| litigation where the funder has otherwise has no connection with the merits of the dispute.
I think those organizations and other social policy groups can demonstrate that they have a vested interest in the merits of the dispute. In fact that litmus test may be overbroad, allowing any corporation for whom the case is useful to their business strategy to claim they have a vested interest in the case...
He does have a law degree.
One of those liberties is the right to a free press - "free" specifically meaning "has the right to annoy rich and powerful people."
Thiel promotes Thiel.
It's a clear difference in scope.
IMO a culture that can't tolerate having a court jester like Gawker on the premises isn't a healthy one.
Sometimes a jester can go too far, and a kick in the ass is deserved.
But trying to nuke the jester from orbit is an act more common in totalitarian regimes than in those that value personal freedoms.
Surely ACLU lawyers (many of whom are minorities) have been wronged by the government and that contributes to their desire to help others who have had similar treatment.
This is an interesting one. If the answer is "yes", then donating to the ACLU should itself be criminalized.
I agree with the first sentence, but not with the second. There should never be a situation in which you can use the legal process to extract revenge over a matter which has not itself been subject to the legal process. This would allow Thiel to seek revenge for almost anything.
However, Thiel has the legitimate justification of believing that Gawker's behavior in the Hogan situation was simply abhorrent, which is something that I and many other observers also believe, and also the legitimate justification of believing that Gawker abuses it's access to funds and lawyers to avoid the consequences of being sued for such behavior, both of which are reasons to fund a suit against them. Particularly for the latter reason it doesn't strike me as unfair to fund a tort by an individual against a corporation which has demonstrated every intention of avoiding justice.
In all these cases, powerful people with interest in a case decided to assist people who did have standing. Do you oppose that practice in all these cases?
What Peter Thiel did was secretly fund a lawsuit by someone else in order to exact revenge (or depending on your point of view, to provide a service to society).
I think there is a pretty big difference between the two groups.
Because if your framework becomes "non-profit that publicly reports spending is okay," what's to stop a billionaire from donating millions to their own non-profit, governed by a bunch of their "elected" friends (membership fee = $1M)? Now you can expect a bunch of lawsuits over that question!
As with campaign finance, this has two benefits: it avoids trying to enumerate all of the ways someone might try to game the system and it addresses free speech concerns by simply requiring attribution in an area where there's a strong public interest.
While I wholeheartedly support those organizations, your point highlights why I think making 'maintainence' a crime wouldn't pose a problem for those looking to interfere - it would just slow them down. All they'd have to do is come up with a good reason for making it their business (I'm sure even Thiel could have gotten away with a "defense of privacy" argument if he hadn't acknowledged having a vendetta with Gawker) or otherwise 'launder' their money through donations to charities or benefactors who have strong enough ties to whatever policy it is to support litigation.
We've all seen how well money works "for the people" when allowed in large sums through superPACs in campaign financing, I agree with the OC in that this is a major issue which we shouldn't let be clouded by specific opinions of Hogan or Gawker.
(Which of course happens all the time, but still...)
Besides, the government already has sovereign immunity to lawsuits unless it chooses to allow itself to be sued. So if anything your first sentence is backward.
I'm fine with the concept of 'maintenance' but at the same time I feel that there is such a basic unfairness in the various implementations of our systems of justice that some re-balancing is often the only way in which one of the parties stands a chance of winning or losing the case on its merits.
Especially when the other party is a corporation or the government I have no bad feelings about helping to fund the lawsuit (especially a defense).
People forget that proper civil litigation is a public good (in the economic sense). Ensuring that (civil) wrongdoers pay for their actions benefits everyone by making it less likely they will be a victim of such acts, and more likely that transgressors will offer a quick settlement rather than using the courts in the first place.
[1] While it's impossible to truly shield off such influence, we can at least go for some standard like, "it should take an exponential investment to produce a linear impact on the award".
I'm not sure how we would manage that but, assuming we could, doesn't this cut both ways? As long as money is in the equation, then don't all parties still benefit by having as much money as possible?
