People forget that proper civil litigation is a public good (in the economic sense). Ensuring that (civil) wrongdoers pay for their actions benefits everyone by making it less likely they will be a victim of such acts, and more likely that transgressors will offer a quick settlement rather than using the courts in the first place.
[1] While it's impossible to truly shield off such influence, we can at least go for some standard like, "it should take an exponential investment to produce a linear impact on the award".
I'm not sure how we would manage that but, assuming we could, doesn't this cut both ways? As long as money is in the equation, then don't all parties still benefit by having as much money as possible?
Under that condition, each doubling of the amount spent on influencing the outcome (via payments expert witnesses, bribes to the judge, discovery, etc) would only yield the same gain in revenues from the court. So for example, if you start with $1000, then doubling to $2000 might yield $1500, doubling to $2000 with only yield $1500 more on top of that, and so on.
(I agree an exponential difference might be two hard; I'd be happy for even a quadratic difference!)
Do you have any scientific research backing this? Or just anecdotal evidence?
In an adversarial system your chances depend on the amount of valid legal process-effort you exert. If you acknowledge that this effort is correlated with financing, even a little, then you admit there is a vulnerability.
A more reasonable question would be if they have a reason to assume that the variable has an oversized impact on the process.
This is a fair point, but the existence of such a vulnerability is unquestionable. However, SilasX seemed to be implying that this is a significant vulnerability, which is a claim that certainly deserves some evidence to back it up.
>A more reasonable question would be if they have a reason to assume that the variable has an oversized impact on the process.
That's exactly what I was asking about, SilasX specifically said "so vulnerable" as opposed to just "vulnerable". That seems to imply such an oversized impact.
Beyond that: the "merits" of a case is unknowable. Courts don't have the "merits" in front of them. They have the evidence and arguments developed by the parties. Consider the Gawker case: did Gawker publish the video recklessly or maliciously? The "yes" or "no" answer doesn't exist in reality. It's an abstraction. The only thing that exists in reality is, e.g., various emails and communications and meetings that can lead to one conclusion or the other.
Developing that evidence--particularly within the context of a process where everyone has a strong incentive to lie and fabricate--is what makes litigation expensive. But it takes a certain amount of money to develop the evidence. Spending a lot more money than that isn't going to get you a much better result.
And that's precisely the point, if you don't have that money (and this can be quite a lot) then you're out of luck. The linked case is about a celebrity worth quite a bit of money and still it wasn't enough to get the case decided in his favor, it needed yet another - bigger - millionaire / billionaire to step in to sway the case. I don't see what could prove this more conclusively, a 'certain amount of money' can be more than what most mortals have access to.
It it wasn't for Thiel to have an axe to grind with Gawker this would have not happened.
And that's just civil proceedings, in criminal proceedings the odds are stacked even worse against a defendant without funds.
I'm just cautioning extrapolating from that, to the conclusion that the party with more money wins the lawsuit. That's only true up to a certain baseline.
> And that's just civil proceedings, in criminal proceedings the odds are stacked even worse against a defendant without funds.
Maybe. The DOJ's conviction rate isn't appreciably different between divisions, including white collar crime: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011... (all around 90%).
Conviction rate doesn't tell you how much the deck is stacked against defendants, it tells you how good the prosecuting agency is at assessing its ability to secure a conviction before initiating formal charges.
And that's true enough for me.
> Maybe. The DOJ's conviction rate isn't appreciably different between divisions, including white collar crime: > (all around 90%).
Interesting report, thank you for the link. I think 90% in and of itself is high enough to warrant scrutiny, any higher and it would be grounds for an investigation. Japan (99%) and China (98%) appear to be significantly higher still but many other first world countries are significantly below that (the UK for instance at 74%).
Surprising too that in the 1970's the US was at 72%, 18% more convictions in such a short period should be another cause for worry, either in the past people were more likely to walk when guilty, or in the present a lot of people that aren't guilty end up in jail. (Or, alternatively, a lot more stuff that is easy to prosecute got added to the list of offenses but that would have to be an immense number to skew the totals from 72% to 90%.)
But it's not true as a general proposition, nor are you excluding an irrelevant class of litigation. Much (most?) commercial litigation is between well-funded parties (e.g. a big company and it's insurer).
