Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by NateLawson on Saturday June 20, 2015 @03:27PM
(#9750798)
Bruce Schneier is falling into the trap of saying since computer security is hard, the NSA has certainly been compromised and we can assume these docs have been out there for a while.
Yes, securing the endpoint is hard, especially given the non-hardened OS and applications we mostly use. However, you can't extrapolate from that to say with certainty what has and hasn't been exposed via security flaws.
The USSR was much more successful at espionage than the US was, and they took a low-tech approach to it. For decades, they developed contacts within the govt, gave them money, and had documents handed to them by authorized insiders.
Let's not assume computer exploitation is the only culprit. History has shown a variety of techniques, even very low-tech ones, have been employed for espionage and it's impossible as an outsider to determine how much has been taken, by whom, and by what means.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by kbenson on Saturday June 20, 2015 @04:06PM
(#9750895)
> > The vulnerability is not Snowden; it’s everyone who has access to the files.
> > First, the journalists working with the documents.
> Bruce Schneier is falling into the trap of saying since computer security is hard, the NSA has certainly been compromised and we can assume these docs have been out there for a while.
The NSA has been compromised. By Snowden. There's no assumption there, that's fact. Now, access to the documents not longer just means having NSA access (or a complicit person with access) or hacking the NSA, it includes access to any system or person who has access to all the files, which are no longer restricted to NSA servers. It's no longer about what the NSA's security practices are.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by flyryan on Sunday June 21, 2015 @12:51AM
(#9752230)
Wait... you believe that the NSA is easier to compromise than the computers of reporters from multiple international news agencies with various levels of computer security policies and knowledge?
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by Sammi on Sunday June 21, 2015 @09:52AM
(#9753420)
I'll let Schneier answer that, in case you didn't read the article:
> The open question is which countries have sophisticated enough cyberespionage operations to mount a successful attack against one of the journalists or against the intelligence agencies themselves. And while I have my own mental list, the truth is that I don’t know. But certainly Russia and China are on the list, and it’s just as certain they didn’t have to wait for Snowden to get access to the files.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by rst on Saturday June 20, 2015 @04:57PM
(#9751033)
Snowden didn't create any flaws in NSA's internal systems (or at least, none that anyone's described publicly), but his actions certainly demonstrate that they were there. All Schneier is saying is that someone else could have taken advantage of the same flaws -- and that he thinks, given the givens, that someone else almost certainly did. He's not the only one who thinks the odds stack up like that...
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by tsotha on Saturday June 20, 2015 @05:53PM
(#9751156)
Spying is a wash - what you're saying is true, but it's only half the equation. Sometimes that second guessing is what keeps the conflict from becoming hot. Spying can compromise a country's defense to the extent another country feels comfortable attacking. Also, if a weaker country can maintain the facade of strength it's less likely to be attacked.
The most obvious example is when one country manages to uncover another country's nuclear assets to such a high degree of confidence it feels (rightly or wrongly) it can make a 100% successful first strike.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by gizmo686 on Saturday June 20, 2015 @06:15PM
(#9751233)
You need mutual spying, but if you have that, then the week country will know that it is 100% vulnerable to first strike, and surrender before it comes to that.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by oofabz on Saturday June 20, 2015 @08:36PM
(#9751589)
I'm not so sure you can count on a country to act in rational self-interest. Individual people aren't so good at that, and collectives can be less rational than individuals.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by Retra on Sunday June 21, 2015 @01:13AM
(#9752287)
If I had better knowledge of military history, maybe. But I find it extremely unlikely that there has never been a situation where somebody knew some secret about their enemy that encouraged them into a concession instead of resistance. I mean, it happens in legal situations every day.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by efoto on Saturday June 20, 2015 @05:43PM
(#9751136)
Assuming this is true "we have now seen our agents and assets being targeted”, there is another explanation why now - other than foreign agencies getting the documents Snowden took.
