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Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by skyfaller on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:21PM (#24511162)
I used to love PGP, but I now think encrypted email is a bad idea. https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted....

Better to use a protocol designed with encryption in mind, like Signal, to get forward secrecy, avoid leaking metadata, and have encryption always on by default.

UPDATE: I have been reminded that PGP does not have to be used with email. I meant to say that I used to love using PGP with email, since that is the primary way I have used it. I will not comment on the use of PGP outside of email, since I haven't carefully examined its use in other contexts.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rendx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:37PM (#24511252)
That is the single most common misconception around PGP, and it comes up every time:

(Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format (and other specs), and GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it -- all of it. You can build something that hides metadata, you can have forward secrecy, and encryption always-on by default with PGP (and GnuPG). You can use it for whatever trust model you want, neither OpenPGP (the specs) nor GnuPG prescribe a certain model. It provides building blocks. It just happens that no good client exists and no more high level specs were written that use it, which is highly unfortunate. The client in this case here used to be "Enigmail" (a wrapper around GnuPG), and now is built-in since plugins are not allowed to be as powerful with the new browser architecture that Thunderbird piggybacks on and this was the only way to bring PGP to Thunderbird users. Also, there are some more modern libraries nowadays for standard use cases around PGP.

Signal was able to move faster since it did not exist, did not try to build things in an open and collaborative fashion, still refuses to work in any open way. Its founder Moxie even openly argues against standards [x]. I am not saying he does not have "a point", but in the long run this will lead to just more silos and ultimately technical stagnation, and for me goes against the ethos of "a public and open inter-net." (and the learnings behind it. 'Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.')

That said, I do agree with your comment on a pure end-user level. It still makes me sad to always see this confused and not acknowledged better in places like HN, where people "should know". Technologists can defend and strive for the most promising long-term solution and "proper way to do it", and at the same time recommend "the best of the bad that is currently available". Even if it is confusing sometimes.

Just to give an example, there are plenty of high security use cases that require using smartcards. I'm very grateful that the OpenPGP standard and GnuPG exist that (can be made to) work in such cases. Signal does nothing in that space, rightfully so. But you are comparing different fruit to each other, which is kind of unfair.

[x] and still calls himself an "anarchist". You would think those know better...

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by skyfaller on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:54PM (#24511371)
I understand that PGP doesn't have to be used with email. That is why I haven't commented on PGP, I'm saying that I think encrypted email is a bad idea, regardless of whether you use PGP or something else. We're posting in a thread about Thunderbird, an e-mail client :)

I agree that one great weakness of Signal is its centralization, and that decentralization is a great strength of email.

For a decentralized encrypted communication channel, Matrix may become a good option now that it is encrypted by default, but I haven't studied carefully the quality of its encryption beyond that yet.

Regardless, I really do think a new protocol is required for secure communications and that email won't cut it. If Signal or Matrix can't do the job for some applications, we'll just have to try again. I cannot recommend email for secure communications, and in any situation where security matters, I have to prioritize people's safety. In terms of security, the best that is available in the realm of encrypted email is not and cannot be good enough.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by kd5bjo on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:04PM (#24511452)
For future reference, statements like this:

> I used to love [A], but I now think [B] is a bad idea.

will lead many people to think that you consider A and B to be essentially the same thing. In the specific case of PGP and encrypted email, this is a category error: you are implying (perhaps unintentionally) that PGP’s only use is for encrypted email.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by skyfaller on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:14PM (#24511523)
Fair enough, I've updated my top comment with an attempt to clarify.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by Quekid5 on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:08PM (#24511486)
> GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it

It abjectly fails at that. It's just awful to interface with.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rendx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:27PM (#24511628)
Agreed. It has been long overdue that alternative OpenPGP implementations exist that try to address some of the peculiarities of GnuPG -- most of which are [still] there because its founder wants to preserve compatibility at all costs to support some of its long-term institutional users. And, yes, dealing with these peculiarities should not the responsibility of end users, but of further abstraction layers built on top of it (of which there are only a few, and all of them focused on the email use case).

The constant confusion between OpenPGP (the standard) and GnuPG (one implementation) has led many users to look elsewhere, which is unfortunate, but has also led many developers to look elsewhere, which is just sad.