> Interesting report, thank you for the link. I think 90% in and of itself is high enough to warrant scrutiny
The government should only bring a lawsuit if it looks at the evidence and decides it can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Generally, that's in the 95% certainty range. A jury should only convict if it comes to the same conclusion. Thus, it should be quite unusual for the jury to acquit. If the jury is acquitting in 25% of cases, that means the government is bringing lots of prosecutions it shouldn't be bringing.
It's true that over the last 30 years, the government has gotten much more conservative about bringing prosecutions. That's a good thing. Many might disagree with the law underlying, say, the Silk Road case, but it's hard to say the government didn't base that prosecution on a wealth of evidence.
There is a huge fallacy underlying your numbers. 90% is about right if the number of false convictions is acceptably low. 90% is a terrible number if it should contain a large number of false convictions.
The 'establishing of facts beyond reasonable doubt' only happens for cases that actually go to court, in the light of the above mentioned asymmetry in resources you're going to end up with a lot of cases that will never make it that far. Some will claim this is efficiency but I don't really feel comfortable with an 'efficient' process that places large numbers of people in lock-up. The chances of getting it wrong are fairly high in a system that aims for a certain percentage of convictions, after all there are two solutions to getting that percentage, the first is to ensure that only the 'good' cases make it through the system, the other is to railroad the bad ones through as well and make sure that a conviction is secured anyway.
In fact, one could argue the only way to look at it is in a precision/recall manner, how many cases that were known to be solid turned out to be false positives and how many cases that were dropped were the false negatives (cases that should have been won but were not, for instance because the defendant was wealthy enough that they could afford a large defense).
This is of course all only relevant if you actually care about justice rather than about convicting as large a number of people possible once they enter the judicial system, and I'm not at all sure that that is the goal of the systems in place in the various countries. Too many people depend for their livelihood on large numbers of people getting convicted.
Sure. But you implied above that a 90% conviction rate warrants more scrutiny than a 75% conviction rate. To the contrary, a 90% conviction rate may be indicative of a fair process. A 75% conviction rate is definitely indicative of an unfair process.
Obviously you still need to scrutinize the rate of false convictions. But that's true regardless of the conviction rate. Indeed, a low conviction rate suggests that the government is bringing marginal cases and trying to make things "stick" which increases the risk of false convictions.
> Some will claim this is efficiency but I don't really feel comfortable with an 'efficient' process that places large numbers of people in lock-up.
The U.S. has a large number of people in prison because it imposes long prison sentences for some very common and easy-to-prove things: drug sales, auto theft, assault, firearms. If you take a random sampling of federal convictions, you'll see that almost always there is a laundry list of physical evidence of guilt. The government doesn't bring marginal cases.
The solution to the prison problem is not to force all these clear-cut cases to go to trial. It's to stop imposing 20-year prison sentences for people selling a few pills of Oxycontin, or stop putting felons back in prison for 10 years just for having a gun.
I'm not sure that this is actually true. Instead, I see a much greater use of plea bargains, especially of the "accept this deal or we will throw every possible charge at you" type. Given the sheer number of laws, this can lead to life-ending penalties for seemingly minor crimes.
But that's not what happened. The case was "decided in his favor" a long time ago when Gawker offered to settle for a sum of money that would far exceed anything he could have expected in his wildest dreams in any other country other than the US. Thiel intervened not to win Bollea more money (indeed, he may end up getting less), but to pay Bollea off so that the case would be about hurting Gawker more than benefiting Bollea, which is what Thiel wanted. I understand that they even changed the lawsuit so that the insurance wouldn't cover the payoff to Bollea -- getting him less money -- only so that Thiel could hurt Gawker further.
Do you have any evidence of this at all?
Be careful, you probably shouldn't just make shit up about someone and then pretend it is true.
AIUI he was pretty much insolvent at the time due to an expensive divorce.
I don't know what the fix is, but the current system is near-extortionate (an attorney made this observation to me).
If party A makes a claim against party B, but party B cannot afford counsel, then party B would likely be required to acquiesce to those claims. The standard to be considered frivolous is woefully high. And, even making that case generally requires counsel.
This gives firms and individuals with the resources to access the legal system tremendous advantages over those who do not have same.
I'm fine with the concept of 'maintenance' but at the same time I feel that there is such a basic unfairness in the various implementations of our systems of justice that some re-balancing is often the only way in which one of the parties stands a chance of winning or losing the case on its merits.
Especially when the other party is a corporation or the government I have no bad feelings about helping to fund the lawsuit (especially a defense).