The explanation is called protecting intelligence sources: Russia, China - or whoever had their spies inside NSA long before, can now act on the intelligence they got without triggering counterintelligence alarms.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by sangnoir on Saturday June 20, 2015 @09:58PM
(#9751808)
If they hacked the NSA, I'd suspect most spies are known rather than unknown. There's a curious event where Russia expelled 30 UK diplomats from Moscow - and none of them were intelligence operatives (and this was no coincidence as 1/3rd of the staff were intelligence operatives) - it was just to send a message: "we know who your spies are"[1].
Edit: corrected number of diplomats & added citation
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by superuser2 on Sunday June 21, 2015 @12:59PM
(#9754070)
This is uninteresting. It is fully expected that foreign countries know about (and extensively surveil) your "official cover" embassy staff intelligence officers. We tailed everyone who stepped out of the Soviet embassy for most of the Cold War.
Those people are administrators. Your actual covert operatives will never interact with the embassy in a detectable/obvious way.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by how_about_no on Saturday June 20, 2015 @07:00PM
(#9751339)
That theory is unlikely to gain traction among the public at this point in time. Even with the much-publicised example of an intelligence community insider exfiltrating data and then traveling to both China and Russia, it's considered uncouth and irresponsible to suggest that those nations have any intelligence assets in the U.S.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by nabla9 on Saturday June 20, 2015 @04:24PM
(#9750941)
NSA adopted two man rule for system administration only after Snowden leaks. Before Snowden anyone with similar access as Snowden could have copied the same data.
What is the probability that at least one guy with same access as Snowden spied for China or Russia? I would say close to 1.0.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by ehvatum on Sunday June 21, 2015 @12:00PM
(#9753879)
And much good it did for preventing the Snowden leak. The false sense of security instilled by confidence like yours likely hindered implementation of common-sense safeguards, such as the two man rule and more generally any functional oversight of any kind.
In my experience, the NSA performs its own security clearance checking and does not use the OPM for this function, but, in any case where OPM did perform a background check, that background check provided China with far more compromising information than China otherwise would have had.
That people place such faith in vetting in the first place is a huge problem. Furthermore, background checking performed by most of the rest of the US government has actually been a huge source of actionable intelligence for our enemies.
In my opinion, it is not possible for an organization the size of the NSA to keep its secrets. It's, what, 1000x larger than the Manhattan project? And, would you say that James Clapper's intellect was in the same ballpark as those of Leslie Groves and Robert Oppenheimer?
In fact, when confronted with opportunities to avoid mistakes, the US government's reflexive response is compulsion toward secrecy so as to avoid reform. IE, so much of this secrecy is motivated by desire to escape oversight, rather than to provide our nation actual advantage over rivals. If the latter were our goal, oversight and strictly limiting classification to the most sensitive subset of weapons research and ongoing military operations would be a road to it. Instead, such approaches are termed dangerous and even intellectual property normalization treaty negotiations are treated as military secrets in order to protect the power of entrenched political influences.
When secrecy is so rampant that it makes it impossible for us to keep secrets, you might ask why we have so much fucking secrecy.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by decisiveness on Sunday June 21, 2015 @05:08PM
(#9754989)
Snowden was someone with access who acted on what he thought was in the best interest of Americans. Whether it was or wasn't is debatable. But to assume foreign spies exist in the NSA, and would risk treason for foreign interest because NSA screening missed Snowden, is a big leap in logic.
Of course no one can say foreign spies inside the NSA or access to their top secret files is impossible, I'm simply suggesting it's safer to assume this is not likely, and comparing the NSA to civilian corporations in this regard is unreasonable.
His points are:
* China and Russia probably ALREADY had access to that material BEFORE Snowden, based on the NSA's poor internal security.
* Now that journalists have the remaining unpublished Snowden documents, any nation-state can hack the journalists.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by CurtMonash on Saturday June 20, 2015 @05:53PM
(#9751157)
I once challenged Glenn Greenwald as to how he could be confident his copy of the documents hadn't been hacked. His answer wasn't terribly convincing.
