(Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format (and other specs), and GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it -- all of it. You can build something that hides metadata, you can have forward secrecy, and encryption always-on by default with PGP (and GnuPG). You can use it for whatever trust model you want, neither OpenPGP (the specs) nor GnuPG prescribe a certain model. It provides building blocks. It just happens that no good client exists and no more high level specs were written that use it, which is highly unfortunate. The client in this case here used to be "Enigmail" (a wrapper around GnuPG), and now is built-in since plugins are not allowed to be as powerful with the new browser architecture that Thunderbird piggybacks on and this was the only way to bring PGP to Thunderbird users. Also, there are some more modern libraries nowadays for standard use cases around PGP.
Signal was able to move faster since it did not exist, did not try to build things in an open and collaborative fashion, still refuses to work in any open way. Its founder Moxie even openly argues against standards [x]. I am not saying he does not have "a point", but in the long run this will lead to just more silos and ultimately technical stagnation, and for me goes against the ethos of "a public and open inter-net." (and the learnings behind it. 'Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.')
That said, I do agree with your comment on a pure end-user level. It still makes me sad to always see this confused and not acknowledged better in places like HN, where people "should know". Technologists can defend and strive for the most promising long-term solution and "proper way to do it", and at the same time recommend "the best of the bad that is currently available". Even if it is confusing sometimes.
Just to give an example, there are plenty of high security use cases that require using smartcards. I'm very grateful that the OpenPGP standard and GnuPG exist that (can be made to) work in such cases. Signal does nothing in that space, rightfully so. But you are comparing different fruit to each other, which is kind of unfair.
[x] and still calls himself an "anarchist". You would think those know better...
I agree that one great weakness of Signal is its centralization, and that decentralization is a great strength of email.
For a decentralized encrypted communication channel, Matrix may become a good option now that it is encrypted by default, but I haven't studied carefully the quality of its encryption beyond that yet.
Regardless, I really do think a new protocol is required for secure communications and that email won't cut it. If Signal or Matrix can't do the job for some applications, we'll just have to try again. I cannot recommend email for secure communications, and in any situation where security matters, I have to prioritize people's safety. In terms of security, the best that is available in the realm of encrypted email is not and cannot be good enough.
> I used to love [A], but I now think [B] is a bad idea.
will lead many people to think that you consider A and B to be essentially the same thing. In the specific case of PGP and encrypted email, this is a category error: you are implying (perhaps unintentionally) that PGP’s only use is for encrypted email.
It abjectly fails at that. It's just awful to interface with.
The constant confusion between OpenPGP (the standard) and GnuPG (one implementation) has led many users to look elsewhere, which is unfortunate, but has also led many developers to look elsewhere, which is just sad.
Yes, trying to work within the existing standardization bodies can be very painful and disheartening, but the few people who try and survive in that space can use every good soul willing to assist.
The OpenPGP community has done hundred times more than Signal for the state of security on the Internet, and I'm sure it will continue to do so. Signal is great, and pushed the limits quite far (and still does), and I'm very grateful that it exists and use it every day.
See https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html for more on that. And it isn't hard to find lots and lots of cryptographers agreeing with the thesis.
OpenPGP is used to secure everything from simple messages and email to authenticating OS updates for most servers today.
Should they use something more specialized now that it exists? Sure, but that an argument for PGP not against it; PGP is useful in situations where no specialized solutions exist or are inadequate.
Until something comes along that can cover every situation where OpenPGP is useful, I can't see people stop using it (much to the dismay of the 5 vocal crptologists that keep arguing against it).
At least with PGP email, you can make the argument that PGP sticks around because people don't want to recreate contact lists. But even that argument doesn't apply to update.
I'm suggesting that "seems fine so far" is not effective at evaluating solidity of cryptographical usage.
Well, just use TUF [1] and in-toto [2] ;)
For the simple case of "a single publisher publishes update for a single product", TUF is an overkill. Something like signify or seccure will be way easier to set up and use.
And for MOST of the places that it is used, it gets screwed up in some way that makes it not as secure as the people using it thought that it was.
Stop and think carefully about that statement. And repeat it to every person you meet who thinks that they are solving their problems with OpenPGP.
Due to the complexity of the PGP system, there are a plethora of downgrade attacks. Where something that was supposed to be at one level of security can be tricked into doing something much less secure. See https://twitter.com/xmppwocky/status/1291144278953955328, https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/JLn7sL6TqikUf-..., and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/pgp-and-efail-frequent... for three different examples of such attacks against PGP in recent years.
