The judges are checked and balanced by executive appointment, and legislative confirmation. They also can be impeached by the legislature. Same as it ever was: perhaps this is no longer sufficient, but surely it is not new?
The legislature, setting up this agency as a parallel judiciary/executive that both prosecutes cases and judges them, while also insulated from the presidential oversight, is setting up something accountable only to Congress, and unchecked.
The supremacy here which you advocate here semi-explicitly is Congressional supremacy. It could be argued this is better! It is more directly democratic, after all, and it’s probably more like parliamentary systems. But it’s sure not what the US constitution went for in the eighteenth century, nor has anyone amended it since.
I don't deny that the judicial branch has the authority to review these semi-judicial schemes designed by the legislative branch. What I find concerning is the broader conclusion: that the legislative branch may effectively have no regulatory power behind its statutory power, and that all regulatory decisions or adjudications would have to flow through a judicial process instead of the competent agency or department.
In effect, this would both gum up the US's regulatory machinery by making legislative acts themselves toothless. That seems pretty bad to me, and not in keeping with the enumerated powers of each branch.
I think of the FAA, FDA, and the like as being part of the executive branch, not the legislative. Quick Google seems to back that up (and it matches my model of checks and balances from civics.)
The basic breakdown is this:
Lawmaking: Congress
Law Enforcement: The President and all agencies under him
Adjudication and guarantor of due process: Federal Judiciary
Regulations often get confused with law, but they’re not law so much as either 1) guidance as to how that agency interprets the laws that Congress passes within their enforcement domain and will be proceeding with how they enforce it or 2) orders issued by the President or his cabinet as to how an agency lower in the hierarchy is to proceed.
Where the NLRB is being challenged (as had the FTC and SEC has been recently) is that in addition to authorizing the agencies in question, Congress vested them with some limited amount of adjudication powers related to their enforcement domain which have in turn tried to limit access to Article III judicial review by saying you have to go through their internal court processes first before you can get access to the Federal Judiciary to review the case.
If you think that violates separation of powers, Amazon and SpaceX do too. Theoretically handling everything within a single agency might be more efficient, but that’s to the government’s benefit to the detriment of the rights of Amazon and SpaceX to due process and Judicial oversight of the Executive branch.
And does any of these companies include an arbitration clause in any of their contracts?
Or to their benefit when the regulations affect their competitors, often to the detriment of the rest of us.
There should be a time limit beyond which the Supreme Court cannot act. If nobody has challenged the constitutionality of something in 10 or 20 years, it should be implicitly constitutional, and no court opinion should be allowed to change that. Similarly, if the Supreme Court has already made a decision, it should not change it unless the relevant laws or the relevant parts of the constitution have changed. The right way of changing the constitutional status of an established practice should be changing the constitution itself.
If the legislature was getting screwed by this arrangement there would be a lot less deadlock in congress and the power of the judicial branch would be relatively less. And somehow this take is somehow less cynical then yours? What a world we live in.
> Originalism is a method of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Originalists assert that legal text should be interpreted based on the original understanding at the time of adoption. Originalists object to the idea of the significant legal evolution being driven by judges in a common law framework and instead favor modifications of laws through the Legislature or through Constitutional amendment.
> Proponents of originalism argue that originalism was the primary method of legal interpretation in America from the time of its founding until the time of the New Deal, when competing theories of interpretation grew in prominence.
Note that this philosophy -- for better or worse -- runs counter to many modern rulings of courts.
Example of decisions that differed from accepted understanding of the Constitution+Amendments at time of ratification:
* Gideon v Wainwright
* Lemon v Kurtzman
* Roe v Wade
* Obergefell v Hodges
It was not universally believed that public school segregation was compatible with the 14th Amendment when it was ratified.
Originalists may have something to say about the legal reasoning in the opinion, but Brown's victory itself is not a counterexample.
I've never heard an originalist say anything but that Brown v Board conformed to the original meaning of the 14th amendment.
If you want judicial philosophies that produce only moral outcomes, regardless of law, you don't even need laws.
That's because originalists are hypocrites.
> I don't see how "it starkly reveals how untenable originalism is."
Because if originalists were not hypocrites, if the actually practiced originalism consistently, they would be calling for the repeal of Brown and Loving and advancing a whole host of other radical ideas that no sane person supports, and everyone would see how intellectually and morally bankrupt they are.