Yes, trying to work within the existing standardization bodies can be very painful and disheartening, but the few people who try and survive in that space can use every good soul willing to assist.

The OpenPGP community has done hundred times more than Signal for the state of security on the Internet, and I'm sure it will continue to do so. Signal is great, and pushed the limits quite far (and still does), and I'm very grateful that it exists and use it every day.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by btilly on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:05PM (#24511879)
The OpenPGP community would do more for security if they listened to serious cryptographers and began recommending better solutions.

See https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html for more on that. And it isn't hard to find lots and lots of cryptographers agreeing with the thesis.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by ifmpx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:48PM (#24512119)
People in this industry use OpenPGP because it's flexible and amendable to almost any usecase you can think of. "Better solutions" are usually indeed better but are also so specialized for their purpose to the point that they can't be easily used for any other purpose.

OpenPGP is used to secure everything from simple messages and email to authenticating OS updates for most servers today.

Should they use something more specialized now that it exists? Sure, but that an argument for PGP not against it; PGP is useful in situations where no specialized solutions exist or are inadequate.

Until something comes along that can cover every situation where OpenPGP is useful, I can't see people stop using it (much to the dismay of the 5 vocal crptologists that keep arguing against it).

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by tptacek on Thursday September 17, 2020 @11:07PM (#24512577)
It's telling that the most common example of a widespread use of PGP (modern messaging applications exchange more messages in a day than OpenPGP has ever exchanged) is software update schemes, because software update cryptography is both a solved problem (just use signify) and doesn't have network effects; it's a "trust anchor" application.

At least with PGP email, you can make the argument that PGP sticks around because people don't want to recreate contact lists. But even that argument doesn't apply to update.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by somedude11 on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:20AM (#24513513)
Backup, archivization, password managers, the list is long. Duplicity has many users: http://duplicity.nongnu.org Pass is also pretty popular on HN: https://www.passwordstore.org Both use GPG.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by stormbrew on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:58AM (#24513745)
I use pass and I would switch in a heartbeat to a fork of it that used ssh keys or something similar instead of gpg. For something so amazingly simple and useful, its dependence on the klunky mess that is gpg key management is an anchor that weighs it down.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by somedude11 on Friday September 18, 2020 @03:30AM (#24513963)
Key management is a burden in every cryptosystem. I'm using KeePass and can recommend it, it works well.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by wglb on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:33PM (#24520294)
Would you know if it failed?
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by somedude11 on Saturday September 19, 2020 @06:02PM (#24530601)
If it would "fail" and there would be no consequences so I could't tell if it failed or not - would it make a difference?
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by wglb on Sunday September 20, 2020 @08:10PM (#24538520)
If the failure were discovered by you a year later, realizing that all you thought was protected was in an adversary's hands.

I'm suggesting that "seems fine so far" is not effective at evaluating solidity of cryptographical usage.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by trishankdatadog on Thursday September 17, 2020 @11:49PM (#24512799)
> software update cryptography is both a solved problem (just use signify)

Well, just use TUF [1] and in-toto [2] ;)

[1] https://theupdateframework.io/

[2] https://in-toto.io/

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by theamk on Friday September 18, 2020 @04:13PM (#24521403)
Note that TUF is great for things with multiple contributiors (think npm or pypa).

For the simple case of "a single publisher publishes update for a single product", TUF is an overkill. Something like signify or seccure will be way easier to set up and use.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by trishankdatadog on Monday September 21, 2020 @02:11PM (#24546574)
signify is nice when key distribution, revocation, and rotation is handled for you... but how do you do that securely for many different publishers on a single repo?
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by btilly on Thursday September 17, 2020 @10:47PM (#24512459)
OpenPGP is used to secure everything from simple messages and email to authenticating OS updates for most servers today.

And for MOST of the places that it is used, it gets screwed up in some way that makes it not as secure as the people using it thought that it was.

Stop and think carefully about that statement. And repeat it to every person you meet who thinks that they are solving their problems with OpenPGP.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by ifmpx on Friday September 18, 2020 @10:11AM (#24516989)
What do you mean by PGP "not [being] as secure as the people using it thought that it was"? Can you mention something specific?
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by btilly on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:21PM (#24520142)
Here is something specific.

