How often do you replace tenants? And what's your occupancy rate? If you're in a situation where you can reliably raise rent 7% YoY indefinitely without decreasing your occupancy rate, then you were severely underpriced for the market (and you should probably fire that management company for pricing you that absurdly low). 7% YoY after inflation is a big increase that outstrips average wage increases.
If you aren't severely underpriced, then what's going to happen is that when you increase by 7%, the tenants will choose to end the lease because they can find something cheaper (or they emmigrate from the city because nothing is affordable), and you'll struggle to replace them with wealthier tenants willing to pay what you think is market price, so you'll have to lower rent to attract a tenant. Once you get to the point where your price is roughly in line with what the market will bear, you'll only be able to squeeze one or two years of rent increases out of a tenant before the non-monetary costs of moving are outweighed by the cheaper rent, so constantly trying for 7% YoY post inflation will just mean a decrease in your occupancy rate, both because you'll be replacing tenants more frequently and because finding new ones will take longer.
If they lose this “right”, they insist on becoming pure profit maximizing machines?
It's disingenuous to pretend like the landlord is the only party with any control. Landlords cannot remove a tenant at "the drop of a hat" by any stretch of the imagination, nor can they arbitrarily increase rental prices. Rentals usually involve a lease that protects the tenant from arbitrary removal and price modifications as much as it protects the landlord from unexpected vacancy. If you're renting, you should know when your lease is up and know that the landlord has the option not to renew and/or to modify the price. (If you're in California, you should also know that the new law punishes your landlord for trying to do you a solid and keep your rent stable across lease terms.)
On top of conventional lease protections, virtually every state has default tenant protections written into statute that can't be overridden by lease agreements, and that include a default implicit month-to-month tenancy term, providing at least basic protection from out-of-the-blue demands to vacate.
If an eviction must occur, it has to be conducted as prescribed in state law. Tenants overstaying or defaulting on their leases frequently can't be removed without 3-6 months of legal wrangling, which is no fun.
The CA law allows the rental price to reset to market rate for a new tenant, so unless the landlord doing you a solid was planning to stick you specifically with a rent increase down the line to recapture the present solid, they can still keep your rent stable across lease terms.
Before, the tenant was happy because they got below market rent for 4 years, and I was happy because I could defer pricing work without long term penalty or risking a move-out during an already busy year. This new law will likely result in my tenant paying more, and me working more at times I don’t want to work.
It’s not the end of the world, it’s just one more annoying piece of red tape that doesn’t seem to help anyone.
You are doing no one any favors except short-term renters who never get an increase. In other words, your so-called benefit is actually a detriment to long-term renters.
Unclear on why doing it all at once is worse than doing it regularly and extracting more rent in the period in between. Is the theory that they will be unable to adjust their budget in 60 days?
Let's say the rent is $1000/month (for simplicity). That's $12000/yr in the first year. If you increase the rent by 12% ever 4 years they'll have 3 years of paying $1000/month, followed by a 4th year of $1120/month and so on.
If you instead raised it yearly by 2.87%, which give-or-take is the same as a 12% one-off increase we can calculate the net rent paid over the period in the two scenarios:
$1000*12*3 = 36000
r=1000;x=1.0287;
(r*x^1*12)+(r*x^2*12)+(r*x^3*12) =~ $38106
I think people that are arguing bigger rent increases that happen less often are bad are assuming tenants are stretching their housing budget to the max and won't be able to afford the large hikes. In which case they wouldn't have been able to afford it with smaller increases either.
It is well known that most people can not afford significant sudden expenses. I think the inability of some folks here to recognize how bad a 4 year rent hike can be have the privilege of not being in that group.
Note this works both ways. If the market goes down, if no one wants to live there anymore, tenants have a lot of room to negotiate. Vacancies are expensive and the hassle of getting a new tenant is not something many people want to handle even in good conditions.
I also contend that not all markets make this easy. I rent a single family home in a town of 4,000. This is not a super liquid market. There are not a lot of good comps - my house is a block from the town’s best park, and walking distance to the small downtown. On the other side, it is a substantially smaller lot than the average house. There are essentially zero houses that are equivalent, and I have to do a lot of digging (including calling up other folks I know that are landlords) to figure it out.
My tenant is not on the verge of financial collapse. They’re a manager at a local business, they probably spend about 20% of their gross pay on rent. They have demonstrated an ability to absorb the bump without issue.
No, the market kicked out most tenants. The tenant should be expected to also monitor market prices for their rental and know automatically when they're getting a deal or when to expect an increase.
