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Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by awb on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @09:57AM (#29980089)
A few issues with the “free will” debate.

1) Define “free”

2) How do you test your hypothesis?

You’re trying to apply logic to an untestable philosophical debate. If you believe free will doesn’t exist, you can’t design an experiment that would invalidate that belief. And if your theory is untestable and unfalsifiable, then what good is it other than a creative exercise?

However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:

https://www.thegreatcoursesdaily.com/quantum-universe-fundam....

So, we do know that the universe is not pre-determined and cannot be calculated in advance, but if you want to believe in humans as fully deterministic (or some other definition of no free will) inside of a non-deterministic environment, I haven’t heard anyone propose an experiment that could test that, at which point the debate of “free will” is relegated to the realm of thought experiments rather than science.

So, perhaps the better question is: Does it serve you better to believe there is free will or no free will? And leave it at that.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by vidarh on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @10:40AM (#29980755)
> You’re trying to apply logic to an untestable philosophical debate. If you believe free will doesn’t exist, you can’t design an experiment that would invalidate that belief. And if your theory is untestable and unfalsifiable, then what good is it other than a creative exercise?

This is reversing the burden of proof. The issue with "free will" is getting those who think there is a meaningful "free will" concept to actually define what they mean.

Look through this discussion and see the comments trying to justify the existence of free will, and look for definitions of what they actually mean by that.

> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:

That's a meaningless distinction in this context. The point is that nobody has presented a mechanism whereby you can inject any form of agency that fits a definition of "free" (see your own point: define "free") that doesn't devolve to smoke and mirrors that way.

In order to do so, there'd need to be something that would lead to measurable biases in outcomes that can not be explained by the probabilities.

The rest of your argument devolves to Russel's teapot: As long as nobody has posited a reasonable definition that'd give rise to a theory of what free will might mean, the notion is so absurd that it is entirely reasonable to say that free will makes no sense.

If you can present a definition that can't easily be shown to be just smoke and mirrors and which somehow makes sense to people, even without coming up with ways of actually testing it, I might be tempted to moderate that claim, but I've had these discussions with people for decades, and in none of them have anyone ever managed to come up with a cohesive definition of what free will would even mean that doesn't very easily start looking distinctly "unfree".

There are clearly definitions of free will that would allow something you label with that term to exist. But I challenge you to come up with one that people would agree is both "free" and "will".

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by awb on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @11:13AM (#29981303)
> This is reversing the burden of proof.

No, in response to someone vaguely mentioning the words “free will”, you made the claim: “Free will does not exist.”

The burden of proof is now on you to provide evidence of your claim as well as on you to define the terms contained within your claim.

I am not arguing the “free will” debate either way for the reasons mentioned previously and do not care to define the terms as the entire debate is nothing more than a creative thought experiment as far as I can tell.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by vidarh on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @11:37AM (#29981667)
Russel's teapot.

If I claim Russel's teapot doesn't exist, the burden of proof is on you to prove it exists if you disagree with me, not me, because the set of claims that are so poorly defined and unlikely as to make it an unjustified burden to expect anyone to caveat the claims to make them technically correct is infinite - someone who makes an extraordinary claim without being able to provide a justification therefore needs to be prepared to take on the burden of proof.

I equally claim that santa doesn't exist, and yet will insist the burden of anyone disagreeing with my claim lies on them, not on me, even if I make the initial claim, for exactly that reason.

In this case the claim that free will does not exists puts the burden on those who disagree *because nobody here or otherwise* have presented a definition of free will that most people would agree to, not least because without narrowing the scope with a definition I have the freedom to apply whichever definition I prefer, and I have several places in this thread.

E.g. I'd argue that "free will" would require an entity to be able to do something which cannot be explained by the combination of determinism and randomness. Given we're unaware of any kind of processes that can produce outputs that are not either deterministic or random modulated by some sort of probabilistic distribution, to claim that a process that can produce such an output exist is an extraordinary claim that would give you a Nobel in physics if you could demonstrate it.

As such: Russel's teapot.

I'd love to be wrong. I'd love for someone here to come up with a definition of free will that overcomes that problem, as if so I'd be witnessing a revolution in philosophy surpassing anything we've seen in centuries.

Just like I'd be delighted to be wrong when I say that santa doesn't exist, but I do believe I'm far more likely to be proven wrong about santa than free will, given that people can at least come up with definitions of santa that are somewhat coherent if unlikely.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by awb on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @02:11PM (#29984169)
The difference between free will and Russell’s teapot IMO is that free will to many is an internal, subjective, untestable experience whereas Russell’s teapot is an external object that is theoretically existent or non-existent for everyone regardless of their internal experience.

