1) Generally, the nature of a bubble is that nobody knows when it will pop. People knew about the U.S. asset bubble in the mid-2000s for years, but even those not caught up in the bubble mass psychology couldn't accurately predict when it would collapse. The same was true of the dot-com bubble around 2000. You can be right that there is a bubble, but be far wrong about when it ends.
2) There was a stock broker looking for new business. He cold called 512 people (he must have been a quant); half he told to sell X stock, half he told to buy. The next week he called the 256 for whom he'd made the right prediction and did the same again: Half he told to sell, half to buy ... several weeks later he was down to 16 people. He called all of them and said, 'look, I was right 5 times in a row ...'.
* Actually a show within the actual show "Square One TV"
Except, what you just described is a scam and not something a registered broker can do.
FTFY
The point is that if enough people make prediction, some of them will right over and over and over - even though it's all random.
Ha, that's a great observation; I hadn't thought of it. On one hand, I'm very uncomfortable with any implied comparison to the most well known practitioner of parables. On the other, many others have used the form. Maybe I'll write all my HN posts in parable form - 'those who have ears to hear' will understand; the others I won't have to deal with. I could use it for business emails too.
Coming up with that many parables might be challenging.
It's a really effective technique for getting a point across to most people if they'll give you the time to listen and you're a good storyteller. It's a bit less effective in highly nerdy spaces but still worth doing.
I actually replied to you ask who you were referring to, since I had no idea, but then another comment said who it was so I deleted my reply.
I clearly am never going to be able to use the word "parable" again. I'll say fable from now on, even though fables have animals in them, not humans.
The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.
Before an econ degree I thought it could all be understood the way we understand, say, a chemical reaction, or some process with rules, laws and order.
But afteran econ degree the thing I realized is that money and economics, it's all about people. Money and debt has no intrinsic value (especially in 2017)--it's just promises and credits people made to each other.
But people are prone to irrationality, cheating, and frankly, their own bullshit. The global financial system in 2017 has not done everything it can to minimize this, either. If anything, they take advantage of it where it profits them.
(Actually asking, I know they've been loosening their financial walls but am not sure what the current controls are)
Chinese equities are something else entirely, closer to a derivative class. And hard to trade in directly (not that I have tried or would ever try -- I'm in index funds).
And the truth is, the banking system is less liquid, and the equities market much smaller, than developed economies. Oh, also, short-selling is illegal, I believe.
So no, there aren't any natural, market-driven checks on this stuff.
When the collapse will happen, people will be outraged and will pretend like in Greece that they were betrayed by their politicians, lied to. But this accumulation of debt happens in plain sight, it is just that no one seems to care.
Hard to predict the timig, like it is hard to predict the timing of a market crash. I have heard people calling the end of the current economic cycle for the past 5 years. Some say Trump has delayed a correction that should have happened this year by 2-3 years (if his economic package goes through). Well it's the same with the accumulation of debt. You can live on the credit card as long as your creditors are not concerned about your credit. At one point the sentiment turns and your credit lines get cut. Then it is the end. Greece is there. Italy is close. France and Japan a little further. The US will get there eventually.
But let's say a majority of voting eligible citizens decided their country needs to dial down debt-fueled growth? Well there's almost nothing they can do, even though popular opinion has changed.
In Greece, even with the fraud that went on voters still had to know bad financial choices were being made. Heck, I live in the U.S. and know when politicians are using financialeering to make the books balance better...
This kept German industry competitive, and enhanced exports. This overall made the euro stronger, but not as strong as the deutschmark would have been. Greece suffered from the other end: they became less competitive by being tethered to Germany's economy.
[1] https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/
Source pdf (page 1): https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2017/mar/pdf/bu...
US DOE and IEA oil forecasts are similar.
If you mean sound growth, they were right. That has ended and growth is increasingly based on financial tricks that will make things worse in the long term, so I would say the experts turned out to be correct.
