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Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by benoau on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @06:39PM (#41782514)
The weak-point is the shared USB device that copies from one machine to another which seems to defeat the whole purpose of being air-gapped - you could have printed-and-OCR'd data three decades ago so the air-gapped machine is never reading anything from outside at all, these days a video stream and AI could probably automate that?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by zahlman on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @07:39PM (#41782960)
I can definitely imagine use cases where a network is air gapped internally for security but bidirectional transfer still takes place. The point is that humans are supposed to be in control of exactly what is transferred, in both directions (not feasible with a network connection, to my knowledge).
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by benterix on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @02:49AM (#41785189)
Yes, humans are in control, but in the case of Windows the humans that control the default behavior of the system when an USB device is connected are not the ones that are using it. Frankly, I wonder why implement an air gap if Windows is being used. Even in the case of Linux a hardened configuration should be used.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by jonathanstrange on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @04:13AM (#41785624)
Windows can be hardened as much as Linux and has less attack surface for supply chain attacks. At least, the latter holds when you believe Microsoft as company is overall more secure and less compromised than tens of thousands of open source contributors working from home.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by benterix on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @04:36AM (#41785745)
I'm not discussing the general situation as the topic is too vast, just this particular case of OS reaction when a device is connected.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by dotancohen on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @09:45AM (#41787914)
In both Windows and Linux the amount of people contributing code are roughly within an order of magnitude equal. The difference is that with Linux we understand that every commit must be verified. We do not know to what extent Windows upholds that same standard.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by fsflover on Friday October 11, 2024 @05:55PM (#41814200)
Why the false dichotomy? One should use an OS dedicated to security, e.g., Qubes OS.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by benterix on Saturday October 12, 2024 @05:34AM (#41817810)
QubesOS is so much better than a traditional OS but the separation is (at least in theory should be!) weaker than an air-gapped system as there is still a connection through software (and hardware) components.

But the air-gapped system turned out to be hacked because of the way USB devices are handled by the OS, something that can be very finely controlled in Linux. As for Windows, I didn't do any research, but either (1) it is controlled by Microsoft and you can't turn this automation off, (2) it can be done but the technicians hardening these systems didn't do their job correctly.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by fsflover on Saturday October 12, 2024 @12:24PM (#41820252)
> but the separation is ... weaker than an air-gapped system

Not necessarily: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-u...

> But the air-gapped system turned out to be hacked because of the way USB devices are handled by the OS, something that can be very finely controlled in Linux.

This is one the key features of Qubes: All USB devices are isolated with hardware virtualization into a dedicated VM. It would protect against the USB attack.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by kibwen on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @07:12PM (#41782750)
Surely some government has come up with physically-unidirectional data transmission mechanisms for getting data onto airgapped networks. There has to be something more sophisticated than single-use CD-ROMs, even if it's just a blinking LED on one end and a photosensor on the other end.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by nl on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @08:17PM (#41783218)
Data diodes are commonly used: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/data_diode

I don't know if people class something connected using a data diode as airgapped or not.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by fuzzfactor on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @09:46PM (#41783668)
Regular two-way IR diodes and sensors were standard on 90's business laptops for ordinary RS-232 file transfer between machines wirelessly. Before wifi or even ethernet was everywhere, and before USB and Bluetooth came along. The first smartphones had it too so you could dial up the internet on the road in the years before phones had a browser and stuff like that.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by matco11 on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:09AM (#41784677)
Yes. …and, indeed, that used to be a vector for hacking “air gapped” systems back in the day
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by firesteelrain on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:55AM (#41785533)
Airgapped from the Internet —- yes.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by SAI_Peregrinus on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @08:17PM (#41783217)
Good old UART without the RX connected on one side.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by aenis on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @07:04AM (#41786491)
Alas, this can be reconfigured without anyone noticing, assuming compromise on both sides.

