1) Define “free”
2) How do you test your hypothesis?
You’re trying to apply logic to an untestable philosophical debate. If you believe free will doesn’t exist, you can’t design an experiment that would invalidate that belief. And if your theory is untestable and unfalsifiable, then what good is it other than a creative exercise?
However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:
https://www.thegreatcoursesdaily.com/quantum-universe-fundam....
So, we do know that the universe is not pre-determined and cannot be calculated in advance, but if you want to believe in humans as fully deterministic (or some other definition of no free will) inside of a non-deterministic environment, I haven’t heard anyone propose an experiment that could test that, at which point the debate of “free will” is relegated to the realm of thought experiments rather than science.
So, perhaps the better question is: Does it serve you better to believe there is free will or no free will? And leave it at that.
This is reversing the burden of proof. The issue with "free will" is getting those who think there is a meaningful "free will" concept to actually define what they mean.
Look through this discussion and see the comments trying to justify the existence of free will, and look for definitions of what they actually mean by that.
> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:
That's a meaningless distinction in this context. The point is that nobody has presented a mechanism whereby you can inject any form of agency that fits a definition of "free" (see your own point: define "free") that doesn't devolve to smoke and mirrors that way.
In order to do so, there'd need to be something that would lead to measurable biases in outcomes that can not be explained by the probabilities.
The rest of your argument devolves to Russel's teapot: As long as nobody has posited a reasonable definition that'd give rise to a theory of what free will might mean, the notion is so absurd that it is entirely reasonable to say that free will makes no sense.
If you can present a definition that can't easily be shown to be just smoke and mirrors and which somehow makes sense to people, even without coming up with ways of actually testing it, I might be tempted to moderate that claim, but I've had these discussions with people for decades, and in none of them have anyone ever managed to come up with a cohesive definition of what free will would even mean that doesn't very easily start looking distinctly "unfree".
There are clearly definitions of free will that would allow something you label with that term to exist. But I challenge you to come up with one that people would agree is both "free" and "will".
No, in response to someone vaguely mentioning the words “free will”, you made the claim: “Free will does not exist.”
The burden of proof is now on you to provide evidence of your claim as well as on you to define the terms contained within your claim.
I am not arguing the “free will” debate either way for the reasons mentioned previously and do not care to define the terms as the entire debate is nothing more than a creative thought experiment as far as I can tell.
If I claim Russel's teapot doesn't exist, the burden of proof is on you to prove it exists if you disagree with me, not me, because the set of claims that are so poorly defined and unlikely as to make it an unjustified burden to expect anyone to caveat the claims to make them technically correct is infinite - someone who makes an extraordinary claim without being able to provide a justification therefore needs to be prepared to take on the burden of proof.
I equally claim that santa doesn't exist, and yet will insist the burden of anyone disagreeing with my claim lies on them, not on me, even if I make the initial claim, for exactly that reason.
In this case the claim that free will does not exists puts the burden on those who disagree *because nobody here or otherwise* have presented a definition of free will that most people would agree to, not least because without narrowing the scope with a definition I have the freedom to apply whichever definition I prefer, and I have several places in this thread.
E.g. I'd argue that "free will" would require an entity to be able to do something which cannot be explained by the combination of determinism and randomness. Given we're unaware of any kind of processes that can produce outputs that are not either deterministic or random modulated by some sort of probabilistic distribution, to claim that a process that can produce such an output exist is an extraordinary claim that would give you a Nobel in physics if you could demonstrate it.
As such: Russel's teapot.
I'd love to be wrong. I'd love for someone here to come up with a definition of free will that overcomes that problem, as if so I'd be witnessing a revolution in philosophy surpassing anything we've seen in centuries.
Just like I'd be delighted to be wrong when I say that santa doesn't exist, but I do believe I'm far more likely to be proven wrong about santa than free will, given that people can at least come up with definitions of santa that are somewhat coherent if unlikely.
If someone says they experienced free will today when they chose to stand up, it’s on you to disprove that it couldn’t possibly happen to anyone ever, or come up with a definition of free will that means they couldn’t possibly experience what they claim to be experiencing. To them their experience is real. You’re claiming it’s not, so I don’t think Russell’s teapot applies here. I think you have set forth a bold claim that someone is not experiencing what they report they are experiencing.
> I'd argue that "free will" would require an entity to be able to do something which cannot be explained by the combination of determinism and randomness
What is your benchmark for determinism? No technology we have can predict or determine a human action. While it’s reasonable to assume that humans are deterministic, it’s still just a theory at this point. If I put the onus on you to prove determinisms in humans, you’d certainly win the Nobel as well.
That’s kind of my point is that both sides of the free will debate are a far cry from having enough evidence or the ability to conduct an experiment to settle the issue. Yet many believe they experience free will everyday and many don’t, because it’s a subjective experience.