Under that condition, each doubling of the amount spent on influencing the outcome (via payments expert witnesses, bribes to the judge, discovery, etc) would only yield the same gain in revenues from the court. So for example, if you start with $1000, then doubling to $2000 might yield $1500, doubling to $2000 with only yield $1500 more on top of that, and so on.
(I agree an exponential difference might be two hard; I'd be happy for even a quadratic difference!)
Do you have any scientific research backing this? Or just anecdotal evidence?
In an adversarial system your chances depend on the amount of valid legal process-effort you exert. If you acknowledge that this effort is correlated with financing, even a little, then you admit there is a vulnerability.
A more reasonable question would be if they have a reason to assume that the variable has an oversized impact on the process.
This is a fair point, but the existence of such a vulnerability is unquestionable. However, SilasX seemed to be implying that this is a significant vulnerability, which is a claim that certainly deserves some evidence to back it up.
>A more reasonable question would be if they have a reason to assume that the variable has an oversized impact on the process.
That's exactly what I was asking about, SilasX specifically said "so vulnerable" as opposed to just "vulnerable". That seems to imply such an oversized impact.
Beyond that: the "merits" of a case is unknowable. Courts don't have the "merits" in front of them. They have the evidence and arguments developed by the parties. Consider the Gawker case: did Gawker publish the video recklessly or maliciously? The "yes" or "no" answer doesn't exist in reality. It's an abstraction. The only thing that exists in reality is, e.g., various emails and communications and meetings that can lead to one conclusion or the other.
Developing that evidence--particularly within the context of a process where everyone has a strong incentive to lie and fabricate--is what makes litigation expensive. But it takes a certain amount of money to develop the evidence. Spending a lot more money than that isn't going to get you a much better result.
And that's precisely the point, if you don't have that money (and this can be quite a lot) then you're out of luck. The linked case is about a celebrity worth quite a bit of money and still it wasn't enough to get the case decided in his favor, it needed yet another - bigger - millionaire / billionaire to step in to sway the case. I don't see what could prove this more conclusively, a 'certain amount of money' can be more than what most mortals have access to.
It it wasn't for Thiel to have an axe to grind with Gawker this would have not happened.
And that's just civil proceedings, in criminal proceedings the odds are stacked even worse against a defendant without funds.
I'm just cautioning extrapolating from that, to the conclusion that the party with more money wins the lawsuit. That's only true up to a certain baseline.
> And that's just civil proceedings, in criminal proceedings the odds are stacked even worse against a defendant without funds.
Maybe. The DOJ's conviction rate isn't appreciably different between divisions, including white collar crime: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011... (all around 90%).
Conviction rate doesn't tell you how much the deck is stacked against defendants, it tells you how good the prosecuting agency is at assessing its ability to secure a conviction before initiating formal charges.
And that's true enough for me.
> Maybe. The DOJ's conviction rate isn't appreciably different between divisions, including white collar crime: > (all around 90%).
Interesting report, thank you for the link. I think 90% in and of itself is high enough to warrant scrutiny, any higher and it would be grounds for an investigation. Japan (99%) and China (98%) appear to be significantly higher still but many other first world countries are significantly below that (the UK for instance at 74%).
Surprising too that in the 1970's the US was at 72%, 18% more convictions in such a short period should be another cause for worry, either in the past people were more likely to walk when guilty, or in the present a lot of people that aren't guilty end up in jail. (Or, alternatively, a lot more stuff that is easy to prosecute got added to the list of offenses but that would have to be an immense number to skew the totals from 72% to 90%.)
But it's not true as a general proposition, nor are you excluding an irrelevant class of litigation. Much (most?) commercial litigation is between well-funded parties (e.g. a big company and it's insurer).
> Interesting report, thank you for the link. I think 90% in and of itself is high enough to warrant scrutiny
The government should only bring a lawsuit if it looks at the evidence and decides it can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Generally, that's in the 95% certainty range. A jury should only convict if it comes to the same conclusion. Thus, it should be quite unusual for the jury to acquit. If the jury is acquitting in 25% of cases, that means the government is bringing lots of prosecutions it shouldn't be bringing.
It's true that over the last 30 years, the government has gotten much more conservative about bringing prosecutions. That's a good thing. Many might disagree with the law underlying, say, the Silk Road case, but it's hard to say the government didn't base that prosecution on a wealth of evidence.
