Don't use their service but they do really come across as one of most trustworthy out there. Have a Protonvpn account for getting around a geoblock once in a blue moon, personally don't have much use for commercial vpns.
If you're serious you send a machine, that you own, to a colo provider and you register for service with a corporate entity that you created for just that purpose.
Your name exists nowhere and ... regulatory inquiries are directed to your corporate contact email.
Or, if you feel like that's a heavy burden and you don't attach any value to the physical machine (some old 1U, right ?) then you can just sign up under an assumed corporate name with some colo provider that doesn't care that it is, or is not, an actual corporation and you can pay with your non-AMEX credit card[1] using whatever Mickey Mouse name you feel like.
Trust me - it won't take long to find someone who will take your money.[2]
[1] Only AMEX validates First Last ...
It looks to me that NEITHER would be prevented by you using a colocated machine. It's not like your colocation provider is incapable of compromising you and probably would if ordered to do so in a jurisdiction where this act would be legal.
A hacker presumably isn't concerned about whether they are attacking a machine on your desk or in Nebraska.
Over a 5 year time frame your colocated machine would presumably run you between $6600 and $19000 and would have bought you zero additional privacy compared to paying $360 for a vpn in the same jurisdiction.
Very likely, no one cares about me enough to put effort towards specifically monitoring or hijacking my internet traffic.
However, someone puts out a shingle as NordVPN or Mullvad or whatever else, and starts advertising VPN services to the world.
That VPN provider has a finite number of endpoints / egress nodes, and those become a very high value target. Now my threat model has to include not just targeted attacks at me, but general attacks on the VPN provider.
An analogy would be, if you have 1 million dollars worth of real-world valuables (artwork, say), it's better to store it in a nondescript warehouse than a warehouse with a neon billboard out front that says "BOB'S HIGH-SECURITY WAREHOUSE FOR EXPENSIVE VALUABLES". The latter is painting a giant target on itself for anyone interested in stealing stuff.
If the vpn provider doesn't keep any logs your total exposure is that they may start collecting logs of traffic for the duration during which they are compromised. If they are attentive and competent this either will never happen or it will be for a short duration. Again this breaks the example of valuables in storage.
In fact a VPS or indeed any host actually has the same problem you describe in that a host is a bigger target than you and therefore more valuable.
On the other hand for most people the differential between know how between you and professionals is probably sufficiently useful that you are less likely to get hacked with them than on your own. After all nobody has to actually target you in particular they can look for vulnerable hosts in an automated fashion.
I don't think you have provided any substantial argument for most commercial vpn users to switch. I feel like for most threat models its a more than acceptable tool.
If just you want to torrent the last season of game of thrones (why would you?) then a reasonably reputable no-log vpn service will probably do a perfectly fine job.
If you want to access non-https websites from coffee shops, buy a $5/mo vps from amazon/prgmr/digitalocean/whomever and tunnel through it.
I don't see a situation in which the dedicated colocated hardware is the right choice.
Probably yes, but it does not necessarily break your anonymity for https websites.
(On the other hand, if you want to perform a public service, using tor is a good way of masking the traffic of people who actually want to use it to disseminate sensitive information.)
> non-https websites from coffee shops
If the website you are accessing is unencrypted then the exit node knows the entirety of your communication with it. (It doesn't know your IP; but small consolation. You're still vulnerable e.g. to injection.)
Also, as others have pointed out, all you have to do is sniff the traffic going in to the machine, something both the colo and ISP and upstreams are trivially able to do to obtain your residential or GSM IP, linked to your name/identity.
This is bad advice. Mullvad is like five bucks and offers equivalent privacy.
I don't know about obscuring the fact of the connection between you and it though. Tor isn't enough by itself.
Nah. If you're worried about the kind of attacks that necessitate sending your own hardware, then, regardless of who owns title to the device, the firmware being replaced to snoop on or alter what is actually in RAM is in-bounds.
There are lots of ways of hiding persistence on a system, and decades of research along these lines. Once it leaves your possession, there's not much you can do to ensure that it still has unmodified code on it (assuming standard PC hardware).
Really though this isn't the threat model at all for someone who just wants to use a VPN, I only went there because the comment senselessly advised shipping your own hardware to the colo. That's the same privacy as using the colo-owned machine, which, for a VPN, is the same privacy as using a generic $5/mo VPN service, as in all cases the upstream can be trivially monitored (even in the case where it's your own, tamper-evident HSM-whatever remote attestation hardware).