As such it's on them to first state a complete hypothesis of what happened to them, because absent that it is not even possible to start disproving it, and so rejecting it out of hand is perfectly justified just as much as it's justified rejecting Russel's teapot.
> What is your benchmark for determinism?
That everything we have so far observed with any kind of precision has turned out to be predictable to our level of precision or to show no sign of deviating from randomness.
Determinism is also a falsifiable theory: All you need to disprove it is to show the existence of a type of events which are biased in ways which can't be explained in a mechanistic or by randomness.
The total lack of such examples, despite a very substantial amounts of claims, which always collapses under scrutiny, gives me as much confidence in determinism as in gravity.
Our understanding of gravity could be massively off too - I'd consider it far more likely that we'll need to revise our understanding of gravity than determinism, because a non-deterministic model would require a fundamental change in logic to accommodate another category of causality which can not be modelled as a computation over a combination of mechanistic determinism and randomness and without just introducing regress (the last part there is essential to rule out "God did it" or "we're in a simulation" answers, both of which just lifts the question one level up).
The first step in falsifying determinism is to actually find a way of determining whether or not an event fits that criteria to show that it's even logically possible for such events to exist. Just that would get your name in the history books. Of philosophy anyway. And if anyone could present a logically sound argument for how such events could exist, it would seriously shatter my world view. I'd love that anyway because it'd force us to rethink a whole lot of things about the world from scratch. Unfortunately I think I'm more likely to meet santa.
> Yet many believe they experience free will everyday and many don’t, because it’s a subjective experience.
People's subjective experience is not in question. I feel like I make free choices every day as well. I feel like I'm exercising one right now in choosing to answer you. That does not give me any reason to presume that feeling reflects the underlying processes. That subjective experience have no bearing on the issue.
It’s a philosophical debate, not a science experiment. In philosophy, a declarative statement asserting the affirmative is always true is just as big a fallacy as saying the negative is always true.
That is not true, quantum mechanics - more specifically the Schrödinger equation - is deterministic. What is not deterministic is the wave function collapse but that is also incompatible with the Schrödinger equation because it implies non-unitary evolution of the wave function. And we have - as far as I know - no really good ideas how to resolve this. In consequence I think it would be premature to declare that the universe is definitively non-deterministic.
> One of the key implications of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is that it highlights the probabilistic nature of the universe
[1] https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/63811/is-the-uni...
> Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics is given by another "evolution" that the wavefunction may experience: wavefunction collapse.
I’ll give you that it’s not a fully settled issue though:
> According to the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, it does mean the universe is non-deterministic. There are other interpretations of QM which allow for determinism though. Which is the correct interpretation (if any)? Currently, no one knows.
Here’s another article: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/29/the-battle-for...
> Most physicists would not regard the events in our universe as deterministic, or clockwork if you insist; they are in fact considered probabilistic
> randomness (ie indeterminism) has been proven to be real by the National Institute for Science and Technology’s work on a randomness beacon.
This is not true, and there are consistent interpretations of QM that are fully deterministic (many worlds, superdeterminism, pilot wave).
Still, probabilistic vs deterministic makes no difference. There is no free will in a throw of the dice, and no free will in the wave function collapse.
On the other hand, the main philosophical position on this is compatibilism: free will in a fully deterministic universe (or probabilistic one). If you think of yourself as the sum total of all your experiences and genetics, your next action is of course determined by these; but, another agent in your shoes, one with different experiences and genetics, would make a different choice. So in this framework, your choice, even though uniquely determined by everything that happened before, and theoretically predictable 1000 years in advance, is still meaningfully "your choice".
In fact, random chance hurts this definition, and weakens the case for compatibilism; if your next action is entirely dependent on some random quantum fluctuation, and running the experiment with your exact same experience and genetics but a different random quantum event at this exact time would produce 1000 entirely different actions on your part, then it is very hard to imagine any kind of free will. So, free will actually depends on some amount of determinism. Even the type of determinism in Many Worlds would not solve this - since in that interpretation, all possible outcomes of the quantum event actually happen, so all your "choices" that depend on the random event are fully real. So, if each of the fully real copies of you, with the exact same experiences and genetics, does a wildly different thing, then it's pretty clear there is no meaningful free will in any possible sense.
For what it's worth, I don't see any reason to imagine that hard decisions are of any other quality than easy decisions. It's part of my history and experience just as much that I prefer to eat salty foods than sweet ones as it is that I sometimes abstain from eating that pizza to try to manage my waistline, or refuse that job offer because I don't want to work for a company I don't find ethical.
But I'm not sure what to make of your second paragraph - doesn't saying there are hard and easy decisions require there be a difference of quality between the categories?
> doesn't saying there are hard and easy decisions require there be a difference of quality between the categories?
