News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by lolsoftware on Thursday April 07, 2022 @03:07PM (#30949008)
The TailScale folks caught a bunch of flak for their "do things that don't scale" approach to databases. But, honestly, most startups would be better off following that approach than what Fast did. Sounds like the engineers were just entertaining themselves with shiny toys rather than solving the problems they actually had.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by enra on Thursday April 07, 2022 @04:03PM (#30949695)
> Sounds like the engineers were just entertaining themselves with shiny toys rather than solving the problems they actually had.

This is often the problem when hiring too fast. New employees don't have context or direction but generally people try to be productive, so they start inventing work.

Management team is new too, and not built up either direct or handle the bandwidth and they also are lacking the direction. Senior leadership and founders are likely busy hiring more folks and potentially trying to sort through the chaos described before.

IMO, pre-product market fit company shouldn't have 500 employees, maybe not even 10. These things don't become easier with more people, usually everything gets harder and slow. You also shouldn't have massive marketing or sales force before you actually have product to sell and have figured out your sales motion.

It seemed that Fast was just trying to shortcut their way to be the next Stripe by hiring people instead of actually working on the fundamentals like the product and business.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by kevan on Thursday April 07, 2022 @04:32PM (#30949973)
It's not just limited to startups. When my business unit in Amazon spun up we hired way too fast and ended up having a harder time shipping v1 of the product than if we would've started lean and grown organically. We ended up spending a lot of time on a modularized platform to enable ~5 matrixed feature teams to contribute across iOS and Android apps. Looking back, a small dedicated team for iOS and another team for Android probably could've shipped v1 in less than half the time with a lot less tech debt.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by enra on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:17PM (#30950996)
Yeah for sure. I think even senior leaders forget the team culture/context piece, and try to scale up too fast because they are used to it in their current orgs or previous companies.

If you have a 500 person org that has operated for years you can probably add 10%-20% new people each year without it breaking too bad. But it can be very hard to build a complete function from 0 to 100 people within a year because there is no infra, culture or understanding how things work. The new people cannot be absorbed/aligned because there is no central gravity so people easily end up pulling different directions and spending their time on internal coordination vs actual useful output.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by tootie on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:38PM (#30951627)
There's always misalignment incentives. If you put a tech manager in charge they're going to look for tech solutions that increase their head count.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by lostcolony on Friday April 08, 2022 @01:00AM (#30953470)
Not really. Managers don't have incentives to grow their team size; they have incentive to deliver. And Amazon is known for 'two pizza teams' anyway.

The parent mentioned 5 teams instead of 2. That's director or higher level decisioning. Which is where you frequently end up having someone far enough away from the actual work that needs to be done, starting early to come up with a roadmap. Given fixed deadline and fixed scope, you lean on your PM triangle knowledge and try to get as much headcount as possible to ensure success, because you don't have enough knowledge yet to really decide at what point adding headcount leads to a negative gain. It's usually less about empire building and more about trying to plan things early rather than growing in response to need.

I've been in this situation, as a manager, being told to hire three teams (two being teams of contractors), pushed back to say I should hire only one (the FTE team) as we didn't have enough work for them, was rebuffed and told I needed to hire (the roadmap said we had the work!), hired, and then had leadership panicking about the fact the teams were idle with nothing to do. After a couple months had enough work we could split it (unnecessarily finely) between them so they could all look active, which lasted about a month before the FTE team just started doing it all, as that was more efficient. I didn't stay there long.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by noisy_boy on Friday April 08, 2022 @04:03AM (#30954497)
> Not really. Managers don't have incentives to grow their team size; they have incentive to deliver.

This may be true about Amazon but it is not a given in general. Managers can operate in the grey area where they deliver just enough to justify more headcount "in order to deliver more" where the underlying motivation is increasing headcount. Not atypical in political environments like banks etc.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by AtlasBarfed on Friday April 08, 2022 @02:15AM (#30953858)
If you have a small team, and well hired, then the stack rank grim reaper kills off 20-30% of your labor each year.

For your huge hires, 1/3 of the people were hired to be fired in the stack ranking, which of course is a huge morale hit.

The ones that aren't setup to fail lose 20-50% of productivity doing machiavellian backstabbing, defensively or offensively, for promotions other culturally ingrained/highly encouraged organizational sociopathy.