The second one is just yet another person discovering that the MDC check can be stripped off a message.
The third one seems to be just EFAIL which is not a downgrade or any attack really against PGP.
I didn't know OpenPGP was used to authenticate OS updates for most servers today. Can you give me a place to find out more about that; are you talking about a specific OS?
If you're not using GnuPG, you can pick any format you want! What does OpenPGP add? Everything I can think of is a negative.
If you want an explanation of why GnuPG is dangerous for anything besides email, let me know. But parent post was very specifically NOT about GnuPG- it was about OpenPGP.
What does the OpenPGP format bring to the table, BESIDES HAVING A COMMONLY AVAILABLE IMPLEMENTATION IN GNUPG?
What I got from it is that the strength of PGP is in its flexibility and that it gains that flexibility from being standardized and open.
Of course you can extend PGP (or any protocol really) to include cryptographic handshakes, but that's besides the point.
That makes an even better case that PGP is not much of a modern secure system generally, rather than it just being bad for secure email.
I don't understand what you're trying to say here.
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/05/16/agility.html
“Have one joint, and keep it well oiled.”
At the top of the thread someone says 'PGP has all this ancient cruft and also isn't good for email/email is maybe unsecurable anyway'. The PGP-enthusiast response to that is 'No problem! You see, PGP is so flexible, you can build anything out of it, including maybe an actually-secure system of some sort'.
This is a fundamentally inadequate response and we've realized it's inadequate and don't really design secure systems like that anymore. In fact, this class of concern has permeated almost all aspects of contemporary software systems design rather than being something narrowly limited to 'crypto algo agility is bad'. Here's an example/illustrative timeline that doesn't have anything to do with 'data at rest'.
1998 Netscape: Behold our cross-platform, cross-language super-toolkit for building super-extensible Enterprise Groupware apps. Also one of them is a web browser!
2015 Mozilla: [belated forehead slap] This is a terrible way to architect a web browser that has any hope of offering end-user security.
Edit: I'll expand the quote from the original thing a bit if it helps:
(Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format (and other specs), and GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it -- all of it. You can build something that hides metadata, you can have forward secrecy, and encryption always-on by default with PGP (and GnuPG). You can use it for whatever trust model you want, neither OpenPGP (the specs) nor GnuPG prescribe a certain model. It provides building blocks.
This is a huge 'nope'. It's, by this point, an uncontroversial, well-understood nope. A known-nope, if you will! The only people who don't seem to think so are PGP people and that, in itself, is rather telling.
How do you do a downgrade attack on, say, an encrypted backup?
That's it. That's the actual arguments to this point. Then you just said nope.
You are not claiming that logic and facts are irrelevant here, are you?
I never said that. You're replying to someone else.
On the face of it, that sounds like exactly the position an anarchist would take...
That's an incredibly... unconventional read on the IETF.
Edit: language fixes. English is not my language of choice for discussing things like this...
If you try to actually build a secure environment within a group that tries to maximize security while getting real work done you find you want to be encrypted by default at least with each other. Signal is pretty suboptimal for heavy volumes of messages. If you and I have three threads going they are all jumbled together. If I want to send to more than one person I have to whip out my phone and form a group and name it.
PGP is imperfect but with the right settings and defaults it is far better than having email default to clear text. And in any long term endeavor with more than a few people you will find you want email.
Signal is great for what it does. It is not designed to be a high volume working tool like email though.
It's not possible to make email secure, the flaws are on the protocol level. To fix it, you would need to change it until it is no longer email.
If you’re saying Signal is strictly more secure I agee 100%. It’s just not suitable for using for large amounts of comms within a group. I wish they’d improve it and have even detailed features I think they should add (I made an HN thread when they got that donation from the whatsapp guy).
For now it’s not realistic to expect people to know how to put ALL sensitive comms in Signal. You need to build an environment where as many channels as possible are secure by default. Setting everyone up with GPG and using it by default actually works in group settings and is much better than not doing it. The “just use Signal” meme is wrong. Because you can’t. Not at high volumes.
(Also, metadata is a lot less important in the context of a group that openly associates with one another as a great many do. It does suck that subject lines leak. But better to encrypt the message body than throw up hands and give up because no perfect substitute exists. One learns not to put much info into subject lines. You can always just not use them. Signal does not have them.)