Not necessarily. There is a difference of "quantity" if you want, but not quality. It's like the following model: it's easy to compute 1+1, and it's hard to compute 19312123+123468. But they are not qualitatively different, they don't need different explanations: they both have the same nature, they use the same algorithm, one is just a bigger amount of state than the other.
I'm not sure there are alternatives to these.
Here's why I believe in free will: The preferences of the energy are subjective, not objective[1]. Its inputs are dictated by the architecture it resides in, but the meaning it attaches to them are determined internally and infinitely[2] more complex. So for example, someone who loves exercising gets very much the same nerve signals as someone who hates it. The difference is in the meaning each attaches to the experience, and meaning is not objective.
[1] AKA 'the hard problem of consciousness' [2] Insofar as internal communication happens across a higher-dimensional manifold than its communication with the architecture. For ease of visualization I imagine a three-dimensional gas interacting with the two-dimensional surface of a building, but I am working on a model that properly accounts for time.
But it's okay, I understand if you have no choice but to argue with that.
From a pragmatic analysis the answer is pretty straightforward[1] (Spoiler, believing in free will is better if you value moral behaviour). Glad I chose to believe in free will!
[1]https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9280.200...
But the question seems to me more about pragmatism vs realism than pragmatism vs. realism with 'some beliefs-as-if'. I find realism unsatisfying philosophically because we can see historical beliefs being so off the mark that we'd have to live in a pretty special time to have anything close to a realistic model of the universe, I think making good predictions is simply the best tool that we have. If that comes at the cost of having a single internally-consistent model of the universe, that's unfortunate, but at least I'm not attached to the wrong one. So if my belief in free will and my belief in Newtonian Mechanics are incompatible, that's not such a big deal to me as a pragmatist. In fact it's a useful feature of the metaphysics, since the places they come into conflict give an idea of where they're incomplete.
It doesn't seem worth spending much time here, lest the entire argument becomes nothing more than a semantic one. If your definition of "free will" is "this thing that I undeniably feel" then sure, you've made it undeniable by definition.
Do we? Quantum mechanics looks like there is genuine randomness, but one interpretation of experiments testing the Bell inequalities is non-locality. It could be completely deterministic, we just don't know what determines it.
At a first approximation there are obviously limits to our “free” will as no one has yet been able to will themselves to float through the air without support, go without food or water indefinitely, pop a pet dragon into existence, survive the physical destruction of their brain, etc.
So it’s hard to start from a position that anyone ever seriously thought “free will” meant no limits or dependencies.
Personally I'm happy with other definitions, not because I feel I'm doing mental gymnastics, but because the version you give is clearly not what normal people mean by it when they refer to it. It might well be related to what philosophers argue about, but normal people who offer you a 'free choice' or who say that you did something 'of your own free will' do not mean anything like 'your choice was not a function of the state of the universe'.
Despite being happy with those other definitions that you aren't, I'm equally skeptical of the idea that free will has to be rescued just because different points in time can be observed simultaneously. What does someone even mean by free will if it can't cope with that?
There's certainly a duality here where it's fine to talk about people having choices even if one strictly believe they don't, but my experience is that if anything people tend to often get exasperated or outright agitated if you try to question to what extent their decisions are free. A whole lot of human society is organised around the idea that we have agency and that we're the product of choices we've made of our own volition.
E.g. if you genuinely believe the notion that we have free will is nonsense (and I do), then the logical extension is to be very uncomfortable with the notion of e.g. prison used for vengeance or anything at all other than to the bare minimal extent required to protect others, because the logical conclusion of thinking people don't have agency is that there was no way other than other external stimuli in their lives that they could have come out making other decisions.
It's a very uncomfortable thing to view society through a lens of seeing free will as an illusion. But it's also very hard to unsee the lack of any kind of coherent theory of free will that could justify anything else.
The reality is that if you actually talk to people about this, you'll quickly find that most people go through life with a very strong belief that they have agency and that people around them have agency, but the moment you start to question what that belief is based on, the basis for it tends to start to crumble very, very quickly. As I've said elsewhere, in decades of discussing this subject I've never seen someone come up with a definition of "free will" that still looks either "free" or like "will" under scrutiny. Usually you end up with people trying variations of arguments that just leads to infinite regress (e.g. arguing our soul gives us free will, at which point the question just shifts to a definition soul that would give it agency).
Not really. You can view it as a game theoretic situation. Will the use of prison likely produce a good outcome or a bad outcome? Whether or not the criminal was deterministically required to commit the crime, the structure of punishments will (perhaps deterministically) affect the incidents and severity of future crimes.
Just because the creature in Black and White may have made decisions deterministically doesn't mean I won't punish it if it behaves in an inappropriate way. If anything, believing the agents are deterministic would make me even more keen to punish in situations where it will change behaviour usefully.