"The market" is not an entity with its own volition, and speaking of it as if it were obscures the reality that it's comprised of individuals and collectives making individual or collective choices about what to charge and what to pay.
Two viewpoints, one tree.
The tenant still gets below market rent for 4 years, you and can defer pricing work for as long as you want without penalty or risking a move out during a busy year.
I think you might be overly worried for your situation. Your 12% example is an amortized difference of at most 1.5% compared to the new 7% cap (1.12yroot3 vs 1.07yroot5).
It also may change the equilibrium behavior, because it upsets a social norm and affects landlords' estimations of what other landlords will do.
It’s not a lot of work, but my FT job isn’t being a landlord, and we’re talking about a property that nets maybe $8k/year. It’s been a better rate of return than the stock market, but the alpha is small relative to my SWE salary.
I guess another possible outcome of this is pushing marginal small landlords out, or pushing them to use property management firms since the fees possibly start making more sense. Neither of these seem like good outcomes to me.
$1000 +7% = $1070, $1070 +4% = $1112.80
$1000 +12 = $1120.
Increase by 7% followed by an increase of 4.67289719626168224299065420561%.
The point is that the 12% hike every 3 to 5 years can be accomplished over the same time frame because the max the law allows for is 22.5043% in 3 years and 40.25517307% in 5 years.
Your hypothetical also assumes that in the next year, the market value will stay the same, when in reality the expectation would be that it would increase another percentage point or two, meaning they'd have to come close to maxing that second year's increase to fully recapture the value.
It also creates an effect where now that there's a legal range, the landlord will still feel like a nice guy by increasing rent "only" 4% each year, for example, and that's worse for tenants overall. It strongly incentivizes small-time landlords to imitate commercial landlords and squeeze the tenant for more each year, which other posters have adequately demonstrated is a significant loss to the tenant over a simple periodic adjustment every 3-5 years.
These policies may be better justified in high-density areas like San Francisco (probably still net negative), but applying them state-wide is crazy. California is a very large state and they just made things substantially more complicated for both tenants and landlords throughout.
Maybe inflation gets crazy, maybe taxes increase, maybe maintenance turns out to be more expensive, maybe they realize they've been underpricing, maybe they sell the property to someone who has the same reasons.
If you tell them that you will limit their freedom to choose the rent price, they will try to retain as much freedom as they can.
It's like a use-it-or-you-lose-it budget game.
Needless to say, costs are increasing faster than 60% of inflation... In turn, landlords are only willing to write leases at very high prices and the supply of rental units is even lower than it would be otherwise...
https://www.creditdonkey.com/average-stock-market-return.htm...
However, there's an issue with how you're calculating the market rate: You're assuming that tenants can/will bear that cost indefinitely, so the market rate can be "whatever the landlords want to make it". That won't always be true, not just from landlord defectors who might try to undercut the oligopoly on price, but because the tenants can move elsewhere and effectively remove demand.
Well, “Nothing” is an unusual way of referring to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
To undercut that this year would mean being below market price in a future year. The only arbitrage would be between present and future prices. Perhaps some subset of landlords only seek to rent out for the front-end years, so they would have a different calculus, but all that would do is to pull down the average transaction price by a little, according to their size in the market. So if the current price demands a natural increase of 2%, maybe the market will clear at 5% instead of the 7% max, but it remains the case that there will necessarily be years where the clearing price is higher than without rent control.
[1] This is assuming the government "guesses" it right that 7% is the average rate of increase over the long term. If it is below average, then the market gets severely distorted.
And the cap was explicitly set to be below the average rates of increase for many areas because the effects of the higher increases in those areas is what the law is explicitly trying to prevent.
Spreading the increase to a leaner year only works if the unit is below the market rate. If the unit is already within 7% or so of market rate, then market won't bear that increase. Instead the tenant will move out to a market rate unit. If the entire city increases in lockstep that means people near the bottom of the market will be literally priced out and either move to another city or resort to sleeping in their cars or become homeless, but everyone else will just downgrade the size of the unit they rent since once the price of the current unit exceeds their ability to pay. At the very top end of the market that will mean units will have decreasing occupancy rates assuming the landlord refuses to compete on price to increase demand and insists on capturing the 7% increase.
You are forgetting about transaction costs.
The new law does provide a Schelling point. (But I do agree that it's probably not going to be an important one.)
