works fine, I don’t need some centralized service for this.