Why don't they just desolder the cpu and wire up an emulator and laugh at all those secure enclaves and encryption?
Apple can decrypt the whole thing without any input from the user: they don't need their phone, they don't need their password, they don't need their keys.
The whole thing was a carefully orchestrated media dance designed to make it seem like the feds can't get the data off of iPhones. Not only do they have access to almost all of the data on almost every iPhone, they have access to it without a warrant or probable cause thanks to the FISA Amendments Act. Apple compromised over 30,000 accounts for the US government without a warrant in 2019, per Apple's own transparency report.
Edit: I should say, I used their support email, they responded pretty quickly for a cheap service, offered a beta client and that fixed the issue (I'd actually tried the beta by the time I got the email back, but still).
However, I don't fully understand the privacy argument. It would seem to be that instead of handing over your entire DNS query history and unencrypted HTTP history to your own corporate IT department or the Starbucks Wi-Fi router, you're now handing over all that data to Mullvad. Are people okay with that?
I usually create my own VPNs. I realize that involves handing data over to AWS or whoever I use for my servers but I somehow feel slightly better about that than handing it over to some Mullvad dude.
Google tries to impose its VPN on Android too and my first insinct is: do I really want all my traffic going through Google?
Well, you're of course right that the privacy argument for VPNs doesn't make a lot of sense. But there's a whole industry living from people believing it does, and ad partners of that industry willing to proclaim that VPNs are essential for your personal privacy.
If you do believe that, it's more private. If you don't, they still might have access to that data. Otherwise AWS or someone else will.
However, even so it will be more difficult for third parties to track you since you will generally not be assigned a dedicated IP address. You are probably NATed with a bunch of other customers from all over the world. If you set up a VPN in a VPS you'll most likely have a permanent public IP.
Personally, I believe that Mullvad is truthful about its privacy claims, but I'm not a customer.
AWS I would "trust" slightly more only because I get to implement the infrastructure and among the sea of trillions of requests they serve it would be a bit more of a challenge for them to figure out which of those requests are VPN browsing data and clean that data. I can also mildly obfuscate and pollute requests using their own infrastructure and make it hard for them to extract anything meaningful about me unless they really wanted to.
Basically AWS isn't already set up as a VPN service, so they'd have to put in a nonzero amount of time to extract, parse, collate, and analyze VPN logs, let alone figure out which instances among their billions are actually VPN instances, especially if I run a non-standard, modified protocol. Unless I was some Snowden-like target it's unlikely they would waste a couple weeks of engineer hours to wireshark and clean the data from my instances.
Mullvad on the other hand handles 100% VPN browsing data so if they unscrupulously keep logs, they would have clean logs to begin with, nicely organized by username, which is scary. They wrote the client and they control the protocol. They also rent their instances from various providers (the names of which they disclose on their website) and I could presumably just bypass them and rent an instance with one of those providers directly.
Of course, either approach should work if the goal is merely to disassociate your traffic from your identity in order to keep marketing companies knowing your interests. Your approach is more provably reliable, but some VPN providers do provide 3rd party audits and such which seems a reasonable way to establish trust.
Hiding IPs while engaging in piracy.
Other than that, I think it's mainly geoblocking evasion, which might have overtaken piracy recently as the most popular reason for using a proxy service.
Any use where the slowness of tor is a dealbreaker, and where criminal liability is not so high that law enforcement will attempt to unmask proxy users in realtime.
Yes, it's crap, and any techbro worth their salary should know this.
It's also incredibly annoying when VPN this and VPN that pops up on youtube.
https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-...
It's mostly moot. In the days of HTTPS and DoH, they're essentially selling snake oil. It was a lot more useful in 2010.
Also getting around some geoblocking.
Also it bugs me that there are 5 "Try" buttons on the Mozilla site before they even show you the price. To be fair it does show you the price on the credit card page after you log in but still feels a bit scummy to me. Mullvad puts it in your face above the fold.
I'm not expecting privacy, I just want a way to occasionally geo-hop to other countries, for streaming video and to test if a problem is related to my IP/location or not. And occasionally to have some minimal level of protection in a coffee shop.
If you're worried about a government, your personal info from a VPS provider is just one court order away. If you use a VPN service that actually is serious about not keeping PII or logs, you might fare better there (they might be coerced to log future traffic of yours, but at least your prior activity is still secret).