If someone says they experienced free will today when they chose to stand up, it’s on you to disprove that it couldn’t possibly happen to anyone ever, or come up with a definition of free will that means they couldn’t possibly experience what they claim to be experiencing. To them their experience is real. You’re claiming it’s not, so I don’t think Russell’s teapot applies here. I think you have set forth a bold claim that someone is not experiencing what they report they are experiencing.

> I'd argue that "free will" would require an entity to be able to do something which cannot be explained by the combination of determinism and randomness

What is your benchmark for determinism? No technology we have can predict or determine a human action. While it’s reasonable to assume that humans are deterministic, it’s still just a theory at this point. If I put the onus on you to prove determinisms in humans, you’d certainly win the Nobel as well.

That’s kind of my point is that both sides of the free will debate are a far cry from having enough evidence or the ability to conduct an experiment to settle the issue. Yet many believe they experience free will everyday and many don’t, because it’s a subjective experience.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by vidarh on Wednesday January 19, 2022 @10:52AM (#29995195)
If someone says they experienced free will today, the claim is ludicrous without a definition.

As such it's on them to first state a complete hypothesis of what happened to them, because absent that it is not even possible to start disproving it, and so rejecting it out of hand is perfectly justified just as much as it's justified rejecting Russel's teapot.

> What is your benchmark for determinism?

That everything we have so far observed with any kind of precision has turned out to be predictable to our level of precision or to show no sign of deviating from randomness.

Determinism is also a falsifiable theory: All you need to disprove it is to show the existence of a type of events which are biased in ways which can't be explained in a mechanistic or by randomness.

The total lack of such examples, despite a very substantial amounts of claims, which always collapses under scrutiny, gives me as much confidence in determinism as in gravity.

Our understanding of gravity could be massively off too - I'd consider it far more likely that we'll need to revise our understanding of gravity than determinism, because a non-deterministic model would require a fundamental change in logic to accommodate another category of causality which can not be modelled as a computation over a combination of mechanistic determinism and randomness and without just introducing regress (the last part there is essential to rule out "God did it" or "we're in a simulation" answers, both of which just lifts the question one level up).

The first step in falsifying determinism is to actually find a way of determining whether or not an event fits that criteria to show that it's even logically possible for such events to exist. Just that would get your name in the history books. Of philosophy anyway. And if anyone could present a logically sound argument for how such events could exist, it would seriously shatter my world view. I'd love that anyway because it'd force us to rethink a whole lot of things about the world from scratch. Unfortunately I think I'm more likely to meet santa.

> Yet many believe they experience free will everyday and many don’t, because it’s a subjective experience.

People's subjective experience is not in question. I feel like I make free choices every day as well. I feel like I'm exercising one right now in choosing to answer you. That does not give me any reason to presume that feeling reflects the underlying processes. That subjective experience have no bearing on the issue.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by bmh100 on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @03:36PM (#29985368)
In science, when testing the existence of something, the burden of proof is generally on the one hypothesizing the existence. The existence is generally accepted if experiments fail to reject the hypothesis.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by awb on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @03:57PM (#29985678)
But free will is a concept, a way of viewing the world. It’s not a physical object or mechanical process that can be tested. It’s why trying to prove it scientifically or through logic is just as impossible as trying to disprove it.

It’s a philosophical debate, not a science experiment. In philosophy, a declarative statement asserting the affirmative is always true is just as big a fallacy as saying the negative is always true.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by skeaker on Monday January 24, 2022 @06:16PM (#30065498)
That's quite literally the opposite of how Russel's teapot works. Russel originally thought up that scenario to show how silly it is to put an unprovable idea forward (specifically the existence of god, which Russel absolutely did not believe in) and expect another party to disprove it when doing so is impossible. Here in this thread you've put forward an unprovable idea and now expect others to disprove it, which is the exact scenario Russel criticizes. How on earth did you interpret it so wrongly that you came out with the exact opposite of the message that Russel intended?
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by danbruc on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @10:54AM (#29980968)
However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic

That is not true, quantum mechanics - more specifically the Schrödinger equation - is deterministic. What is not deterministic is the wave function collapse but that is also incompatible with the Schrödinger equation because it implies non-unitary evolution of the wave function. And we have - as far as I know - no really good ideas how to resolve this. In consequence I think it would be premature to declare that the universe is definitively non-deterministic.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by awb on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @02:33PM (#29984505)
From the article:

> One of the key implications of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is that it highlights the probabilistic nature of the universe

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by danbruc on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @04:20PM (#29986014)
The article is wrong there. I can not provide a good source so I will just point you to this StackExchange question [1].

[1] https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/63811/is-the-uni...

