For what it's worth, I don't see any reason to imagine that hard decisions are of any other quality than easy decisions. It's part of my history and experience just as much that I prefer to eat salty foods than sweet ones as it is that I sometimes abstain from eating that pizza to try to manage my waistline, or refuse that job offer because I don't want to work for a company I don't find ethical.
But I'm not sure what to make of your second paragraph - doesn't saying there are hard and easy decisions require there be a difference of quality between the categories?
> doesn't saying there are hard and easy decisions require there be a difference of quality between the categories?
Not necessarily. There is a difference of "quantity" if you want, but not quality. It's like the following model: it's easy to compute 1+1, and it's hard to compute 19312123+123468. But they are not qualitatively different, they don't need different explanations: they both have the same nature, they use the same algorithm, one is just a bigger amount of state than the other.
I'm not sure there are alternatives to these.
Here's why I believe in free will: The preferences of the energy are subjective, not objective[1]. Its inputs are dictated by the architecture it resides in, but the meaning it attaches to them are determined internally and infinitely[2] more complex. So for example, someone who loves exercising gets very much the same nerve signals as someone who hates it. The difference is in the meaning each attaches to the experience, and meaning is not objective.
[1] AKA 'the hard problem of consciousness' [2] Insofar as internal communication happens across a higher-dimensional manifold than its communication with the architecture. For ease of visualization I imagine a three-dimensional gas interacting with the two-dimensional surface of a building, but I am working on a model that properly accounts for time.
This is not true, and there are consistent interpretations of QM that are fully deterministic (many worlds, superdeterminism, pilot wave).
Still, probabilistic vs deterministic makes no difference. There is no free will in a throw of the dice, and no free will in the wave function collapse.
On the other hand, the main philosophical position on this is compatibilism: free will in a fully deterministic universe (or probabilistic one). If you think of yourself as the sum total of all your experiences and genetics, your next action is of course determined by these; but, another agent in your shoes, one with different experiences and genetics, would make a different choice. So in this framework, your choice, even though uniquely determined by everything that happened before, and theoretically predictable 1000 years in advance, is still meaningfully "your choice".
In fact, random chance hurts this definition, and weakens the case for compatibilism; if your next action is entirely dependent on some random quantum fluctuation, and running the experiment with your exact same experience and genetics but a different random quantum event at this exact time would produce 1000 entirely different actions on your part, then it is very hard to imagine any kind of free will. So, free will actually depends on some amount of determinism. Even the type of determinism in Many Worlds would not solve this - since in that interpretation, all possible outcomes of the quantum event actually happen, so all your "choices" that depend on the random event are fully real. So, if each of the fully real copies of you, with the exact same experiences and genetics, does a wildly different thing, then it's pretty clear there is no meaningful free will in any possible sense.