There's certainly a duality here where it's fine to talk about people having choices even if one strictly believe they don't, but my experience is that if anything people tend to often get exasperated or outright agitated if you try to question to what extent their decisions are free. A whole lot of human society is organised around the idea that we have agency and that we're the product of choices we've made of our own volition.
E.g. if you genuinely believe the notion that we have free will is nonsense (and I do), then the logical extension is to be very uncomfortable with the notion of e.g. prison used for vengeance or anything at all other than to the bare minimal extent required to protect others, because the logical conclusion of thinking people don't have agency is that there was no way other than other external stimuli in their lives that they could have come out making other decisions.
It's a very uncomfortable thing to view society through a lens of seeing free will as an illusion. But it's also very hard to unsee the lack of any kind of coherent theory of free will that could justify anything else.
The reality is that if you actually talk to people about this, you'll quickly find that most people go through life with a very strong belief that they have agency and that people around them have agency, but the moment you start to question what that belief is based on, the basis for it tends to start to crumble very, very quickly. As I've said elsewhere, in decades of discussing this subject I've never seen someone come up with a definition of "free will" that still looks either "free" or like "will" under scrutiny. Usually you end up with people trying variations of arguments that just leads to infinite regress (e.g. arguing our soul gives us free will, at which point the question just shifts to a definition soul that would give it agency).
Not really. You can view it as a game theoretic situation. Will the use of prison likely produce a good outcome or a bad outcome? Whether or not the criminal was deterministically required to commit the crime, the structure of punishments will (perhaps deterministically) affect the incidents and severity of future crimes.
Just because the creature in Black and White may have made decisions deterministically doesn't mean I won't punish it if it behaves in an inappropriate way. If anything, believing the agents are deterministic would make me even more keen to punish in situations where it will change behaviour usefully.
These discussions are always interestingly recursive, since if I do not believe in free will then my own view on free will is itself not a free choice. And yet I still feel strongly that my not believing in free will appears to be my free choice.
I agree that there are still people who needs to be locked up, including under possibly brutal sentencing terms. E.g. Anders Behring Breivik who carried out the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway is up on a parole hearing today - if he gets out (it'd take a miracle) it doesn't matter if it's free will (in any sense of the term) or purely deterministic processes that leads him to act if he is still probabilistically likely to carry out another attack - it's still more important to keep the public safe from him than to worry about whether or not he had a genuine choice.
To the extent there's a measurable effect of seeing the punishment of others, that too might be a justification, though I find that dicier. But if that is done based on a cold calculation of how it affects offending rates that to me is still very different from vengeance.
So to be clear I'm not arguing it removes the justifications for punishments, and I agree with your mention of seeing it as a game theoretic situation - even really harsh punishments might be the best choice in some circumstances. But it removes "they chose this themselves" or "they deserve it" as a justification (the feeling is still valid; acting on it becomes cruel), and that makes for a very different legal system. It also shifts a focus towards considering that if it's not about vengeance, then you should look at how to actually optimise the balance between the public good and treating the prisoners as humanely as you can without reducing the public benefit of the punishment too much.
Norway is far from achieving that, but if you look at e.g. Bastøy fengsel [1] ([2] has links to assorted longer articles), you can get one idea of what de-emphasising vengeance and taking rehabilitation and trying to address reoffending rates might start to look like (though Norway has by no means solved that, Bastøy also certainly haven't made it worse, but it also is not the norm in Norway either - yet anyway). For some people, it might well be that harsher prisons works better, or are necessary (I doubt Breivik will ever get the chance to serve his time somewhere like Bastøy for example). (Bastøy is the - so far - culmination of a process of reform that started in the 1960's, at a point where Norwegian prisons were quite brutal and the brutality of it eventually triggered a strong counter-reaction.)