These discussions are always interestingly recursive, since if I do not believe in free will then my own view on free will is itself not a free choice. And yet I still feel strongly that my not believing in free will appears to be my free choice.
I agree that there are still people who needs to be locked up, including under possibly brutal sentencing terms. E.g. Anders Behring Breivik who carried out the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway is up on a parole hearing today - if he gets out (it'd take a miracle) it doesn't matter if it's free will (in any sense of the term) or purely deterministic processes that leads him to act if he is still probabilistically likely to carry out another attack - it's still more important to keep the public safe from him than to worry about whether or not he had a genuine choice.
To the extent there's a measurable effect of seeing the punishment of others, that too might be a justification, though I find that dicier. But if that is done based on a cold calculation of how it affects offending rates that to me is still very different from vengeance.
So to be clear I'm not arguing it removes the justifications for punishments, and I agree with your mention of seeing it as a game theoretic situation - even really harsh punishments might be the best choice in some circumstances. But it removes "they chose this themselves" or "they deserve it" as a justification (the feeling is still valid; acting on it becomes cruel), and that makes for a very different legal system. It also shifts a focus towards considering that if it's not about vengeance, then you should look at how to actually optimise the balance between the public good and treating the prisoners as humanely as you can without reducing the public benefit of the punishment too much.
Norway is far from achieving that, but if you look at e.g. Bastøy fengsel [1] ([2] has links to assorted longer articles), you can get one idea of what de-emphasising vengeance and taking rehabilitation and trying to address reoffending rates might start to look like (though Norway has by no means solved that, Bastøy also certainly haven't made it worse, but it also is not the norm in Norway either - yet anyway). For some people, it might well be that harsher prisons works better, or are necessary (I doubt Breivik will ever get the chance to serve his time somewhere like Bastøy for example). (Bastøy is the - so far - culmination of a process of reform that started in the 1960's, at a point where Norwegian prisons were quite brutal and the brutality of it eventually triggered a strong counter-reaction.)
For others even less prison (Norway as it is have sentences that would look comically short for e.g. Americans or British people). But evaluating it as a "game theoretic situation" as you say would in any case very likely lead to very major change to how the legal system would work most places in the world (including Norway)
So, as to 'they chose this themselves', that's begging the question a little - as we've already seen I think that believing in determinism doesn't stop you from believing that people can choose things. As to 'they deserve it', questions of what people deserve is a huge other topic, and I think it's most likely possible to define desert in terms that fit within a deterministic viewpoint.
However, perhaps you're right about its effect since I do in fact think that vengeance is a thoroughly dumb rationale for treating people badly. This is to such an extent that I'd feel surprised to find anyone seriously try to justify it, which is why I didn't really engage with your apparent suggestion that it was an important justification. There are lots of ways you can try to justify criminal punishment in my view but 'vengeance' doesn't fit into any moral system I consider valuable unless it's actually being used as a code for game theoretic concerns or rehabilitation.
But I don't feel so strange thinking this, since most people I know think the same, even those who don't share my views on free will and I'm pretty sure I believed it before I came to that conclusion on free will.
I mean, a key example of how vengeance still plays into punishment is the level of support for capital punishment.
I'm glad we find it equally unjustified.
Also, I agree that you certainly can dismiss vengeance as a valid argument without dismissing free will, btw. - a lot of people who do believe in some variant of free will absolutely do reject vengeance. My point was more to offer up an example of something that is very hard to reconcile with rejecting free will.
I think this lacks imagination for human cruelty. If they had no free choice but to steal my things, then I guess I don't have any free choice but to torture them in revenge. Hard determinism does not erase the possibility of punishment.
With respect to using hard determinism as an excuse for vengeance, keep in mind that even a society that buys into the lack of moral justification for vengeance on a hard determinist basis will still have every reason to punish you for it purely based on the expected effect on future offending (by you or others).
This is one of the things that often cause people to react to a determinist view: They tend to think that it either makes it pointless to make choices because they have no control, or that it makes everything a free for all because you have no responsibility.
But the problem with that line of thinking is that we don't get to "step out of the illusion". We live within a world where irrespective of whether your choices are free, you do make them - choosing to do nothing (or anything) because your choices are not free is in itself a choice, and has consequences that may be good or bad for you. Making choices because you think you can use lack of free will as an excuse may or may not end well for you even if your choice to do so was not free.
It seems to do so either by erasing justification entirely (thus permitting anything), or by making it impossible to justify reforming any one person (by removing moral responsibility).
That is, under hard determinism, either society does not have to bother justifying anything it would like to do in response to what it considers a crime, or if you think moral justifications for actions are still required, it makes it impossible to actually say "person X requires rehabilitation", because placing such blame requires free will from which moral responsibility follows.
There's this dialog from some centuries ago (I guess it's from some Enlightenment philosopher?) that goes like this
- Guards, please, set this murderer free: he has no free will, so he can't be held responsible for his actions.