Due to the complexity of the PGP system, there are a plethora of downgrade attacks. Where something that was supposed to be at one level of security can be tricked into doing something much less secure. See https://twitter.com/xmppwocky/status/1291144278953955328, https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/JLn7sL6TqikUf-..., and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/pgp-and-efail-frequent... for three different examples of such attacks against PGP in recent years.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:55PM (#24520582)
The first one appears to be some sort of joke.

The second one is just yet another person discovering that the MDC check can be stripped off a message.

The third one seems to be just EFAIL which is not a downgrade or any attack really against PGP.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by jrochkind1 on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:59PM (#24512193)
What industry do you mean by "this industry"? Just... computing?

I didn't know OpenPGP was used to authenticate OS updates for most servers today. Can you give me a place to find out more about that; are you talking about a specific OS?

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by somedude11 on Friday September 18, 2020 @06:34AM (#24515050)
Packet managers on pretty much every Linux distribution use GPG for verifying packages.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by aptmiguk on Friday September 18, 2020 @05:34AM (#24514749)
It's used to digitally sign software, not encrypting.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by XMPPwocky on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:06PM (#24511888)
What is a good non-email use case for the PGP format?
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by ifmpx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:50PM (#24512139)
Any usecase forwhich no specialized solution already exists. Source code signatures and Apt/RPM packages are good examples of this.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by XMPPwocky on Thursday September 17, 2020 @10:31PM (#24512352)
What does OpenPGP bring there? At least GnuPG has the benefit of being a tool that's present on many system and which is capable of verifying signatures.

If you're not using GnuPG, you can pick any format you want! What does OpenPGP add? Everything I can think of is a negative.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by gsich on Thursday September 17, 2020 @11:28PM (#24512679)
OpenPGP is the standard, gnupg is a implementation.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by XMPPwocky on Thursday September 17, 2020 @11:34PM (#24512709)
Right, so why talk about the standard when you mean, specifically, GnuPG?

If you want an explanation of why GnuPG is dangerous for anything besides email, let me know. But parent post was very specifically NOT about GnuPG- it was about OpenPGP.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by gsich on Friday September 18, 2020 @06:26AM (#24515013)
because gnupg is not the only implementation.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by XMPPwocky on Friday September 18, 2020 @08:28PM (#24523409)
Yes, that's what I said, and why I was asking!

What does the OpenPGP format bring to the table, BESIDES HAVING A COMMONLY AVAILABLE IMPLEMENTATION IN GNUPG?

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by gsich on Saturday September 19, 2020 @01:14AM (#24525312)
It's the generic term.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Friday September 18, 2020 @08:19AM (#24515724)
It is used routinely on the dark nets by pasting encrypted messages into web forms.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rlpb on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:13PM (#24511510)
Who said that it's for a user to interface with directly? mutt interfaces with it perfectly fine, and mutt's PGP UX is also fine.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by tptacek on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:44PM (#24512086)
This is a weird argument. By your logic, there's practically no cryptosystem PGP can't be; after all, it's an omnibus standard to which people routinely add extensions for new algorithms. Want a double ratchet? An elliptic curve triple handshake? The "building blocks" are all there, all you have to do is use PGP's "flexible packet format" to carry them.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by ifmpx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @10:15PM (#24512270)
This is an interesting interpretation of what he stated.

What I got from it is that the strength of PGP is in its flexibility and that it gains that flexibility from being standardized and open.

Of course you can extend PGP (or any protocol really) to include cryptographic handshakes, but that's besides the point.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:28PM (#24511637)
(Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format

That makes an even better case that PGP is not much of a modern secure system generally, rather than it just being bad for secure email.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rendx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:30PM (#24511646)
Because packet formats are bad?

I don't understand what you're trying to say here.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by owenmarshall on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:23PM (#24511974)
Flexibility in cryptography is often very bad and opens doors to downgrade attacks or things like JWT’s alg:none issues.

https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/05/16/agility.html

“Have one joint, and keep it well oiled.”