I think what OP was saying was that in an unrestricted market they have wider range (due to discretion) but given this shackle on hikes, they are going to max it out. Maxing it out means there will not be downward adjustments when warranted (economic trends) and will instead ride it out (not make it avail at lower price) because when the economy picks up they’ll more than make the loss up.
- He may be socially responsible and not want to charge through the roof. E.g. likes the tenants, prefers stability etc.
- The whole point of the law is indeed to prevent large raises. But what if expenses suddenly skyrocket, or inflation does, and he has to increase more or go bankrupt? That’s the worry here. No, the law won’t react quickly enough. It’s preventing him from being socially responsible.
- You assume annual 7% would not work eventually because it will raise the price too much in the market. This assumes free market, but you don’t have it anymore, now you’re regulated. In particular, your missing that everybody else will adopt the same rational self-preserving policy. Approximately the entire market is going to grow 7% YoY now.
- nitpicking: 7% before, not after
I'd hazard that the PM charges a percent of the gross rent, but has a minimum irrespective of the rent actually charged, so the landlord will then just tell them that they don't want the PM to rent at a price where the PM's minimum fee is more than the fixed percentage. (or in hard numbers. If the PM requires the greater of 10% or $100, then the landlord will just say "don't rent below $1000")
Sadly, their contracts are pretty slimy - they usually absolve the property manager of any wrongdoing whatsoever. Do they hold up in court? KINDA. Unless you're incredibly rich and have a fantastic lawyer.
They use their money to build new units in that area or entice someone to build new units on their behalf on which they will then outbid everyone else.
Similarly, i tell my tenants that they should expect the minimum increase yearly as i cannot make up for any lost increases nor can i make larger increases if something about the economics of the house changes.
The real issue here is the cost to provide housing, and the limited amount that exists. I wanted to finish a basement in one of my places, to do this legally, i owe the city $140k in fees alone. This is around 5-6years of rent. You can probably imagine why i opted to put this money in a bunch of index funds and do nothing instead...
The core issue is there is not enough good housing for everyone in California.
The real solution is to greatly loosen building regulation and make getting permits much faster and easier statewide. Then entrepreneurs will double or triple the housing supply and drop the costs of renting or buying a home by 80%. You could see rents go from $2500 per month in LA to $1000 a month or less.
And you build more and more housing, you'll wind up with 4-lane highways to and through Yosemite or something - that's not at all desirable is it? How would you handle the traffic and flow of people? Giant hotels, McDonalds, and huge traffic stops? It's just not sustainable.
California's problem is that it's not sustainable for the amount of people that want to live there. I think it's a global problem in general too. Less people, and no cars would be most desirable to me.
Sorry for a bit of a discoherent rant.
Density does not automatically mean low quality of life, and in fact could just as easily enhance it: what matters is good city planning and design, and I’d very much argue that in e.g. LA (where I live) the vast majority of single family homes in the city are in areas where it makes no sense for them to be, lowering the quality of life for even those that own and live in the home (e.g. single family homes right next to highways and commercial corridors? why?)
In my opinion, the idea that California is “full” is immensely dangerous. Especially considering the fact that SF and LA are losing net population yearly — and yet the rents are still increasing and our suburbs are still sprawling further and further out. Density is the solution, not sprawl and not limiting who can come here.
California is in no danger of being overpopulated... The issue is as you say - single family homes are a brain dead way to live. Every homeowner has to spend hours a day maintaining his house... We stopped running our own internet servers after the first ten years of the web. Why can't we do the same with housing? Convert everything to medium (4 story buildings) or high (10+ story) density housing. You would completely get rid of suburban sprawl and everyone rich and poor could live within a mile of the ocean or mountains, walk or ride a five minute train to work, and solve climate change at the same time.
(1) Since rent control laws put limits on increases (and not decreases) every landlord understands that he/she should test the upper boundary at all times to avoid renting severly below market rates during boom years. With sufficient landlords undertaking this task, rents should go higher than without this limitation. Moreover, the cost of moving is higher for the tenant (who has to find a home and move his/her property) than the landlord (who has to find a new tenant).
(2) real estate becomes less attractive builders and buyers, given the mandated constraints on charging rent. See https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pd. For a counter, see https://www.housinghumanright.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11... (you'll have to wade through ad hominem attacks).
(3) high-income earners tend to benefit the most on rent control over time. As market rates for rentals increase (i.e., property up for rent), only higher-income individuals can afford to move in. Over time that leads to the displacement of lower-income individuals. Anecdotally, I can attest how some of my high-income earning friends pay very little for housing in SF because they locked in rates before 2011.