A diode / photosensor can't.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by ahartmetz on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @08:07PM (#41783148)
I have heard (on HN) of... 100 MBit ethernet with the transmit wires cut. Probably in the context of in-flight infotainment: plane data to infotainment yes, infotainment anything to plane control anything no. If it's stupid but it works...
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by nullc on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:31AM (#41785404)
gigabit fiber works fine, amazon sells splitters, split tx and loop back to rx on the tx side. Rx side just works.

you need to use a file transfer tool intended for unidirectional transfer (e.g. multicast) otherwise you will have failure from lost packets.

If you don't require high speed just use RS232.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by guenthert on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @04:36AM (#41785748)
It was used to connect network monitors (packet capturing devices) to ensure that ARP or a bug or misconfiguration wouldn't reveal the existence of that device on the network.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by wannacboatmovie on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @07:24PM (#41782849)
> There has to be something more sophisticated than single-use CD-ROMs

But why, when a DVD-R handles most use cases at a cost of < $0.25 each, are reliable and ubiquitous, the hardware is likely already there (unless you are using Apple - caveat emptor) and they close the threat vector posed by read/write USB devices.

Sometimes the simplest solution is the best solution.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by rhcom2 on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @08:26PM (#41783274)
I would guess having a CD/DVD drive opens another attack surface. Similar to why people gluing their USB ports closed.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by zmgsabst on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @08:49PM (#41783382)
Right — but the question isn’t CD/DVD versus nothing. It’s CD/DVD versus USB; and which has a smaller attack surface.

I’d argue that read-only CD/DVD has a smaller attack surface than USB, so of the two, it’s preferable. I’d further argue that a CD/DVD (ie, the actual object moved between systems) is easier to inspect than USB devices, to validate the behavior.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by RF_Savage on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:40AM (#41784839)
The CD/DVD discs used can also be retained and later audited to verify what was moved to and from the systems.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by sneak on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @11:38PM (#41784282)
DVD-R is read/write unless you are very careful to have read-only hardware on the destination device.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by roywiggins on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:39AM (#41784834)
You can always shred the DVD afterwards I guess!
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by alwa on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @09:18AM (#41787672)
Even if the destination device were to write something to said discs, the optical media are cheap enough that it makes sense to destroy them (or archive them in case they become useful for forensic purposes) rather than reusing them.

Plus, compared to a USB form factor, one imagines it’s harder to sneak in circuitry that could retransmit data by unexpected means.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by BlueTemplar on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @10:49AM (#41788503)
Why "very" ?

Also, if you think that the seller is lying to you, can't the drive be opened up and inspected to check for that kind of capability ?

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by neonz80 on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @07:15PM (#41782776)
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by maxerickson on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @07:25PM (#41782854)
Which ironically describes them evolving into software driven gateways.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by coopreme on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @08:57PM (#41783425)
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by khaki54 on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:21AM (#41784735)
Yeah they exist. Data diodes or data guards. They operate at currently available line speeds and there are 100s of thousands in operation. Data diodes are favored by OT companies. For government, Data Guards as they tend to have more robust inspection
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by mitjam on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:55AM (#41784916)
SD cards can also have a switch to make them read only.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by gnabgib on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @02:00AM (#41784947)
They have a switch that requests the host doesn't try and write, but it's not read only:

  It is the responsibility of the host to protect the card. The position [i.e., setting] of the write protect switch is unknown to the internal circuitry of the card
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SD_card#Write-protect_notch
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by dwattttt on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:55AM (#41785531)
Ah, security via the honour system. Unbeatable
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by ykonstant on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @07:17AM (#41786594)
The CIA would never spy on me: they promised!
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by folmar on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @07:31AM (#41786693)
It's usability feature, not security. For cameras/floppy-like usage it's to prevent accidental write/erase errors, which are quite common in managing a large stash of cards.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by theamk on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @09:10PM (#41783485)
The things are much easier: two parts, one has blinking LED, another is photosensor. This is called "data diode" and there is a lot of them.