And the guard replies
- Uhm.. no. But if I'm making a mistake, don't worry: per your own explanation, I can't be held responsible for it either.
edit: this view was echoed in another comment, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29985738
Then you need to genuinely accept that you're not right, you're not making a cogent argument, you're just a fly buzzing around a giant turd.
Or rather you don't, cause you can't.
What, specifically, is not cogent about his argument?
I think you'll find that if you think about it rationally, there really is no other conclusion without invoking mysticism.
First is that while an argument is being made, absent subjective agency on his part he is no more than a candle flame illuminating the room. The candle once lit must illuminate - it cannot do anything else. And so I grant in the sense of a flame burns, he makes an argument - but without subjective agency, while an argument us being made I’m not sure what precisely we mean by he.
Second absent free will, truth seeking has no more transcendent meaning or inherent value than a fly’s turd seeking. Love, wisdom, justice simply are, and are no better or worse than hate, ignorance or cruelty.
Your rejection on the basis of my claim that none of us have free will is logically unsound whether we have free will or not.
> Second absent free will, truth seeking has no more transcendent meaning or inherent value than a fly’s turd seeking. Love, wisdom, justice simply are, and are no better or worse than hate, ignorance or cruelty.
I agree with that. Nothing has any inherent meaning or value. The meaning or value in everything is merely the value we subjectively assign to it. That does not remove that value. The subjective experience is just as good or bad whether or not it's based on values we've merely assigned to it without any choice in the matter.
To me this notion that we need free will to value the feeling of freedom or the beauty of love, wisdom and justice is bizarre. The experience is the same whether or not the underlying choices are free or purely deterministic.
I'm a hard determinist, materialist, atheist, yet I spent a large portion of my youth writing goofy sentimental romantic poetry - the two are not in conflict; I can recognise love is a biochemical reaction following a chain of deterministic events and still feel it.
There is no denial that the subjective experience of free will is real, even to a free will denier. That is, we're not talking about qualia. See the distinction of 'hard' free will.
So in fact there was no absence of subjective agency. But I get your point. You hold the belief that free will deniers are themselves automatons. A strange but expected reversal of conclusions--understandable, as yet it's more of that reflexive defensiveness on display.
And to your second point, for your statement to follow, you'll first have to show that truth seeking has transcendent meaning or inherent value in the first place. That sounds as tough to solve as the free will debate ;).
I guess I am loathe to throw something so essential and universal to the human experience out the window.
I think many people get into verbal and philosophic contortions because like me they find it difficult to accept something which goes against their fundamental experience, and yet unlike me they're unable to let go of a materialist reductionist view of the universe.
> reflexive defensiveness
Reflexive - that is to say not controlled by me. ;-)
As to my second point, I cannot show that. I believe without proof that existence has meaning, justice, truth, wisdom are good and to be sought, and ignorance, slavery, cruelty are bad and to be rejected.
I just don't agree that the underlying reality of it is that there's anything "free" about it any more than e.g. a movie character has free will.
Yet that movie character will still make choices within their movie world that matters to the character, even though the choices are all illusory, and even the characters existence is illusory.
(I'd go much further and argue that we can't tell if space or time has any existence independent of a single instant of sentience, but it doesn't matter - the only thing that matters is that we experience it as if it has; the fundamental defence of philosophical materialism against philosophical idealism is exactly that: it doesn't matter; we have to act as if reality is as we sense it, whatever we know or believe we know about it)
I don't see the contradiction. I don't go around living my life thinking that what I do don't matter because the choices aren't free. They feel real and feel free, and the consequences are real whether or not the choice was truly free.
The only thing it changes is perhaps how I look back at things, and some views on morality:
I try not to have regrets (I do sometimes, because whatever my views I can not override all feelings, and would not wish to anyway), because while I may wish I had acted differently, I am pretty good at accepting that I couldn't have. I can try to act differently in the future, and hope I actually will, but what happened in the past, happened.
At the same time I can feel angry about how someone else acts but recognise that while that may inform how I act around them in the future because it may say something about how they will act in the future, it feels immoral to me to seek vengeance (that doesn't mean I can't feel a strong urge to, because the feelings are still real).
> As to my second point, I cannot show that. I believe without proof that existence has meaning, justice, truth, wisdom are good and to be sought, and ignorance, slavery, cruelty are bad and to be rejected.
And that's entirely fine, and I would largely agree because it's almost entirely orthogonal to the question of whether free will is real or just an illusion.
But you don't, cause you can't ;)
(and as the other response pointed out: this is exactly the kind of response I expect when I ask for definitions of free will, because the notion of it collapses rapidly when people try to define it)
[0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/...
You claim that causation and determination were conflated, but if the distinction between them depends on terms that can't be defined scientifically, then you haven't shown that they are different in what they refer to in the universe. It's conceivable that on a physical level causality is just a word for a property of a deterministic system.
