To expand on this point. Deregulation with a federal reserve fallback is especially dangerous because it's essentially fake deregulation. When you know that you're too big to fail and the government is going to bail you then your risk to allocate capital effectively becomes zero.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571441
Thus, it’s ok to spend extra cash to stock buybacks and maintain no cash reserves.
I thought it was more about "too big to fail" attitudes preventing enforcement from being fairly applied to the largest participants.
At a broader level, there is most consensus on the idea that the key failure in 2008 was that no one--neither investors nor creditors nor credit-rating agencies nor regulators--correctly understood the risk profiles of the new financial products, and things that were thought to be very safe or at least combined uncorrelated risk profiles suddenly started all taking in unison at the same time.
I thought 2008's cause was perfectly clear: the banks all sold insurance policies on each other (in the form of credit default swaps) that they couldn't fulfill. When one bank went under due to bad bets in the market, this triggered policies that, if fulfilled, would bankrupt the next bank. That in turn bankrupted the next, and so on.
People focus on the conditions that bankrupted the first bank, but that was just the final snowflake that happened to trigger the avalanche.
And no, saying natural idiocy in the citizenry is to be embraced, does not simplify the issue: it was caused by natural idiocy which was enabled by lax enforcement. There are countries where your credit score matters not at all and your current ability to actually repay is analyzed.
You can fix the banks all you want but if people take stupid loans you ll never run out of ways to crash.
This is my point, the focus on bad debt is like obsessing over the last snowflake that fell before the avalanche. The bad debt didn't cause the avalanche, the underlying structure of credit default swap contracts between the banks did. They were all writing each other checks that they couldn't cash. If the underlying problem of unaccounted-for credit default swaps didn't exist, the bad debt would've just been another snowflake falling on the ground, essentially.
In America, the SEC had been systematic defunded and weakened - over successive administrations.
The argument, in the years before 2008, was that more regulation only holds wealth creator back. Especially when the market self corrects itself.
To suggest otherwise was even nearly un-American.
The SEC policy had adapted to pursue slam dunk cases, ensuring that it’s resources were spent in achieving some form of guaranteed deterrence.
However things like CDOs and the rest were out of its reach.
This leads to the low oversight.
The self correcting aspect of the market was also more mythical than practical.
As a financial analyst we were encouraged to ensure that model predictions were within range of other firms.
Multiples out of range meant that you were likely wrong.
Faith in the market became a shortcut meaning “someone else has done the homework”.
With all the rating agencies beholden to the purchaser of the rating, you start setting up the dominos for 2008.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass%E2%80%93Steagall_legis...
Either you can let (systemically important) people buy whatever junk they want, or you can mandate a minimum bar.
But if you mandate a minimum, who judges what does or doesn't meet it?
If something is too complex to interpret: maybe that's not immediately a problem, but it likely shouldn't serve as collateral for a loan (or similar), especially not systemically.
So this conceptual oracle doesn't need to be perfect: it just needs to accept a few false negatives (unnecessarily rejected collateral) in order to ensure there are few false positives (unwisely accepted collateral). Philosophically it certainly feels to me like an easier problem than finding a more generally trustworthy oracle; but these kind of things certainly are tricky.
They often are.
A lot of times a large investor pays them to look at a possible investment, and this case is quite ok. But the official ratings they are listed with are set by a third party mandating the company "go pay Fitch to rank you". It's not plain bribery like companies paying reviewers, but it's quite shady.
Yes, it's not a case of fraud. It's a case of a process structured in a way that facilitates fraud. (Who pays for the invoice has the power to negotiate its value.) It is a very different thing, but it's still a problem to be solved.