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Friday September 18, 2020 @08:24AM (#24515765)
The linked article is all about protecting data in flight like in the TLS case. PGP is all about protecting data at rest. The two applications are fundamentally different.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Friday September 18, 2020 @10:15AM (#24517039)
I think you're misunderstanding the general complaint or maybe not the complaint but how general, rather than specific it is.

At the top of the thread someone says 'PGP has all this ancient cruft and also isn't good for email/email is maybe unsecurable anyway'. The PGP-enthusiast response to that is 'No problem! You see, PGP is so flexible, you can build anything out of it, including maybe an actually-secure system of some sort'.

This is a fundamentally inadequate response and we've realized it's inadequate and don't really design secure systems like that anymore. In fact, this class of concern has permeated almost all aspects of contemporary software systems design rather than being something narrowly limited to 'crypto algo agility is bad'. Here's an example/illustrative timeline that doesn't have anything to do with 'data at rest'.

1998 Netscape: Behold our cross-platform, cross-language super-toolkit for building super-extensible Enterprise Groupware apps. Also one of them is a web browser!

2015 Mozilla: [belated forehead slap] This is a terrible way to architect a web browser that has any hope of offering end-user security.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Friday September 18, 2020 @10:23AM (#24517130)
How do you do a downgrade attack on, say, an encrypted backup?
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Friday September 18, 2020 @10:31AM (#24517239)
I guess I don't understand how that's a response to anything I've written in this thread.

Edit: I'll expand the quote from the original thing a bit if it helps:

(Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format (and other specs), and GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it -- all of it. You can build something that hides metadata, you can have forward secrecy, and encryption always-on by default with PGP (and GnuPG). You can use it for whatever trust model you want, neither OpenPGP (the specs) nor GnuPG prescribe a certain model. It provides building blocks.

This is a huge 'nope'. It's, by this point, an uncontroversial, well-understood nope. A known-nope, if you will! The only people who don't seem to think so are PGP people and that, in itself, is rather telling.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Friday September 18, 2020 @01:22PM (#24519441)
You can't just "Nope" this issue. You need to come up with some sort of rational argument. The PGP people have been dealing with the data at rest issue since forever. It is a bit presumptuous to just write off all that acquired wisdom without reason.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:15PM (#24520066)
I have come up with a rational argument, you just refuse to address it at all. Your argument boils down to 'the PGP people are smarter than everyone else' which I think isn't really even a rational argument.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Saturday September 19, 2020 @10:46AM (#24527762)
There is no reason to appeal to authority here when a simple koan can provide enlightenment. I will repeat it one more time:

How do you do a downgrade attack on, say, an encrypted backup?

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Saturday September 19, 2020 @04:20PM (#24530082)
No. We've got a threadful of arguments here in which you simply refuse to engage. You don't get to superciliously demand Socratic satisfaction, wave around your list of logical fallacies and mumble oracularly about koans and enlightenment. You have to make an argument otherwise what you're doing is simply rude preening. It's fine if you have nothing to say. You don't get to (at least, publicly) pretend you've actually said anything and that it's everyone else who has to meet your precise terms of discussion. Sorry.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by upofadown on Saturday September 19, 2020 @07:47PM (#24531036)
This all started when you said something to the effect that "packet oriented formats" were bad. When asked to clarify you switched the topic to how flexibility in cryptography was bad because it could lead to downgrade attacks. I pointed out that downgrade attacks were not really possible in a data at rest application and that the article you linked to was about data in flight applications.

That's it. That's the actual arguments to this point. Then you just said nope.

You are not claiming that logic and facts are irrelevant here, are you?

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Sunday September 20, 2020 @01:27AM (#24532079)
you switched the topic to how flexibility in cryptography

I never said that. You're replying to someone else.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rakoo on Friday September 18, 2020 @05:28AM (#24514714)
Because flexibility brings bugs, and bugs in cryptography means breach of security.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by pvg on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:53PM (#24511817)
Because a flexible 'format' or 'model' or whatever with which you can construct insecure systems or (hypothetically) secure systems, is not really useful, it ends up being inherently insecure.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by AlexCoventry on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:23PM (#24511603)
> Moxie even openly argues against standards [x] and still calls himself an "anarchist".

