Cryptocurrency mining is as close as one can get to a theoretical free market in the real world. Free markets have known modes of failure [1]. One of these is where first-mover advantage and economies of scale combine to produce a barrier to entry; the result is oligopoly or monopoly.
Bitcoin cash is trying an other route with bigger blocks but it remains to be seen if it scales well enough to real-world currency usage. And of course there's the big problem of cryptocurrencies being useless as currencies because they're not stable enough. Which itself can be largely blamed on their limited supply and inflationary nature which is necessary to bootstrap them (there's an incentive to get in early) but seems to turn against them in the long run since nobody wants to spend something that's by design supposed to become scarcer and scarcer.
It might be theoretically free but it doesn't work great so far. And of course we could discuss whether a completely free market is a good or a bad thing, but that's a whole different debate.
The centralization narrative involving LN is somewhat mischaracterized IMHO. Given that source-routing puts control of payments into the the payer, you can choose to mitigate the custodial risk of a single hop holding up your funds in their payment channel a number of ways. For instance, there is no reason one payment from person A to person B needs to involve only one route.
Intelligent wallet software, on the order of tens of milliseconds, could break up one payment of $10 into 100 different routes across numerous payment channels. In addition to giving you custodial risk mitigation, its also beneficial for privacy as well.
That gives well connected "bank" nodes a lot of power because they can decide who they connect with (you could imagine paying a "bank" node to connect with you to enable cheaper transactions for your customers) and as a user you have an incentive to host your coins in one of these bank nodes so that it remains easily and cheaply available for purchases. Meanwhile a small indie shop (or some guy selling socks on ebay) won't have any channel so transacting with them will end up more expensive than buying from a popular store.
Basically you've reinvented Visa without the insurance, regulations and customer protection. At least that's how it looks like to me.
I guess we'll know soon enough which one of us is right. Maybe the truth is somewhere in between.
I think it ends up being more nuanced than that, with plenty of gradations of all of those factors.
If it means, "Literally nobody can know whether I prefer pads or tampons, and where I get them, not even the person I buy pads or tampons from", then I'm going to lean toward paying cash at some random drug store. A brick and mortar because getting things shipped to me requires giving them identifying information, and cash because it has literally zero fees and leaves no paper trail.
If I have to buy something online, then I already have to give them my name and address so I can get it shipped to me. At that point I may not care if my bank and the credit card processing agency also have a record of the transaction, because the info's already out there. At that point it's just a question of whether there are privacy laws that prevent parties from selling too much information or not - either way, I'm guessing 1 and 3 parties will ultimately fall in roughly the same equivalence class, on the privacy front.
Personally, I don't see a middle path where blockchain is preferable to either of those options. If I want complete privacy, then I don't want that transaction appearing on the blockchain, either. If I don't, well, might as well get some consumer protection.
Only the subset of privacy concerned consumers who don't want anyone to know whether they prefer pads or tampons will go out of their way to visit a random drug store.
Except that Bitcoin is (with consensual upgrade) infinitely divisible. (E.g. the network can [vote to] move to 16 decimal places, and so on).
If you have $100 on your bank account today then you've got incentives to spend or invest it soon because it's slowly losing value because of inflation, your $100 will probably buy you fewer goods and services in the future that it does now.
Now if you have BTC100 on your wallet and you believe that Bitcoin will succeed as a currency then you know for a fact that these bitcoins will be more valuable in the future than they are now (because the demand will grow but the supply is capped). Ergo you have strong incentives to hoard your bitcoins and not spend or invest them. Your savings gain value without actually being invested in anything. They don't contribute to the economy, they don't fund anything.
I don't understand why most cryptocurrency enthusiasts don't see a huge problem in this. How will you get a loan to start your company in the bitcoin world? Who would want to take such a risk when they'll keep getting richer by not doing anything at all? You'd have to promise them ridiculously high returns (higher than bitcoin's deflation at least). The rich gets richer by virtue of being rich, the poor needs to buy food and basic utilities so they can't save their coins to become rich. Basically what we have today, only worse.
That said, there's no guarantee that BTC or any crypto will appreciate indefinitely; in fact quite the opposite. It can (and does) lose value.