With 50% turnover per year (IT stats, not warehouse worker stats), it'll be hard to sustain development as well.

So it makes sense that Amazon would overhire.

Get out as soon as you can.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by weatherlite on Friday April 08, 2022 @09:15AM (#30956416)
Where the hell were you working? This isn't normal for any company.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by fbanon on Friday April 08, 2022 @09:19AM (#30956449)
They're talking about Amazon.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by AtlasBarfed on Friday April 08, 2022 @12:22PM (#30959103)
This is essentially the long term endgame of any diehard adherent to stack ranking its employees.

Heavy stack ranking basically means for a life event, a worker is very likely to get axed. Any health event, having a child, partner has hard times, or management reorg that puts you with a boss that doesn't like you, and the writing is on the wall.

Companies with a good long term focus should concentrate on acquiring and developing long term workers.

Amazon in particular structures its pay (payoffs come from bonuses and vesting 3-4 years in) in such a way that if one takes a perverse sociopathic view of how they manage workers, that management is incented to rug-pull workers three-four years in so the vesting doesn't happen.

Amazon is DEFINITELY sociopathically and perversely managed to do this.

Once that fundamental disdain of your work force becomes ingrained, then all other organizational abuses (stack ranking, hire for fire, backstabbing) is all fair game.

It starts with stack ranking and the fundamental management sociopathy. Which anyone that looks into accounts of Jeff Bezos becomes apparent of the source.

So why has Amazon been successful? Amazon's advantage in the overall corporate competition landscape was simply that they built an integrated business+IT strategy while every other company treated IT as a cost and annoyance.

But they treat their people like utter shit, and as Amazon transitions from an explosive growth company to a more sustained presence, and from AWS from explosive growth to "utility", the now-huge middle management and workforce devolves from stack ranking and sociopathic disdain into a cesspool where only the wicked survive.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toxic_workplace

Unfortunately, Amazon continues to ride a growth momentum, so the toxic workplace will be viewed as a positive. Nothing will change until serious incidents occur.

Of course Amazon is huge, so there are workers who may be in less troubled areas. Just keep in mind that toxic areas of companies that derive from corporate practices will inevitably spill over to the "good" parts. Amazon is acquiring massive amounts of pure sociopaths in their management culture, and those sociopaths will "eat" other idealistic parts of the corporate management.

Corporate america is adapting. Better integration of IT and management is going to come to Amazon's competitors. Amazon's apathy to its product fraud and fake reviews, now stretching into a three year ongoing problem shows that it is faltering. Its lies during its AWS downtimes show a blame culture in action.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by jakey_bakey on Thursday April 07, 2022 @04:52PM (#30950207)
I find it absolutely crazy that companies do this.

My company's strategy is get one extremely solid person across all our verticals (Android / iOS / Backend / Infra) to minimise communication overhead and maximise iteration speed (since we throw out half the code we write anyway).

I would be very hard pressed to hire more than 2-3 people in each role even if we were offered 10s of millions.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by ChrisMarshallNY on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:30PM (#30951103)
> My company's strategy is get one extremely solid person across all our verticals (Android / iOS / Backend / Infra) to minimise communication overhead and maximise iteration speed (since we throw out half the code we write anyway).

but ... but ... that makes sense ...

I have found that having fewer good engineers is much better than lots of bad ones.

That approach is treated as heresy, in today's tech industry.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mwcampbell on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:41PM (#30951189)
Perhaps the thinking is that it's easier to hire multiple good-enough programmers to get dependable productivity, and to replace one if something goes wrong. In the extreme case, if a company has one programmer who is very good when they're working at peak productivity, but then they have a period of low productivity for whatever reason, that company is in trouble. I've been that person.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by hn_user82179 on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:07PM (#30951411)
Additionally, it's a bigger loss felt when that person leaves.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by ChrisMarshallNY on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:19PM (#30951505)
...which is why it's so important to foster an environment, where they don't want to leave.

I kept engineers (really good ones) for decades. They had many "life problems" (like divorce, cancer, etc.) during that time, and I kept them on.

It's entirely possible. I have done it. I ran a team that was all "top-shelfers."

