Edit: I'll expand the quote from the original thing a bit if it helps:
(Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format (and other specs), and GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it -- all of it. You can build something that hides metadata, you can have forward secrecy, and encryption always-on by default with PGP (and GnuPG). You can use it for whatever trust model you want, neither OpenPGP (the specs) nor GnuPG prescribe a certain model. It provides building blocks.
This is a huge 'nope'. It's, by this point, an uncontroversial, well-understood nope. A known-nope, if you will! The only people who don't seem to think so are PGP people and that, in itself, is rather telling.
How do you do a downgrade attack on, say, an encrypted backup?
That's it. That's the actual arguments to this point. Then you just said nope.
You are not claiming that logic and facts are irrelevant here, are you?
At the top of the thread someone says 'PGP has all this ancient cruft and also isn't good for email/email is maybe unsecurable anyway'. The PGP-enthusiast response to that is 'No problem! You see, PGP is so flexible, you can build anything out of it, including maybe an actually-secure system of some sort'.
This is a fundamentally inadequate response and we've realized it's inadequate and don't really design secure systems like that anymore. In fact, this class of concern has permeated almost all aspects of contemporary software systems design rather than being something narrowly limited to 'crypto algo agility is bad'. Here's an example/illustrative timeline that doesn't have anything to do with 'data at rest'.
1998 Netscape: Behold our cross-platform, cross-language super-toolkit for building super-extensible Enterprise Groupware apps. Also one of them is a web browser!
2015 Mozilla: [belated forehead slap] This is a terrible way to architect a web browser that has any hope of offering end-user security.