How could Signal (or other client-server protocol) not leak metadata? It is true that OpenPGP leaks more metadata than necessary (e.g. Subject), but seems to me that any efficient message protocol needs to leak at least three most important metadata - source, destination, time.
One could avoid leaking destination by broadcasting encrypted to many receivers (when only the true one can decrypt it) and therefore server does not need to know true destinations, but that is rather inefficient.
I don't know if they can do anything about destination or time, but even hiding the source seems like a significant advancement.
The post mentions some kind of "short-lived" pseudo-sender, which is vulnerable to the same metadata analysis.
Encrypting the receiver is a lot harder though. It will probably involve dropping off the message at some central location and some very fancy cryptography. Secure multi-party computation [0] will probably be involved. I don't know if it can be made scalable though.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation
That's the point. If the sender is encrypted, what's "the destination"? The IPv4 space? A random ID that represents the sender? How does that change the metadata angle?
`Have a nice day. Regards, sobani`
and see that I'm the sender.
If I'm worried about leaking my IP address, I can use something like Tor.
I'm confused why you think the sender needs to be known in any way to allow bytes to be delivered to your mail server.
PGP can be used to encrypt headers such as Subject. Mail addresses can be temporary and pseudonymous much more easily than phone numbers. One could imagine building something like "Signal" on top of PGP and "email" that has all the "metadata hiding" properties of Signal, and more, e.g. by introducing delays and random relaying order on SMTP level.
Deltachat is an example of an open project in that space: https://delta.chat/
To present an iron-man argument instead of a straw-man, imagine they were comparing Delta Chat to Signal, and pointing out that Delta Chat does encrypt subject headers[0], and that Signal users typically don't use temporary phone numbers (which are harder to obtain than temporary email addresses).
If you want, you could try comparing Signal's proprietary network versus the global SMTP network in terms of how secure they are against traffic timing analysis.
[0] https://delta.chat/en/help#how-does-delta-chat-protect-my-me...
It's not possible to make Signal secure, the flaws are on the protocol level. To fix it, you would need to change it until it is no longer Signal.
You have your email set up to "default" to PGP? Can you say more about what you mean by that?
Transport-level security and authentication of email content is a perfectly valid use-case for an organisation when protection against third-party interference is desired. They don't need to worry about forward secrecy, they just need attachments to be transmitted in a legally-compliant manner.
For example each month HR email me my payslip as an encrypted attachment. I decrypt it and save locally. They just have a batch job that encrypts for each user and sends. They don't have to worry about who uses which IM client. They don't need to care if I self-host or use Gmail, because their ligation is simply to keep the information secure in transit.
You are also too keen to support Signal's use of phone numbers as identifiers. That's a design choice, instead of using client-managed identifiers, and makes it unsuitable for organisational use. Whose phone will we use to send the deposition to the court... and who in the court will have a phone with Signal on it? Email by contrast is universal and integrates well into organisational processes without dependency upon individuals.
This makes sense to me. I've been trying to get friends, family and colleagues to encrypt email (hell, even signing would be a step!) for about 3 decades, now, and have basically thrown in the towel. So anything that affords a small toe-hold to begin the painful process of building the necessary network effects for the idea of encrypted email to gain traction is a good thing.
With PGP there is zero chance of anyone decrypting my data unless they have my key and password, which isn't uploaded anywhere and no apps have access to it.
For me, open-standard-ness and federated-ness are two measures that i consider even more important than cryptographic security. So communication protocol that does not satisfy either of these have little value to me, i would rather use e-mail.
And personally, I think the points made it the linked article are weak.
Apps like ProtonMail or Tutanota may have an impact on encrypted email. If both sides use ProtonMail, communication is end to end secure. That’s also the case with encrypted messaging. In both cases, copying outside an incompatible platform may be insecure. At least, email address is more private than phone number.
If both sides use [the same provider], it's not mail anymore, it's something internal. That is the fundamental issue of ProtonMail/Tutanota/any service provider that pretends to solve end-to-end encryption in email: without standards, it's a proprietary system. Today the only viable path towards easy E2E encryption in email is Autocrypt. AFAIK only Posteo is working towards including it.
Better to use a protocol designed with encryption in mind, like Signal, to get forward secrecy, avoid leaking metadata, and have encryption always on by default.
UPDATE: I have been reminded that PGP does not have to be used with email. I meant to say that I used to love using PGP with email, since that is the primary way I have used it. I will not comment on the use of PGP outside of email, since I haven't carefully examined its use in other contexts.