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by lostcolony on Friday April 08, 2022 @01:05AM (#30953497)
You still should avoid being too siloed. Bus factor matters; their life problems you might be able to keep them, but you're ensuring you suffer death problems the same time they do.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by ChrisMarshallNY on Friday April 08, 2022 @05:12AM (#30954908)
Well, the software industry seems to believe that, for some reason, we get to live by different rules from every other company on Earth, throughout all of human history.

Depending on key roles is something that every company in history has had to do. It’s a risk, but one that has been paying off for hundreds of years, for millions of companies.

There are ways to reduce “bus factor,” yet still maintain high Quality work. The corporation I worked for, managed this, but the price is extreme levels of overhead and rigidity. That has its own risks. I was treated as a “cowboy” in our company, and was considered to be borderline “reckless.” Most folks here, would have considered me to be destructively conservative and risk-averse. I got the job done, though. Our team consistently delivered high-Quality solutions to difficult problems, for decades.

The “easy answer” is to keep expectations and demands on labor low. Keep quality to a minimum. Rely on “black box” dependencies. Don’t use advanced development techniques. Squeeze your coders like lemons. Treat every employee the same as every other one, and control for the lowest common denominator.

That’s not how I worked.

It's OK. The industry is safe from me, and my radical views. It was made abundantly clear, years ago, that no one wants people like me in their company, so I have been forced to work with people that can't afford even crappy programmers.

Poor bastards are living the nightmare.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by infinite8s on Thursday April 07, 2022 @09:40PM (#30952396)
I assume you were able to do it with more than just money?
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by ChrisMarshallNY on Friday April 08, 2022 @05:05AM (#30954863)
Definitely. My company offered “competitive” salaries (i.e. “low”).

I feel as if I was a very “human” manager, and that seemed to make the difference.

My employees were loyal to me, not the company. Not an ideal situation, but it WFM.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by erikerikson on Thursday April 07, 2022 @08:57PM (#30952134)
And most companies can't seem but try to run them off.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by TuringNYC on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:05PM (#30951390)
>> I find it absolutely crazy that companies do this.

It has changed a bit, but a large part of it is due to HR policies around salary bands. You can have one person do 10x or 5x and another do 1/3x but their salaries are often max .5 factor apart. Ive been in situations where i'd rather reward (perhaps with a vest period) one person with 3x the salary and just skip all the inter-person communications bs, but HR makes it hard.

We were able to do this at hedge funds, and i'm sure small startups can do this, but as companies grow, HR will generally not allow this.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by JonChesterfield on Thursday April 07, 2022 @08:17PM (#30951903)
It strikes me as a fundamental mistake that HR are not responsible for the consequences of their policies. Failing to hire people leads fairly directly to failing to ship products, yet that doesn't appear to be attributed back to the team that insists they are all asking for above 'market rate'.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by recuter on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:17PM (#30950991)
Headcount perversely increases the valuation sometimes. Hence, big head positions.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mwcampbell on Thursday April 07, 2022 @09:57PM (#30952495)
This seems so backward to me. Since technology is all about achieving more with less work, shouldn't headcount always count against the valuation?
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by saila on Thursday April 07, 2022 @09:18PM (#30952262)
I've been wondering why a seemingly stable startup would go on a massive hiring spree leading to all kinds of chaos rather than take a more measured approach and have started to suspect that this is the reason right here.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by rongenre on Thursday April 07, 2022 @09:53PM (#30952474)
Headcount absolutely does.

In the 90's there was a joke that they'd take the engineering headcount and multiply it by 10M (or something), subtract a multiple of management and there's your valuation.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by Nextgrid on Friday April 08, 2022 @04:51AM (#30954788)
"Hiring too fast" happens because managers, company executives and sometimes even investors want to play with shiny toys rather than solving the problems they actually had.

The "shiny toys" in this case are employees and the task of managing them.

As a (future?) lead/manager, having more people on your team bolsters your resume. A lot of people would benefit from the company hiring more too as it generates demand in other parts of the business - HR, IT support, etc (which in turn causes more hiring if you need more people to deal with the increased workload). As a higher-up in the company, it looks better on your resume if it was a "big" company with 100+ employees rather than a scrappy garage startup with 3 people, and likewise for investors.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by SkyPuncher on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:36PM (#30950636)
I've done startup engineering for a while. I've seen exactly 1 issue that we couldn't solve easily (N+1) or with simply turning our server count up (often way cheaper than putting an engineer to a problem).