For others even less prison (Norway as it is have sentences that would look comically short for e.g. Americans or British people). But evaluating it as a "game theoretic situation" as you say would in any case very likely lead to very major change to how the legal system would work most places in the world (including Norway)
So, as to 'they chose this themselves', that's begging the question a little - as we've already seen I think that believing in determinism doesn't stop you from believing that people can choose things. As to 'they deserve it', questions of what people deserve is a huge other topic, and I think it's most likely possible to define desert in terms that fit within a deterministic viewpoint.
However, perhaps you're right about its effect since I do in fact think that vengeance is a thoroughly dumb rationale for treating people badly. This is to such an extent that I'd feel surprised to find anyone seriously try to justify it, which is why I didn't really engage with your apparent suggestion that it was an important justification. There are lots of ways you can try to justify criminal punishment in my view but 'vengeance' doesn't fit into any moral system I consider valuable unless it's actually being used as a code for game theoretic concerns or rehabilitation.
But I don't feel so strange thinking this, since most people I know think the same, even those who don't share my views on free will and I'm pretty sure I believed it before I came to that conclusion on free will.
I mean, a key example of how vengeance still plays into punishment is the level of support for capital punishment.
I'm glad we find it equally unjustified.
Also, I agree that you certainly can dismiss vengeance as a valid argument without dismissing free will, btw. - a lot of people who do believe in some variant of free will absolutely do reject vengeance. My point was more to offer up an example of something that is very hard to reconcile with rejecting free will.
I think this lacks imagination for human cruelty. If they had no free choice but to steal my things, then I guess I don't have any free choice but to torture them in revenge. Hard determinism does not erase the possibility of punishment.
With respect to using hard determinism as an excuse for vengeance, keep in mind that even a society that buys into the lack of moral justification for vengeance on a hard determinist basis will still have every reason to punish you for it purely based on the expected effect on future offending (by you or others).
This is one of the things that often cause people to react to a determinist view: They tend to think that it either makes it pointless to make choices because they have no control, or that it makes everything a free for all because you have no responsibility.
But the problem with that line of thinking is that we don't get to "step out of the illusion". We live within a world where irrespective of whether your choices are free, you do make them - choosing to do nothing (or anything) because your choices are not free is in itself a choice, and has consequences that may be good or bad for you. Making choices because you think you can use lack of free will as an excuse may or may not end well for you even if your choice to do so was not free.
It seems to do so either by erasing justification entirely (thus permitting anything), or by making it impossible to justify reforming any one person (by removing moral responsibility).
That is, under hard determinism, either society does not have to bother justifying anything it would like to do in response to what it considers a crime, or if you think moral justifications for actions are still required, it makes it impossible to actually say "person X requires rehabilitation", because placing such blame requires free will from which moral responsibility follows.
There's this dialog from some centuries ago (I guess it's from some Enlightenment philosopher?) that goes like this
- Guards, please, set this murderer free: he has no free will, so he can't be held responsible for his actions.
And the guard replies
- Uhm.. no. But if I'm making a mistake, don't worry: per your own explanation, I can't be held responsible for it either.
edit: this view was echoed in another comment, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29985738
Then you need to genuinely accept that you're not right, you're not making a cogent argument, you're just a fly buzzing around a giant turd.
Or rather you don't, cause you can't.
What, specifically, is not cogent about his argument?
I think you'll find that if you think about it rationally, there really is no other conclusion without invoking mysticism.
First is that while an argument is being made, absent subjective agency on his part he is no more than a candle flame illuminating the room. The candle once lit must illuminate - it cannot do anything else. And so I grant in the sense of a flame burns, he makes an argument - but without subjective agency, while an argument us being made I’m not sure what precisely we mean by he.
Second absent free will, truth seeking has no more transcendent meaning or inherent value than a fly’s turd seeking. Love, wisdom, justice simply are, and are no better or worse than hate, ignorance or cruelty.
Your rejection on the basis of my claim that none of us have free will is logically unsound whether we have free will or not.
> Second absent free will, truth seeking has no more transcendent meaning or inherent value than a fly’s turd seeking. Love, wisdom, justice simply are, and are no better or worse than hate, ignorance or cruelty.
