To expand on this point. Deregulation with a federal reserve fallback is especially dangerous because it's essentially fake deregulation. When you know that you're too big to fail and the government is going to bail you then your risk to allocate capital effectively becomes zero.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571441
Thus, it’s ok to spend extra cash to stock buybacks and maintain no cash reserves.
I thought it was more about "too big to fail" attitudes preventing enforcement from being fairly applied to the largest participants.
At a broader level, there is most consensus on the idea that the key failure in 2008 was that no one--neither investors nor creditors nor credit-rating agencies nor regulators--correctly understood the risk profiles of the new financial products, and things that were thought to be very safe or at least combined uncorrelated risk profiles suddenly started all taking in unison at the same time.
I thought 2008's cause was perfectly clear: the banks all sold insurance policies on each other (in the form of credit default swaps) that they couldn't fulfill. When one bank went under due to bad bets in the market, this triggered policies that, if fulfilled, would bankrupt the next bank. That in turn bankrupted the next, and so on.
People focus on the conditions that bankrupted the first bank, but that was just the final snowflake that happened to trigger the avalanche.
And no, saying natural idiocy in the citizenry is to be embraced, does not simplify the issue: it was caused by natural idiocy which was enabled by lax enforcement. There are countries where your credit score matters not at all and your current ability to actually repay is analyzed.
You can fix the banks all you want but if people take stupid loans you ll never run out of ways to crash.
This is my point, the focus on bad debt is like obsessing over the last snowflake that fell before the avalanche. The bad debt didn't cause the avalanche, the underlying structure of credit default swap contracts between the banks did. They were all writing each other checks that they couldn't cash. If the underlying problem of unaccounted-for credit default swaps didn't exist, the bad debt would've just been another snowflake falling on the ground, essentially.
In America, the SEC had been systematic defunded and weakened - over successive administrations.
The argument, in the years before 2008, was that more regulation only holds wealth creator back. Especially when the market self corrects itself.
To suggest otherwise was even nearly un-American.
The SEC policy had adapted to pursue slam dunk cases, ensuring that it’s resources were spent in achieving some form of guaranteed deterrence.
However things like CDOs and the rest were out of its reach.
This leads to the low oversight.
The self correcting aspect of the market was also more mythical than practical.
As a financial analyst we were encouraged to ensure that model predictions were within range of other firms.
Multiples out of range meant that you were likely wrong.
Faith in the market became a shortcut meaning “someone else has done the homework”.
With all the rating agencies beholden to the purchaser of the rating, you start setting up the dominos for 2008.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass%E2%80%93Steagall_legis...
Either you can let (systemically important) people buy whatever junk they want, or you can mandate a minimum bar.
But if you mandate a minimum, who judges what does or doesn't meet it?
If something is too complex to interpret: maybe that's not immediately a problem, but it likely shouldn't serve as collateral for a loan (or similar), especially not systemically.
So this conceptual oracle doesn't need to be perfect: it just needs to accept a few false negatives (unnecessarily rejected collateral) in order to ensure there are few false positives (unwisely accepted collateral). Philosophically it certainly feels to me like an easier problem than finding a more generally trustworthy oracle; but these kind of things certainly are tricky.
They often are.
A lot of times a large investor pays them to look at a possible investment, and this case is quite ok. But the official ratings they are listed with are set by a third party mandating the company "go pay Fitch to rank you". It's not plain bribery like companies paying reviewers, but it's quite shady.
Yes, it's not a case of fraud. It's a case of a process structured in a way that facilitates fraud. (Who pays for the invoice has the power to negotiate its value.) It is a very different thing, but it's still a problem to be solved.
It's basically a thing guaranteed by single entity that promises that if the price drops they will buy tether at personal loss.
It's as safe as any pre-crypto, single company e-currencies. All of which died.
The only thing they have going for them is that they managed to place thrmselves as currency of the crypto market.
How many of those try to do something interesting and how many are just single entity backed coins like Tether?
Stable coins with centralized generation are not interesting.
This is the part that excites me about Ethereum, and also scares me when I hear talk of "regulation" for the space. By definition, a lot of the projects on Ethereum are a LOT more transparent than the traditional finance world. I can interact with something like DAI, and see exactly what backs it at every second of every day. I have an idea of what would happen if certain assets that backed it dropped too quickly.
With most of the traditional finance world, it's all very grey and hidden. I'm told that there is regulation "protecting me", but in a lot of cases that regulation doesn't really accomplish its goal and instead acts as a moat.
The important stuff is not transparent. For example, how do you know that Tether is backed by real USD? That Binance isn’t manipulating prices via wash trades? That the promises made about various coins are being upheld? etc.
Crypto is reliving the era of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wildcat_banking
> With most of the traditional finance world, it's all very grey and hidden
What specifically are you referring to with “traditional finance”?
You are describing so called centralised finance (CeFi) whereas the most high quality Ethereum projects focus on decentralised finance (DeFi). DeFi tries to break any chains to opaque companies and have all actions happening transparently and auditable on-chain. However ones like Tether murky the waters a lot here.
How can you create anything of value¹ by limiting yourself to on-chain transactions?
If value is created, the transaction would cover something happening in parallel, and your transparency does not extend to that.
¹ I do not consider lotteries or similar zero-sum games as value creation, but those can be 100% on-chain.
Likewise, we also all choose to agree that the owner of a car or a piece of land is whoever holds legal title to that car or piece of land according to some records maintained by some government office. If you think you own my car, and you make a duplicate set of keys and drive away in my car, I can get men with guns to go try to stop you from doing that because the official record says it's my car. But if you're the repo man, and I miss enough car payments, you can get the men with guns to take your side instead of mine, according to a similar process involving trained professionals arguing in front of someone wearing a black robe.
So yeah, the actual value isn't on-chain. What the chain replaces is the system of implicitly trusted institutions keeping records and adjudicating disagreements. Sure, out there in the real world, you have my car, but it's the record keeping that helps the men with guns decide whether to let you keep it or throw you in a cage for the next few years.
Is there an actual problem that this solves?
What do you believe caused regulators of financial instruments to be created?
One Explainer video with the founder: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXLTE-5BkhA
I think DeFi is really getting interesting.
Totally read experiments as experts
It's also 200% collateralised so USDC could go to zero (or freeze all of the DAI locked USDC) without breaking the peg on DAI
It would be very useful if we could kill vermin with it.
DAI is immensely exciting. Stablecoins like DAI are interesting experiments that could powerfully create new online economies.
Blockchains like Ethereum are currently far more transparent than the state-sponsor US monetary system. I hope to live in a society where economic experiments can be executed, new lessons learned, and transparency maintained. If stablecoins are persecuted, the need for cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs will allow these systems to continue with far less transparency.
As a different matter, how can society say "2008 bad", which resulted in little economic progress, and then threaten problem solvers from making new solutions? Innovation is a hedge against regulator lethargy.