If the company just says "don't do it" there is still social pressure to be polite and not slam the door in someone's face. But if there are consequences that everyone knows about then no one is going to begrudge you if you tell them they have to swipe their own way in.
Heck, put up signs that say "allowing tailgating is a serious offense" so that visitors are aware as well.
There is no point in badging an unlocked door, or in expecting people to do so. You have to actually close it between entries. This is a physically and socially ridiculous thing to do with traditional doors; if it's what you want, you need a turnstile.
The whole idea of 'challenging tailgating' falls apart because someone walking in after you is not performing a strange act.
You would have to actively close the door _on_ people, including your colleagues, which goes against social norms to such an extreme extent that it's just not happening.
Some people do ask for the owner of a badge to do a second pass but security always appears at that point.
We have passcarded doors and then inside we have gates like many subway stations do that are timed only long enough for one person to pass through.
So I can hold the door open for someone on the way in—especially if they have their badge out— but there's nothing I can do about those giant plexi gates once inside. They have to swipe.
And since they’re entry and exit, there’s many methods to enter by triggering the exit side, from umbrellas to a small dog.
The social stigma, unpredictability and inconvenience of having to pay the fine is a big part of it (not having a ticket is just stressful). Another part is that you don't need to prevent freeriding, nor recoup all the lost ticket sales. You just need enough of a nudge to keep most people honest most of the time.
Obviously "not having too many unauthorized riders" is a very different objective from "only allowing authorized access and refusing all else".
Nuisance riders are: disturbing peace, damaging proprty, assaulting passengers or staff.
Police behaviour, not fares.
(And have social and justice systems which can effectively deal with individuals in need of help or discipline / isolation.)
The specifications for those gates almost certainly include a requirement that they allow a sufficiently determined person through without breaking themselves, and probably sound an audible alert.
The gates at my work are enter/exit as well but we have to swipe out.
They allow one authorized person to pass from one side through but sensors on both sides can easily detect if another person is trying to piggy back from the other side of the door. And there's no way over or around them. In higher security environments where unauthorized persons getting on the other side of the door is already an unacceptable risk they can also allow security personnel to trap someone in the door (rotate only 90 degrees).
And as far as usability and efficiency goes, they can allow traffic both ways at the same time (as long as both people are authorized).
Granted, they might not know the difference between one person and a handcart versus two people where one is in a wheelchair, but I doubt many would-be infiltrators would draw attention to themselves that way.
They also have people who go out and try to tailgate, and say they left their badge on the other side of the door and ask if you can badge them in, or let them borrow your badge to get theirs. If you help, they walk in and get security and HR and you're done.
At first I thought it was weird, but since being here I've noticed more and more unmarked and federal police vehicles parked downstairs, and several offices/floors that are unlabeled and used mainly by those guys.
I'm guessing there's some kind of diplomatic etc services that go on here which not everyone's privy to.
Tailgating is a problem for your physical security staff, not your run of the mill white collar employee.
I have zero experience with this, but I imagine the policy would be "Don't enter the building if someone is too close behind you."
If you don't feel comfortable asking for space (fine!), turn around, go back to your car, and call building security as necessary.
Is this shortsighted?
We have the advantage that all entrances end up going through a central area, and we have ample camera coverage, such that security can reliably find people who tailgated if they are informed.
Tailgating is actually a very frequent and problematic occurrence for us, sometimes by people who will be aggressive, and this has seemed like the safest solution for us.
After the incident, he was contacted by the building management, who asked him what happened and warned him not to do it again.
This seems like a reasonable policy since many people would not have thought in advance what to do if a potentially threatening person tries to tailgate.
If you’re just trying to ensure only employees are on-site, tailgating is less of an issue (unless somebody got fired but their colleagues were never told).
It's one thing to say "don't let people tailgate", it's quite another to actually enforce a policy that says that unless you provide proper physical security onsite. During security awareness training I always stress that people know who to notify onsite as well as telling them that they can choose to challenge them directly if they encounter someone tailgating.
I wouldn’t expect any physical force to be used. If asking politely doesn’t work, call security. If they threaten you into letting them in, comply, then call security.