Basically, to move development velocity faster we "load everything". Seems like a really bad idea on the surface. In practice, we only ran into an issue with a single customer that was literally 1000x as large as the other customers. It took about two weeks by 1 engineer to rework a select few calls that were egregiously slow and we were back at it.

----

In other words, even with some arguably inefficient technical decisions, I've rarely if ever seen performance issues at early stage startups.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by irjustin on Thursday April 07, 2022 @10:59PM (#30952878)
Exactly, the cost of turning on additional servers is measured in ~US$100's/mth vs an engineer's time ~US$10k-25k/mth.

If you can make the problem go away by spending more in servers always do it.

For startups, the life and death is product market fit and you only get there by iterating on the business as many times as possible, not making something more efficient.

Put engineers on business iterations.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by dgb23 on Friday April 08, 2022 @04:03AM (#30954501)
Using more machines also introduce complexity.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by tomp on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:02PM (#30951358)
Even before using more servers, one should consider using (one) bigger server (and another as backup).

Massive servers are laughably cheap these days. E.g. 16 cores, 128GB RAM is €112 from Hetzner.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mwcampbell on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:05PM (#30951392)
Damn, wish those dedicated servers were available in Hetzner's US data center. As far as I'm aware, the closest thing to a competitor in the US is OVH, and the server you get for that price is about a quarter of the capacity. That's plenty for my little company, but still...
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by hardwaresofton on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:54PM (#30951735)
Same here -- I'm eagerly awaiting them having a dedicated server offering

In the meantime have you looked at leaseweb?

https://www.leaseweb.com/dedicated-servers#US

I'm planning on running nimbus web services[0] there and there are a few other smaller providers I have earmarked depending on how brave you are:

https://www.defendhosting.com/usa-unmanaged-servers/

https://cc.delimiter.com/cart/dedicated-servers/

https://greenserver.io

[0]: https://nimbusws.com

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by SkyPuncher on Friday April 08, 2022 @05:11PM (#30962577)
In our case, we're running on top of a PaaS (think Heroku). Vertical vs Horizontal scaling is essentially the same complexity for the scale we're currently at.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by lmeyerov on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:50PM (#30950754)
It wasn't "doesn't scale to 10-100X bigger" but "doesn't burn themselves and their teammates out 6mo from now and needlessly risk a stressful & prolonged sev0 when one of the 1-2 people who did weird things gets COVID / goes on a honeymoon / leaves for netflix".

Spending time on needless infra (scale you don't need, AI you don't need, infra you don't need, things could have been postgres as in this case, ...) both prevents building useful stuff ($-generating features/experiences/...) and increases operational cost (maintenance, debugging, ...). Both the lost revenue growth and the increased costs are compounding. Imagine a maniac steadily piling on a bit more technical debt every day and eat a bit more of the seed corn every day instead of growing it.

A good phrase for this is "playing house": http://www.paulgraham.com/before.html

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by randmeerkat on Thursday April 07, 2022 @03:49PM (#30949541)
> Sounds like the engineers were just entertaining themselves with shiny toys rather than solving the problems they actually had.

More like, sounds like management was trying to get as much money as quickly as they could from their VCs before it all imploded. The engineers aren’t at fault that management didn’t have a real product or vision.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mrkurt on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:42PM (#30950696)
We all know plenty of engineers who want to build things for inappropriate scale. The company was a disaster, but part of building a disastrous company is hiring the engineers who want to make everything webscale and have no sense of pragmatism.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by randmeerkat on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:31PM (#30951114)
> The company was a disaster, but part of building a disastrous company is hiring the engineers who want to make everything webscale and have no sense of pragmatism.