Also, I wonder if your either/or line of reasoning depends on the Law of the Excluded middle. What happens to your reasoning if that law is not true?
A third option would have to be a wild thing - a choice would have to neither depend on the state of the universe, i.e. be determined, nor be independent of the state of the universe, i.e. be random. I personally don't see any room for a third option but there are probably a lot of things you could try to poke holes into. Is the state of the universe a meaningful concept? How does it relate to time? Does true randomness exist?
If a black box is fully deterministic to the point that you can construct a model that is entirely accurate, then there's nothing "free" about it. What you're modelling has no agency. For the notion of "free will" to have any meaning at all, it doesn't need to be "unpredictable" in the sense that it keeps confounding someone trying to predict it all the time, but it does need to deviate from predictions sometimes or you have just an automaton, and it needs to do so in a way that is fundamentally impossible to model, and it needs to do so without just injecting randomness.
I've yet to see anyone present a definition of "free will" that doesn't reduce to smoke and mirrors, because that would mean coming up with some fourth category in a venn diagram of determinism, randomness and the combination of the two where they intersect, that is non-deterministic in a way that can't be explained by layering a deterministic model and randomness.
I see no reason to think that just because something is predictable it is not free. That seems like such a strange constraint to me that I can only assume that we have different understandings of what it means to be free.
If I know someone well, I might predict that when offered a free choice between an ice cream and a brussels sprout they will choose the ice cream. The fact that I was able to predict that with an incredibly high degree of certainty didn't stop them from being free.
But pick one specific person, why would you call their pick a free choice? There choice might not be influenced by your offer but it will be by their preferences. Let them choose, rewind the universe a minute or two, let them choose again. They will make the same choice over and over and over again.
Maybe not if there is true randomness in the universe and this choice happens to be influenced by some random event.
I challenge you to describe a selection process that is not fully deterministic but where the lack of determinism is caused by something other than randomness.
That is what you need to be able to come up with to define free will in a way that isn't smoke and mirrors.
There's no agency. Nothing but automatons.
Only if you define 'agency' as requiring magic. If you think that there's no conflict (as I do) between being an automaton and having agency, then there's no problem here.
The point being that if you start asking questions to determine what people think free will means, you'll find most will argue an automaton can not have free will. In which case to "rescue" free will you need to come up with a way in which entities with supposed free will are not automatons.
So, sure, it is possible to posit an infinite set of theories of "free will" that are true. But I'd claim that nobody has so far managed to come up with one that is both true and that most people will agree fits the woolly concept of "free will" the way most people use it.
The concept is almost religious in the sense that most proponents of it are unwilling to try to nail down specific definitions that might give rise to testable hypotheses, and those who do tend to come up with definitions that are so far from the common understanding as to be meaningless.
Your definition of it being entirely nonsensical is clearly even worse than this definition for being accepted the way most people use it, since your view implies that there is nothing people mean when then say 'free will', while the fact that almost everyone can tell the difference between someone robbing a bank of their own free will and someone robbing a bank because their loved one is being held hostage tells you that it really does have meaning.
To me what you describe does not at all match what I've observed people try to defend as free will whenever you peer beneath the vague veneer of external coercion.
> Your definition of it being entirely nonsensical is clearly even worse than this definition for being accepted the way most people use it, since your view implies that there is nothing people mean when then say 'free will', when there clearly is something that is meant.
That is not at all what I meant by calling it nonsensical. I am very sure that people do mean "something" and my experience is that this "something" includes a very strongly held belief that peoples actions can't be predicted based purely on the state of their brains and inputs. Try to suggest to people that maybe they're effectively just machines, and you'll find a lot of people balking at it, because it e.g. would imply no soul or anything to set us apart.
What I meant by calling it nonsensical is that when you start probing into why people hold beliefs like that, you'll find it evaporate as you probe. You'll find people can't put up arguments for, but more critically few can even describe a version of free will that fits their beliefs.
You've given a definition, and that's great, but it's a definition that defines away the problem under discussion - nobody who argues against free will would disagree with you that there exists a feeling of being a choice making agent. We disagree with those who claim that we are choice making agents other than in the same way that an automaton can be.
So you are right in the sense that free will by the definition you have given exists. But that's not the kind of free will most people here who are denying free will are debating.
If anything, the definition you have given tends to be an important answer to those who believe in "hard free will" to disambiguate them for why you should keep making choices if you don't have free will: Because whether or not it is an illusion, we do have that feeling, and whether or not we have control over the choices made, if we don't make any choices we still suffer the consequences. So the only logical choice, illusory or not, is to still make choices as if you have free will whether or not you think we have "hard free will".