Also, even with all the debt, yearly GDP growth is down from the previous 10% to something like 6%, so again the experts were right.
The value of these analyses is they try to plumb the limits of the model; there was a substantial sea change in how China's economy operates ~2008-9, with a shift towards massive debt growth. That's inherently less sustainable, particularly because the rate of debt growth is climbing.
China's government debt situation isn't bad.[1] Government debt / GDP is less than half that of the US. Japan is much worse off, with the world's highest Government debt to GDP ratio.
What's really likely to hit China is the same thing that's hitting the rest of the developed world - it just doesn't take all that many people to make all the stuff. This is a killer for an export economy. This hit in Japan 20 years ago, in the US 10 years ago, and is starting to hit in China.
The biggest suggestion of trouble is that so many wealthy Chinese are trying hard to get assets out of the country. This fuels the Vancouver and London real estate booms, and in a lesser way, Bitcoin.
[1] http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/government-debt...
Without the perception that moral hazard exists, this credit binge is really dangerous.
Not covered in the article I linked in particular, but his main idea is that China has had investment-fueled growth that's no longer sustainable; the foundation for all advanced, post-industrial economies is a robust consumer sector. China's is stunted at best. That's the motivation for transfers, not a productivity argument.
He's complaining that China's individual savings rate is too high?
"Use it up. Wear it out. Make it last. Or do without." - U.S. Government, WWII.
However, on first level principles, money is simply an abstraction; it's a medium for trading your services for other people's services. And if you become more efficient, you can buy more services with the same amount of effort and vice versa. The root cause of this increase in efficiency is technology.
As a developing country, China has lots of easy productivity growth just by adopting current technologies on the technological frontier. Therefore, I think an analysis on how fast China is advancing in various technological areas and their industrial policy would be much more useful than one just at a financial level. Are Chinese companies as a whole becoming more productive and creating new technology?
High rates of growth in developing countries, with the rate slowing as they 'catch-up' to more developed countries, is also what the bog-standard macro-growth model (Solow-Swan) predicts.[0] To simplify, developing countries will have lots of labour inputs and relatively few capital inputs. Therefore the marginal factor productivity of each capital input will be high. Eventually, as the economy reaches capital saturation, the marginal productivity of capital will decline and the economy will settle into a low 'steady-state' growth level, where real growth is largely the product of technological advances.
This is why I've always been puzzled by economic commentators who assume China will continue to enjoy 7-9% GDP growth rates forever. Although I'm not suggesting that there's "nothing to see here" in this particular case. China does indeed have a bubble (and massive oversupply) in its residential property market, mostly due to the stimulus deployed just after the GFC. It could make one hell of a pop.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solow%E2%80%93Swan_model#Condi...
This is a theory based on NeoClassical economics which modern Behavior Economics finds that the models of NeoClassical economics fail in nearly every situation [2].
The Solow-Swan model has no rigor, predictions, or testable results to justifying its usage nor faith in its system. Science is a quantitative game, yet economics isn't?
[1] https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/70/1/65/190377...
- This is just a simplified description of probably the simplest macro-economic growth model you'll learn if you study economics. It's basically the model you learn in Macro 101. I didn't really want to write a super-long post going through all the extensions of the base model (not to mention the more complicated micro-economically founded concepts, models and theories you'd learn if you study developmental economics) as one of the predictions of the simple model that I thought relevant, that economies experience slower rates of growth as they reach capital saturation, is empirically supported.
- It's not intended to accurately reflect all aspects of a actual economy. No model is. If a model did this, it wouldn't be a model. We would probably just call it 'the economy'. It's just a simplified model from which a number of more complex extensions have been made, but I didn't feel were worth going into.
- It doesn't purport to make realistic assumptions, and no-one with any sense would think that to be the case. In addition to what you've pointed out, it also assumes the economy only produces a single good, has no government, no international trade, and constant returns to scale. All of these are almost certainly incorrect to varying degrees. Despite these simplifying assumptions, that does not mean the model is useless, or that it does not make any testable predictions. No-one in their right mind would think these assumptions are correct.