We don't actually. All sane employers have them record and report the incident and not engage, because petty shoplifting isn't worth somebody getting shot and it's built into the margins anyway. If the store is big enough, they may have "loss prevention", who are people who are very much not tiny and will verbally engage the shoplifter and pretend to be scary, but they are also not allowed to engage physically, because again, it's not worth somebody getting shot, and liability is going to be a nightmare even if they were stealing.
99.99% of the time, saying to the tailgater "you need to swipe" is enough. If you do work somewhere where people are physically trying to break in often, then you ought to have real security personnel.
The implications are enough to make it a shitty situation for such a person have to turn around and say "sorry person that looks c-suite, you can't come in with me."
We had a secure building with glass entry turnstyles. In my second week, a suited important-looking person was standing behind the gates at 8:20AM (we started at 8:30AM). It was busy and everyone was ignoring him (that seemed odd).
The suited guy picked me from the line of drones going through the turnstyles and asked if he could jump in behind me (he didn't even mention if he worked for the company).
I was still doing the HR training program stuff (the general wear deodorant, don't plug in flash drives from outside, don't ask for teamviewer, etc stuff) and the last thing we did the day before was end on the tailgating policy.
I told the suited guy that I couldn't let him in due to company policy. He smiled and said "all good" and went back to the corner.
He ended up being the head of logistics. Apparently, he liked to scope out the new hires and "test" their compliance. He tried this with 5 or 6 of the new hires and only managed to get let in once. The lady that let him in wasn't fired, but she did get a warning.
It’s also a safety issue. In a building evacuation, you should be able to account for every employee or visitor.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/tennis/not-so-fast-roger-fe...
Rules are rules in Australia, even if you are a 20-times Grand Slam champion and one of the most recognizable people on the planet.
Roger Federer found that out this week when he was blocked access to a locker room at the Australian Open by a security guard who took his job very seriously.
A video circulating Twitter on Saturday showed the Swiss double defending champion stalled at the entrance for lacking his tournament accreditation.
I’ve done it to VP level and I’d do it to my CIO too. I’d be that guy who badged the CIO but I try to take basic security and company policy seriously. I’d like an intern who is professional enough to “challenge” someone. Not sure I would’ve at that time.
My employer recognizes this and uses mantraps to physically prevent tailgating at unguarded entries.
Electric mortise locks and strikes will click, though sometimes they are held in unlocked state for a few seconds so you won’t hear a second click, or the second click might be reverting to locked state. Depends on hardware and configuration, and maybe a what the person in front is doing with the handle, and when/whether the exit sensor trips. Different things on the door can make clicking sounds, they’re a bit different from each other, but pretty close. Magnetic locks, forget it. Sliding doors, forget it.
I’m an engineer interested in security, I pay close attention to these systems, I’ve run their cabling and installed their admin panels, and I doubt I could tell even if I were actively paying attention.
If building security matters you implement mechanisms to enforce it, not burden all your employees with taking up the shortcomings.
Tail-gating should be impossible if you care about security.
I would add in my proposal that if a percentage of employees under a director fall for it, the director gets let go. If a number of directors are let go, the C-Level is let go and so on.
I mention the pencil whipping because I have seen financial institutions put on a really good show, but under the covers they are not doing proper management of ssh key trusts, ssh multiplexing, port forwarding, sudo or network access or encryption keys and they know which engineers to put in front of the auditors.
I only entered that area once, as I was a low-level programmer.
It was also the only company where I never ever made a query on the production server :) (I worked for another financial institution on a more senior role and I did have scary access to the production DB).
They have to compromise between security and keeping it easy for people to apply.
The more companies that have complicated application portals, the fewer applicants they’ll have. Particularly from occasional job-seekers that already have other jobs.
a) Some test phishing urls include the plaintext mail address of the employee. Easy to retaliate against someone you don't like.
b) Does the phishing test service detect if the link is accessed via a sandboxed env?
In any company likely to be doing phishing testing internally, there are two kinds of people who might try this. One is the infosec group, which isn't going to do this because they're running the test. The other is engineers who think they're clever and are equipped to fsck around with things.
The former are professionals. The latter are dangerous and not actually an exception. The frequency with which their confidence is justified approaches zero and in the vast majority of shops simply not worth the time it takes to contemplate.
A good infosec group is a wonderful thing. It's unfortunate that you don't have one.
That sounds about right. Your average developer dealing with malware is roughly as safe and sane as playing pool with 6-kilo balls of pu-239. Especially since a lot of places, developers are trusted with things like access to production from their workstations.