On the face of it, that sounds like exactly the position an anarchist would take...

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rendx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:31PM (#24511660)
If you believe in abolishing hierarchy and institutions where they have no legitimacy, _all_ you are left with is communication, community, and open standardization as practiced in anarchist bodies such as the IETF.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by cwyers on Thursday September 17, 2020 @10:10PM (#24512238)
> anarchist bodies such as the IETF

That's an incredibly... unconventional read on the IETF.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by bjoli on Friday September 18, 2020 @12:56AM (#24513140)
Not really. I know very little about both anarchy and the IETF, but voluntary organisation (as in opposed to wage slavery) and a democratic governing of the group is very much in line with many anarchistic schools.

Edit: language fixes. English is not my language of choice for discussing things like this...

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by int_19h on Thursday September 17, 2020 @11:39PM (#24512736)
Anarchists would be philosophically opposed to top-down, mandated standards, not standards in general.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by mapgrep on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:25PM (#24511190)
Signal is great as an all in one solution if encrypted messaging is a hobby. It is also very good for mobile and encrypted occasional messages.

If you try to actually build a secure environment within a group that tries to maximize security while getting real work done you find you want to be encrypted by default at least with each other. Signal is pretty suboptimal for heavy volumes of messages. If you and I have three threads going they are all jumbled together. If I want to send to more than one person I have to whip out my phone and form a group and name it.

PGP is imperfect but with the right settings and defaults it is far better than having email default to clear text. And in any long term endeavor with more than a few people you will find you want email.

Signal is great for what it does. It is not designed to be a high volume working tool like email though.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by skyfaller on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:33PM (#24511238)
So you're saying that if you're building a professional secure environment, you don't need forward secrecy and it's ok to leak metadata? This doesn't make sense to me. The US gov't kills people based on metadata: https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/why-metadata-matters

It's not possible to make email secure, the flaws are on the protocol level. To fix it, you would need to change it until it is no longer email.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by mapgrep on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:37PM (#24511253)
I’m saying people will use email in any decent sized group over any significant length of time and it is very good to encrypt that email by default.

If you’re saying Signal is strictly more secure I agee 100%. It’s just not suitable for using for large amounts of comms within a group. I wish they’d improve it and have even detailed features I think they should add (I made an HN thread when they got that donation from the whatsapp guy).

For now it’s not realistic to expect people to know how to put ALL sensitive comms in Signal. You need to build an environment where as many channels as possible are secure by default. Setting everyone up with GPG and using it by default actually works in group settings and is much better than not doing it. The “just use Signal” meme is wrong. Because you can’t. Not at high volumes.

(Also, metadata is a lot less important in the context of a group that openly associates with one another as a great many do. It does suck that subject lines leak. But better to encrypt the message body than throw up hands and give up because no perfect substitute exists. One learns not to put much info into subject lines. You can always just not use them. Signal does not have them.)

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by skyfaller on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:55PM (#24511383)
What about Matrix/Element for heavier communications? It's at least encrypted by default now, although I haven't carefully studied their security otherwise.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by sudosysgen on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:03PM (#24511441)
Matrix is probably the only real alternative to email, I agree. Hopefully it becomes dominant.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by zajio1am on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:28PM (#24511634)
> and it's ok to leak metadata?

How could Signal (or other client-server protocol) not leak metadata? It is true that OpenPGP leaks more metadata than necessary (e.g. Subject), but seems to me that any efficient message protocol needs to leak at least three most important metadata - source, destination, time.

One could avoid leaking destination by broadcasting encrypted to many receivers (when only the true one can decrypt it) and therefore server does not need to know true destinations, but that is rather inefficient.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by skyfaller on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:37PM (#24511695)
Signal has been working on features like "sealed sender", which encrypts the source metadata: https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/

I don't know if they can do anything about destination or time, but even hiding the source seems like a significant advancement.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by JetSpiegel on Saturday September 19, 2020 @10:40PM (#24531590)
How does that even work? The only way to encrypt the sender is to send every (encrypted) message to everyone and let the clients drop the ones they can't encrypt. On a Phone. I hope they give out free batteries.

