(I actually do know where my key material is. It's on a smartcard that nothing that exists today can read. Back in the day laptops had smartcard ports! Crazy.)
AFAIK, and I might be wrong here, you do have the right to be forgotten - art 17. But there is no need to periodically renew consent. As long as the period for consent is understood and is relatable for the reason of the consent, it can be basically for ever. In this case, that period seems to be 'until he withdraws his consent' and that seems fine by my reading of the GDPR.
> Your company/organisation should establish time limits to erase or review the data stored.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CEL...
> In order to ensure that the personal data are not kept longer than necessary, time limits should be established by the controller for erasure or for a periodic review.
Have you not gotten, over the past few years, emails from services you no longer use and probably forgot that you ever setup an account for, informing you that they will delete your account if you don't use it soon? It's because of the GDPR.
I do miss built-in smartcard readers though; carrying a USB reader is just not the same and I usually don't have mine with me when I need it.
That said, I also wish browsers would support the ISO 7816 transport of CTAP2 for WebAuthN using these readers. That would allow me to use a card form factor WebAuthN authenticator not only on my phone (both iOS and Android support CTAP2 over contactless), but also on my computer.
> I'm at a little bit of a loss here. I totally understand sending me encrypted emails if I've gone through the steps to set the CNAME that indicates that I want to do that, but it doesn't seem like that's how the service works. As far as I can tell, the act of uploading a OpenPGP-compatible key seems to trigger their service to send it as an end-to-end encrypted message.
A similar example is how Windows changed their OS to require a PIN, which can be a password if you figure how to. It then asks you for this when doing completely unrelated to your OS online stuff sometimes, like some of the weird flows to do with using Teams or whatever, and I am not expecting it was asking me for my PC pin because it before that just asked me for my Online username. It is a UX issue.
I never felt comfortable having my private key on my phone, so I can't read encrypted email on the go.
I get one or two encrypted emails on a good year, and they are rarely important (or require encryption really).
Well if only "important" things are encrypted, then the existence of an encrypted message is evidence to whomever you may be trying to hide from that something "important" is going on. Ideally everything would be encrypted, important or not; having all current encrypted things being unimportant is actually better than having only important things encrypted. :-)
I should have used "urgency" instead.
GPG will never be that simple to use. Personally, I hate GPG with such passion, but I'm fully aware it's the best thing we have for asynchronous messaging.
If it was some other email provider that did the same, I'd 100% agree. But with Protonmail, GPG is pretty much the entire reason we're all aware of their existence.
I just tested it myself, and while there is a visual indicator of that automatic key lookup happening, there's zero way to disable it, nor to even verify which key it picked or to display the key hash.
It seems like a terrible solution halfway between convenience/opportunistic encryption and actual security, combining the downsides of either (a high risk of sending messages the recipient won't be able to decrypt and a moderate risk of encrypting to a key other than the expected one).
Though.. note that WhatsApp doesn't have any documentation on their key discovery either, because WhatsApp is not a federated system. Achieving automatic end-to-end encryption in a federated system, when it wasn't there before, isn't so easy. So there's bound to be some growing pains, but we're still trying :)
I understand Protonmail's approach but I also understand - and share - OP point of view.
You have a sign out saying encrypted email here, and are mad someone finally read it.
Remove the sign, or change it to [email protected]
Op is mad he left the sign out saying come in and play when people came in to play way after his party ended.
Except, it is. You can’t control of everyone out only some will send you encrypted email.
But if an email provider purportedly bringing email encryption to the non-GPG-trained masses does, it's a different story.
The presence of a key on a key server is in no way or form an explicit opt-in to encrypted email. That's what the CNAME is for.
This is seriously like telling somebody that you can be contacted on a particular phone number and then getting upset that you're getting phone calls. "Who uses the phone these days," you complain, despite having set into motion the sequence of events that led to you getting a phone call! Worse, in this analogy, it's not like you even said "only text this number"; you explicitly applied metadata saying that you would be open to a phone call.
Telling you to use a particular phone number - say through a business card, a contact page or a profile - is the analogy matching configuration of your domain to publish your intent, similar to how your domain also specify where you mail server is.
I mostly only use mine to sign release tags for software I publish. Having that key uploaded to a public keyserver is a useful thing to do in that case.
But maybe I wanted to use it for other things... perhaps I just want to sign my email, and not encrypt what I send, and allow others to verify the signature. Having the key out on a public keyserver is essential for that.