Lastly, pro-rent-control reports/papers I read highlighted the need for a comprehensive housing strategy beyond rent control, like increasing rental supply by making it easier to build ("It is also critical to recognize that the need for reforms extends beyond rent control and housing policy more broadly ... This includes developing new funding sources for affordable housing development and addressing exclusionary zoning policies at the root of the displacement crisis, https://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/opening-door-rent-control). As the article already mentions, Scott Wiener's bill to override local zoning laws was shelved. The CA legislature did not have the stomach to address the underlying cause.
A far more sensible solution (IMO) is: (1) override zoning laws / ordinances that prohibit building more homes (2) tie rent control to income.
Funnily enough though, I would say that Montreal has less of a supply problem, despite being on an island with no room to expand into an infinite suburban sprawl like the bay area has. Construction still seems to happen here. People are bitching that too many condos are being built, but I think more supply is good.
Anyway, I think rent control can work pretty well, as exemplified by this Canadian city. At the very least measures to prevent surprise rent tripling while someone is renting an apartment are very much a good thing. Sidenote: I think that rent control can also help prevent property price explosions. It makes no sense to buy an apartment for over a million dollars when its rental value is only 1000/month.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/how-does-montr...
>>Montreal is not shrinking, but it is growing slower than other big Canadian cities – driving down rental demand in the process. From 2013 to 2014, despite gaining nearly 43,000 immigrants from other parts of the world, Montreal tallied a net loss of 10,000 residents to other provinces.
If either Vancouver or Toronto had had more stringent rent control in place over the last few decades, the housing situation in these cities would be much worse than it is right now.
The effects of rent control have been heavily studied and are well-known:
I'm not saying the contents of the article is wrong, but just be aware of its source/publisher.
Give one moment's thought to the most likely side effect of that...
Most landlords already increase rents at the maximum rate that the market will bear. Capping annual increases at 7% just ensures that in a year when the market would allow landlords to get away with increasing rents by over 7%, they won't be able to do so.
I do not follow when you say that the strategy of increasing rents by the maximum amount permissible is necessary "because larger adjustments cannot be made if and when necessary due to market conditions". In what scenario would larger adjustments be necessary? If you made a viable investment in a property and are currently renting it out, wouldn't rent increases just need to equal inflation in order for you to maintain the same level of profitability? Sure, increasing by more than inflation allows you to increase profits, but I hardly see why maximizing profits should be seen as a necessity---especially when it comes at the cost of pushing people out onto the streets.
Price ceilings (even non-binding ones) can create market power for suppliers by providing a focal point for tacit collusion.
[0] Knittel and Stango (2003), Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3848/b5c04ae02c17c0b5135841...
[1] DeYoung and Phillips (2009), Payday Loan Pricing https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c587/58d243ad0653b052b1c77a...
If the market can support it, these laws guarantee the maximum increase. If the market cannot, well you are already at the top of the market aren’t you? So no benefit here.
Not necessarily - taxes on property owners don't follow inflation. They may go up greatly compared with inflation.
>>> I hardly see why maximizing profits should be seen as a necessity---especially when it comes at the cost of pushing people out onto the streets.
Because if don't allow it to be profitable people won't do it. Particularly in California it can be quite risky the rent out a property. It's an extremely tenant friendly location, so much so that evictions for major infractions can take several months, or in some cases years.
What would be the positive effects?
Do they just knock down a wall in the middle? Or is there any new construction involved? (Usually the developer wants to go for higher intensity to sell more units per land.)
Except in Cal where they go up much lower than inflation...
(However, your example would still work, if the reliable tenant turns into a nightmare tenant.)
I was talking with a real estate agent in SF and he said it’s not unusual for landlords looking to sell their rent controlled building to just let units sit empty.
Why? Because it can increase the value of the building by hundreds of thousands of dollars. Losing out on $24k worth of rent each year is easy if you know it comes with an extra $300k in your pocket when you sell.
The estimate is there are 100,000 empty homes in the SF area.[1]
I’ve seen an estimate of 20,000 for SF proper.
This [2] report to SF Planning states the number of empty units has doubled over time.
[1]https://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/An-estimated-100-0... [2]http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/CR_Final_2.3.19.pdf
Even if that was added to the vacancy rate, that would still leave SF with around the national average (~7%) vacancy rate, and that's without counting the off-the-market housing anywhere else in the average (and not double counting actual on-the-market vacancies everywhere else, either.) Anyway you cut it, SF has a low vacancy rate/rate of empty homes.