There is a huge fallacy underlying your numbers. 90% is about right if the number of false convictions is acceptably low. 90% is a terrible number if it should contain a large number of false convictions.
The 'establishing of facts beyond reasonable doubt' only happens for cases that actually go to court, in the light of the above mentioned asymmetry in resources you're going to end up with a lot of cases that will never make it that far. Some will claim this is efficiency but I don't really feel comfortable with an 'efficient' process that places large numbers of people in lock-up. The chances of getting it wrong are fairly high in a system that aims for a certain percentage of convictions, after all there are two solutions to getting that percentage, the first is to ensure that only the 'good' cases make it through the system, the other is to railroad the bad ones through as well and make sure that a conviction is secured anyway.
In fact, one could argue the only way to look at it is in a precision/recall manner, how many cases that were known to be solid turned out to be false positives and how many cases that were dropped were the false negatives (cases that should have been won but were not, for instance because the defendant was wealthy enough that they could afford a large defense).
This is of course all only relevant if you actually care about justice rather than about convicting as large a number of people possible once they enter the judicial system, and I'm not at all sure that that is the goal of the systems in place in the various countries. Too many people depend for their livelihood on large numbers of people getting convicted.
Sure. But you implied above that a 90% conviction rate warrants more scrutiny than a 75% conviction rate. To the contrary, a 90% conviction rate may be indicative of a fair process. A 75% conviction rate is definitely indicative of an unfair process.
Obviously you still need to scrutinize the rate of false convictions. But that's true regardless of the conviction rate. Indeed, a low conviction rate suggests that the government is bringing marginal cases and trying to make things "stick" which increases the risk of false convictions.
> Some will claim this is efficiency but I don't really feel comfortable with an 'efficient' process that places large numbers of people in lock-up.
The U.S. has a large number of people in prison because it imposes long prison sentences for some very common and easy-to-prove things: drug sales, auto theft, assault, firearms. If you take a random sampling of federal convictions, you'll see that almost always there is a laundry list of physical evidence of guilt. The government doesn't bring marginal cases.
The solution to the prison problem is not to force all these clear-cut cases to go to trial. It's to stop imposing 20-year prison sentences for people selling a few pills of Oxycontin, or stop putting felons back in prison for 10 years just for having a gun.
I'm not sure that this is actually true. Instead, I see a much greater use of plea bargains, especially of the "accept this deal or we will throw every possible charge at you" type. Given the sheer number of laws, this can lead to life-ending penalties for seemingly minor crimes.
But that's not what happened. The case was "decided in his favor" a long time ago when Gawker offered to settle for a sum of money that would far exceed anything he could have expected in his wildest dreams in any other country other than the US. Thiel intervened not to win Bollea more money (indeed, he may end up getting less), but to pay Bollea off so that the case would be about hurting Gawker more than benefiting Bollea, which is what Thiel wanted. I understand that they even changed the lawsuit so that the insurance wouldn't cover the payoff to Bollea -- getting him less money -- only so that Thiel could hurt Gawker further.
Do you have any evidence of this at all?
Be careful, you probably shouldn't just make shit up about someone and then pretend it is true.
AIUI he was pretty much insolvent at the time due to an expensive divorce.
I don't know what the fix is, but the current system is near-extortionate (an attorney made this observation to me).
If party A makes a claim against party B, but party B cannot afford counsel, then party B would likely be required to acquiesce to those claims. The standard to be considered frivolous is woefully high. And, even making that case generally requires counsel.
This gives firms and individuals with the resources to access the legal system tremendous advantages over those who do not have same.
I disagree. Division of labor and specialization is almost always economically efficient. Litigation finance is just the embodiment of that concept applied to litigation.
Traditionally, litigation has been financed either by: (1) the plaintiff; or (2) the plaintiff's lawyer (in the form of a contingency arrangement). Neither of those parties are the right ones to valuate or finance lawsuits. They don't have a sufficiently cross-sectional perspective of the industry. Lawyers are in fact notoriously bad at valuing cases.