The post mentions some kind of "short-lived" pseudo-sender, which is vulnerable to the same metadata analysis.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by sobani on Monday September 21, 2020 @04:04AM (#24540917)
Encrypting the sender is pretty easy. Deliver the encrypted message+sender at the destination. Only the receiver will be able to decrypt it and see who the sender was.

Encrypting the receiver is a lot harder though. It will probably involve dropping off the message at some central location and some very fancy cryptography. Secure multi-party computation [0] will probably be involved. I don't know if it can be made scalable though.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by JetSpiegel on Monday September 21, 2020 @07:51PM (#24549601)
> Encrypting the sender is pretty easy. Deliver the encrypted message+sender at the destination.

That's the point. If the sender is encrypted, what's "the destination"? The IPv4 space? A random ID that represents the sender? How does that change the metadata angle?

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by sobani on Tuesday September 22, 2020 @03:58AM (#24552039)
If I deliver a bunch of bytes at [email protected] then that's the destination. Now you can decrypt it with your public key and get

`Have a nice day. Regards, sobani`

and see that I'm the sender.

If I'm worried about leaking my IP address, I can use something like Tor.

I'm confused why you think the sender needs to be known in any way to allow bytes to be delivered to your mail server.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rendx on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:36PM (#24511686)
Signal pumps all traffic across AWS infrastructure, where the simplest of all traffic analysis can deanonymize its users. Signal relies on phone numbers (for reasons), which again is not exactly the best "metadata" to carry around. If you look at the NSA material in the Snowden cache, it becomes clear that the whole "US kills based on metadata" is fed by piggybacking exactly on such systems, like deanonymization of simple VPNs and other "streams of data with simple proxies in between".

PGP can be used to encrypt headers such as Subject. Mail addresses can be temporary and pseudonymous much more easily than phone numbers. One could imagine building something like "Signal" on top of PGP and "email" that has all the "metadata hiding" properties of Signal, and more, e.g. by introducing delays and random relaying order on SMTP level.

Deltachat is an example of an open project in that space: https://delta.chat/

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by tptacek on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:48PM (#24512123)
Ah, the "sufficiently sophisticated PGP usage", where everyone uses ephemeral email accounts for each message, subjects are encrypted, nobody can reply plaintext, and nothing runs over an infrastructure that can be traffic-analyzed. That "Deltachat" doesn't accomplish this is besides the point, of course.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by jrochkind1 on Thursday September 17, 2020 @10:04PM (#24512219)
One can imagine all sorts of thing. Are you saying that you routinely send PGP email with Subject headers encrypted, using temporary mail addresses and pseudonyms? This is your routine email use, with a bunch of correspondents who do the same? Or, along with "random relay ordering on SMTP level", it's just something you're imagining? If you're saying the PGP use you imagine would be more secure than the Signal use that actually exists... I mean, I guess that's cool.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by dane-pgp on Friday September 18, 2020 @10:13PM (#24524264)
> If you're saying the PGP use you imagine would be more secure than the Signal use that actually exists...

To present an iron-man argument instead of a straw-man, imagine they were comparing Delta Chat to Signal, and pointing out that Delta Chat does encrypt subject headers[0], and that Signal users typically don't use temporary phone numbers (which are harder to obtain than temporary email addresses).

If you want, you could try comparing Signal's proprietary network versus the global SMTP network in terms of how secure they are against traffic timing analysis.

[0] https://delta.chat/en/help#how-does-delta-chat-protect-my-me...

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by lmm on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:00PM (#24511851)
If you're building a professional secure environment, forward secrecy is a tradeoff that you need to tune (and OpenPGP gives you the tools for doing so, viz. subkeys and expiration), you absolutely need federation, and identifying contacts by phone numbers (as Signal does) is a zillion times worse than leaking email headers.

It's not possible to make Signal secure, the flaws are on the protocol level. To fix it, you would need to change it until it is no longer Signal.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by jrochkind1 on Thursday September 17, 2020 @10:02PM (#24512211)
> it is far better than having email default to clear text

You have your email set up to "default" to PGP? Can you say more about what you mean by that?

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by dingaling on Friday September 18, 2020 @03:15AM (#24513860)
Your article seems to focus on individuals. Consider also organisations.