I'm honestly not sure what level of realism you expect an economic model to have. Just because a model is strictly wrong (as all models are; hence the name: model), does not mean it isn't useful. You mention empirical results from behavioural economics, which strongly suggest the neoclassical assumption of perfect actor rationality is incorrect. Again, this is just a simplifying assumption under which models can still yield accurate predictions in the large. Is Newton's law of gravitation completely correct? No, and it's been superseded by general relativity. However, is it still useful? Yes.
I can't really think of any economists (and this is certainly true for those I work with), let alone any people in general, who would believe any of these assumptions accurately reflect reality. There are a whole bunch of others too, like the implicit assumption that the labour-capital split of income remains constant. This is also almost certainly not correct as well.
It, and its extensions which account for 'human capital' (which has a multiplicative effect when combined with physical capital) which the simplified model just rolls into the solow residual (i.e. total factor productivity), do make a number of testable predictions, some of which have actually been tested in cross-country econometric studies. For example, here's a paper that examines a number of extended models, and among other things, examines the evidence for absolute vs conditional convergence (http://www2.stat.unibo.it/brasili/file/2009-2010/COSDI/chap1..., see pages 48 & 49).
You can literally just look at the model equation, do some simple algebra to turn one of the independent variables into the sole dependent variable and, presto, you have a prediction. Here are a few:
- An economy will converge to a balanced-growth equilibrium, regardless of its starting point. At this point, the growth of output per worker is determined solely by the rate of technological progress.
- At equilibrium, the capital/output ratio depends only on savings, growth, and depreciation rates.
- Countries with higher savings rates will accumulate capital at a faster rate (if all other relevant features of these economies are the same, which they aren't).
- If productivity is the same across countries (which it isn't), then countries with less capital per worker will have a higher marginal productivity of capital and provide a higher return on capital investment. Consequently, in a world of open market economies and global financial capital (which does not exist, and probably can't), investment will flow from rich countries to poor countries, until capital/worker and income/worker equalise across countries.
All that said, if you are able to produce a model that makes no incorrect assumptions, accurately accounts for bounded rationality, and all its predictions in every real world scenario are accurate, you'll win a nobel prize (and will also become filthy rich by investing according to this super-model's predictions).
Given us economist have simply just been 'doing it wrong' this whole time, because we foolishly didn't realise SF computer programmers held a much deeper understanding of macroeconomics, I'm really excited to being a first-hand witness to, what will be, a quantum leap in our understanding of macroeconomic dynamics and development economics.
I'll try to make sure to list every relevant caveat (the above is only a partial list, at best, for this particular model btw), before daring to discuss an unscientific subject like economics (which I apparently know nothing about).
EDIT: Oh fuck it. I quit.
Internet message boards (yes, even HN's) are not kind to actual expertise.
> Internet message boards (yes, even HN's) are not kind to actual expertise
Would you elaborate on this, in particular what you mean by buried? I'm assuming you're referring to 'spangry's responses. Given the nature of threading and where 'spangry chose to respond, I don't see how it could be anywhere other that where it is. As of the posting of this comment, both of 'spangry's responses are the highest of its siblings. Are you thinking of a different model of threading or highlighting highly-upvoted comments?
As for why it's "hilarious" (okay, overstatemetn) -- it's not really a critique of how comments work -- more just that this is sort of an off-topic subject matter for the audience, and spangry is trying to reply to a comment.
If I were spangry, I would've replied to the post itself. I think HN commenters are pretty thoughtful, and his detailed post probably would've risen to the top, and enhanced the overall conversation.
So the right way to read my snark is more as a commentary on the fact that economics is a technical subject, but most technical readers at this site are technical in different ways. I would assume the top comment (and attendant conversation) would be spot-on for the latest framework or software technology, though.
Pettis does discuss this at length.