Litigation funders can become experts at valuing good lawsuits, and financing lawsuits so that entities don't have to divert their own capital for those purposes.
Note also: in a system like ours that relies on lawsuits to protect property and other rights, forgone meritorious lawsuits are a source of economic inefficiency. Gawker is a great case in point. If a judgment against Gawker makes it go under, that means the harm caused by Gawker's existence exceeded the value created thereby. If Gawker didn't get sued simply because Hogan lacked the liquidity to bring the suit, that would've been a net loss to the economy--an entity sticking around that literally does more harm than good.
I'd be more comfortable with your economic-efficiency argument if there were more economic certainty in the process by which damages awards are arrived at --- especially in situations such as the Gawker case. I didn't see or hear any of the damages evidence, but it seems strange that the jurors concluded that Hulk Hogan really suffered $115 million in damages. As I know you're aware, it's not uncommon for lay jurors to do a version of baseball arbitration, choosing the analysis of one side's damages expert over that of the other --- and of course the opinion of neither expert is entirely unmotivated.
Justice is not a resource to be allocated, and in this case all we're discovering the price of is a billionaire's bruised ego.
For example, one might view lawsuits against polluters as a matter of punishing companies that do harmful things to the environment. I'd argue that's a pretty fuzzy and irrational basis for environmental law. A more rigorous approach is to view environmental lawsuits as forcing polluters to internalize their negative externalities: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=....
In that context, meritorious lawsuits that don't get brought are inefficient. They represent a polluter not forced to internalize its externalities, or a business creating risk not forced to bear the costs of that risk, or a business creating harm not forced to compensate the injured. That distorts incentives and leads to more than an efficient amount of harmful activities.
People use the courts to get payback all the time, in a variety of ways. It's not about what's right, its about what's allowed. People with a lot of money have a big advantage in that regard. If we try to change that, we'll have to redo a lot of the legal system.
Thiel can do whatever he wants with his money, including using it on legal cases. The key rule that Gawker broke here was "Don't make powerful enemies"
It is right in front of your nose. Whatever your views of Gawker, Thiel destroyed a news company out of spite. That seems like maybe a little bit of a problem.
> It's not about what's right, its about what's allowed. People with a lot of money have a big advantage in that regard. If we try to change that, we'll have to redo a lot of the legal system.
Or, you know, revert to making maintenance/champerty illegal, which appeared to work for the intended purpose[1] for rather longer than the US has existed.
> The key rule that Gawker broke here was "Don't make powerful enemies"
In a thread discussing what can be done about the rich hijacking the justice system to destroy a news company out of spite, you (apparently normatively) (1) don't see the harm and then (2) essentially declare "Don't talk back to your betters". Please correctly where I'm wrong, but it sounds like you don't see any problem at all with the rich buying vengeance through the courts.
[1] Yes, money will always have an advantage. That doesn't mean throw your hands in the air and walk away.
It seems like you're discussing a situation other than this case, but I can't figure out what it is. The court ruled that Gawker unlawfully invaded someone's privacy. They are clearly in the wrong no matter how you look at it. This isn't a case of rich people abusing the court system or using money to gain an unfair advantage. This is justice being done in the service of revenge, which is the usual way in which justice gets done.
I'm going to stick by the idea that people can use their money however they want within the boundaries of the law. The idea of not making powerful enemies is sound because there are countless ways that someone can use resources to make life difficult for someone else. It would be impossible to outlaw all of them, and you wouldn't want that even if it could be done.
I'd still love to hear how Thiel using his money to bring about a just outcome does harm to the integrity of the legal system.
Thiel enabled something which should have destroyed them but was unlikely to (because of one of the stupidest reasons to not uphold the law, "because one side doesn't have the funds") to actually destroy them.
Gawker pretty much brought it upon themselves expecting to get away with it (see their disorganized deposition where one of the plaintiffs was actually laughing at questions).
While I'm wary of letting money have any more influence over the courts, this could be seen as a way for it to actually have less influence - the situation of "A is right but can't fund their case."
The worst you could do with this situation with billions to spare would be to try and fund a side "in the wrong" to help someone get away with something, but if the case against them is that strong all the funded legal maneuvering shouldn't allow them to 'get away clean'... Though perhaps 'shouldn't' should be the operative word there.