That said, it's also possible he got lucky. He lives in a fairly isolated farmhouse with a lot of dogs, so maybe it really is hard to do a black bag operation on him. And I'm not sure how even a nation state could do a purely internet-based attack on an air-gapped computer.
That said, Laura Poitras in bustling Berlin or an entire major newspaper might be an easier target ...
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by jefurii on Saturday June 20, 2015 @08:34PM
(#9751584)
> That said, Laura Poitras in bustling Berlin or an entire major newspaper might be an easier target ...
That incident where British government officials destroyed the laptop containing The Guardian's copy of the documents makes more sense in light of this.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by hackuser on Saturday June 20, 2015 @04:47PM
(#9751004)
There's evidence that US government counter-intelligence and information security are very poor: Snowden, Manning, the recent break-in at OPM, etc. In past generations, nuclear plans were stolen, the heads of both FBI and CIA counter-intelligence have been moles, a Navy sailor kept the Soviets updated on the locations of US submarines, etc. Here's a list I came across recently:
http://www.wearethemighty.com/american-spies-military-secret...
It's hard to know how bad or good the US's security is, because most intelligence operations are secret and I don't know enough about the field to have a standard by which to judge it. Maybe these things are the norm for most governments.
I would not be surprised if other governments already knew much of what Snowden made public. Some secrecy clearly is necessary for governments but how often does "secret" merely mean "unknown to the public" (but already known to enemies)?
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by hackuser on Saturday June 20, 2015 @08:18PM
(#9751542)
Just to be clear, it wasn't the heads of the whole FBI and CIA; it was the heads of their counterintelligence divisions (or maybe their Soviet counterintelligence divisions - I don't know the org charts precisely), Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI). Just do a search; there were arrests, trials, etc. - it is very well documented.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by Retra on Saturday June 20, 2015 @07:27PM
(#9751409)
Well, it offers a huge military advantage, so in the interests of waging war, it is very useful, if not necessary.
But I think the most common use of it is probably the fact that politics is a game of hypocrisy, and you can't play unfairly if you don't get to keep secrets.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by lvs on Saturday June 20, 2015 @07:11PM
(#9751368)
The objective content of this article is no better than the one it criticizes. Its claims all boil down to speculation about events for which there is no evidence of any kind.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by decisiveness on Sunday June 21, 2015 @03:08AM
(#9752516)
To suggest all foreign superpowers have access to the NSA goods because "security is hard", and "Snowden was able to wander through the NSA’s networks with impunity", is a weak conjecture at best.
Re:Bruce Schneier: China and Russia Almost Definitely Have t...
by tekao on Saturday June 20, 2015 @11:29PM
(#9752040)
I think Snowden/Wikileaks/EFF/ioerror etc are probably much better at endpoint(ie the computers used to access the documents) security than most governments. AFAIK they are not using Windows, all the hacks the Schneier mentions are on Windows systems, rather Tails Linux and other such tools.
There is alot of spin when it comes to security.
It's pure speculation from Schneier. Also Interesting that Schneier has not mentioned this article on his twitter.
Yes, securing the endpoint is hard, especially given the non-hardened OS and applications we mostly use. However, you can't extrapolate from that to say with certainty what has and hasn't been exposed via security flaws.
The USSR was much more successful at espionage than the US was, and they took a low-tech approach to it. For decades, they developed contacts within the govt, gave them money, and had documents handed to them by authorized insiders.
Let's not assume computer exploitation is the only culprit. History has shown a variety of techniques, even very low-tech ones, have been employed for espionage and it's impossible as an outsider to determine how much has been taken, by whom, and by what means.
> > First, the journalists working with the documents.
> Bruce Schneier is falling into the trap of saying since computer security is hard, the NSA has certainly been compromised and we can assume these docs have been out there for a while.
The NSA has been compromised. By Snowden. There's no assumption there, that's fact. Now, access to the documents not longer just means having NSA access (or a complicit person with access) or hacking the NSA, it includes access to any system or person who has access to all the files, which are no longer restricted to NSA servers. It's no longer about what the NSA's security practices are.