> If you want judicial philosophies that produce only moral outcomes, regardless of law, you don't even need laws.
I want a judicial philosophy that is, at a bare minimum, internally consistent. Originalism as it is actually practiced by self-identified originalists doesn't even meet that basic criterion. Originalists are originalists only when it suits their political agenda.
Loving is a terrible counterexample. Following the 14th Amendment, there were no anti-miscegenation laws (or they lingered dormant). Not to mention the democratic debate in passing the 14th Amendment, had many legal assertions that the amendment would invalidate such laws.
That the 14th Amendment was democratically -- if contentiously -- adopted by the people with the express consequence of ending racial discrimination (education, marriage) is a ridiculously easy case to make.
Yes, that's possible. But the (ostensible) rules of originalism are not exactly rocket science.
> Following the 14th Amendment, there were no anti-miscegenation laws (or they lingered dormant).
That statement has the form of "Santa Claus exists (or the sky is blue)." It's technically not false, but it is not a good-faith argument either. There absolutely were anti-miscegenation laws in 1865; such laws date back to 1691. So there is absolutely no possible originalist justification for Loving. When Loving was decided, anti-miscegenation laws had been on the books continuously since long before the United States even declared independence from Britain.
>That the 14th Amendment was democratically -- if contentiously -- adopted by the people with the express consequence of ending racial discrimination (education, marriage) is a ridiculously easy case to make.
None of that is even remotely close to being true. You are either not arguing in goof faith, or you are profoundly ignorant of history. The passage of the 14th Amendment was followed by 100 years of uncontested Jim Crow laws [2]. Even today the Republican party is hard at work finding new and creative ways to disenfranchise minority voters [3-8, and I could have gone on and on and on].
---
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interracial_marriage_in_the_Un...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Crow_laws
[3] https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/09/29/stacking-the-deck-how-t...
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/trump-republi...
[5] https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659784277/republican-voter-su...
[6] https://pbswisconsin.org/news-item/republican-election-tacti...
[7] https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-...
[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/vot...
[1] https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/government-pro... "Fifth Circuit Holds That SEC’s Use of In-House Courts to Adjudicate Enforcement Actions Is Unconstitutional"
How is the NRLB "controlled by elected branches" but judicial systems are not? Judges are appointed, not elected - actually, some lower court judges are elected. Same with the NRLB. It's just changing authority from one completely unelected branch of government to another branch that has a mix of elections and appointments.
This is going to confuse people.
Not in the Federal government they’re not. All Federal Judges are appointed from the lowest to the highest.
Some States have variations though from fully elected judges to retention elections, effectively turning their judges into politicians too.
(The argument is not that the NLRB itself is elected, or needs to be. It's whether the judicial branch has the authority to diminish Congress or the Executive's statutory authorities as enumerated under the constitution.)
Second: the relevant decision here is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, which puts it succinctly[1]:
> Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.
I'm not aware of a more recent ruling that changes that doctrine.
Maybe SpaceX/Amazon's legal argument approach is similar to the Supreme Court's ruling that EPA didn't have authority from Congress for dictating emissions standards:
https://www.google.com/search?q=supreme+court+limits+epa
Maybe Amazon/SpaceX thinks a Republican-majority Supreme Court could be receptive to their arguments and limit NLRB's authority.
> Alienating a right is different from exercising it or waiving it in a particular case. A police officer comes to my door and asks to look around my apartment; if I give my permission, I have waived my right. But the next time he comes, he must ask again, and if he is refused he cannot rely on my previous permission.
[0]: https://www.bostonreview.net/forum_response/jeremy-waldron-i...
Example: Many, many contracts explicitly say that any waiver of a contract right is only one-time, so as to rule out an argument by an opposing party that the waiver was continuing.
Example: If you enlist in the military, you waive — on an ongoing basis — your Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, because the Uniform Code of Military Justice prescribes who can sit as a member of a court-martial [plural: courts-martial].
So in the context we're discussing, calling rights "inalienable" or "unalienable" is not a helpful concept.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T_Mobility_LLC_v._Concepc... (binding arbitration overrides state law)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/business/supreme-court-up... (binding arbitration overrides labor protection)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/supreme-court-backs-... (binding arbitration overrides consumer protections even in cases of fraudulent deceptive advertising)
And just imagine if you said it was protected from slavery ... would that mean all corporations are suddenly free of the dictates of their executives, their boards, their shareholders.