If you're worried about ad tracking, a VPN just doesn't do you much good period: ad tracking is sophisticated enough to not care about your IP address.
But all of this "VPN for privacy" stuff is predicated on trusting faceless third-parties to help keep you safe, so it's generally a losing proposition. Agree that the only "safe" thing to use a commercial VPN for is to bypass geographical restrictions.
If you are trying to avoid your ISP knowing you are downloading movies a VPN is a good solution.
If you don't want others in the coffeeshop to be able to snoop on remaining unencrypted http traffic. VPN
If you don't want your employer to have a list of your web traffic from your personal device. VPN
If you don't want a service which you don't pay with a credit card to have a way to connect your pseudonym to your real name. VPN
If you want to opt out of some degree of dragnet surveillance/data collection via parties like your ISP. VPN
None of these are incredibly uncommon. VPSs work great for most scenarios. If your actions are dangerous to your continued existence or you need to keep your own government from watching you then you probably need to adopt far more stringent measures but I feel this is vastly less common than the above situations.
If you're talking about bulk collection, then your ISP is probably already doing that.
If I pirate using a VPN in a country hostile to mine, the local RIAA/MPAA can't do anything. They probably already can't when VPN is in same country. A VPN doesn't stop a determined adversary, but if you worry about these you should probably use Tor or something like that, possibly without going back to clearnet.
While your stance is a good wake-up call, and perhaps a decent rule of thumb the above are reasonable exempts.
If they shoehorned bitpay in, its probably not tapping into the utility of having bitcoin payment options.
I like paying invoices with Monero over Tor, while the merchant receives bitcoin that a third party pushed to them. I’ve been doing that for at least half a decade.
But if I can’t access their invoice they just lose a customer.
I don't think MorphToken would work because as far as I can tell, they have no way to set a fixed amount of the destination currency.
Other providers like ChangeNOW do offer that but they have much higher minimums, something like .003 BTC, which is obviously not useful for a $5 payment.
Really? My Ledger app says 112 sat/byte, which comes out to $8 for me, and I'm pretty sure they were higher a few weeks ago, when I checked. Am I way overpaying?
> I don't think MorphToken would work because as far as I can tell, they have no way to set a fixed amount of the destination currency.
That's too bad, XMR.to was really useful for this...
Hm, maybe? I think those clients usually just use the average fee paid in recent transactions, which will result in overpayment if everyone else is doing it too.
The real question, "how low can I set the fee and still have my tx confirmed," is given an attempt at an answer by https://fees.watch, which is what I checked -- it showed less than $2 for every speed at the time.
To be honest I don't actually use Bitcoin, but I do use Ethereum regularly and I use this fees.watch site for that. My transactions almost always get confirmed exactly when expected, and it's almost always cheaper than whatever the wallet suggests.
You can pay any bitcoin invoice with Monero and people have been doing that for 6 years
ChangeNOW allows that, but has a much higher minimum, .003 BTC or so. Not useful for small transactions.
And all of these services take many minutes to complete the exchange, by which time the invoice you're paying might expire. AFAIK xmr.to was the only one that did instant exchange with zero confirmations for smaller amounts.
still waiting for something better but its good enough
1. https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/la46ds/xmrto_servic...
One day people will figure out how to connect XMR to other chains, really unlocking its value and utility for those markets
Most VPN services get blocked eventually and then play cat-and-mouse to get themselves back up, so the service is overall unreliable.
The China firewall also does some "intelligent" blocking of common VPN protocols by fingerprinting their traffic patterns, handshakes, ports, and other things.
If you set up own server, it helps to modify the protocol or wrap it in a proxy that obfuscates the VPN traffic as something innocent-looking. Basically, if you implement something like TCP/IP-over-cat-picture-jpeg-files-on-HTTP-port-80 you'll generally have a rock solid experience. (That's not exactly what I do, but it's along the same lines of thinking, you get the idea, be creative.)
Unfortunately I'm not going to provide code to do this though because that makes it vulnerable to its traffic pattern being fingerprinted and blocked.
Also, avoid AWS. Using slightly lesser-known IaaS providers helps.
1: https://www.digitalocean.com/docs/networking/floating-ips/
That said, I never had problems using an SSH tunnel and the end result is the same.
I'm not affiliated, just a very happy customer.
Mullvad is also who Mozilla trusts for the Mozilla VPN [2]. You can sign up with that if you'd like Mozilla to get a cut.
[1]: https://mullvad.net/ [2]: https://vpn.mozilla.org/