Transport-level security and authentication of email content is a perfectly valid use-case for an organisation when protection against third-party interference is desired. They don't need to worry about forward secrecy, they just need attachments to be transmitted in a legally-compliant manner.

For example each month HR email me my payslip as an encrypted attachment. I decrypt it and save locally. They just have a batch job that encrypts for each user and sends. They don't have to worry about who uses which IM client. They don't need to care if I self-host or use Gmail, because their ligation is simply to keep the information secure in transit.

You are also too keen to support Signal's use of phone numbers as identifiers. That's a design choice, instead of using client-managed identifiers, and makes it unsuitable for organisational use. Whose phone will we use to send the deposition to the court... and who in the court will have a phone with Signal on it? Email by contrast is universal and integrates well into organisational processes without dependency upon individuals.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by brnt on Friday September 18, 2020 @02:08AM (#24513448)
Autocrypt is the middle ground Thunderbird should have implemented (and which Enigmail used to offer). Email is here to stay, so encryption by default won't happen as long as the PGP standard is used as designed (trust levels and all). Autocrypt improves all that horrible UX, including secure key transfer or rotation, where you can keep doing your own key management if you wish, but you have to do nothing more than enable Autocrypt if you don't. It's a mystery why Mozilla didn't push this, seems a perfect fit for them to empower regular web users.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by mikro2nd on Friday September 18, 2020 @05:21AM (#24514677)
From what I've read, PGP for Thunderbird is just a first step. My guess is that they chose the easiest/quickest path for first implementation, but I think we'll see more facilitation of encrypted email in TBird in time.

This makes sense to me. I've been trying to get friends, family and colleagues to encrypt email (hell, even signing would be a step!) for about 3 decades, now, and have basically thrown in the towel. So anything that affords a small toe-hold to begin the painful process of building the necessary network effects for the idea of encrypted email to gain traction is a good thing.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by brnt on Saturday September 19, 2020 @03:27AM (#24525822)
The Autocrypt plugin was that toehold for me. Together with a mobile client like K9mail it works beautifully.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by uhtred on Friday September 18, 2020 @08:51AM (#24516032)
I don't know much about Signal, but who manages your private key? Who does the encrypting?

With PGP there is zero chance of anyone decrypting my data unless they have my key and password, which isn't uploaded anywhere and no apps have access to it.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by zajio1am on Thursday September 17, 2020 @08:38PM (#24511709)
That would make sense for people who consider privacy as single most important measure for communication system. That is not true for everybody. The advantage of OpenPGP is that it does not break any existing advantages of e-mail (except perhaps simplicity) so it is unequivocally better than unencrypted e-mail, while other protocols may have better encryption / privacy, but are worse in other measures.

For me, open-standard-ness and federated-ness are two measures that i consider even more important than cryptographic security. So communication protocol that does not satisfy either of these have little value to me, i would rather use e-mail.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by nialv7 on Friday September 18, 2020 @03:23AM (#24513911)
I find this kind of arguments ridiculous. Sure PGP is not perfect in all cases, but advocating not using it at all is like throwing away the baby with the bath water.

And personally, I think the points made it the linked article are weak.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by aborsy on Friday September 18, 2020 @05:00AM (#24514551)
Yeah. PGP doesn’t offer forward secrecy. Solution? Use Age!! which also has no forward secrecy!

Apps like ProtonMail or Tutanota may have an impact on encrypted email. If both sides use ProtonMail, communication is end to end secure. That’s also the case with encrypted messaging. In both cases, copying outside an incompatible platform may be insecure. At least, email address is more private than phone number.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by rakoo on Friday September 18, 2020 @05:39AM (#24514775)
> If both sides use ProtonMail, communication is end to end secure.

If both sides use [the same provider], it's not mail anymore, it's something internal. That is the fundamental issue of ProtonMail/Tutanota/any service provider that pretends to solve end-to-end encryption in email: without standards, it's a proprietary system. Today the only viable path towards easy E2E encryption in email is Autocrypt. AFAIK only Posteo is working towards including it.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by heavyset_go on Friday September 18, 2020 @12:14PM (#24518620)
Does Signal still require you to use your phone number to use it?