From the article, Pettis assumes the following is true:
1) China has overinvested in infrastructure and manufacturing capacity to such an extent
that in the aggregate the cost of additional
public sector investment exceeds the present
value of future increases in productivity generated by
the investment
2) China's long-term sustainable growth rate is substantially below the economy's current GDP growth target
Basically, qualitatively, you're right. Technological improvements can generate growth from scratch. But when you look at the historical data to try to quantify it, you see it's quite modest. Big gains have come from: women entering the workforce, electrification, containerization. The rest is incremental enough it doesn't matter in the same way.
(Part of this is how it's measured; the fact that consumers get much more value for their dollar isn't well captured, but the point remains because it's about debt-servicing, not consumer value.)
My Dad used to work as a merchant seaman, I believe he got up to first officer and had passed his captain's exam.
But then the big container ships came along, and they needed a tiny fraction of the captains, officers and seaman they needed previously per tonne and he ended up coming ashore to pursue a different career. His stories from those times are pretty amazing.
Two, the 'average' in China includes huge numbers of the rural poor. They are living in the third world; an office worker in Shanghai is not, but her income's contribution to the average is diluted by rural subsistence farmers.
This does suggest that there is room for growth via urbanization and modernization: if subsistence farmers switched to commercial farming, and the excess labor moved to productive cities, in theory you've got a productivity boom. But China's productivity is predicated on the world's ability to absorb their excess production, which is not actually unlimited. That said, the central government is taking deliberate steps to encourage urbanization (while simultaneously not undertaking some reforms that would help, like overhauling the hukou system).
China is still pretty much a planned economy, where the government is in control of major state-owned corporations. I wouldn't worry too much about the debts that they owe to the state.
Why not? The state can forgive the debt, but when those resources disappear from the economy then many people will lose out.
My initial reaction is "...and?"
Not because I'm trying to be obstinate or lacking empathy, but because I'm trying to hard visualize a situation (re: China) where those who lose out legitimately can do anything about it.
They can't realistically move, or revolt. They can starve[0], but that's happened in the past and the State really didn't suffer for it.
--- [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Chinese_Famine
Some can. Those are the ones who matter. No man rules alone--political leaders are only powerful insomuch as they can incentives or coërce others to act for them. A ruling class whose living standards is falling is a ruling class more willing to entertain other leaders.
"Certain types of unemployment are likely to be perceived as more politically costly than others - e.g. because returning to family farms acts as a kind of safety valve, even though a significant fall in living standards, unemployment among migrant workers is likely to be less costly, or because university graduates are presumably more communicative and have higher expectations, their unemployment might be more costly" [1].
[1] http://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/66221
History isn't in agreement, and time after time, the peasants will starve before the bourgeoisie suffer to a point that they feel enough pain to revolt.
It's economically cheaper for the State to continue to pay for the ruling classes' requisite "hookers and blow" than it is to pay for social programs.
I can't recall a single civilization where the majority of people were "those people". The point is there are enough who demand enough that mortgaging the non-influential majority to pay for "those peoples'" bread (or as you put it, "hookers and blow") will be a short-term patch at best. (Reverse wealth transfers are not uncommon in a regime's dying days. Case in point: Venezuela.)
Another example is the scientific and military grant-making processes. Such grants may fund labs and companies with wealthy owners and managers. But that isn't the intent behind the grants. Furthermore, politicians--as a group--don't existentially fear the defense contractors or contract-lab operators.
Now consider Venezuela. Babies are starving [3]. Yet bondholders get paid. Why is the government more afraid of its bondholders than citizens? If it's because the government fears the bondholders' reactions, e.g. military insurrection, more than popular revolt then it's a desperate maneuver.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Bank_Bailout
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_Economic_Stabilizati...
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/world/americas/dying-infa...
The bill eventually comes due, but what cost does the population pay in the interim?