Not saying it would solve the housing crisis, but adding another 20,000+ units onto the market would certainly help.
This may or may not be true, but that is the idea.
But I don't think it's fair to say that expensive housing, full stop, is a product of regulation.
There are desirably places to live that have housing that goes up at a good enough rate to be considered an investment. As long as there are people of sufficient means, some of them will add property to their portfolio of assets. A home that sits unused on prime real estate is, frankly, more of a drain on that community than $100,000 in cash sitting under a mattress going unused.
It's not perfect, and it IS a regulation, but penalizing people for hoovering up housing stock and then not using it, can benefit society.
What if someone’s on vacation or has mail being delivered there etc. or comes in once in a while or Airbnb’s it’s much harder to impliment I think than it sounds.
The real problem is we're not taxing these properties at the true value they could provide to society, so a massive market inefficiency exists.
You hint at the easier solution: repeal prop 14 and increase property taxes. A lot. Problem solved.
(If you want to be a bit more sophisticated, look into land value taxes.)
The real issue is that there is no central authority at the CA State or even Bay Area level planning growth holistically.
A company can hire 5,000 people tomorrow and they'll all just move here and look for a place to live, regardless of whether the city their employer is based in has any housing or not. That drives up rent. It creates the absurd traffic that we now get to enjoy every day of the week. It drives up the costs of goods and services.
Bay Area leadership and California leadership need to sit down and have a discussion with employers and cities about how to effectively and responsibly grow, and then move towards developing new infrastructure to support the plan that comes out of those discussions.
If the fact that allowing landlords race-based leasing won the vote isn't enough to convince you that direct democracy is a stupid idea I don't know what is.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_California_Proposition_...
But you do you.
Your landlord may be able to evict one building’s worth of people, but your goal is to evict many more than that.
Your landlord is harmless by comparison.
But ignoring that absurdity - property taxes are usually 2% of the property value. So you'd need to what... Not pay any property tax at all for 100+ years for that scenario to play out?
But let's say we allowed that to happen, and we're somehow sympathetic to that owner. You still don't evict anyone over property taxes. The next buyer will just have to work it out. See Detroit and its $1 homes with $20k in back taxes.
I guess the problem here is I don't see housing as something anyone should expect a guaranteed profit from. I view it just like anything else - there's real risk, and if you're going to privatize the profit, you damn sure better privatize the risk, too.
Just like any other asset you can pay too much, buy something unsuitable, or mis-predict market forces.
Are you against private ownership of property outright?
Do you favor being taxed on the value of other things you own, how about your laptop, stove, etc?
Edit: just to appeal to authority: every single legitimate economist agrees with me on this as well.
Other states may do this, but many other countries do not.
Why shouldn’t you be taxed on the assessed value of your laptop and car each year too? How about your savings account? Shouldn’t that be taxed?
If you're putting the place up on AirBnB more often than not, the unit is not your primary residence and shouldn't be afforded benefits as such. If the goal of a vacancy tax is to increase rental supply, AirBnB does pretty much the opposite.
In California, and most of the US, property assessments are done by elected officials on an annual basis. In California the rate of increase is severely capped, but you're free to apply for a reduction if the value of your property decreases. If you're legitimately on vacation (or whatever), apply for an exemption. It's not that complex.
Also, if you take your reasoning to the extreme then an empty apartment building has a negative value.
It also opens it up to people who want to buy the building and move in.
FWIW rent control advocates agree with you.[1] It’s a point in which the “PHIMBY” left[2] and the real estate lobby agree.
The reasoning is that it’s not actually a full rent control bill (it just stops the most extreme cases of gouging) which is why the California Apartment Association stopped opposing it. Thus it doesn’t go nearly far enough to stabilize rents.
I know there are a lot of supply siders on HN champing at the bit to dump on rent control, but this particular bill is a bit more nuanced.
[1] https://twitter.com/rcmoya84/status/1171972636294840320?s=21
[2] https://www.kqed.org/news/11731580/forget-yimby-vs-nimby-cou...
You need to have some degree of control. I live in a suburb close to a tech hub in WA. They built a lot of housing in the past 3 years. And I mean a lot. At least a couple of hundred of apartments on the market every year, after raising 3-4 buildings at the same time, in a town of 20k people.
