This dynamic crops up pretty often in historic wars, in which it's less the technology that determines the result but how well the humans are trained. The Civil War in the US was also a slog because of the poor level of training among both enlisted and officers. There was a tendency among poorly trained or untrained volunteers to 'go to ground' to hide from gunfire. Neither infantry nor cavalry really learned how to charge properly because of deficiencies in training, which made the battles go on for a lot longer than they would have otherwise.
It was a similar situation with WWI. It is very, very complicated to coordinate artillery and infantry and to properly plan a successful penetration through fixed defenses. This came to be more or less a solved problem by Germany under Ludendorff's new doctrine.
A lot of the breezy summaries about WWI about it being static also only apply to the western front, because there was lots of successful maneuver warfare in the east. That's why Ludendorff got the job to try to end the war in the west after his success against Russia.
We see this every day with the technology industry: often we have a technology that works well years before we can get people to use it properly or to make it user-friendly enough for everyone to understand readily. Coordinating artillery with infantry movements required lots of work in math/statistics and drilling plus lots of data collection to make the plans and timetables realistic.
The resilience that suddenly was there in WW1, was that there were so many people you could throw into the fire, suddenly.
The Black Death killed an estimated 40-50% of Europeans between 1347 and 1351, but the survivors were not doomed. In fact, living standards increased as the amount of agricultural land per person increased.
The Black Death killed 40-50% of the population indiscriminately. Wars killed able-bodied men in their prime almost exclusively—removing a huge chunk of those best able to bring in the harvest (many able-bodied women can help, of course, but some percentage of those are pregnant or caring for babies for much of the day), without removing a proportional chunk of those who cannot contribute as much but still need to eat.
Definitely not true and increasingly not. Civilians, especially old and vulnerable die due to violence of soldiers, general violence, lack of food, medicine, having to move without support and so on. Armies extract very much needed resources and destabilize places.
Plus, civilians are often targets - WWII notoriously killed more civilians then soldiers.
Being soldier of front line is massive risk factor. But they are not exclusively victims, as non soldiers people die due to their activity everywhere they go.
And sure, wars could target civilians, and sometimes did. But what you can be guaranteed of in a war is that soldiers will die.
They very often do. It is not exceptional. In pretty much all wars, civilians die. Cities, villages, farms get attacked and destroyed along people in them. War where civilians don't die would be an exception.
Also, wars happen where people live.
> I was referring to wars prior to WWII
In those, civilians died too, cities/villages were attacked for fun and profit and all that.
In addition, prior wold wars, armies lived off the land. Meaning taking food off whoever happened to live there, by force if necessary. Meaning, additional deaths off lack of food.
That sounds like a factor in determining how long an attacker can sustain attacks, but the underlying hypothesis is that defense far outweighed the ability to sustain attacks.
To quote the OP:
> "But the real problem was that, for the first time since castles vs. troops without cannon, defense was stronger than offense."
This sounds like what Iain Banks referred to as an OCP - an Outside Context Problem [0].
As TFA describes:
"Crudely put, it occurs when you don’t have the right conceptual tools for the job. The result is an inability to make sense of what is happening and a resulting tendency to force phenomena into crude, distorting pigeonholes."
I suspect the cautious thinkers are always alert, to the point of being hyper-sensitive, to this risk - manifesting in imposter syndrome through excessively cautious, highly qualified caveats around their messages, etc.
We circle back towards a generic DK effect, while introspection leads to further introspection.
In the seminal book "On War" which was published in 1832 and is still required reading in many military academies, Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz explicitly says that defense is stronger than offense.
Maybe this intensified in WWI
If, all else being equal, it takes a force of 1500 attackers to overwhelm 1000 defenders, defense is still stronger than offense, but you can still expect to be able to make progress relatively easily.
If, on the other hand, it takes 5000 attackers to overwhelm 1000 defenders, suddenly you have to make very different kinds of calculations about what is worth the cost, and what is even strategically feasible to take without destroying your army's ability to fight.
Force ratio doesn't have to be strictly numerical, though. Offense can have better weapons, rely on element of surprise, and we also like to attack during really bad weather because it sucks a lot more to be dug in during a rainstorm than to be on the move. There's also some advantage in indirect fire in that it's easier for artillery to hit a stationary target than a moving one, so provided your artillery itself is mobile enough to survive counterbattery strikes, that goes to the offense. Unless the defense is so well dug in that artillery can't even affect it. So it depends on a lot of things.
But in general, defense always has the advantage. They get to choose where to fight, they can prepare their positions, they don't need to expose themselves.
I guess it's reversed in cyberwarfare if you want to think of it that way, but it's really not analogous. It's never been all that difficult to sneak a small surgical force inside an enemy perimeter, but you can't take and hold land that way, which is what attack versus defense force ratios are thinking of. This is more of a law enforcement thing, which has always relied on either having more cops than criminals or extremely harsh punishments. The issue here is we can't enforce the law against foreign actors if the host nation won't help. When actual Americans have been caught breaking into American computer systems, they've totally had the book thrown at them and I think that really has deterred domestically launched cyberattacks. It's not like the NSA can't find you, but if the only way to actually stop you is to send in Seal Team Six, that isn't worth starting a real war over.
I'm curious about the "they get to choose where to fight" question, actually.
I can see where this would apply on a tactical scale, like if I'm preparing an ambush. But on an operational scale, doesn't the attacker choose where and when to fight?
