gizmo686
You can go a step farther and model the instruction set and architecture, and which point you can make proofs about the final binary directly (thereby sidestepping the problem of compiler bugs). At this point, your assumption is just that your physical hardware actually matches your model.
The area is still bad for humans; but not terrible for the ecosystem.
Assuming the Netherlands was acting unnilaterally, Russian ISPs would be able to coordinate with other ISPs to get back online via other routes. Assuming Russia's enemy wanted to press the issue, it would quickly devolve into a political question of who wants to allow Russian peering, who does not, and who is willing to not peer with peers of Russia (and peers of peers, etc).
This has always been the case. The internet is a network of networks; all of which are subject to control by their host governments should they choose to exercise it. With or without RPKI, a partitioning of the Internet for a significant period of time was always going to be a political decision.
Air craft carriers such as the USS Abraham Lincoln? Which had to remain at sea for 286 days, including 208 consequtive days without making port. During which time, the military suffered a massive logistical failure to adaquetly supply it, presumably due to them moving their logistical base from Bahrain to Diego Garcia. Then, was relieved only by diverting the USS George Washington and USS Theodore Roosevelt to the region, leaving no carriers in the West Pacific
> Also there are somewhere between 20 and 28 US military bases in the middle east alone
Bases which have been comming under repeated air attack; the extent and damage of which is kept quiete, but appears to be much more substantial than the US military wants to admit. And which are increasingly vulnerable as they loose air defense abilities due to both loss of supporting infastructure, and a depletion of interceptors.
If enough people try profiting by stealling pennies, the cumulative losses are significant; and can threaten confidence in and the strenght of the market.
There are a bunch of ways that AI the technology could be massivly successful, while AI the industry crashes.
https://www.etftimemachine.com/en/compare/XLK-vs-SPY?start=2...
Had you invested in XLK when it opened in 1998, then following the .com crash, it would take until early 2020 to return to parity to the S&P 500.
However, the BB function itself is not computable. It makes sense to ask "for what inputs is the BB function computable?". When people talk about BB(n) not being computable, they are really talking about the computability of the BB function at n, not the computability of the integer that happens to be BB(n).
Since f(n) is trivially computable, we know that BB(n) grows faster than f(n). It follows that there must be some n such that BB(n) > C.
There is a point where these values become uncomputable, but they still exist (for some definition of exist).
This looks like a pretty classic case of stenography. You are able to hide the data in the weights such that the data is not apparent on casual (or even careful) inspection. However, the information is still there, and someone who knows to look for it can still find it, even if they do not know the specific message.
If you are going through all of that, there is not much benefit to plug-in solar instead of traditional.
This has never been proven. The entire point of the post is that all of public key cryptography is based on a small number of "hard" problems for which we have no deep reason to think are hard. In the pre-AI world, that was a pretty safe situation to be in. Math is a very old field, so the pace of progress was a known quantity. If we started to solve those hard problems, there would be plenty of time to find new ones before they all went away. With AI, the pace of math in the medium term is a much more unknown quantity; so the possibility of loosing all of them before we have time to find a new one is much more of a possibility.
> RSA and ECC still rule the world and no amount of AI will "break" them.
RSA has been theoretically broken for decades, as it is based on integer factorization, which is known to be vulnerable to quantum computers. Even if we ignore quantom computers, we still have no solid reason to believe that there are no solutions to integer factorization that can be realized on normal computers. At best, that gets us to 3 hard problems.
ECC is based on the assumption that ECDLP is a hard problem; and was deployed because we were concerned that integer factorization was broken.
MLWE is the backup plan if ECDLP ends up being broken.
The problem with C is that modern compilers do a lot of transformations between your source code and the final machine code, so the actual behavior could be very far afield from what you would expect.
> And I'm not even sure if Rust solves this case as far as UB is concerned.
If your entire program is inside unsafe, then Rust is actually worse than C as far as UB is concerned. On the other hand, no one writes Rust like that, and Rust restricts all UB to unsafe blocks.
The problem is that history has shown that companies really do not want to do that. They will happily pay to maintain an inferior interface and go out of their way to disrupt third party clients.
Sure, that optimization interacts badly with the optimization that removes the infinite loop. But half the point of UB is to avoid needing to deal with such interactions, because they are defined out of existence.
In theory, there is also an annual wait limit to free dumps, but they can't actually enforce it.
If we look at his stated reason for the attack [0], it is hard to reconcile post 9/11 history with a claim of his victory.
[0] https://web.archive.org/web/20040615081002/http://observer.g...
The history of automation is filled with cases where the result has been lower quality goods at lower prices.
By itself, that does not exclude the possibility of dark matter having other interactions which do not interfere with our detectors.
If a problem is not able to influence anything, even in theory, then by definition, it cannot possible influence any testable predictions we have.
Add to that the potential for unknown and mis-moddeled manufacturing defects, and manipulated electrical voltages and signals, random particle interactions, and there is a lot of room for known physics to break a verilog level proof of correctness.
Sure a hardware or model bug would render your proof non-applicable, but that is already the case for the existing proofs.
The bigger problem is simply that hardware designers do not care about timing side channels. Even if you did accurately model the timing behavior of a modern processor, you would just discover that trying to write software free from timing side channels is a practical impossibility.
> And then you'd need assurance that the Verilog is faithfully transcribed in the silicon, which is a can of worms in itself.
You would also need to prove that our model of physics accurately describes how that silicon would behave, and the the environment around the silicon is within the physical parameters you modeled...
Otherwise, you are relying on obscurity, and will lose as soon as you become interesting enough to matter.
You will also break non-AI machine processing use cases. That isn't just accessibility, it is things like search.
> Any excess money at the end of the year should be moved to the pool for the next year, not as a bonus on CEOs' 100m+ salary
Under the ACA, excess money in the pool must be rebated to policy holders. In practice, this worked for a few years, but eventually insurance companies ended up increasing cost in order to increase the absolute amount they were allowed to keep. Maybe this is still good (more claims approved), but it is counter productive to the goal of reducing healthcare costs.