Exactly what would this emancipated entity be?
> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
If you break it, it's a breach of contract, not a criminal act and you didn't break any laws.
There are some severe problems both in theory and in practice, but that's the rough justification.
At the risk of spamming (I think I've pasted this link several times recently) I've been compiling as much information as possible here. https://arbitrationinformation.org/docs/problems/
https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/01/supreme-court-likely-to-d...
The ultimate power to make policy choices should be made by lawmakers who can be voted out. Bureaucrats are too insulated. An individual bureaucrat can't feasibly be fired by either a President or the Congress.
FWIW I think there's a difference here between the big-C Conservative politicians and judges who are hopelessly corrupt, vs the run-of-the-mill small-c conservative voters who keep voting for them because of virtue signals (guns, abortion, defense, anti-wokism, whatever). The corruption isn't really a high concern to them, either a positive or negative, as long as they get their values enshrined into political power.
It's not really SCOTUS vs the Executive, it's whatever pathway to power they have available at any given juncture in history. They're very good at pivoting and projecting! Not to say it's admirable, but it's undoubtedly very effective, having captured almost the entirety of the US power structure over the last decade while also striving to make sure their liberal opponents cannot easily reverse those gains. Having so thoroughly captured SCOTUS that they can rewrite/reinterpret the Constitution at will is just the latest move in a long series of such maneuvers over the past decades, skillfully executed.
Yes that is literally what conservatives have always stood for since we developed the term "conservative" to stand for that kind of political stance. Back then it was to preserve the power of the French aristocracy over the rising calls for democracy. Today it's to preserve the power of the wealthy and over that of everyone that has to actually work for a living.
They use different tactics, deflections, and posturing to justify their positions, and are willing to give different kinds of concessions in order to achieve those goals today, but it's been essentially the same overarching theme for a couple hundred years. A well-functioning democracy (in this case, one where employees can organize to negotiate the terms of their employment) is an obstacle to them that they want to clear.
Local is best. Send this kind of thing back to states where it belongs.
The ATF is one of the worst examples, but the NLRB here is also wrong.
I understand this will come with a reflexive downvote from many who don’t like the outcome, but this has been warned about for decades: Administrative law isn’t. The executive has no right to act as the police, legislative, and judiciary at the same time.
This is true even if it gives you the outcomes you personally want.
Are you sure they're not from people who think this sort of preemptive griping looks like a manipulation attempt.
2) post unpopular (sincere) opinion, with a disclaimer that you expect to get downvoted: Get accused of being manipulative
3) wrap said unpopular opinion in flowery emotional language “I’m not an X by any means, but I think Y” still get downvoted and flagged
4) pretend/lie: post what the hive mind wants and get upvotes
The system encourages you to lie, in fact it rewards you for betraying your convictions and just posting what you think others want to hear. Your post is accusing me (subtly) of posting in bad faith, when in fact bad faith posting is what would make my karma go up.
Frankly while I don't think the "originalist" interpretation here is correct, clearly early congresses delegated broad and vague authority to executive in various matters, I actually think it's one of the weaknesses of the original intent of the founders. I assume, given that the early American elite was a relatively small group of people with a lot in common, they didn't foresee the need to micromanage each other in such matters.
Now that executive employs millions of people, I think it's necessary. Like, when CDC can suspend probably the most common private contract in the country (rent) under the delegated authority to fight diseases, this is a step too far for me; and even if you don't think so, what would you think of China-style extreme lockdowns? There needs to be a way to draw the line over vague delegation of power. If IMPROVES checks and balances - judicial can check the executive. Congress can still explicitly give executive the authority it needs and override the judges.
Same for NLRB - pass labor law as the normal laws that the normal judges can interpret.
Next stop, make Commerce Clause unimportant again ;)
If this interpretation is correct, the consequences are disturbing: a ruling against the NLRB here would imply absolute judicial supremacy, and not a system of checks and balances. In effect, it'd break the US Government's regulatory backbone: any regulatory decision could be challenged not within its statutory limits (or for exceeding its statutory limits), but on the basis of statutory regulation itself being unconstitutional. In effect, it would amount to a government whose regulatory framework is not controlled by the elected branches, but by the sole unelected one.