... Did he? Cause it seems like the court did that. Everyone's talking as if judges are some passive entity that have no option but to allow money to dictate outcomes.
I've seen news companies destroy hundreds of people and companies to gain readership and/or for other more political motives. Seems fair that they should have the table turned on them from time to time no?
Perhaps the remaining media companies will now be more diligent about who and what they report on.
I see a problem with a potential result where justice would not have been served simply because one party run out of funds to pay the lawyers. That is a problem with a legal system.
The problem is that Thiel's intervention is just a one-off "workaround" that fixed one case but doesn't help other similar cases.
"people with a lot of money have a big advantage in that regard" and as far as I understand, it's the exact reason why Gawker had gotten away with similar offenses multiple times already. A solution that aims to improve justice needs to ensure that a low-funded claimant can reasonably win against a multi-million company like Gawker - forbidding maintenance isn't a fix for that; it still leaves open the much, much more popular scenario where injustice is served simply because you can't afford to someone who is rich enough on their own.
This is a case that had an even playing field - before that it was a case of the rich (namely, Gawker) buying immunity through the courts.
Thiel didn't destroy Gawker, Gawker destroyed Gawker. They willfully broke the law. Even put up a self-congratulatory article about how they'd been told to take it down and weren't going to.
Woah, let's not get carried away here :)
What's wrong with Thiel destroying things out of spite? Should he not be allowed to retaliate if someone attacks him? Why? Should anyone be allowed to retaliate when attacked?
Is the only problem here that Thiel used the courts to accomplish this, rather than other means?
We appear to have isolated our point of disagreement. I'm afraid I can only say, if you can't answer this for yourself, I can't answer it for you.
Gawker's reputation and missteps aside, this is not a rule any respectable journalism organization would agree with.
If you're going to cross that line, you'd better do so carefully. At the very least don't antagonize someone who can rightfully sue you into oblivion.
This seems like a terrible basis for a justice system. Do you not see the harm this could lead to?
Keep your eyes out in the next 10-20 on the wisdom of easy and prolific debt because we're so much smarter than our ancestors who viewed it with suspicion, for instance. We've already been served some wake up calls but as near as I can tell we've hit the "snooze" button.
I'm happy about the outcome.
That's a big if, that is verifiably false.
E.g. why have lawyers of higher skills available based on their asking fees? That's like openly acknowledging that people with more money get better leverage on the law and have better representation.
If it was to me, I'd take that aspect out of the legal system. We might value such competition in business, but I sure as hell don't want it there -- it's what ensures millionaires get out with a slap on the wrist for dire offenses and poor people and minorities end up with disproportionate sentences.
Of course this would never fly (too much money to be lost), but e.g. making lawyer assignment random for everybody, or having the state demand a total specific cap on what they can charge that's the same for everybody.
In other words: stop allowing legal representation to be a market where more money buy you better services.
I want the Nick Dentons of the world to lie awake at night worrying the people they've ruined might get access to enough money to mount a successful lawsuit.
Having said that, I'll also say the courts should be more willing to award fees to defendants when lawsuits are groundless or mostly so. But that needs to be a determination based on the circumstances of the case and not who funds it.
I'd argue that maybe we need to come up with a way to go even further. This is only interesting because the idea of actually materially harming a corporation through litigation is so foreign these days. That and for some reason a few employees of some major news papers have allowed gawker to be lumped in with their own publications, giving "maintenance" to the idea that this is a first amendment issue. Do you have anything to substantiate that it's "not good" to allow third-party money in the courts? I'm sure there are things we haven't thought of but can it be worse than big money in politics? There are still judges that run their courts, right? They still have a roll here.
First, we are left saying that this outcome would have been fine if Hulk had the money to do scorched earth. Second, we directly admit that the outcome of this case is the result of the money spent. Both of these, especially when taken together, are a death blow to any notion of justice in regards to law. And I don't even see this as a question, but a reality that we seem unable to admit to ourselves.
A state monopoly on legal services where lawyers are assigned by lot? A system of "loser pays legal costs" where lawyers bid for likely wins/profitable cases?