> The open question is which countries have sophisticated enough cyberespionage operations to mount a successful attack against one of the journalists or against the intelligence agencies themselves. And while I have my own mental list, the truth is that I don’t know. But certainly Russia and China are on the list, and it’s just as certain they didn’t have to wait for Snowden to get access to the files.
The most obvious example is when one country manages to uncover another country's nuclear assets to such a high degree of confidence it feels (rightly or wrongly) it can make a 100% successful first strike.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five
The explanation is called protecting intelligence sources: Russia, China - or whoever had their spies inside NSA long before, can now act on the intelligence they got without triggering counterintelligence alarms.
The spy you know about is much less dangerous than spy that you don't know about.
Edit: corrected number of diplomats & added citation
1. http://www.globalresearch.ca/five-reasons-the-mi6-story-is-a...
Those people are administrators. Your actual covert operatives will never interact with the embassy in a detectable/obvious way.
What is the probability that at least one guy with same access as Snowden spied for China or Russia? I would say close to 1.0.
Even with oaths and allegiences, the probability that Snowden is the only one to take advantage of the lax security in the NSA is 0.
[1] http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=...
In my experience, the NSA performs its own security clearance checking and does not use the OPM for this function, but, in any case where OPM did perform a background check, that background check provided China with far more compromising information than China otherwise would have had.
That people place such faith in vetting in the first place is a huge problem. Furthermore, background checking performed by most of the rest of the US government has actually been a huge source of actionable intelligence for our enemies.
In my opinion, it is not possible for an organization the size of the NSA to keep its secrets. It's, what, 1000x larger than the Manhattan project? And, would you say that James Clapper's intellect was in the same ballpark as those of Leslie Groves and Robert Oppenheimer?
In fact, when confronted with opportunities to avoid mistakes, the US government's reflexive response is compulsion toward secrecy so as to avoid reform. IE, so much of this secrecy is motivated by desire to escape oversight, rather than to provide our nation actual advantage over rivals. If the latter were our goal, oversight and strictly limiting classification to the most sensitive subset of weapons research and ongoing military operations would be a road to it. Instead, such approaches are termed dangerous and even intellectual property normalization treaty negotiations are treated as military secrets in order to protect the power of entrenched political influences.
When secrecy is so rampant that it makes it impossible for us to keep secrets, you might ask why we have so much fucking secrecy.
Of course no one can say foreign spies inside the NSA or access to their top secret files is impossible, I'm simply suggesting it's safer to assume this is not likely, and comparing the NSA to civilian corporations in this regard is unreasonable.
His points are: * China and Russia probably ALREADY had access to that material BEFORE Snowden, based on the NSA's poor internal security. * Now that journalists have the remaining unpublished Snowden documents, any nation-state can hack the journalists.
That said, it's also possible he got lucky. He lives in a fairly isolated farmhouse with a lot of dogs, so maybe it really is hard to do a black bag operation on him. And I'm not sure how even a nation state could do a purely internet-based attack on an air-gapped computer.
That said, Laura Poitras in bustling Berlin or an entire major newspaper might be an easier target ...
That incident where British government officials destroyed the laptop containing The Guardian's copy of the documents makes more sense in light of this.
It's hard to know how bad or good the US's security is, because most intelligence operations are secret and I don't know enough about the field to have a standard by which to judge it. Maybe these things are the norm for most governments.
I would not be surprised if other governments already knew much of what Snowden made public. Some secrecy clearly is necessary for governments but how often does "secret" merely mean "unknown to the public" (but already known to enemies)?
this is necessarily the case. people are the biggest flaw followed by technology itself which is expected to be cheap and easy.
But I think the most common use of it is probably the fact that politics is a game of hypocrisy, and you can't play unfairly if you don't get to keep secrets.
EDIT: and it was worth it, excellent article.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Sx7GYBF...
There is alot of spin when it comes to security.
It's pure speculation from Schneier. Also Interesting that Schneier has not mentioned this article on his twitter.