No, in response to someone vaguely mentioning the words “free will”, you made the claim: “Free will does not exist.”
The burden of proof is now on you to provide evidence of your claim as well as on you to define the terms contained within your claim.
I am not arguing the “free will” debate either way for the reasons mentioned previously and do not care to define the terms as the entire debate is nothing more than a creative thought experiment as far as I can tell.
If I claim Russel's teapot doesn't exist, the burden of proof is on you to prove it exists if you disagree with me, not me, because the set of claims that are so poorly defined and unlikely as to make it an unjustified burden to expect anyone to caveat the claims to make them technically correct is infinite - someone who makes an extraordinary claim without being able to provide a justification therefore needs to be prepared to take on the burden of proof.
I equally claim that santa doesn't exist, and yet will insist the burden of anyone disagreeing with my claim lies on them, not on me, even if I make the initial claim, for exactly that reason.
In this case the claim that free will does not exists puts the burden on those who disagree *because nobody here or otherwise* have presented a definition of free will that most people would agree to, not least because without narrowing the scope with a definition I have the freedom to apply whichever definition I prefer, and I have several places in this thread.
E.g. I'd argue that "free will" would require an entity to be able to do something which cannot be explained by the combination of determinism and randomness. Given we're unaware of any kind of processes that can produce outputs that are not either deterministic or random modulated by some sort of probabilistic distribution, to claim that a process that can produce such an output exist is an extraordinary claim that would give you a Nobel in physics if you could demonstrate it.
As such: Russel's teapot.
I'd love to be wrong. I'd love for someone here to come up with a definition of free will that overcomes that problem, as if so I'd be witnessing a revolution in philosophy surpassing anything we've seen in centuries.
Just like I'd be delighted to be wrong when I say that santa doesn't exist, but I do believe I'm far more likely to be proven wrong about santa than free will, given that people can at least come up with definitions of santa that are somewhat coherent if unlikely.
If someone says they experienced free will today when they chose to stand up, it’s on you to disprove that it couldn’t possibly happen to anyone ever, or come up with a definition of free will that means they couldn’t possibly experience what they claim to be experiencing. To them their experience is real. You’re claiming it’s not, so I don’t think Russell’s teapot applies here. I think you have set forth a bold claim that someone is not experiencing what they report they are experiencing.
> I'd argue that "free will" would require an entity to be able to do something which cannot be explained by the combination of determinism and randomness
What is your benchmark for determinism? No technology we have can predict or determine a human action. While it’s reasonable to assume that humans are deterministic, it’s still just a theory at this point. If I put the onus on you to prove determinisms in humans, you’d certainly win the Nobel as well.
That’s kind of my point is that both sides of the free will debate are a far cry from having enough evidence or the ability to conduct an experiment to settle the issue. Yet many believe they experience free will everyday and many don’t, because it’s a subjective experience.
As such it's on them to first state a complete hypothesis of what happened to them, because absent that it is not even possible to start disproving it, and so rejecting it out of hand is perfectly justified just as much as it's justified rejecting Russel's teapot.
> What is your benchmark for determinism?
That everything we have so far observed with any kind of precision has turned out to be predictable to our level of precision or to show no sign of deviating from randomness.
Determinism is also a falsifiable theory: All you need to disprove it is to show the existence of a type of events which are biased in ways which can't be explained in a mechanistic or by randomness.
The total lack of such examples, despite a very substantial amounts of claims, which always collapses under scrutiny, gives me as much confidence in determinism as in gravity.
Our understanding of gravity could be massively off too - I'd consider it far more likely that we'll need to revise our understanding of gravity than determinism, because a non-deterministic model would require a fundamental change in logic to accommodate another category of causality which can not be modelled as a computation over a combination of mechanistic determinism and randomness and without just introducing regress (the last part there is essential to rule out "God did it" or "we're in a simulation" answers, both of which just lifts the question one level up).
The first step in falsifying determinism is to actually find a way of determining whether or not an event fits that criteria to show that it's even logically possible for such events to exist. Just that would get your name in the history books. Of philosophy anyway. And if anyone could present a logically sound argument for how such events could exist, it would seriously shatter my world view. I'd love that anyway because it'd force us to rethink a whole lot of things about the world from scratch. Unfortunately I think I'm more likely to meet santa.
> Yet many believe they experience free will everyday and many don’t, because it’s a subjective experience.
People's subjective experience is not in question. I feel like I make free choices every day as well. I feel like I'm exercising one right now in choosing to answer you. That does not give me any reason to presume that feeling reflects the underlying processes. That subjective experience have no bearing on the issue.
It’s a philosophical debate, not a science experiment. In philosophy, a declarative statement asserting the affirmative is always true is just as big a fallacy as saying the negative is always true.
This is reversing the burden of proof. The issue with "free will" is getting those who think there is a meaningful "free will" concept to actually define what they mean.
Look through this discussion and see the comments trying to justify the existence of free will, and look for definitions of what they actually mean by that.
> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:
That's a meaningless distinction in this context. The point is that nobody has presented a mechanism whereby you can inject any form of agency that fits a definition of "free" (see your own point: define "free") that doesn't devolve to smoke and mirrors that way.
In order to do so, there'd need to be something that would lead to measurable biases in outcomes that can not be explained by the probabilities.
The rest of your argument devolves to Russel's teapot: As long as nobody has posited a reasonable definition that'd give rise to a theory of what free will might mean, the notion is so absurd that it is entirely reasonable to say that free will makes no sense.
If you can present a definition that can't easily be shown to be just smoke and mirrors and which somehow makes sense to people, even without coming up with ways of actually testing it, I might be tempted to moderate that claim, but I've had these discussions with people for decades, and in none of them have anyone ever managed to come up with a cohesive definition of what free will would even mean that doesn't very easily start looking distinctly "unfree".
There are clearly definitions of free will that would allow something you label with that term to exist. But I challenge you to come up with one that people would agree is both "free" and "will".