> This is a site called hacker news, if you're a web developer and you can't figure out how to pull an html page without executing the scripts involved (a TRIVIAL thing to do) you shouldn't have a job.
You know what's interesting? Even if you can do that, you've already made a mistake and leaked information. You've demonstrated for an attacker deliverability, who is curious and amateurish enough to think they can handle it (but hasn't thought it through), and some useful information about how they believe they are protecting themselves. Fetching a malicious server's HTML safely isn't as easy as might be readily supposed - both curl and wget (https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-72/p...) have suffered remote exploits in the past. Those are almost certainly the tools a random dev would reach for and they cannot be assumed to be safe. The odds that said random dev is equipped to set up a sandbox to do so reasonably safely are not great, and the odds of them doing so much smaller.
Curiosity isn't a bad thing. It's a wonderful and powerful trait that has driven humanity relentlessly forward through the ages. Unfortunately, it can also be used against people. Being curious when playing with fire can be dangerous. Especially if you just think the fire is pretty and haven't figured out that it burns yet.
This site may be called hacker news, but it's not full of the kind of hacker that congregates at DEFCON and understands the House of Prime. It's full of the other kind.
Look the problem with this kind of attitude is people take security less seriously when security experts go overboard. It’s classic boy who cried wolf. If you want people to take security seriously it starts with honest conversations where you treat people like adults and don’t immediately go to hyperbole.
Adults are perfectly capable of believing that their expertise extends further than it actually does and taking risks they do not fully understand or appreciate. I see it daily in the developers I work with. I have worked with more than one developer brimming with confidence in their ability to tackle areas beyond their expertise, who will try to engineer on-the-fly around any shortcomings pointed out in their approach (this is unrealistic, in real attacks adversaries don't give you friendly feedback iteratively).
I'm plenty willing to listen and take on board feedback here. What attitude should I take? How do I convince responsible adults, in a constructive and serious way, that they are not equipped to entertain their curiosity in this arena and should not try? How should I communicate to you, and to hundreds of developers at once, this message without going overboard or crying wolf?
It's one thing to play with malware and phishing at home, on your own hardware, on your own network, and with your own data. That's all your own risk to assume as you like. It's quite another to do so with company hardware, network, and data. That's not your risk to run and not your risk decisions to make. If you can advise me on how to communicate this to engineers who honestly and earnestly believe in their ability to safely handle things well beyond their expertise, I am absolutely all ears.
Here's what you can do: tell them what can go wrong, with specifics, and don't make assumptions about them. Be realistic about what the likely consequences are and what the worst case is.
If we wanted perfect security we'd never connect machines to the internet and superglue the usb ports shut. But in a realistic world, the level of security we choose is measure against how much risk we're willing to take. Lets say my risk profile is this: I don't work for the NSA and I'm not important enough that someone is going to try a unique zero day exploit on me. But it would be trivial to figure out my work email based on my linked in and my name, so I don't really care about them discovering deliver-ability. If the phishing attempt is bad, I'll probably spot it immediately and not bother to even open the email, but if it's good I'll probably at least investigate because I'll want to know if it was a legitimate email. Chances are, they're just trying to convince me to type my password into a web form (and assuming I use the same password everywhere). Of course, chances are also that, just based on my past experiences, about 90% of phishing attempts come from corporate security departments anyway. If someone really has a very clever zero day exploit of wget then they'll get access to a container with little sensitive data that I rebuild about a hundred times a day.
Yes it's not my hardware, but on the other hand, my company has entrusted me with local admin to get my work done and use of the internet. That's the risk profile they're comfortable with, and sometimes I get external emails and need to figure out if they are legit or not, and I don't work for a giant company with a huge security department so sometimes I need to take a glance to see if it's a legit email or not.
My only issue with what you've described is that I cannot scale it. When I have hundreds of developers to educate, sitting down with each of them and spending hours hashing out what they do and don't know and educating them over the gaps can at times become somewhat time-consuming.
How do I deal with hundreds of developers, the vast majority of whom have no significant background in security, many of whom earnestly and honestly believe that their understanding of web development protects them? How do I collectively treat them like adults and not lose their empathy or attention in a scalable way? A highly individualized approach isn't workable in this context.