One would think that the price would go down based on supply and demand, right? More than half of the apartments were empty while the management companies were not budging on the price. Nobody wanted to go below 2k/month for a one bedroom and they were sitting around with empty apartments. Finally they managed to reel in some suckers by offering 2-3 months free rent but again, no rent was going below 2k so the next year, you pay up or move out.
Right now, people are moving out and the apartment buildings aren't what you'd call full but again, the rent is not going down. It actually increased. Because what happens is that they're owned by large landlord corporations which can take the hit for a year or two to keep the prices up. I know this because I used to live in one. They increased my rent (years ago) from 1.2k to 1.7k and I moved out. The apartment was on the market afterwards for about a year and they didn't try too hard to get new tenants, they just posted it periodically on Craigslist. I tried to negotiate to bring it down to 1.4k and they said no. It was way profitable for anyone to keep the price up, although they lost a year of rent from it.
A big big problem is that we have underbuilt for decades, which has normalized underhousing for younger people.
Increasing supply simply ensures tomorrow's rent is lower than it would be otherwise.
With regard to the story before it, it sounds like they actually lowered rent to about $1600 (2 months free is a 17% reduction, which is pretty hefty. Sure, you’re betting on them staying after, but it switches to month to month usually after a year so it’s risky).
If the unit sits vacant for a while but they do eventually succeed in growing building revenue through rent increases, they don't have to wait out the full breakeven timeline to make money since they can sell it on to the next buyer at the newer higher price indicated by the latest year's financials.
Let's take an example building where the local market has apartments trading at a 3% cap rate. If there are 30 units renting at 1.2k with no vacancy, that's $432k in annual rent. Let's say running this property requires a $80k property manager, $80k in property taxes, $40k in utilities, $40k in insurance, and $25k in miscellaneous expenses for a total of $265k/yr in expenses. The net operating income is $432k - $265k = $167k/yr. The market value of this building to a prospective buyer would be $167k/0.03=~$5.56M
Renting the 30 units at $1.7k (41% rent increase), gross rents would be $612k. Expenses constant at $265k/yr (taxes would go up, but this is napkin math), the NOI is now $347k and the building is worth $347k/0.03=$11.56M .
In this example, a 41% rent increase more than doubled the value of the building. For an investor with deep enough pockets, the $6M of equity created by renting units at the higher price is enough to cover the cost of a long vacancy / rehab process. But they can't get too greedy or the units will never rent and they're just stuck holding the bag on a high-vacancy underperforming property.
These dynamics amount to what is basically a slow-motion flip playing out over 4-10 years. Some REITs do this across their entire portfolio to achieve healthy annualized returns.
When I said there needs to be some level of control (and apparently nobody agrees), I was referring to something like the taxes put in place by local governments against foreigners buying up property, keeping it unoccupied thus creating scarcity and driving prices up.
In this particular case, the local government practically gave away building permits, changed codes, the whole town was at the developer's feet (roads closed, free traffic enforcement, less green space, redesigned roads to deal with the forecasted traffic, etc..) under the promise of building plenty of 'affordable housing'.
But when after you build it (tons of this crap https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-02-13/why-ameri...) you raise the rent for no reason and practically drive people away (I'm not saying it's gentrification, I'm saying it's well-off young professionals who are now choosing to move to a different city), the local market stops being competitive, you sit around with empty apartments, somebody went wrong somewhere. All new developments are under the ownership of two or three giant entities which have a vested interest of keeping prices very high as opposed to competing among themselves. The management companies who own these also made sure to buy a lot of the existing (crappy) apartment buildings.
The argument I was trying to make is that more housing does not necessarily solve the rent price problem, especially if the new housing is governed by a handful of large corporations. And that is usually the case.
I see this all the time where a large ownership company will leave apartments or commercial real estate totally unoccupied rather than allow a cheaper rent.
I don't understand what they gain.
So, leaving an apartment empty that could be rented for $X isnt quite a straightforward loss of $X, since you also gain the ability to offset future taxes.
It shouldn't be a surprise that more landlord-friendly rent control measures get less resistance from landlords.
When the market will bear an increase less than rent control, it gives landlords something to point at as justification and help mitigate turn over. When the market will bear a greater increase, it is unfair and harmful to communities, etc. etc. etc.
Is the property management company collecting an extra commission each time a new tenant moves in? Because all this strategy is going to do is let tenants quit once the rent goes considerably above the market rate.
A much wiser strategy, IMO, would be to watch the market rates and keep the existing tenants' rate constant until the market rate climbs considerably higher (7% sounds like reasonable threshold) and then raising it to be marginally below the market, incentivizing the tenant to stay.