I hope that all subjugated and disenfranchised people rise up to remind their governments that they are the reason that those governments ultimately exist, but the cost of that "disobedience" is a heavy burden if they don't succeed.
And yet when I read things like this I also think of the cliché, "Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent."
People have been waiting decades for Japan's post-boom day of reckoning and we've not seen it.
Japan's "day of reckoning" already came: what they've been in for the last 25+ years is the "post-reckoning" of ZIRP, low growth and low inflation. If the Chinese debt bubble explodes, it's not like the country is going to collapse, the most common prediction is that they'll become "Japan 2.0" where the country is functional but trapped in anemic growth because they won't let zombie businesses fail.
It's quite tragic.
What appeals to me about Pettis's analysis is it's rooted in a simple quantitative model that rests on accounting identities. When you've got a model that fundamental, it's easier to make strong predictions.
Also, "markets being irrational" is a claim about asset bubbles. What we're discussing here is much larger, and subject to its own laws of dynamics. It's not a bubble, per se -- it's more like a bad loan that keeps getting rolled over and bigger, and no one acknowledges the loan won't be repaid. Someone is going to lose out, but the day you can't cover the interest payments is the day you have to acknowledge the loss.
In the case of China in 2017, the debt is held by banks, who are functionally insolvent if the bad loans (usually to property developers and commercial entities) were called in. Many of these commercial entities (large, state-owned enterprises, or state-adjacent conglomerates) simply have no possible way to service the actual loans, short of rolling over more debt.
This isn't about asset prices, or a bigger fool bidding up the price of, say, housing stock: it's about the ratio of debt to productive capital. And the reason debt ballooned post 2008 is because the regular investment engine (mostly infrastructure and housing) had started to lose steam. The growth in debt in the economy was a rational response to the need to keep growth numbers high.
But deferring the reckoning doesn't make it better. Though it's held in the corporate sector, much of China's debt behaves almost like revolving consumer credit in the US.
(Also: one form of reckoning is flat growth for an extended period of time; Japan's lost decade is entering its third decade now, and systemic debt is still really bad. Pettis holds up Japan as one example of how not to correct the imbalances.)
But I'd hardly describe that as a "reckoning". It sounds more like a predictable "regression to the mean"
China's unprecedented growth is unsustainable; people know this. Case in point: this article.
We saw the bust in the early 90's.
Maybe I'm misunderstanding what he's saying, but isn't what he describes true of any export-driven economy? And, doesn't it ignore the fact that a large portion of the country is still pre-industrial and is easy pickings for GDP growth? It should be not terribly difficult to grow GDP via moving these people to an industrial standard of living based on domestic consumption, albeit not nearly as easily as in an export-driven economy where your customers are holding your hand along the path. And, does it not also ignore the possibility of moving up the value chain as their technological prowess increases? China is producing some pretty sophisticated technology on their own these days, and they have no shortage of engineers (although the quality may not be world class, I have no idea).
This isn't to say his theory is wrong, it just doesn't seem terribly useful. But I think I must be missing something?
So yes, grandparent's point is correct, that there's room for consumer-led GDP growth. But the mechanism for how to get there is not easy. (And it's something Pettis has written about extensively.)
Sure, it may not be "easy", but is it hard?
No, they really don't have any political will to do anything about the SEOs. That is why their debt is still ballooning in an unsustainable manner. Just as Japan didn't, and the Japanese economy is still held back by keeping failing business afloat. The entrenched elite is just too strong, in both Japan and China.
China may overcome the issues in a way Japan didn't, but the things you list apart from the political will (that they emphatically doesn't have) is plain irrelevant.
He's pessimistic in the longrun, but it seems like China may be able to keep the ball in the air for the next few years.
Worth a read: http://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/68708?lan...
http://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/66221
It really makes clear how stark the choices are for China. The debt binge of the last ~10 years has masked the flattening out of productive investment, and there will need to be a reckoning. Hopefully it's a soft landing, but that will depend on politics as much as anything.