I don't know if they can do anything about destination or time, but even hiding the source seems like a significant advancement.
The post mentions some kind of "short-lived" pseudo-sender, which is vulnerable to the same metadata analysis.
Encrypting the receiver is a lot harder though. It will probably involve dropping off the message at some central location and some very fancy cryptography. Secure multi-party computation [0] will probably be involved. I don't know if it can be made scalable though.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation
That's the point. If the sender is encrypted, what's "the destination"? The IPv4 space? A random ID that represents the sender? How does that change the metadata angle?
`Have a nice day. Regards, sobani`
and see that I'm the sender.
If I'm worried about leaking my IP address, I can use something like Tor.
I'm confused why you think the sender needs to be known in any way to allow bytes to be delivered to your mail server.
How could Signal (or other client-server protocol) not leak metadata? It is true that OpenPGP leaks more metadata than necessary (e.g. Subject), but seems to me that any efficient message protocol needs to leak at least three most important metadata - source, destination, time.
One could avoid leaking destination by broadcasting encrypted to many receivers (when only the true one can decrypt it) and therefore server does not need to know true destinations, but that is rather inefficient.