This also overlooks the benefits of a non-fiat currency, such as protection against things like hyper-inflation (most of us don't think about this right now, but if you have any friends in Venezuela ask them how important this protection is).
Begging the question.
It's zero sum (minus the cost wasted in maintaining the network), and the game theory Satoshi designed will inevitably disincentive new users from adopting it as the barrier to entry increases and alternative options will likely obsolete BTC.
>You could then still increase the virtual money supply through fractional reserve banking
You can't do fractional reserve banking on-chain as far as I know so that would mean having your money managed by 3rd party banks who would take ownership of your coins, pool them with other people's coins and manage them for you. So... Back to the start?
Furthermore I don't think it solves the problem of deflation, even with a fractional reserve the bank has no incentive to invest the money if the expected return are less than what it would end up with by not doing anything at all (and therefore not taking any risks either). If you have inflation of, say, 2% then any investment expected to create value or even lose less than 2% is a good one. If you have deflation of 2% then an investment that managed to generate 1% of additional value over your investment actually made you lose money because you'd have been better off not doing anything.
Therefore deflation will make it a lot harder to loan money, fractional reserve or not. Interest rates will be a lot higher to make up for it. The poor will pay the price for being poor, the rich will reap the reward for being rich.
>“investing” is a lot more like hoarding than it is spending…
Depends what you invest into I suppose, if you "invest" in gold bullions then you're right, if you're investing in a startup or loaning money to people buying houses then you're powering the economy.
Deflationary currencies worked well for literally thousands of years, when people used precious metals for their currency.
Inflationary monotary policy is a fairly recent invention of the 20th century.
But the point is to give people choices.
Some people do indeed prefer deflationary currencies, and that's OK.
The point of a small limited inflation is to encourage a healthy flow of capital into services, workers, and development of activities.
And those of us who prefer deflationary ones should be free to use those as well.
I don't get why the mere existence of alternatives pisses off economists and the like so much.
If inflationary currencies are so great, then that's fine, feel free to go use those, and those of us that disagree will choose something else.
And the majority chose inflationary monetary systems.
Each of us is free to offer to pay for goods and services with, say, for example, gold, and each of us is free to ask you trade your gold for legal tender and give us that instead - yeah, the one the tax agency accepts.
The only thing stopping deflationary currency from being used by most people is that most people are too busy surfing / skiing / rock climbing / recovering from a hang over / what have you to care much about how monetary value is exchanged. People, on the whole, only seem to really care about convenience. And more specifically, the more convenient it is to spend money, your own or credit, the better.
Unless you want to be able to force others to accept whatever you want to give as payment, sure.
This is ultimately what I think will sink blockchain as a medium of exchange (not necessarily as a store of value). By its very nature it cannot be cheap, so TTPs will always be able to beat it on price.
If things do end up being an oligopoly, then any one of the members of that oligopoly will only have a relatively small sprint between their current position and a 51% attack. And quite a few options for how to attempt such a sprint.
Work needs to be approximately the same difficulty for everyone
Unfortunately the main design and math of of Satoshi's PoW means that users who ran the BTC software app 2009-2014 worked far far far less and spent much less CAPEX and OPEX to generate the majority of BTC that will ever exist.Edit: It seems this thread has gone off on a tangent. I was adding to the discussion of flawed assumptions, not ethics.
Perhaps it would diminish the ability for early users to extract wealth and capital from later users?
The principle value of Bitcoin as a protocol is its incredible (even detrimental, from a technical perspective) simplicity.
They also think that it's Proof of Work that provides a lack of trust. While that's involved, what's actually more meaningful is the demand to quickly select a "profitable" branch to mine and re-mine on. That can exist in PoS as well.
1) Non-technical friendly overview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzWiiOLv96I
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/hedera-hashgraph-co...
The other two possible environments being multi-administrative (permissioned DLT deployed among a consortium of banks or entities sharing administrative privileges) or no-administrative (public permissionless blockchains like Bitcoin/Ethereum). The hard problem is developing consensus algos for the latter that scale while maintaining security of the shared ledger.
It’s still early days, unfortunately the hype got far ahead of the tech but progress is being made everyday. I think the same of VR/AR.
If only. If Only. IF ONLY. iF oNLY. If OnLy. iF oNlY.