It is made all the harder by the "American Association for Justice"[0], a lobbying group made up of trial lawyers. They really don't want any sort of tort reform, which might be able to fix this problem.
[0] https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000065
Can you imagine the outcry if we had a system where lawyers were randomly assigned to cases, and paid according to some fixed schedule (eg seniority)?
Yet wouldn't you want a world like that? Where whenever some matter arose, it wouldn't matter whether you were rich or poor, you would get some random lawyer, as would your opponent?
As to whether better lawyers get paid more, I need evidence to believe that. I'm no expert, but it seems to me the quality of legal work has a lot to do with how much time is available to do it, which pretty much depends on budget.
Whenever I've dealt with a certain class of (suited) professional, I've never gotten the sense that one guy would come up with something that another guy wouldn't, given the time. If there was doubt on an issue (typically tax related) both accountants would say so, and suggest spending time on research. If there was something aggressive (again tax deals) evert accountant seemed to think so. Same with lawyers, I've never come across some line of reasoning that seemed like it wouldn't have been uncovered by every lawyer, given enough time. And also they tend to defer to specialty experts whenever they are at the end of their knowledge, so it all feels pretty standard.
If you'd like an alternative, you could consider inquisitorial law - but barring a revolution, that will be a pipe dream.
The real question that I guess escapes most Americans (yet more Europeans notice it) is whether money should be able to influence the judgement at all.
Wealthy people shouldn't be privileged in court.
Unfortunately, I have no idea how to make this happen.
Edit: seems like Lawtonfogle and spott mentioned the same thing before me.
I was taught to do this in political classes (based on James Madison's discussion of factions), and it can have such a huge impact on motives and attitudes. For example, should government track all Muslims? What if in 10 years the government started tracking all Christians? Still think that tracking policy is a good idea??
If your assumptions are that Bollea's was a legitimate victim of Gawker's actions, and that we would need to protect the EFF from a similar outcome, it seems to be that what you're saying is that we need to prevent victims from winning court cases because the perpetrators who harmed them might be otherwise good people.
It certainly works as an argument but it's scary it even has to come up this way. It's basically having to explain to someone else: "You know, muslims are people too".
"It could happen to you" is a symptom of failed education of the recipient. It's scary some people today still lack basic empathy, the basic considerations that "all people are equal and deserve the same respect as you owe yourself".
Not to detract from your point, of course. It's more understandable that someone wouldn't immediately connect the dots between "Bad thing happening to bad entity" and "Bad thing could also happen to good entity". Although I'd consider it a similar failure of education as well.
If it's true that the appeals court would be likely to severely reduce the damage amount, if not overrule the verdict itself, is it reasonable to claim that the decision not to stay enforcement is by itself unjust, in that it effectively robs the defendant of a chance to exhaust the judicial process?
Where's the justice in that?
If money can influence litigation, isn't that a bigger problem than a third party funding some lawsuit for whatever reason?
And Thiel certainly has an issue with Gawker, having been victimized in exactly the same way (revealing of otherwise personal information unrelated to the nature of their business or other public persona), so can he show connection with the merits as another victim?
Other replies to your comment have pointed out that the actions of the EFF and so on are generally against the government rather than private parties. But I wonder how re-instating "maintenance" would affect issues like consortiums funding defences against patent trolls.
If we look at
there seem to be 296 matters mentioned (which isn't exactly all of EFF's casework for various reasons; for example, some cases may predate the existence of that page, some matters mentioned there may encompass multiple court cases, and some cases may be under seal).
It would take a while to classify all of them, and it's not a good idea to just take a sample of the first n cases in alphabetical order (for example, because criminal cases are captioned U.S. v. Somebody).
I did a random sort of the cases there and went through the first 50 of them, and I classified them as 18 government, 30 private, and 2 other (not clearly referring to an individual court case). It's also interesting to note that in two of the cases in my sample, EFF was defending (or not opposing) the government's position.
To summarize, I think EFF's legal work more often involves private parties than the government, at least by number of court cases (not necessarily by number of attorney hours or pages of briefing!). The same might not be true of ACLU's work.