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by awb on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @05:43PM (#29987185)
The article you linked to seems to say the universe is indeterministic:

> Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics is given by another "evolution" that the wavefunction may experience: wavefunction collapse.

I’ll give you that it’s not a fully settled issue though:

> According to the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, it does mean the universe is non-deterministic. There are other interpretations of QM which allow for determinism though. Which is the correct interpretation (if any)? Currently, no one knows.

Here’s another article: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/29/the-battle-for...

> Most physicists would not regard the events in our universe as deterministic, or clockwork if you insist; they are in fact considered probabilistic

> randomness (ie indeterminism) has been proven to be real by the National Institute for Science and Technology’s work on a randomness beacon.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by tsimionescu on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @12:22PM (#29982409)
> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:

This is not true, and there are consistent interpretations of QM that are fully deterministic (many worlds, superdeterminism, pilot wave).

Still, probabilistic vs deterministic makes no difference. There is no free will in a throw of the dice, and no free will in the wave function collapse.

On the other hand, the main philosophical position on this is compatibilism: free will in a fully deterministic universe (or probabilistic one). If you think of yourself as the sum total of all your experiences and genetics, your next action is of course determined by these; but, another agent in your shoes, one with different experiences and genetics, would make a different choice. So in this framework, your choice, even though uniquely determined by everything that happened before, and theoretically predictable 1000 years in advance, is still meaningfully "your choice".

In fact, random chance hurts this definition, and weakens the case for compatibilism; if your next action is entirely dependent on some random quantum fluctuation, and running the experiment with your exact same experience and genetics but a different random quantum event at this exact time would produce 1000 entirely different actions on your part, then it is very hard to imagine any kind of free will. So, free will actually depends on some amount of determinism. Even the type of determinism in Many Worlds would not solve this - since in that interpretation, all possible outcomes of the quantum event actually happen, so all your "choices" that depend on the random event are fully real. So, if each of the fully real copies of you, with the exact same experiences and genetics, does a wildly different thing, then it's pretty clear there is no meaningful free will in any possible sense.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by SuoDuanDao on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @01:43PM (#29983755)
I find the most satisfying version of compatibilism one where an agent is mostly determined by 'state' (genes/experiences etc), but the subjective experience of expending mental effort (e.g. when overcoming an addiction) is the agent nudging the wave function collapse this way or that. Add in the ability to influence future 'states' and one has a model much more consistent with the subjective experience of making difficult choices.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by tsimionescu on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @03:46PM (#29985515)
That's not compatibilism - as long as "will" can influence the physical world, you have a non-materialist philosophy. Nothing wrong with that, but it's very strange to call it compatibilism.

For what it's worth, I don't see any reason to imagine that hard decisions are of any other quality than easy decisions. It's part of my history and experience just as much that I prefer to eat salty foods than sweet ones as it is that I sometimes abstain from eating that pizza to try to manage my waistline, or refuse that job offer because I don't want to work for a company I don't find ethical.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by SuoDuanDao on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @08:19PM (#29988622)
Good to know - from the context I thought compatibilism simply meant that 'will' could influence the physical world and the physical world got to have a say as well.

But I'm not sure what to make of your second paragraph - doesn't saying there are hard and easy decisions require there be a difference of quality between the categories?

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by tsimionescu on Wednesday January 19, 2022 @03:42AM (#29991289)
Compatibilism refers to the position that "free will" can be meaningfully accepted to exist in a purely deterministic world. It is the position that even if we accept that your actions 10 years from now could have been predicted with 100% accuracy the very second the Big Bang happened, we can still hold that you have free will in a meaningful sense. The name refers to the idea that free will is compatible with a perfectly determined future.

> doesn't saying there are hard and easy decisions require there be a difference of quality between the categories?

Not necessarily. There is a difference of "quantity" if you want, but not quality. It's like the following model: it's easy to compute 1+1, and it's hard to compute 19312123+123468. But they are not qualitatively different, they don't need different explanations: they both have the same nature, they use the same algorithm, one is just a bigger amount of state than the other.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by JackFr on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @03:15PM (#29985071)
Or you can just accept that reductive materialism is not an adequate description of the world.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by astrange on Wednesday January 19, 2022 @04:04AM (#29991424)
Does your non-materialist theory involve true randomness (which is not really making a decision), or is it just more mind-stuff behaving deterministically in another dimension (which is not really free will)?