That said, once one decides that "hard free will" doesn't exist, it tends to have a significant effect on personal beliefs. E.g. punishment (as opposed to rehabilitation, or incarceration for protection) becomes cruel if you accept that "hard free will" is an illusion - a person may believe they have free will, but if it's an illusion we're punishing people for things they didn't have an actual choice in. (Note that this does not really affect the issue of coercion - a person threatened with a gun to take your example might still be due different treatement than one who did something bad without being threatened, because the latter is still more likely to be a risk to others; but there's a difference between risk mitigation/protection/rehabilitation and vengeance - if it was a truly free choice based on "hard free will" vengeance might well be morally justified, while without "hard free will" vengeance is morally horrendous)
> I don't think that these two topics really have much to do with each other, which I think can be seen by looking at what people really mean when they actually talk about free choice and free will in everyday life rather than in philosophical conversations where they're already trying to justify a position.
I certainly agree that people often conflate these two separate subjects. This is also part of why I push so much on definitions, because so much of the time we speak past each other when discussing these subjects.
How would one prove/falsify that one's actions are merely a function of their brain state and inputs?
Even assuming we have a perfect mapping of the brain and perfect measurement of all neural action, experiments still happen over time and the act of observing changes the observed, so you'd never have repeatability.
It seems to me that determinism is as unscientific as the soul hypothesis.
To raise serious questions, you don't even need to prove the existence of such an effect - just finding even individual particles reacting in ways that seems to show structure (so e.g. ruling out randomness) without a reasonable idea as to cause would justify substantial effort in identifying the cause, and each failure to identify any would successively and significantly weaken the justification for determinism.
In other words: Same as with any other hypothesis for which no experimental data in history indicates otherwise.
Given that most of our reality involves trusting cause and effect, and to an extensive amount measuring it, and no such origination has ever been shown, it is justified to consider determinism to be true until there's data to show otherwise.
What is a "non-random source of events"? Did you mean sequence of events?
Picture a band playing live on stage. Is the music produced random? Is it measurable by brain state/inputs? What if one of the musicians is slightly off tempo? What if one of them plays a wrong note? Is that sequence of events random enough? And is it still all measurable?
> each failure to identify any would successively and significantly weaken the justification for determinism
Failure to justify could also be explained by determinism. As could every other outcome from every experiment, since determinism is, by definition, the meta cause of cause and effect itself.
Why do "I" have this experience of having a viewpoint and making decisions? That is a mystery that I am not close to solving. However why would any of that define how the universe must work?
Much like a finite being can hold thoughts of Cantor's classes of infinities in her finite brain. The domains in question are unrelated.
Those that deny the concept of free will do not deny the subjective experience of free will. The subjective experience of free will was never under question.
The debate has always been about 'hard' free will, i.e., if the universe is fully deterministic, if 'choice' is an illusion.
It's like in chess. If you are running an algorithm that plays chess, you will just play the moves mindlessly, so no free will right? Except that per my definition your internal state is influencing your moves, so, you are free (in this sense).
But there are situations where you're forced into a move. For example, the king is in check, there is only one move possible, then this move is forced. It's precisely in this forced case where there is no free will: you are being compelled to move by forces beyond your internal state.
"Forced" moves can have some shades of gray in chess as well. For example, you may be forced to sacrifice a piece to defend the Queen, because sometimes the game is just lost if you don't do so. So.. the rules of the games allow you do to something else, but you can't meaningfully choose if we suppose you're playing for winning. And, of course, you can only play legal moves: some board states have few legal moves left so you're comparatively less free. In those cases, you have your free will partially constrained.
Also, the concept of free will is bound up with the concept of consciousness. What is the entity that may or may not have free will? Until we define and understand that, free will will be an ill-defined concept not amenable to proper analysis
With varying degrees of conscious capability comes increasing amounts of free will. But absolute free will? For example, I choose to end my life, because I choose too is going to be a very hard push. It is only going to happen if I really want it, and will only want it if I am in a situation that calls for such drastic action. Those situations, we can see, are generally on the peripherals (although way too common these days).
So our free will is a function of the Human Condition, which is relative to our levels of consciousness.
Is it not essentially equivalent to "actual" free will? I am perfectly happy with just this.
The first sentence above though helps to illustrate a problem when thinking about this stuff. You wrote, You are free to…. From your perspective no one has that freedom but our everyday experience is such that it’s hard to really follow through with this belief. Perhaps consciousness and self awareness comes at a cost of not being able to fully embrace the notion that we don’t have free will. It certainly feels like I have exercised free will but that is likely just an illusion.
It is quite interesting in fact, as it lets you sensibly assign moral responsibility to those who were acting of their own free will, even if the world is deterministic. Arguably that's the only kind of free will worth having, and what people mean when they talk about free will (not what people say they mean).
That line of argument makes no difference between the free will of humans and that of animals, insects, bacteria or rocks. But that can't possibly be true: we humans invented free will after all. That's the mental gymnastics that keeps me mentally strong. No beast, nor angel. "Freedom evolves" (DD).