Honestly I don't know why acting so rudely about this, to the point of pretentiously quoting a famous author/journalist. Not to mention the fact that you haven't thought through all the various reasons why someone might have a key published. Maybe step back from the keyboard and breathe a bit?
I can probably read e-mail encrypted with it just fine as long as I use Thunderbird with my Fastmail inbox (which is most of the time), but not when using K9 Mail on a smartphone or the web UI of Fastmail.
Besides, it doesn't make sense to upload keys only meant to be shared among a small number of people to a public keyserver. In your case, the keys better belong in the git repo.
Anyway, the point is public keyservers aren’t a good match for the described use case. If the key is meant to be kept private, it should be shared privately.
> Honestly I don't know why acting so rudely about this, to the point of pretentiously quoting a famous author/journalist. Not to mention the fact that you haven't thought through all the various reasons why someone might have a key published. Maybe step back from the keyboard and breathe a bit?
Yes please, practice what you preach.
I think most people don't know that, and/or don't know how to separate the two. At any rate, it's not particularly convenient. Most people will just generate one set of keys to use, regardless of the intended purpose(s).
Regardless, let's again realize that PGP keys can be used for more than just encrypting email. Maybe I'm using it to encrypt, but not for email.
> Yes please, practice what you preach.
Not sure what you mean. Attempting to equate the tone and words of my comment with that of the toplevel commenter seems a bit in bad faith.
So, the point about rudeness. PGP keyservers exist for the sole purpose of letting you advertise your keys. Shaming people who used keyservers for what they were designed for is what's rude here. Actually, more than rude. It's a trap.
Next, about actually thinking about all the reasons for uploading keys to a keyserver. Can you actually name a use case that you consider legitimate for discovering encryption keys through a public keyserver? Because your point seems to be that people upload them unwillingly.
You shouldn't be quick to accuse people of rudeness and bad faith in those with different perspectives.
> I think most people don't know that, and/or don't know how to separate the two.
I'm sure people will understand what "sign only" means when GPG prompts the user to choose what kind of keys to create.
1. You define a PGP key signature in the package metadata.
2. If you are a part of the Arch Linux project, the key will get installed in user's system as part of the archlinux-keyring package.
3. At package installation time, if your key is not already present, it will look it up on a keyserver. It will then prompt the user if they want to trust this key.
4. If it can't look up the key, it will reject package installation.
I see downthread that Debian works similarly, and also I've seen some people rely on this for publishing signed artifacts on github releases also.
So here's an interface for key creation in gpg
$ gpg --full-gen-key
gpg (GnuPG) 2.4.4; Copyright (C) 2024 g10 Code GmbH
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Please select what kind of key you want:
(1) RSA and RSA
(2) DSA and Elgamal
(3) DSA (sign only)
(4) RSA (sign only)
(9) ECC (sign and encrypt) *default*
(10) ECC (sign only)
(14) Existing key from card
There's also --quick-gen-key which doesn't show this info.Now put yourself in the boots of a new user: Why would you pick to have a key with less features? Maybe the user thinks they may want to encrypt something in the future. Not to mention, many people did this process years ago, and forgot what they picked.
Then you publish that key with gpg send-keys or the keys.openpgp.org web interface, possibly at a later date, then you just pick the one key ID that you have.
And now you have a key published for signing and encryption, with no intention to use GPG email.
Also, any user of a tool should at least check what the primary purposes of that tool are.
I have keys uploaded to PGP directories that I have in the past used for Git commits, and use today for linux package signing.
I've never used encrypted email, so it would be surprising for people to try use it to send email.
This is a common feature provided by privacy oriented email providers. The idea is that the provider will only have access to the unencrypted email at entry to the server but not after that. The email of course can't be signed in any meaningful way, but the original unencrypted message wasn't signed either. This strikes me as the sort of thing that you would want the user to specify a particular key for, but I suppose Protonmail is attempting to increase usability by making it as automatic as possible.
Honestly, what is the complaint here? If you don’t want people to use certain contact info don’t put it on the open internet.
To get your key in that key server not only do you have to submit it you have to verify it via email. It’s literally… to spread it widely… to anyone who wants it… so they can send you encrypted mail. That’s the entire purpose of the thing.
Like if i put my phone number on a billboard I have no right to complain when I get calls.
Take responsibility for your actions.
“ However long we postpone it, we eventually lie down alone in that notoriously un- comfortable bed, the one we make ourselves. Whether or not we sleep in it depends, of course, on whether or not we respect ourselves.” Joan Didion https://www.vogue.com/article/joan-didion-self-respect-essay...