I mean, the engineers held up their side of the bargain. They were hired for webscale, the company got webscale…

Now, if this was a more strategic startup, that had tried to hire pragmatic engineers, that insisted on webscale, I would blame the engineers. However, in this case, I think it’s pretty clear that the engineers did exactly what they were hired to do.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by zozbot234 on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:18PM (#30950459)
Tailscale's "database from 2022" is neither here nor there. What you should do in this situation is use the most boring tech, such as PostgreSQL with a simple HA setup. Thus avoiding the "play with nifty toys" trap and maximizing the chance of making appropriate choices.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by kragen on Friday April 08, 2022 @05:26AM (#30954980)
Your server has 128 gibibytes of RAM, and has for five years now. In fact, you can buy off-the-shelf servers with a tebibyte of RAM now. As long as you have some way to recover from a power failure, if there's something you could do with Postgres without sharding fifteen years ago, you can do it in RAM on a single server now. But, if it was disk-bound, you can do it about a million times faster than you could do it then.

It's reasonable to argue that shelling out the US$800 for a server with 128 gibibytes of RAM (or renting one from a cloud provider for US$150 a month) amounts to buying nifty toys for the engineering department. But if you're paying each engineer US$200k per year in salary and a similar amount in benefits, that's US$190 an hour, so each engineer's workday buys you almost four such servers. Your RAM has a minimum transaction time of about 100 ns, while an SSD is more like 10000 ns. If you have 100+ GiB of data to query, the alternative to buying nifty toys is paying the engineering department to do optimization work that wouldn't be necessary if your data was stored in memory that was 100x faster.

The rough equivalency here is that adding one more engineer to your team costs as much as adding 16 dedicated Xeon servers at Hetzner with 128 GiB of RAM each.

Sometimes the best answer is still a relational database, of course! It's often easier to write your queries in relational terms than by looping over hash tables, though probably not if you're using an ORM, and Postgres is delighted to cache all your data in RAM.

At some point, you may grow beyond being able to run your production environment on a single server, at which point splitting things into tiers is worthwhile. (In some cases you start at that point, for whatever reason, but a lot of web services can serve a million users on a single server. It sure sounds like Fast's service would have worked fine on a single server.)

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by zozbot234 on Friday April 08, 2022 @06:25AM (#30955313)
The point of a RDBMS has never been to save on RAM, raw files have undesirable properties for lots of data management scenarios. You can have a very simple schema if you like, e.g. a RDBMS makes for a damn good key-value store.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by randomdata on Friday April 08, 2022 @12:57AM (#30953454)
The most boring tech imaginable would be a file. Perhaps containing JSON or similar structured data that can be handled using commonly available libraries. Which is exactly what they used for a long time.

I've done something similar before and it saved countless hours wasted on configuring databases, writing queries, fighting impedance mismatches. Postgres brings a lot of work. With a file you just need a couple of lines to write your memory out to a file and a couple more to read it back. Simple and effective.

Until it stops scaling, but at that point you've established that your business is successful enough that it warrants the effort of doing something shiny. Postgres has a place in this world, but no need to put the cart before the horse.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mwcampbell on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:27PM (#30950546)
Perhaps one problem with the current backlash against over-complicated infrastructure is that for some of us, doing everything in one process on one machine using a local embedded database is its own form of playing with nifty toys.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by bryanrasmussen on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:23PM (#30951059)
yeah, I guess, I'm not going to get too specific here but I do think it would be nifty if I didn't go through a couple 10 minute periods every day where I have to basically shut everything down run a number of scripts, then restart individual processes that are problematic, to be able to work again.

Note that this basically works 99% of the time now and is part of a learning process that had the whole thing taking 2 - 5 hours every day for several weeks, down to 2 hours a day for several weeks after that, and now down to the nearly inescapable 20 - 40 minutes a day I have now.

Yeah, not doing that would be my own form of playing with nifty toys.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by collinmanderson on Friday April 15, 2022 @08:17PM (#31047626)
Wow. I would find it super annoying to be interrupted twice a day to do a 10min task. Can’t you try to narrow down the underlying bug? Or somehow automate the restart?
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by nonameiguess on Thursday April 07, 2022 @04:36PM (#30950022)
Staying employed for another few decades without losing seniority in an industry that expects you to stay current on all of the latest hottest fads is a problem the engineers actually had.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by wnevets on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:56PM (#30950814)
> Sounds like the engineers were just entertaining themselves with shiny toys rather than solving the problems they actually had.