Here is a random vendor with nice pictures: https://owlcyberdefense.com/learn-about-data-diodes/

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by eastbound on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:12AM (#41784695)
An optic fiber.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by eptcyka on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:45AM (#41784868)
Optic gas.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by krisoft on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @10:32AM (#41788322)
It has to be. Otherwise it is not air-gapped but vacuum-gapped!
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by jalk on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:39AM (#41785447)
So one-way IrDa?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by folmar on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @07:29AM (#41786685)
Yes, but the vendor also gives some reasonable transmission software that will be able to transmit common protocols (like OPC/DB updates and so on) multiplexed and abstracting away the confirmationless medium.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by ibeff on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @06:27AM (#41786285)
Let's hope the photosensor processing software on the receiving end doesn't have any bugs that could be exploited.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by theamk on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @11:39AM (#41789111)
Depends on the direction.

If data diode points to outside, like a power plant exporting its status to web, then photosensor can be completely taken over. Sure, the web page might be completely bogus, but there will be no disruption in power plant's system. The hardware design guarantees it. That is the strongest case for data diodes.

If data diode points to inside, like a power plant getting new data from the outside, then sure, photosensor software is a concern, but since it's relatively simple, this would not be my biggest worry. I'd worry about app that runs on target PC and receives files; if file is an archive, about un-archiver exploits; an finally about the files themselves. If there a doc, are you sure it's not exploiting Word? If there is an update, are you sure it's not trojaned? Are you sure users are not click on the executable thinking it's a directory?

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by alwa on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @08:10AM (#41786996)
> But what if I need to send data two-ways? Some systems cannot operate one-way, so they require a two-way solution. For these use cases, Owl has a unique bidirectional data diode solution – ReCon – that operates on two parallel one-way paths. Get all the security advantages of data diodes with the flexibility of a two-way solution.

…but…what? Why are we doing the blinking-light song and dance at all then?

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by dotancohen on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @09:43AM (#41787890)
If you're already using a data transfer mechanism that the human can't verify every character going over the line, why use infrared? What does that give over a USB cable or, gasp, an internet connection?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by theamk on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @12:10PM (#41789540)
Why light instead of electricity: tradition, and a bit of quality assurance. For RS232, cutting one line was fine. But modern devices are complex: Ethernet transceivers support auto-MDIX and your RX line might become TX one with a flip of a bit, or your GPIO becomes input instead of output. You can fix it with a buffer, but optocouplers are cheap and look nice in slides.

Why not USB or internet:

Transmitter is totally safe from compromised receiver. If you insert USB stick to upload file, it could maliciously pretend to be a keyboard. If you connect to Internet to upload a file, your network stack can be exploited (and if you have firewall, then firewall must be exploited first, not impossible). Only data diode lets you push the data to unsecure zone and not worry about getting infected in the process.

If receiver has to be secure, things are not as clear-cut, but there is still advantages from great reduction in complexity. None of existing protocols work, so vendor usually implement something minimally simple to allow file transfer and maybe mailbox-like messages. This system will always have some risks present - even if you securely sent PDF to airgapped site, it might still exploit the PDF viewer. But at least the malware won't be able to report status to C&C and exfiltrate the data.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by dotancohen on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @12:38PM (#41789860)
So with this data diode I can install an application to use the PC speaker as an output device, and then record the sound for exfil? Nice.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by theamk on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:48PM (#41791890)
exfil ideas are always interesting to think about! The PC speaker idea may work, assuming:

(1) protected computer has a built-in PC speaker (for example, the computer I am typing this message on does not)

(2) There is an insecure PC with sound card and a microphone (or at least headphones which can be used as microphone)

(3) Secure and insecure PCs are close to each other, as opposed to being in different rooms

(4) It's quiet enough, and no one will notice the sounds (because PC speakers are crappy and can't do infra/ultra sound)

Likelihood of this succeeding depends on a lot of factors, the biggest of them being "how good is the security team". Presumably if they are buying data diodes, they at least have some knowledge?