[1] https://softwareengineeringdaily.com/2018/03/26/consensus-sy...
Blockchain may have value as a decentralized ledger in other areas, but “lots of blockchain based currencies” aren’t really one of them since it’s self-sabotaging.
Don't we? I can think of a dozen or more social networks of one sort or another that I've belonged to in the last decade or so.
Past performance does not beget future success.
[1]: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/feb/08/business....
And by prospered I mean, never made money, never became self-sustaining at all.
Facebook is still expanding in its 15th year.
MySpace never earned a profit pre Fox acquisition (the Google deal gave it a one time bump).
In historical terms, MySpace is barely a bump in the road, about the size of an Ask.fm type service (ie trivial in today's hyper scale). It's like looking back and thinking Excite was a juggernaut and therefore a supporting piece of evidence that Google is going to die soon.
Facebook will earn ~$20 billion in 2018 and will end the year with $50 billion in cash. That's 86 times what MySpace sold to Fox for.
MySpace peaked in size at a mere 75 million monthly active users. Facebook is nearly 30 times larger.
MySpace then is to Facebook now, what AltaVista at its peak is to Google today.
One important point: if we actually include all 7 billion
people on the earth, most of whom have zero BTC or
Ethereum, the Gini coefficient is essentially 0.99+. And
if we just include all balances, we include many dust
balances which would again put the Gini coefficient at
0.99+. Thus, we need some kind of threshold here. The
imperfect threshold we picked was the Gini coefficient
among accounts with ≥185 BTC per address, and ≥2477 ETH
per address. So this is the distribution of ownership
among the Bitcoin and Ethereum rich with $500k as of July
2017.
In what kind of situation would a thresholded metric like
this be interesting? Perhaps in a scenario similar to the
ongoing IRS Coinbase issue, where the IRS is seeking
information on all holders with balances >$20,000.
Conceptualized in terms of an attack, a high Gini
coefficient would mean that a government would only need
to round up a few large holders in order to acquire a
large percentage of outstanding cryptocurrency — and with
it the ability to tank the price.
With that said, two points. First, while one would not
want a Gini coefficient of exactly 1.0 for BTC or ETH (as
then only one person would have all of the digital
currency, and no one would have an incentive to help boost
the network), in practice it appears that a very high
level of wealth centralization is still compatible with
the operation of a decentralized protocol. Second, as we
show below, we think the Nakamoto coefficient is a better
metric than the Gini coefficient for measuring holder
concentration in particular as it obviates the issue of
arbitrarily choosing a threshold.
...However, the maximum Gini coefficient has one obvious
issue: while a high value tracks with our intuitive notion
of a “more centralized” system, the fact that each Gini
coefficient is restricted to a 0–1 scale means that it
does not directly measure the number of individuals or
entities required to compromise a system.
Specifically, for a given blockchain suppose you have a
subsystem of exchanges with 1000 actors with a Gini
coefficient of 0.8, and another subsystem of 10 miners
with a Gini coefficient of 0.7. It may turn out that
compromising only 3 miners rather than 57 exchanges may be
sufficient to compromise this system, which would mean the
maximum Gini coefficient would have pointed to exchanges
rather than miners as the decentralization bottleneck.
Conversely, if one considers “number of distinct countries
with substantial mining capacity” an essential subsystem,
then the minimum Nakamoto coefficient for Bitcoin would
again be 1, as the compromise of China (in the sense of a
Chinese government crackdown on mining) would result in
>51% of mining being compromised.
https://medium.com/@balajis/quantifying-decentralization-e39...Any type of currency that doesn't have something limiting the supply (not fixed, but at least constrained) becomes valueless by default.
Even if Bitcoin is limited, if cryptocurrencies themselves are not then we're all just giving people a license to print money.
At least with the Federal Reserve there is a governing body limiting the supply of new dollars entering into the system.
I think that even if decentralized consensus is workable, it's irrelevant for Wall Street projects because these organizations already have experience creating strong trust relationships and useful governance for collaboration (e.g., traditional contracts).
No, because blockchain is not a consensus protocol.
If you're trying to take a dig at blockchain technology for its decentralized nature and ability to circumvent government controls, you should be aware that this is considered a good thing. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16702684, for instance. The recent SESTA/FOSTA debacle is one example of why such decentralized networks are needed.
