That makes the fix pretty easy. Write a regex to detect the evil script, and revert every page to a historic version without the script.
This library wasn't a living creature, or even possessed of automation (which here might mean something more, far more, than human)."
It's very short and from one of my favorite books. Increasingly relevant.
Fantasy sometimes does this better but usually with specific tropes.
Not so ironically, it came up when we were discussing "software archeology".
The other day I was using Claude for a task, but it occurred to me, what if Claude is unreachable.
So, I told it to "encode your wisdom into this script in case you are not available"
That was my own version of that
The Mummy?
I refuse to believe that someone on the security team intentionally tested random user scripts in production on purpose.
At least, that’s how it worked at literally every big company I worked at so far. The only reason to hold it back is during testing/review. Once enough humans look at it, you release and watch metrics like a hawk.
And yeah, many features were released this way, often gated behind feature flags to control roll out. When I refactored our email system that sent over a billion notifications a month, it was nerve wracking. You can’t unsend an email and it would likely be hundreds of millions sent before we noticed a problem at scale.
However this is a different situation as we’re talking about running arbitrarily found third-party scripts. I can’t imagine that was ever intended to be done in production.
Fun story, when I worked at Facebook in the earlier days someone accidentally made a change that effectively set the release flags for every single feature to be live on production. That was a day… we had to completely wipe out memcached to stop the broken features and then the database was hammered to all hell.
Do I have a bridge to sell you, oh boy
I agree, mostly, but I'm also really glad I don't have to put out this fire. Cheering them on from the sidelines, though!
this is both really cool and really really insane
For the global ones that need admin permissions to edit, it's no different from all the other code of mediawiki itself like the php.
For the user scripts, it's no worse than the fact that you can run tampermonkey in your browser and have it modify every page from evry site in whatever way your want.
However its been really useful to allow power users to customize the interface to their needs. It also is sort of a pressure release for when official devs are too slow for meeting needs. At this point wikipedia has become very dependent on it.
And when you have enough rights, you get to add arbitrary code to everywhere on your site.
The security guy is just the patsy because he actioned it.
They have obviously done this a million times before and now they got burned.
In the case of a Learning event, you keep your job, and take the time to make the environment more resilient to this kind of issue.
In the case of a Limiting event, you lose your job, and get hired somewhere else for significantly better pay, and make the new environment more resilient to this kind of issue.
Hopefully the Wikimedia foundation is the former.
This is more common than you'd think.
Mistakes made per call, like many things, were on a Pareto distribution, so 90% of the mistakes are made by 10% of the people. Identifying and firing those 10% made a huge difference. Some of the ‘mistakes’ were actually a result of corruption and they had management backing as management was enriching themselves at the cost of the company (a pretty common problem) so the initiative was killed after the first round.
From that perspective, it makes sense that the people who made the most mistakes in the past will also make the most mistakes in the future, but it's only because the people who did the most work in the past will do the most work in the future.
If you fire everyone who makes mistakes you'll be left only with the people who never make anything at all.
It’s very human to want to be forgiving of mistakes, after all who has not made any mistakes, but there are different classes of mistakes made by all different types of people. If you make a mistake you are the same type of person, but if you are pulling from a distribution by sampling by those who have made mistakes you are biasing your sample in favor of those prone to making such mistakes. In my experience any effect of learning is much smaller than this initial bias.
> sbassett
That being said, interesting to see how salaries skyrocketed over the years: https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_salarie... but not that much for engineering.
On the other hand,
>a Staff Security Engineer at WMF, and naturally they decided to do this test under their highly-privileged Wikimedia Foundation staff account
seriously?
> our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we. They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our site and our users, and neither do we.
"Claude> Yes, you're absolutely right! I'm sorry!"
So, like the Samy worm? (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_%28computer_worm%29)
this is just us playing on the computer, we got b0mbz
In short, a Wikimedia Foundation account was doing some sort of test which involved loading a large number of user scripts. They decided to just start loading random user scripts, instead of creating some just for this test.
The user who ran this test is a Staff Security Engineer at WMF, and naturally they decided to do this test under their highly-privileged Wikimedia Foundation staff account, which has permissions to edit the global CSS and JS that runs on every page.
One of those random scripts was a 2 year old malicious script from ruwiki. This script injects itself in the global Javascript on every page, and then in the userscripts of any user that runs into it, so it started spreading and doing damage really fast. This triggered tons of alerts, until the decision was made to turn the Wiki read-only.