Programmers love to add the latest tech to their resume then move on to a new position within ~18 months

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by CoastalCoder on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:18PM (#30950999)
That may be specific to early-mid career focus

If/when a developer builds deep knowledge of a problem domain, things like framework-of-the-month may become an unwelcome distraction.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by teaearlgraycold on Thursday April 07, 2022 @08:06PM (#30951842)
Seeing someone using nothing but tried and true tech to solve new problems is a resume green flag.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by Nextgrid on Friday April 08, 2022 @05:02AM (#30954853)
Is there a place where such "green flags" would net me money? It seems like as a software engineering employee, the roles that require me to waste time reinventing the wheel and battling self-inflicted complexity pay significantly more than those who require solving actual problems with boring tech.
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by teaearlgraycold on Friday April 08, 2022 @10:07AM (#30956924)
> Is there a place where such "green flags" would net me money?

Well the best way to reap the benefits of your experience is to run your own company. Not screwing yourself over with BS tech is a competitive market advantage. However you might need to hire people so you can’t pick something too old.

Working for other people it’ll mostly net you less on call headaches.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mooreds on Thursday April 07, 2022 @07:56PM (#30951756)
Yes!

I've seen a few startups that seemed to overengineer things (or build custom solutions rather than use something off the shelf) in expectation of massive growth.

I also thought it might have been due to resume driven development and the need to keep engineers engaged so they didn't leave.

I've also seen successful startups with a monolithic rails or PHP application that ran on heroku with next to zero custom architecture components.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by xen0 on Thursday April 07, 2022 @04:23PM (#30949910)
I wonder, how many engineers had full time jobs just developing and maintaining the various integrations with all their small clients?
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by mywittyname on Thursday April 07, 2022 @05:09PM (#30950362)
I have to imagine they were all stepping on each other and/or reinventing slightly different shaped wheels too.

My experience has been that companies who will customize integrations for you have poorly designed products. By that, I mean, when we ask for a feature, and they bring on an engineer who does some requirements gathering then comes back with some invisible solution. That's a major redflag.

The success of an integration, in my experience, is directly proportional to the amount of the work I'm able to handle as a client.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by vimwizard on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:13PM (#30950957)
>My experience has been that companies who will customize integrations for you have poorly designed products. By that, I mean, when we ask for a feature, and they bring on an engineer who does some requirements gathering then comes back with some invisible solution. That's a major redflag.

I'm feeling a bit called out right now (not an owner but that's my experience, too)

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by lupire on Thursday April 07, 2022 @06:32PM (#30951116)
> The TailScale folks caught a bunch of flak for their "do things that don't scale" approach to databases.

I've seen this repeated on HN, but never saw the alleged flak.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by Aeolun on Thursday April 07, 2022 @08:53PM (#30952113)
It’s a post from around a week ago. They went from embedded JSON, to something else (equally crazy), to embedded JSON again. Lots of laughs were had (and a lot of, just use postgres).
Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by randomdata on Friday April 08, 2022 @01:11AM (#30953535)
> They went from embedded JSON, to something else (equally crazy), to embedded JSON again.

They went from a JSON file, to etcd, to SQLite. etcd seems a little misplaced, but presumably it was already in their infrastructure and they thought they could save time leveraging it. The file-based approach seems appropriate for their particular use-case, though. It's not like it's a Rails app.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by Aeolun on Friday April 08, 2022 @03:46AM (#30954385)
Crap, I’d forgotten about the sqlite part. You are of course correct. Apparently I’d only remembered the fact they went back to something file based :/

I’m still of the opinion that whatever you are storing, if your alternatives are JSON or Sqlite, etcd is a really strange/unconventional choice.

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by hobs on Thursday April 07, 2022 @03:52PM (#30949568)
Pretty sure the reason they caught that flak is because they chose to reinvent the wheel instead of do a normal thing that would work until later - they're on their what - third rewrite of that now?

Tootally worth the time /s

Re:What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse... by lolsoftware on Thursday April 07, 2022 @04:20PM (#30949870)
I don't think that's a fair characterization of what happened. First, they scaled a simple solution for a long time and migrated away from it before it exploded spectacularly. I don't recall them explicitly saying how much time they spent on it, so how is it possibly to say whether it was worth the time or not? I also don't remember if it was here or on Twitter, but one of the engineers listed the many features they built and shipped _instead_ messing with their database. I'd say that was a good business decision - they got more features to their customers sooner and dealt with a scaling issue before it impacted customers.