Its the problem that the advocates for larger blocksizes in BTC ran into. So long as the ecosystem itself was predominantly going to stay on the bitcoin core implementation, the advocates for change couldn't force it. Eventually they just hard forked into BCH, while the more popular original chain keeps on going.
That also means that nothing is really decentralized unless you can cause sea change amongst all participants in a cryptocurrency - if you disagree with what the most common implementation is doing, you can't do squat about it, and commit access is never decentralized or democratized. Theres always someone with the master key to the repo. And we have seen plenty of evidence that once established unseating a popular implementation of any crypto is nigh-impossible, regardless of what the developers do.
The social question is the more interesting one. Tech history has suggested that people slowly but surely gravitate to more open systems, but asking folks to hold their life savings in digital currencies that rely on mathamatical promises completly foreign to the average user seems like quite a stretch. It does not exactly help that just about day there is a news article of some new data breach of an online system.
"Darknet markets are no longer a major use of Bitcoin, accounting for less than 1% of Bitcoin transactions in 2017"
And this very assumption is so untrue. What Satoshi invented is document timestamping protocol, not consensus protocol.
What are you talking about? The rule to choose the correct chain is well defined and simple. The longest chain, i.e. the one with the most work done, is the correct chain.
Some developers would agree with you though, like Gavin Andresen [0].
Either way, you end up with either centralized miners deciding the fate of the chain, or centralized developers deciding the fate of the chain. Both outcomes are contrary to what Satoshi envisioned.
My understanding is that the danger of miner control is not "double-spending" but making multiple spends and being able to pick the most favorable one after the fact.
As a non-controller if you try to double-spend, you can't know which one of your attempted transactions will be recorded in the ledger and which will be rejected. As a 51% controlling miner, you can choose the 'correct' transaction.
This allows the 51% controlling miner to engage in futures arbitrage.
If it wasn't clear, my comment was referring to a double-spend that would result in an invalid block i.e. both transactions are on the same chain. I simply used an example to argue that it's always been the case that invalid chains are rejected by honest nodes.
Useless pedantry that doesn't even map into real world use. The real world has shown your definition is incorrect.
Ethereum forked. Which ethereum fork is the "correct" one? Bitcoin forked. Which one is the correct one? Depends on who you ask...
Taken to the logical conclusion, a supernode that is issuing algorithm changes is no different from a supernode that is signing blocks directly, just vastly more inefficient. Since you are already centralized, there is no reason to have miners at all. It becomes a ponzi scheme where the rewards are paid out randomly to participants.
And that is bad?
At this point, I don't worry about those; criminals would operate with or without Bitcoin and we have government agencies dealing with those; I'm more concern about suicide rate that will spike due to BTC/altcoins losing 80% of value.
I have too many acquaintances on my Twitter that last summer were showing me "this cool blue app that helps make 15% a day" and now they remain silent. I tried to contact two of them via cell and it goes nowhere.
Looking at BTC/ETH/altcoins charts, I can only image brain-halt it caused so many people that we putting second/third mortage on their house just to "invest in a blue iphone app" and many cashing out their 401k just to be lest with 5% of their money not even year later.
What people don't realize is that Satoshi's solution only works if two assumptions hold true:
1. Mining is decentralized: If mining is centralized than relying on proof-of-work for consensus is waste since the centralized entity controls the blockchain anyway.
2. Consensus rules don't change: If you see the threat of #1 and so take power away from miners (like Bitcoin has done), then you cannot ever change the consensus ruleset because aside from proof-of-work, Satoshi did not give any solution to the problem of choosing between 2 chains that have slightly different consensus rules. If you change the consensus ruleset (ie. make any changes where 2 nodes disagree on if a block is valid or not), then you need an oracle to tell you which chain to choose. We've seen this when Core developers chose the 0.7 Bitcoin chain in 2013 and when Vitalik chose the forked Ethereum chain in 2016.
At the end of the day, the blockchain's decentralization is a myth because it relies on false assumptions. Satoshi invented a Rube Goldberg machine that is currently using as much electricity as a medium-sized country (and also enabling things like money laundering, drug trafficking, etc.).