Strategically, there is a lot of value in the attack because you can choose the time and place of fighting to your advantage. This didn't pan out on the Western Front of WWI for a variety of reasons.
Let's say we have fortifications. People are needed to man them. This is understood by everyone. Entry points are checked, etc.
Compare with 'cyber' systems. How many people are adding features, working on bugs and the like, versus how many are even looking into security vulnerabilities?
Translating to the physical domain, it would be as if we were building a fort, then moving almost everyone to build extensions or new forts, with a handful responsible for the security of all fortresses - and the paths in between them! In the dark.
The fact that most systems are not immediately "owned" speaks volumes on how difficult this is to accomplish. Barring zero days, the main way one gets compromised is by making mistakes (not patching, leaving systems unsecured, etc). That is, there's a door that's open and unguarded...
If you consider "defense" as an organization attempting to provide a service securely, and "offense" as all the security threats they are exposed to, it seems hard to argue that the defensive side has any sort of advantage over all of the attackers.
off-topic
I agree fully that a "modern" military will always win against one that depends on "old" doctrines exclusively. I have interesting tales of both English and Zulu officers on how the war proceeded, how the Zulu court knew their fate and had come to choose death, and the English officers who did not want war to begin with.
kwaZulu remains part of the Republic of South Africa, despite recent troubles from Zuma/Zulu loyalists.
Huh? Castles couldn't beat troops without cannon. If you got besieged, your options were to be relieved by an external army, surrender, or lose.
That's a modern-transportation perspective. Unless the siege happens to be on a waterway and you supply that way.
Land-based logistics for pre-modern armies was _hard_. The standard solution was to keep the army on the move and forage as you went, so you kept stealing food from new peasants, but that's not an option for an army laying a siege. On the other hand, if the castle/town knew a siege was coming they would move things like livestock from the surrounding countryside inside the walls, and the grain stores were likely _already_ inside the walls.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Nuremberg explicitly mentions supply as a problem for the besieging army in that case, and that's an early-modern army, not premodern. http://hundredyearswar.com/Books/History/Sieges.htm also says "the siege was often lifted because the besieging commander ran out of food to feed or money to pay his troops".
In practice, what this meant is that you would not even start a siege unless you had some idea that you could ensure supply, which was the common situation.
They would be full of grief and anger at losing some of their grandparents, but that won't affect their ability to fight and would be likely to motivate them to continue.
Smallpox had up to 90% mortality in Native American populations, across all demographics. Fair to say it was a different beast.
Although if you were to go in that direction COVID-19 would be a minor inconvenience when it comes to warfare so I'm not too sure what you're aiming at there. The Spanish "used" diseases that were a heck of a lot more severe.
(And it should go without saying, but the concept of biological warfare is so abhorrent that it should never be considered as an option.)
Did the Taliban lock down? Of course not.
So we've done this experiment and you're simply wrong.
The original SARS and MERS were too deadly to spread widely. In order for the attack to work, you don't need a disease which is lethal. All you need is a disease which makes your enemy ill enough to attack their infra, while you're immune (e.g. via full vaccination, or because of group immunity from antibodies).
Right now, Israel is practically immune to COVID (and was the quickest to get vaccinated), while their surrounding regions are not. This could give them an advantage in warfare, should they decide to initiate such (legit or via proxy). Which, incidentally, is also why is was clever of Israel to pay large sums of money for the vaccines.
For one thing, the initial wave of smallpox wasn't an attack, it was just an ordinary infection. Incredibly deadly but it wasn't deliberately introduced.
For another, comparing smallpox with covid is so thick-headed that I'm not interested in discussing things with you anymore.
Irrelevant.
Viral warfare is an absolutely stupid idea. It’s almost assured that the weapon would escape containment and find its way into the population, and as we’ve seen vaccines are of limited benefit if enough people won’t take them.
I really do suspect that if, for example, some basement biohacker terrorist decided to release an engineered bird flu with high fatality, once having staged their distribution mechanism, they wouldn’t be able to arrange for the other countries to contain it simply by providing input information about what was about to occur.
It’s true that they would be small incidents, but essentially if you can disseminate the knowledge widely enough, and the effects are horrific enough, probably you would have de facto containment.
I have dreaded the scenario since my 20s, and that was a long time ago, and the scenario is many, many times easier than it was at the time.
WWI did have moments of extreme stupidity. But the real problem was that, for the first time since castles vs. troops without cannon, defense was stronger than offense. Machine guns, barbed wire, and trenches could resist most attacks. When that wasn't enough, both sides had plenty of railroad capacity and could move reserves around fast enough that no breakthrough got very far. There was much logistic cleverness behind that. It worked well.
When defense is stronger than offense, wars stall. Which is what happened in WWI. Nobody could force a decision. Until tanks and aircraft entered the battlefield.
We have that today. Guerilla warfare can go on for decades. Neither side can force a decision. If the guerilla side gets ahead, they control entire areas, which means they have vulnerable centers that can be attacked. If the other side gets ahead, the guerillas hide in the population until the heat is off. "A guerrilla swims among the people like a fish swims in the sea." - Mao. Neither side can force a decision, although one side may eventually wear down the other over a long period.
Modern militaries realize that their tactical doctrine may not work, but they're also aware that new, proposed doctrine may be worse. There have been societies that couldn't even think about that problem. Many, from the Aztecs to the Zulus, are extinct.