Here in FL where the case went to trial we have the proposal for settlement rule and an Offer of Judgment Statute.
Obviously Gawker couldn't have forced a settlement but if they really wanted to settle it, Gawker could have potentially recouped their legal fees for the continued litigation. Alternatively, they could have simply accepted liability/default judgment and moved to the damages phase, saving themselves untold legal fees in defending the case. Of course it is easy to Monday morning quarterback these things after you have availed yourself to all potential legal defenses and still not happy with the result.
Are you seriously trying to argue that contingency fee arrangements, or lawsuits funded by groups such as EFF, ACLU, SPLC, ACLU etc etc etc are somehow litigation abuse?
The real underlying issue is that it shouldn't take millions of dollars to litigate a claim against a big corp like Gawker. Why in general should legal fees be so large that someone with any kind of injury has to give 40% of the settlement to a lawyer? This is the public policy issue that is important.
Do you have any evidence that the 'scorched-earth' came from Thiel and not Hogan? If not, you'd best withdraw your 'illustration'.
1. The pressure point here was a court ruling declining to stay enforcement of the $140M judgment pending appeal. This left Gawker having to post a $50M bond in order to avoid enforcement proceedings by which its assets could have been seized and its business literally dismantled. Gawker may or may not ultimately prove to have a successful basis upon which to get this judgment reversed but, without a stay of enforcement, it had no way of staying alive until it could have the matter decided by the appellate courts. No stay, no hope.
2. The bankruptcy filing, then, forces Gawker to give up its business but gives a vehicle by which the parties in interest behind the company can get $100+M by which to continue the fight through appeal in hopes of getting the judgment reversed and presumably leaving them with some significant value to salvage from what is now a desperate situation.
3. Concerning the social policy question here, it has repeatedly been framed as whether it is proper for a super-wealthy individual to fund another party's litigation to get payback or for some other suspect reason and what implications this has on the news media. This is a proper question but it is framed too narrowly. The broader question is whether the law should permit any third-party funding of litigation where the funder has otherwise has no connection with the merits of the dispute. Historically, the answer to that question was an emphatic no. Indeed, that sort of activity was defined as a crime - specifically, the crime of "maintenance." The statutes defining this crime originated in England and dated back the 1200's and so could truly be called ancient of origin. Basically, the idea back then was that feudal lords should not be permitted to use their wealth to interfere with legal process and thereby to potentially corrupt. By the 1700's, William Blackstone summed up the nature of the offense (as part of his famous work summing up all of the English common law) by defining maintenance as "officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one" and called it an "offense against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression." In contrast to this long-established hostility toward the interfering use of wealth to influence the judicial process, modern attitudes (dating back at least 50 years) came to see more litigation as being good for society as it could be used as a tool to help correct inequities in society - hence the litigation explosion. Owing to this changed attitude, many erstwhile barriers to open-ended litigation came tumbling down and along with them came the near-universal repeal of the crime of maintenance (and the related offenses of "champerty" and "barratry"). With this repeal, it became open season for any wealthy person wanting to fund anybody else's litigation for whatever purpose suited him. If people have a problem with that, that is the issue that should be addressed and not a narrow issue involving added protections for the press only. Litigation abuse is litigation abuse; if it is bad for the press, it is bad as well for other victims in society.
4. To illustrate how this sort of intermeddling tainted the processes in this case: lawyers routinely will add claims that will bring in insurance defense coverage to ensure that they can collect on any judgment but here the lawyers were directed to exclude a claim that would have allowed Gawker to bring in its insurer to cover costs of defense and potentially any judgment; parties also routinely will make serious efforts to settle any high-stakes litigation at various critical points but here it was all scorched-earth all the way to the bitter end with no prospect of the parties achieving a reasonable settlement along the way.
I don't think too many people will shed a tear over the demise of Gawker but the public policy issue here is an important one. Can the modern mindset - so enamored with the supposed benefits of expanding redress through litigation - ever go back to reinstating laws forbidding "maintenance"? I doubt it. But perhaps the time is right for a debate and reconsideration. I think we are otherwise left a little unsettled over what the promiscuous scattering of third-party money throughout the courts might do. Whatever it is, it likely is not good.