If you’re saying Signal is strictly more secure I agee 100%. It’s just not suitable for using for large amounts of comms within a group. I wish they’d improve it and have even detailed features I think they should add (I made an HN thread when they got that donation from the whatsapp guy).
For now it’s not realistic to expect people to know how to put ALL sensitive comms in Signal. You need to build an environment where as many channels as possible are secure by default. Setting everyone up with GPG and using it by default actually works in group settings and is much better than not doing it. The “just use Signal” meme is wrong. Because you can’t. Not at high volumes.
(Also, metadata is a lot less important in the context of a group that openly associates with one another as a great many do. It does suck that subject lines leak. But better to encrypt the message body than throw up hands and give up because no perfect substitute exists. One learns not to put much info into subject lines. You can always just not use them. Signal does not have them.)
How could Signal (or other client-server protocol) not leak metadata? It is true that OpenPGP leaks more metadata than necessary (e.g. Subject), but seems to me that any efficient message protocol needs to leak at least three most important metadata - source, destination, time.
One could avoid leaking destination by broadcasting encrypted to many receivers (when only the true one can decrypt it) and therefore server does not need to know true destinations, but that is rather inefficient.
I don't know if they can do anything about destination or time, but even hiding the source seems like a significant advancement.
The post mentions some kind of "short-lived" pseudo-sender, which is vulnerable to the same metadata analysis.
Encrypting the receiver is a lot harder though. It will probably involve dropping off the message at some central location and some very fancy cryptography. Secure multi-party computation [0] will probably be involved. I don't know if it can be made scalable though.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation
That's the point. If the sender is encrypted, what's "the destination"? The IPv4 space? A random ID that represents the sender? How does that change the metadata angle?
`Have a nice day. Regards, sobani`
and see that I'm the sender.
If I'm worried about leaking my IP address, I can use something like Tor.
I'm confused why you think the sender needs to be known in any way to allow bytes to be delivered to your mail server.
PGP can be used to encrypt headers such as Subject. Mail addresses can be temporary and pseudonymous much more easily than phone numbers. One could imagine building something like "Signal" on top of PGP and "email" that has all the "metadata hiding" properties of Signal, and more, e.g. by introducing delays and random relaying order on SMTP level.
Deltachat is an example of an open project in that space: https://delta.chat/
To present an iron-man argument instead of a straw-man, imagine they were comparing Delta Chat to Signal, and pointing out that Delta Chat does encrypt subject headers[0], and that Signal users typically don't use temporary phone numbers (which are harder to obtain than temporary email addresses).
If you want, you could try comparing Signal's proprietary network versus the global SMTP network in terms of how secure they are against traffic timing analysis.
[0] https://delta.chat/en/help#how-does-delta-chat-protect-my-me...
It's not possible to make Signal secure, the flaws are on the protocol level. To fix it, you would need to change it until it is no longer Signal.
It's not possible to make email secure, the flaws are on the protocol level. To fix it, you would need to change it until it is no longer email.