Other exfil ideas I've read were to emit sounds using HDD, emit sounds by changing fan speed, blink code messages on lights ("sleep mode" or caps/num lock), show special patterns on monitors to transmit RF, add hidden dots to printed pages, abuse wireless keyboard or mice.. There are many idea and most of them are pretty impractical outside of very limited circumstances.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by krisoft on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @10:31AM (#41788319)
The idea is in the name. It is a "data diode". It lets data through in one direction and the data can't go in the other. Verifiably because it doesn't have the hardware for data to go the other direction.

I don't think this property can be guaranteed for the alternatives you proposed.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by jszymborski on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @11:07AM (#41788701)
But surely malware is just "data", no? Or am I missing something.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by krisoft on Thursday October 10, 2024 @12:27PM (#41800493)
The idea is that the malware could have infiltrated the system (probably) but couldn't have exfiltrated data from it.

So a data diode wouldn't stop a "stuxnet" scenairo where the malware is trying to sabotage the air-gapped. But it would prevent secret information being leaked out.

(Btw. I'm just explaining what a data diode is, and what guarantees it provides. I don't actually think that it would be useful in practice, because it feels to be too cumbersome to use it and therefore the users/IT would poke holes into the security it would provide otherwise.)

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by jszymborski on Thursday October 10, 2024 @07:24PM (#41804587)
interesting, thank you.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by vrolijk on Thursday October 10, 2024 @02:52PM (#41802086)
There is a cheap way to test via the open source data diode workshop. Https://www.github.com/vrolijk/osdd

Love to read your findings!

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by TacticalCoder on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @09:22PM (#41783544)
> The weak-point is the shared USB device that copies from one machine to another which seems to defeat the whole purpose of being air-gapped...

Yup. I was going to post that TFA and the people at these embassies apparently have a very different definition of what people consider an air-gapped system.

Pushing the non-sense a bit further you could imagine they'd recreate ethernet, but air-gapped, using some hardware only allowing one packet in at a time, but both ways:

"Look ma, at this point in time it's not talking to that other machine, so it's air-gapped. Now it got one packet, but it's only a packet in, so it's air-gapped! Now it's sending only a packet out, so it's air-gapped!".

Yeah. But no.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by PhilippGille on Tuesday October 08, 2024 @11:44PM (#41784313)
> TFA and the people at these embassies apparently have a very different definition of what people consider an air-gapped system.

And Wikipedia? Which says:

> To move data between the outside world and the air-gapped system, it is necessary to write data to a physical medium such as a thumbdrive, and physically move it between computers.

Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_(networking)#Use_in_...

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by eviks on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @12:55PM (#41790045)
How would you get data or even the OS itself to the machine under your definition?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by csomar on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @12:47AM (#41784589)
I created such a system (though to transfer Bitcoin Transactions/Signatures from an airgapped system). The problem is that if you have a lot of bi-directional traffic, you'd want to automate the process of scanning/storing the information. Suddenly, you just have a slow USB device.

What you want is to minimize your data to less than a 1Kb so that it can be manually transmitted.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by jack_pp on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:33AM (#41785413)
Wouldn't it be easier to just have every port blocked except for a very simple application which has no privileges and just writes ASCII to some file? Such an application would be very easy to audit
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by cryptonym on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @04:26AM (#41785680)
Until someone finds a bug in the network stack
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by Aachen on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @05:33AM (#41786000)
I think the general point stands though. While nothing is perfectly secure, having small and understandable components that are fully audited should allow a high level of safety

If a network stack on a modern computer is too dangerous, then use a modem (silly example: apt install minimodem) and an aux cable from the one computer's speaker to the other's mic jack, or a serial connection (not very familiar with those, can't say how complex the driver is there) or something similarly basic that you can audit a memory-safe implementation of