I'm not sure there are alternatives to these.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by tsimionescu on Wednesday January 19, 2022 @05:34AM (#29991979)
I think the standard position of free will non-compatibilists is that there is some dimension of mind whose future at any time T is not uniquely determined by its state at time T-1 (but it is influenced by that state, it's also not purely random). In this model, each agent possessing free will has a series of possible choices with "weights" for each choice pre-determined by the prior state of the agent (their history, their racial instincts etc). Which choice the agent will select cannot be known in advance. Usually it is implied that the agent has a resource of "will" that they must expend more of to select one of the choices with higher "weight". After the agent selects one particular choice, the universe proceeds deterministically (or probabilistically) until the next moment when an agent must make a choice. Whether this phenomenon is happening directly in material reality (the agent can influence wave function collapse or some other such idea) or it is happening in a separate world of mind/spirit and then there is some miraculous reconciliation of the two worlds is somewhat irrelevant.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by SuoDuanDao on Friday January 21, 2022 @10:07AM (#30024473)
Well, I model cognition and decision as energy in architecture. The Architecture dictates what adjacent states are available and what the default likelihood is of each. The more the energy expands itself because of its preferences, the more it can nudge the outcome towards one of the less likely adjacent states. Any outcome changes the state of the architecture and the architecture changes the state of the energy, so the two engage in a kind of coevolution.

Here's why I believe in free will: The preferences of the energy are subjective, not objective[1]. Its inputs are dictated by the architecture it resides in, but the meaning it attaches to them are determined internally and infinitely[2] more complex. So for example, someone who loves exercising gets very much the same nerve signals as someone who hates it. The difference is in the meaning each attaches to the experience, and meaning is not objective.

[1] AKA 'the hard problem of consciousness' [2] Insofar as internal communication happens across a higher-dimensional manifold than its communication with the architecture. For ease of visualization I imagine a three-dimensional gas interacting with the two-dimensional surface of a building, but I am working on a model that properly accounts for time.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by tsimionescu on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @03:49PM (#29985547)
If only any other system of thought could make any kind of verifiable prediction, it would be wise to reject materialism. As it is though, you either have magical systems of thought, that reject the very framework of science; or ones which amount to materialism plus some handwaving.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by SuoDuanDao on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @03:59PM (#29985709)
Oh I accept that, but I'm also wary of theories that seem to handwave material reality. I've found Dione Fortune's writings the most useful in that regard, though she can be... obscure. Quite influential all the same.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by Natsu on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @12:51PM (#29982884)
"Free will" is a gesture at the experience we have of deliberating upon and deciding our own actions, I don't think determinism really matters, as long as we're the ones doing the deterministic calculations by which we choose what to do.

But it's okay, I understand if you have no choice but to argue with that.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by SuoDuanDao on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @01:35PM (#29983636)
>So, perhaps the better question is: Does it serve you better to believe there is free will or no free will? And leave it at that.

From a pragmatic analysis the answer is pretty straightforward[1] (Spoiler, believing in free will is better if you value moral behaviour). Glad I chose to believe in free will!

[1]https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9280.200...

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by danbruc on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @01:53PM (#29983913)
I don't think that would be the best option. There is nothing wrong with figuring out that we don't have true free will - however you want to define it - and still behave in everyday life as if we have it. It might just be a useful abstraction.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by SuoDuanDao on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @02:29PM (#29984456)
The study I linked indicates that people who don't believe in free will act as if they don't, granted, they weren't warned of the dangers of believing they don't so there might be more to explore.

But the question seems to me more about pragmatism vs realism than pragmatism vs. realism with 'some beliefs-as-if'. I find realism unsatisfying philosophically because we can see historical beliefs being so off the mark that we'd have to live in a pretty special time to have anything close to a realistic model of the universe, I think making good predictions is simply the best tool that we have. If that comes at the cost of having a single internally-consistent model of the universe, that's unfortunate, but at least I'm not attached to the wrong one. So if my belief in free will and my belief in Newtonian Mechanics are incompatible, that's not such a big deal to me as a pragmatist. In fact it's a useful feature of the metaphysics, since the places they come into conflict give an idea of where they're incomplete.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by tshaddox on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @01:59PM (#29984012)
> 1) Define “free”

It doesn't seem worth spending much time here, lest the entire argument becomes nothing more than a semantic one. If your definition of "free will" is "this thing that I undeniably feel" then sure, you've made it undeniable by definition.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by phkahler on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @01:42PM (#29983741)
>> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic

Do we? Quantum mechanics looks like there is genuine randomness, but one interpretation of experiments testing the Bell inequalities is non-locality. It could be completely deterministic, we just don't know what determines it.

Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by stevenhuang on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @07:10PM (#29988089)
Furthermore, even granting that, one should realize that _random_ will is not _free_ will.
Re:A delightful quirk of relativity theory by phkahler on Tuesday January 18, 2022 @08:57PM (#29988907)
Or maybe it is. Didn't some big name physicists "prove" that if humans have free will then so do electrons? Not sure why it has to be an inherent property rather than an emergent property, but I just read the summary.