I've been tenant in France, with restrained rent increases. Every year my rent was increasing 20 euros or so.
I've been tenant in California without rent control. After one year, my rent went up 500 dollars.
But well, maybe that's because in France the allowed increase is calculated from a rent index in the area, not a fixed number like "7%" (no idea where it comes from).
Also, don't say "necessary due to market conditions" when the reality is just "can get away with it due to market conditions". It's not like the increase of the rent market causes you more fees or increase your mortgage.
When are "larger adjustments" necessary vs just opportunistically profitable?
The question I always see is "why shouldn't I have the right to make as much money as possible from my investment," but the answer seems pretty clear: because evictions and massive rent hikes have nasty social consequences, as does treating rent-seeking as an investment.
What will probably happen is that you'll have a hard time filling your property after 1-2 years at the latest, and everything goes back to normal.
In other words, it scares all the landlords at once, and they all raise prices a little because of it.
Are average renters getting 7% pay raises every year in perpetuity?
In extreme markets, perhaps.
Normally one landlord's ability to raise rents is constrained by the prices other landlords charge.
Imagine two hypothetical cites, each with one million residents. The first one has half a million apartments, while the second one has ten million apartments.
Which city would have cheaper apartments?
Here's a better question: under a realistic model of building, where building slows down when landlords and property owners feel they have maximized the profit they will get out of it, by what date do you think housing prices will be low enough that current residents who rely on rent control to stay in SF will be able to live there again? 2025? 2035? 2050? What is your recommendation for those people in the meantime?
Nobody is "kicked" out because nobody has an intrinsic right to live in a particular neighborhood. Arguing such a thing is in complete opposition to a free market.
Do rich people to afford that extra housing get created out of thin air?
A) Housing becomes affordable, or B) housing stays expensive.
The latter means we added trillions of dollars to the national wealth.
By the way, please go ahead and do tax property a lot. Ideally, you'd only tax the unterlying land with a land value tax. But even a naive property tax is OK.
That way foreigners buying up local real estate for speculation means foreigners paying for local services.
As for "does not translate to affordable housing"--right now landlords and property developers have two ways of extracting money from the system: charge high rents, or pass the property on to other landlords. Maximizing profit on either of these requires rents to keep going up, and for the second there's no particular reason to actually have tenants. Beyond that, "market rate" in SF right now is nowhere close to affordable for most people and will not be for the foreseeable future, even if building greatly increases, which means that the people currently protected by rent control--those who can't afford "market rate", like the vast majority of people in the U.S.--aren't helped one bit by the creation of new housing.
Also, I assume there is some market pressure to consider, if your increases outpace supply and demand, then tenants would simply move, right?
Interestingly, my rent has remained stable ever since moving - guess it's possible to have much better luck with smaller landlords.
I'm in bumblefudge-nowhere-Midwest USA, and even we've averaged 10% yearly rent increases, for more than 5+ years now. Every top-20 metro area I've looked at, has had it worse than us on rental price increases.
Indexes and aggregations may show something, but it's important to remember that they're lossier than many people appreciate. You'd have to dig into the data to learn how representative it may or may not be. Since small-time landlords are hard to collect data from, most of these city rental indexes are probably relying on large-scale apartment landlords who are constantly trying to squeeze maximum price-per-unit. I'd say you'd do well to take it with a grain of salt.
And I strongly suspect these numbers are below real-world ones (they use Zillow-listing advertised price, which like most advertisements, are usually slightly lower than the actual price a real person would have to pay)
There is a lot of knock on affects that rent control brings that are negative that I don’t have time to go into
In other words, it is totally permissible to increase the legal rent by the officially allowed 7%, but increase the effective rent paid by your tenants by only 2% (or whatever you want). There does not appear to be any restrictions about removing such incentives/concessions/discounts in the future.
It also appears that the California law resets as soon as the tenancy changes hands; so as soon as there is a vacancy the landlord is free to increase the rent by as much as they want. This is not the case for NYC rent stabilization; there the increase in the legal rent is a property of the unit, not of the tenancy.
I was simply thinking, Unintended Consequences in 5,4,3,2,1...but that's one I hadn't thought of. Of course people will push up against the limit in order to buffer out market values.
You could easily see rents above where they should be from a market standpoint simply because of the inertia in a system of annual increases.
It also makes me wonder if you are allowed to increase rents if you improve a dwelling. If not, nothing gets fixed beyond the bare minimum.