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by cryptonym on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @09:18AM (#41787662)
You advocate for really simple application layer, while having that on top of all the other complex communication layers. Implementations had multiple known vulnerabilities over the years. In case of vulnerability an attacker might be able to do much more damages with real-time access. Is it any safer than an USB stick?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by Aachen on Thursday October 10, 2024 @03:35PM (#41802628)
On top of the complex communication layer we're trying to avoid? Umm, I'm not suggesting to run an aux cable or serial connection on top of a TCP stack, so I don't understand what you're saying

Edit: or do you mean the other way around, namely running a network stack on top of this (e.g.) serial connection? Also not what I meant but I wasn't explicit about that so this confusion would make sense. What I had in mind is doing whatever comms you want to do with the airgapped system, like logging/storing the diplomatic transmissions or whatever this system was for, via this super simple connection such that the airgapped system never has to do complex parsing or state machines as it would with something like USB or a standard kernel's network stack

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by guenthert on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @04:31AM (#41785714)
You then need to trust that the kernel doesn't have a bug in the network stack. That trust might be justified, but keep in mind that even OpenBSD suffered a remotely exploitable vulnerability in their ipv6 stack ...
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by csomar on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:01PM (#41790118)
That's not an air-gapped system but mediocre op-sec at best.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by therein on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @03:36AM (#41785427)
Did you do it before or after BBQr and QR started getting broadly used used in air-gapped hardware wallets such as ColdCard Q or Foundation Passport?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by csomar on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:05PM (#41790153)
Way before. Transactions in Bitcoin and small and simple (unless you have lots of inputs). You only need a QR code generator and a Transaction builder.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by therein on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:16PM (#41790273)
Yup, that's what I was thinking. Combining PSBT and QR is a very intuitive workflow. All the pieces are there waiting to be put together. Makes it more novel and impressive you did it way before.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by seeknotfind on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @12:49AM (#41784603)
Lol. Even if it's with the QR code, it will not be safe. If you can read a bit, you can read a file. Security is a mote, and the hacker is a catapult. Any sufficiently complex system, any metric of security will be incomplete or ignoring that Turning complete and uncomputable. Security is about intelligence in all layers of the stack, from the electron to the application and even the front door. A USB exploit attacks a driver or the OS. A QR code attacks the application. There are other ways to exploit besides breaking and entering. Sometimes it's about influence. In the age of AI, the entire internet and all knowledge could be shifted to reframe a single organization to make an exploit possible. Pandora's box is wide open. It's pouring out. Even a machine on the internet can be secure, but an air gap is only the transport layer. It's a false sense of security. You need to be worried about the full stack because that's the only way to be safe, to never be safe, the eternal guard and gaze. The vigilance. Security in layers. Security in depth.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by iforgotpassword on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:01AM (#41784651)
Arguably the qr-code based approach would be much safer, as it would be much simpler to implement and audit.

Moving a USB key between two windows machines sounds as bad of an idea as it can get for airgapped data exchange.

Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by ben_w on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:17AM (#41784717)
Only if it's done right; when I first made this image, the scanners built into phones straight up executed the JavaScript: https://benwheatley.github.io/blog/2017/04/2017-04-10-11-15-...
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by mistercheph on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @11:04AM (#41788658)
Sure, but if you have resources to spend validating the security of a tool, would you rather validate the QR parser or the USB stack?
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by XorNot on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @04:05AM (#41785581)
There are forensic USB write blockers which sit between the USB device and prevent host-writeback to the device.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by notorandit on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @01:41AM (#41784842)
Exactly. Air-gapped means non data going in and out of systems. USB stick are acting as a cable.
Re:European govt air-gapped systems breached using custom ma... by rkagerer on Wednesday October 09, 2024 @02:17AM (#41785026)
You're on the right track in the sense that a key characteristic for a successful air gap is diligent human review of all the information that flows in and out.