Without someone willing to actually define what they mean, the discussion is moot - it makes no sense to claim that an undefined concept exists.
> Free will is the capacity of agents to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded.
That is at the core of this discussion, and why what then follows is a wall of text to set up compatibilism vs. incompatibilism and determinism vs indeterminism, including addressing the issue that many of the proponents of various variants would interpret "choose unimpeded" in entirely different ways.
You'll see that the page itself introduces a number of different interpretations, and you'd struggle to get most people to agree with those definitions.
E.g. many compatibilist views "work around" the determinism issue by separating our internal view of our ability to choose with the physical reality of the choices. In that case I'd agree that that kind of "soft" free will is possible, but it's also meaningless. E.g. a murderer may have exercised such "soft" free will, but that does not create any moral responsibility for their action if determinism meant they had no actual control anyway.
As such, while that kind of "free will" is reasonable to say it exists, it is not the kind of free will usually debated, because it doesn't actually address the important question of whether or not we actually have the ability to make a genuinely free choice. E.g. if we were to rewind time, could we choose differently? On the basis of what?
With the added caveat that merely another outcome in line with e.g. probabilistic effects from quantum effects are not a choice - so let's say we repeat the experiment many times: can you introduce a bias that is inconsistent with randomness; when you start diving into this you start quickly seeing that even trying to define a way of determining if something meaningfully is a "choice" gets at the core of the issue.
So let's restate it:
If we can agree that a an "unimpeded choice" is a decision that is something other than a pure deterministic or probabilistic effect caused by the preceding physical state, then how can you restate that in a way that makes its existence or nonexistence testable?
Because without that it's just woo.
Determinism for human action is very popular among science enthusiasts because we've decided that determinism elsewhere in science is true, and since our brains is part of the universe then it must also be deterministic.
But we only perceive determinism insofar as we only measure what we're able to measure. Then you arrive at quantum probabilities, and it seems to me the multiverse theory is as scientific as believing quantum particles have free will.
And given that the free will and now are connected it is easy to see why we cannot describe the free will using physical equations. Well, at least until we will manage to describe now.
Now back to the freedom of will. Its feeling originates in now as if it exists, it is about changing the future following the now. But since the notion of now is not reflected in physical equations, those cannot describe the freedom of will. In physics the whole timeline exists at the same time. In other words time is static and future has already happen. Thus there is literally no choice in physics.
Here you are conflating a perceptual task with a kinematic equation. What makes you think that these two concepts make sense to tie together so intimately?
This is as free as you can get and I don't think anyone ever posited "free will" as something other than this.
I would not call this free, it's a choice completely determined by you and the environment. Same situation, same resulting choice. Every single time. And people have certainly used free will to mean many different things.
Which is what makes the question kind of unknowable. Because we can't rerun our lives to see if we could make different decisions with all of the exact same conditions as before. Even running the choice twice isn't the same. Because the second time you do it, you're now a person who has previously made this choice. And that makes the scenario different, because you are different. We have no real way of testing free will.
But better still: the question does not matter at all.
Either free will exists or it doesn't. There's no spectrum of "50% will" or whatever. You can either make choices or you're essentially the result of all the forces acting upon you.
So, what are the consequences of both scenarios?
If free will exists, then fine, we can make choices. We can choose to do whatever. There's nothing really interesting to be said about this branch.
However. If free will does not exist, then there's something weird going on. Because if free will does not exist, I don't have any choice in whether or not to post this message. I post this message because your post elicits that response in me. Just like you made your post for the same reason. And we just keep pulling this thread all the way back to the big bang.
But we also don't have the choice in how we feel about this discussion either. You will either accept this or not based on the various physical, biological, and chemical processes going on inside of and around you. So you will either agree or disagree and that decision itself is preordained. Regardless if it is true or not. You're either the type to believe in free will or not and you can't choose that. Because if you could choose that, you'd have free will.
Even if you believe you are making a change, you're not. Because you were going to make that change due to the forces at work on you. Forces that were eventually going to interact with you because those forces themselves are the products of other forces, etc. So if you hear all this, take it to heart, and decide to live a life of apathy because you have no free will and nothing matters. Then that's what was going to happen at this point and time regardless.
Free will does not exist. It is logically inconsistent. Either your choice is some function of your current state and the environment you are in, then the choice is not free, or it is independent of your current state and the environment you are in, then it is not your choice in any meaningful way, it is just the result of a coin flip.
You can do some mental gymnastics, define free will as being able to do what you want, define it as being free of various kinds of constraints, call it free if the choice is not computable in advance, if you can not measure all necessary variables, in practice or in theory, ... If you are happy with any of those definitions, fine, then you might have this kind of free will, but I would not consider any of those particularly interesting.