I'd be more comfortable with your economic-efficiency argument if there were more economic certainty in the process by which damages awards are arrived at --- especially in situations such as the Gawker case. I didn't see or hear any of the damages evidence, but it seems strange that the jurors concluded that Hulk Hogan really suffered $115 million in damages. As I know you're aware, it's not uncommon for lay jurors to do a version of baseball arbitration, choosing the analysis of one side's damages expert over that of the other --- and of course the opinion of neither expert is entirely unmotivated.
Justice is not a resource to be allocated, and in this case all we're discovering the price of is a billionaire's bruised ego.
For example, one might view lawsuits against polluters as a matter of punishing companies that do harmful things to the environment. I'd argue that's a pretty fuzzy and irrational basis for environmental law. A more rigorous approach is to view environmental lawsuits as forcing polluters to internalize their negative externalities: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=....
In that context, meritorious lawsuits that don't get brought are inefficient. They represent a polluter not forced to internalize its externalities, or a business creating risk not forced to bear the costs of that risk, or a business creating harm not forced to compensate the injured. That distorts incentives and leads to more than an efficient amount of harmful activities.
I disagree. Division of labor and specialization is almost always economically efficient. Litigation finance is just the embodiment of that concept applied to litigation.
Traditionally, litigation has been financed either by: (1) the plaintiff; or (2) the plaintiff's lawyer (in the form of a contingency arrangement). Neither of those parties are the right ones to valuate or finance lawsuits. They don't have a sufficiently cross-sectional perspective of the industry. Lawyers are in fact notoriously bad at valuing cases.
Litigation funders can become experts at valuing good lawsuits, and financing lawsuits so that entities don't have to divert their own capital for those purposes.
Note also: in a system like ours that relies on lawsuits to protect property and other rights, forgone meritorious lawsuits are a source of economic inefficiency. Gawker is a great case in point. If a judgment against Gawker makes it go under, that means the harm caused by Gawker's existence exceeded the value created thereby. If Gawker didn't get sued simply because Hogan lacked the liquidity to bring the suit, that would've been a net loss to the economy--an entity sticking around that literally does more harm than good.