Does it really matter? I used to play these games with my org's absurdly obvious phishing trainers, but the truth is it's not my job to determine whether an apparent phishing email is genuine or not. If you know that getting phished is a fireable offense, then just don't access the links, obvious fake or not.
I forward all emails that are not directly from people in the company to the trash.
I also forward anything with the word "phishing", "test", "audit", and our our IT and security department.
The other strategy I have is simply not checking email.
This is so useful, while others are taking security test, and failing phishing link test. I am in the clear.
What test? I did not get the email. You clicked what? Humm, I did not get that email. Man you got a virus -- I run Linux and access my email via Emacs/Mu4e -- also I did not get that email.
All problems solved!
* That their attack was delivered successfully to inboxes.
* What email addresses are live.
* Who is curious enough that they will investigate.
* Who believes they understand and can handle the risks.
These are not small things for an attacker to learn. Further, in a world where drive-by browser attacks are real, it's worth thinking very carefully if clicking a link in a phishing email should be regarded as essentially harmless.I agree, this should only be for 'positive' results (getting hooked).
I mean, sure, if it's 20 times, we're getting into outrageous territory and you have reasons to suspect employee is trolling you. But other than that, the reality is that your employees _will_ get phished eventually. Reduce the risk and work on reducing the harm caused when it happens, instead of antagonising your workforce.
Edit: also, if you could just "filter out" the test means that the tests were about as good as most corporate "compliance" training is. Just as the firings, it feels designed more to coddle the C-levels than actually achieve anything.
...there is no way you can equalise "you're going to lose your job" with anything less than "we're going to give you enough money that you won't really need the job anymore."
And with a Starbucks card or casual Friday? I'm not even sure if you're being serious, because that sounds like a joke.
Both of these things together leave a system in place where:
users are highly penalized for failing a phish test (or real life phishing attempts)
User's that fail the test (or real phishing attempt), but follow it with a timely notice have less pain.
Users that notify on apparent phishing attempts get small rewards.
That does not seem like a joke to me.
how did it get you, if you don't mind sharing? It seems if someone who works in IT (guessing you do) and is very careful fails it, this is an impossibly high standard to meet.
curious how they got you.
The email was a newsletter I didn't care about, and the unsubscribe link was (fake) malicious. That one impressed me because it preyed on what is now a pure reflex to click the unsubscribe link.
Just starting your web-browser would exécuté some Java vuln and scareware you.
https://thecoinshark.net/microsoft-email-clients-was-hacked-...
The breach centered around a hacker getting hold of a Microsoft customer support worker’s login credentials; from there, the hacker could dive into the content of any non-corporate Outlook, Hotmail, or MSN account
This is a security concern for any mail that an administrator can read, although it isn't at the same level as being compromised just through parsing an email.
[0] https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwndwn/microsoft-outlook-...
For the remaining 99.999% of the population, I really don't think opening a web page in an up-to-date browser is cause for concern. Certainly if that browser is also in a VM. People have more pressing concerns in their lives.
The latter is why password managers can be so valuable. I never type my passwords in so if my auto-fill doesn't activate I immediately become suspicious.
If it's the former, it seems like your company must be using an insecure browser or the site was running some kind of 0-day? I never think twice about clicking links.
I hope you don't work for any sensitive position.
If Firefox or Chrome has an RCE + privilege escalation in it that can be triggered just from browsing to a page then, congrats, you got me.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20028108 from earlier this week shows that just loading a page can lead to network information disclosure or other compromise / attack vectors. It's not a zero-day, it's a feature.
AFAIK most enterprises don't mandate ad blocking or noscript.
I've heard more people at enterprises using ad blockers for security so I wouldn't rule that out but in general this is hitting that the broad vs. targeted distinction I mentioned: each time you use an exploit you're risking discovery, which will lead to it being patched & AV signatures going out. Using an ad network increases the number of people who are not your target getting the payload, not to mention any scanning the network does, and since ad networks require payment there's another trail pointing back to you which might not otherwise be the case if you are hosting things on compromised servers.
That's a learned trait. I don't click unsubscribe links; I click "report spam" and "report phishing" button.
If only Gmail would let me create filters to automatically mark entire domains as spam though. That would be nice...
If you got my email address because I applied for a job, then I do not want to be marketed to.