Same when a rent control unit opens up in SF, the goal is to push the rent as high as possible since it’s not going up much after that.
7 percent is a pretty high allowed increase. I suspect that it really doesn't do much except stop gouging in the case of someone who had really cheap rent in a place that gentrified suddenly.
This argument comes up here in Australia with regards to Sydney and Melbourne in particular -- the two largest cities.
Building more houses only makes more sprawl. Increasing density causes problems for current residents and puts enormous strain on existing infrastructure[1].
The only real solution is to get people to live in other places that have more and cheaper housing.
[1] Not just utility infrastructure like water, sewer, power, gas, (roads, sanitation, what the Romans did for us etc) but natural environment and leisure like sport and recreation areas, parks and bush land, and (particularly in Sydney) beaches. It's really hard making new beaches for the increased population.
The solution is to make other places attractive for living and have hood opportunities for employment.
Look at it this way: your house or apartment or whatever can probably fit double the people in it. They might be on the floor or on the sofa or whatever, we can double the density. The quality of life will be decreased for everybody.
At what point do we say "It's full, go somewhere else."
What needs to happen is effort put in to make other cities and towns attractive. This could mean encouraging commerce and industry to re-locate or set up new factories or offices. It certainly means ensuring city-level standards of health care and education, something that is a good thing to do anyway
Lastly there needs to be a campaign to encourage people to move to these places. Australia already has migration programs that require people to live anywhere other than the main capital cities.
Australia has a scarcity of fresh water, and low rainfall. Our inland rivers are dying because water is diverted to irrigation for farming; Sydney's water supply is pretty stretched and the option to build more dams is neither environmentally desirable nor possible, because all the rivers have already been dammed, and most are less than full due to low rainfall.
So without resorting to calling NIMBY, at what point can we say "we cannot support any more people"?
I suspect induced demand is more of an effect with highways than housing. People can change their driving habits from day to day more easily than they can change their living habits.
Expand a highway, and more people in the area start taking more car trips on it.
Add housing, and more people don't instantly come into existence to occupy it. (Maybe, over a few years, people stop cramming themselves into crowded roommate arrangements as much, and over decades they have more kids.)
But if I granted that induced demand applied to both...
Driving is a means to an end. People stuck in traffic are suffering.
Having a home is an end in itself. People need shelter, and living near your community/job/family is a huge quality of life improvement.
Plus, when you expand a highway, strictly more mileage is created. It's not like the additional car trips in this city are taking the place of car trips in another state. It's a net loss for society and the environment.
Whereas, when you add housing, even if it induces more people to move into that city, they're moving out of some other city, easing the demand in the housing market there.
This is the use-it-or-lose-it budget game, landlord style.
2. Realize that not everybody in the world needs to or should live in the Bay Area/Hollywood.
3. Don't pass statewide laws catering primarily to the group of people aspiring to do so.
Take your "I've got mine so screw everyone else" attitude out of the bay area, we don't have room here for people with so little empathy for their neighbors.
This law is not targeted at SF per-se because SF already has strong rental protections, this law offers the bare minimum of protection for everyone in the state. The bay area should, and must, pass stronger protections than this statewide law.
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If you can't afford to live in a box in San Jose, obviously staying isn't an option either.
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"Take your "I've got mine so screw everyone else" attitude out of the bay area, we don't have room here for people with so little empathy for their neighbors."
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Oh I don't live in the Bay Area. Theres an entire nation outside of San Francisco, large parts of which are better than the bay area in every objective fashion other than this weird cult obsession with having to live in the poop filled streets of Silicon Valley.
Excluding people from work in productive areas perpetuates poverty.
But that labour productivity (eg measured in salaries the market can bear) differs so much is a fact. Whether we like it or not.
That puzzle is mostly about productivity differences for tech workers. For the baristas in the Bay Area relatively standard explanations like the Baumol effect do most of the explanatory work.
This has nothing to do with people that think they deserve to work there (which I frankly don't get what the big deal is, you're not a teenager scoping out the best colleges anymore) but obviously the marketplace disagrees.
So if the best companies could employ more people in those places and pay them high salaries, those people would also pay high income taxes that could finance public infrastructure for the rest of the country.
Entitlement was never a core tenant (no pun intended) of the American dream.
The real solution to a housing problem is to incentivize and facilitate the building of more housing. ADUs, relaxed zoning, reduced building regulations, reduced fees for permitting, etc. I fear rent control is actually going to do more damage to the housing market than good.