I agree with that. Nothing has any inherent meaning or value. The meaning or value in everything is merely the value we subjectively assign to it. That does not remove that value. The subjective experience is just as good or bad whether or not it's based on values we've merely assigned to it without any choice in the matter.
To me this notion that we need free will to value the feeling of freedom or the beauty of love, wisdom and justice is bizarre. The experience is the same whether or not the underlying choices are free or purely deterministic.
I'm a hard determinist, materialist, atheist, yet I spent a large portion of my youth writing goofy sentimental romantic poetry - the two are not in conflict; I can recognise love is a biochemical reaction following a chain of deterministic events and still feel it.
There is no denial that the subjective experience of free will is real, even to a free will denier. That is, we're not talking about qualia. See the distinction of 'hard' free will.
So in fact there was no absence of subjective agency. But I get your point. You hold the belief that free will deniers are themselves automatons. A strange but expected reversal of conclusions--understandable, as yet it's more of that reflexive defensiveness on display.
And to your second point, for your statement to follow, you'll first have to show that truth seeking has transcendent meaning or inherent value in the first place. That sounds as tough to solve as the free will debate ;).
I guess I am loathe to throw something so essential and universal to the human experience out the window.
I think many people get into verbal and philosophic contortions because like me they find it difficult to accept something which goes against their fundamental experience, and yet unlike me they're unable to let go of a materialist reductionist view of the universe.
> reflexive defensiveness
Reflexive - that is to say not controlled by me. ;-)
As to my second point, I cannot show that. I believe without proof that existence has meaning, justice, truth, wisdom are good and to be sought, and ignorance, slavery, cruelty are bad and to be rejected.
I just don't agree that the underlying reality of it is that there's anything "free" about it any more than e.g. a movie character has free will.
Yet that movie character will still make choices within their movie world that matters to the character, even though the choices are all illusory, and even the characters existence is illusory.
(I'd go much further and argue that we can't tell if space or time has any existence independent of a single instant of sentience, but it doesn't matter - the only thing that matters is that we experience it as if it has; the fundamental defence of philosophical materialism against philosophical idealism is exactly that: it doesn't matter; we have to act as if reality is as we sense it, whatever we know or believe we know about it)
I don't see the contradiction. I don't go around living my life thinking that what I do don't matter because the choices aren't free. They feel real and feel free, and the consequences are real whether or not the choice was truly free.
The only thing it changes is perhaps how I look back at things, and some views on morality:
I try not to have regrets (I do sometimes, because whatever my views I can not override all feelings, and would not wish to anyway), because while I may wish I had acted differently, I am pretty good at accepting that I couldn't have. I can try to act differently in the future, and hope I actually will, but what happened in the past, happened.
At the same time I can feel angry about how someone else acts but recognise that while that may inform how I act around them in the future because it may say something about how they will act in the future, it feels immoral to me to seek vengeance (that doesn't mean I can't feel a strong urge to, because the feelings are still real).
> As to my second point, I cannot show that. I believe without proof that existence has meaning, justice, truth, wisdom are good and to be sought, and ignorance, slavery, cruelty are bad and to be rejected.
And that's entirely fine, and I would largely agree because it's almost entirely orthogonal to the question of whether free will is real or just an illusion.
But you don't, cause you can't ;)
(and as the other response pointed out: this is exactly the kind of response I expect when I ask for definitions of free will, because the notion of it collapses rapidly when people try to define it)
Personally I'm happy with other definitions, not because I feel I'm doing mental gymnastics, but because the version you give is clearly not what normal people mean by it when they refer to it. It might well be related to what philosophers argue about, but normal people who offer you a 'free choice' or who say that you did something 'of your own free will' do not mean anything like 'your choice was not a function of the state of the universe'.
Despite being happy with those other definitions that you aren't, I'm equally skeptical of the idea that free will has to be rescued just because different points in time can be observed simultaneously. What does someone even mean by free will if it can't cope with that?