If you got my email address because I signed up for a service, then I do not want to be marketed to.
If you got my email address because I purchased something, then I do not want to be marketed to.
If you got my email address because someone else "legitimately" entered my email address into your field, then I do not want to be marketed to.
In short: your definition of "legit" likely does not meet my definition of legit. The only email that I deem to be legit is an email that:
1) is @from a domain name that I recognize (walk like a junk, talk like a junk, it's junk) 2) is @from the same domain name as the correspondent (no third party bulk email or proxies; eg mailchimp et al) 3) does not have a no-reply@ as the reply-to address (I must be able to talk to a human) 4) does not hyperlink to third party domains (from@domain must match hyperlinked domain text)
Any legitimate email outside of those parameters are specially treated with liberal amounts of filtering.
This is the nature of any relationship. You can't be ruthless in eliminating aspects you don't like, if you don't want to end it entirely because it's net positive.
You are incorrect and interpreting my comments very narrowly.
Doing specific business with somebody should not give that somebody carte blanch to use my email address for whatever reason they wish. I absolutely can be ruthless in eliminating aspects I don't like and if businesses don't like that: tough shit. My world doesn't revolve around your business. If that means that the business relationship ends right there, then I'm better off for it.
I know it sucks when an IP gets burned, but when you're acting in good faith it's a rarity - or has been in my experience.
I have filters for almost everything, my boss goes into one folder and gets set one color, automated notifications from my internal system another (green if everything is OK, orange if there is something I really need to look at).
What I really* want is a desktop client that exposes a nice clean Python (or similar) API so I can automate even further - I mean Python has everything I want if I want to do that from the CLI/cron but having it built in would be really nice.
As I’m the head techie (by dint of been the only techie) , I’d be the one purchasing from them in the first place.
I find a filter that sends everything to Marketing/Hardware and marks as read fairer than flagging them as spam.
If you filter out all the people telling me they’ll be out the office, birthday announcements etc, all the vendors trying to sell me stuff and all the automated stuff (which I do automatically), I get less than 5 emails a day (I put my boss on Trello, it’s just better for what we need) which I check once at 11 and at 10 to 5.
I’m ruthless about my time since I’m the only programmer.
I automatically unsubscribe people who mark email as spam but lots of marketers dont do that so you will still receive emails.
Most legitimate companies will respect the unsubscribe links as that is required by law and they invested more infrastructure around that functionality.
I wouldn't click on links from phishing attempts or emails from sketchy services I never signed up. Anything semi-legit is better handled through the unsubscribe link first.
That way they’ll also protect themselves against an external vendor that gets used to spearphish you.
Firstly all external senders have the mail reformatted with a red bar at the top and some text, and secondly all hyperlinks are forced through a proxy, which makes it effectively impossible to know what the URL is from the email.
I'd received a (rare to my work account) fishing email and I was about to click on a link in there just before I started thinking. I'd been trained to trust emails with the red bar, as most external mail I get is trustworthy, and I reflexively check links before I click them but this was just another going through the proxy.
I'm not sure how much these changes help less technical users, but it made me less secure.
Even trained intelligent people have momentary lapses of concentration. Imagine opening a link from email on your phone then looking away for a second while it loads, but then the address bar has disappeared and you've missed the ssl indicator.
It's the same reason you automate things. People make mistakes. It's not about messing up once. It's about always being absolutely positively sure that you aren't making a mistake.
If you've ever clicked on a link from an email, you are vulnerable.
"No tailgating" can be supported through decent vetted entrances and exits.
"No phishing" could have mailserver and mail client support to properly flag the origin of emails and/or enforce "no remote loading" or "restrict html" or "check attachments" sorts of things
I think some kind of strike system is completely reasonable and if you’re working on sensitive information or systems then phishing most definitely needs to count as a strike.
You can contact security, presumably a company with such a policy has 24/7 on site security.
I got caught by a phishing link once because I had just gotten off the phone with a co-worker John and got an email 5 minutes later that said "hey James, it's John". Didn't even think twice about clicking it.
How could you ever possibly know that?
They also did have a reporting system. Presumably you wouldn't get a strike if you clicked and reported. People who reported "legitimate" phishing attempts were rewarded. Spear phishing is a totally different game and nobody in their right mind would fail people for clicking on a (well crafted) spear phishing email.